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THE
ŚRĪKARA BHĀSHYA

HIS HIGHNESS
SRI KRISHNARAJA WADIYAR BAHADUR, G.C.S.I., G.B.E.
MAHARAJA OF MYSORE

THE
ŚRĪKARA BHĀSHYA

BEING THE VÎRASAIVA COMMENTARY ON
THE VÉDÁNTA-SÛTRAS
BY SRÎPATI

EDITED BY
C. HAYAVADANA RAO

VOL. I
INTRODUCTION

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TO

HIS HIGHNESS
SRI KRISHNARAJA WADIYAR BAHADUR,
G.C.S.I., G.B.E.
MAHARAJA OF MYSORE

THIS ANCIENT WORK IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED WITH
HIS HIGHNESS'S GRACIOUS PERMISSION

BY

HIS LOYAL AND DUTIFUL SUBJECT

K. P. PUTTANNA CHETTY
PRESIDENT, MYSORE LINGAYAT EDUCATION FUND ASSOCIATION

IN ADMIRATION OF HIS HIGHNESS'S ABIDING INTEREST IN THE
ADVANCEMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES IN INDIA

BANGALORE,
18th June 1936.

" There are two ways of approaching a great philosopher. The one way is to study his precise teaching, setting it into relation with his age and with his contemporaries and immediate predecessors. I have the greatest admiration for those who perform this work of scholarship, which is the only satisfactory and respectful method of understanding a philosopher, requiring, as it does, both historical research and the most sympathetic philosophical insight. · · · · · · The other and easier method (is) of inquiring what a philosopher can teach us in our present problems." —S. ALEXANDER, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A., *Hon. Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford, and Professor of Philosophy in the University of Manchester.*

PREFACE.

THOUGH the existence of Srīpatipaṇḍitāchārya's *Bhāshya* on the *Vēdānta-Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa has been long known, it has not so far been available in print. An incomplete Telugu edition was published many years ago but this is the first time the whole text is offered in the Dēvanāgari script. The circumstances under which this edition has been undertaken have been set out at some length in the Introduction that follows and it is needless, therefore, to say anything further on that head here, except to state that it is entirely due to the public spirit and liberality evinced by the Mysore Lingayet Education Fund Association that it has at all been possible.

The publication of a work of this kind, a well-known commentary on the *Vēdānta-Sūtras*, raises the question whether there is any utility in making ancient works of this kind available to the general public. The criticism has been offered suggesting that there are systems of philosophy which though they have not yet passed away, still "drag on their barren life, a fixed monotony of centuries" and the specific instances offered are "the schools of Brahmans and Buddhists and Confucians, who have drained off the life-giving words of their ancient masters into labyrinthine canals and stagnant pools. There in the overteemed East is the limbo of unchangeable systems preserved from the fertilizing breath of change by a universal inertia."[1] That the East has been prolific in producing systems of thought may be admitted, but the suggestion that the systems have proved "stagnant" or have been overtaken by "inertia" cannot, perhaps, be easily demonstrated. Faint echoes of the criticism above referred to have been heard now and again, repeated or reflected, in the remark[2] that commentators in India have been content to build up their own systems of thought, profound though they be, "only as appendages to the *Vēdas* and *Upanishads*". Remarks like these miss the main point that the *Vēdas* and *Upanishads* enshrine philosophical thoughts far too fecund to be allowed to rust away. They simply refuse to die. Philosophy is yet philosophy whether it is found in the *Vēdas* or in the *Upanishads* or even in the mathematical formulæ in which Spinoza, of all modern philosophers, set it. Philosophy, whether in the East or in the West, has emerged from religion as often as it has entangled itself in its meshes, and the intermingling is not to be regretted if it has helped in the elucidation of truth. Nothing better brings out the justice of this observation than the lines on which Western philosophy itself has developed. To take but one instance, the case of Spinoza, who, perhaps, has most influenced European philosophical and even political thought in modern times. How much of his system, if a system it be, he owed to his Rabbinical masters, how much to the Neo-Platonists and through them to earlier Hindu thinkers and how much again to Descartes? Then, again, how much did the Christian Platonists of Alexandria and St. Augustine annex of the grand philosophy of religion built up by Plato and Aristotle, and Plotinus, Proclus and the rest of the Neo-Platonists during a period which covered some eight centuries of human thought? And how much of St. Thomas Aquinas is based on the later Platonists? And how much Neo-Platonism itself, as a system of philosophy, which tried to resolve the absolute or God into the incarnation thereof in the Logos, or reason of man, and which aimed at demonstrating the graduated transition from the absolute object to the personality of man, a concretion of European and Hindu philosophy and religion so-called? If philosophy is the science of religions or things in general, if it is properly an attempt to find the absolute in the contingent, the universal in the particular, the eternal in the temporal, the real in the phenomenal, the ideal in the real, or in other words, if it is to discover, as one interprets it, the single principle that possesses within itself the capability of transition into all existent variety and varieties, which it presupposes can be done not by induction from the transient, but by deduction from the permanent as that spiritually reveals itself in the creating mind, then the philosopher should be a man, to adopt the words of Goethe, who stations himself "in the middle (between the outer and the inner, the upper and the lower), to whom the Highest has descended and the Lowest mounted up, who is the equal and kindly brother of all." Philosophy passes the borderland as often as not of religion in its speculations. And if religion is a craving after responsibility to a Higher Power; a mode of thinking, acting and striving after God; or determining one's spiritual relationship to the unseen World; then philosophy needs must do this. Nor is philosophy mere Science either; it is something more than Science. If Science has for its province the world of phenomena, and deals exclusively with their relations, consequences and sequences; if it can never tell us what a thing really and intrinsically is, but only why it has become so; and if it can only, in other words, refer us to one inscrutable as the ground and explanation of another inscrutable, then philosophy has a function to fulfil and a rôle to play. Where Science is silent, there steps in Philosophy. No wonder it has been described as "divine wisdom" instilled into and inspiring a thinker's life, irrespective of the sources from which the inspiration is drawn. Religion and philosophy cannot be kept in watertight compartments any more than religion and science can be to-day.[2] If men of science can invade philosophy and professing metaphysicians adopt the scientific methods and modes, there is no reason why religion and philosophy should stand divorced from each other, though they should normally function in their respective domains.

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[1] Sir Frederick Pollock, *Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy* (1899), 80.

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[2] Presidential Address at the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1930. See in this connection Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, I. 63. A similar charge of sterility can be preferred against contemporary Western philosophy. "The scoffer may pretend," remarks Professor Wolf, after offering an account of recent and contemporary philosophy, "that all these philosophies are little more than the reminiscences of the thought of past ages. He may take to pieces all these philosophical tapestries (from Haeckel to Smuts, ranging from 1834 to 1934) and show that they are mainly a patchwork of scraps derived from Heraclitus or Parmenides, Plato or Aristotle, Descartes or Spinoza, Locke or Liebniz, Kant or Hegel, Schelling or Schopenhauer. And he may reiterate the oft-repeated charge that there is no progress in philosophy. Such disparagement, however, would be unwarranted, even if we admit some of the points on which it professes to be based. After all, the whole history of civilization is so short that it has been described as a 'provincial episode' when measured in terms of terrestrial time, to say nothing of cosmic time. And of this 'provincial episode', the whole history of philosophy is but a single aspect, which only emerged about twenty-five centuries ago and has been more or less smothered more than half the time. Moreover, the problems of philosophy are peculiarly difficult to answer in a manner that may command general consent. For they do not lend themselves to the kind of empirical verification which secures something like general agreement in the sciences. In fact, as soon as any group of problems becomes amenable to empirical verification, it forsakes its parental philosophic home, and sets up as a separate science. In this way, philosophy always remains the limbo of highly speculative questions, which it is very difficult to answer satisfactorily, but which most intelligent persons find it equally difficult to suppress. And since times do change and we change with them, each age needs at least a re-statement of old problems and old solutions in terms best adapted to its own habits of thought or speech. An excessive straining after originality, or the appearance of originality, may do more harm than good. A knowledge of the history of one's subject is probably a universal requisite, but especially so in the case of philosophy. For of philosophy it is particularly true that all history is contemporary history." (A. Wolf in *An Outline on Modern Knowledge*, Chapter XIII, on *Recent and Contemporary Philosophy*, 589.) What Professor Wolf says in regard to modern Western philosophy may, *ipsissima verba*, be said of Indian philosophy.

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[2] "All good moral philosophy, as was said, is but a handmaid to religion."—Francis Bacon, in *Proficience and Advancement of Learning*, Book II.

"Religion is the elder sister of philosophy."—W. S. Landor, *Imaginary Conversations* (*David Hume and John Hume*).

Keats claimed much more for philosophy. He sang:—

"Philosophy will clip an Angel's wings,
Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,
Empty the haunted air, the gnomed mine,
Unweave a rainbow."

—Keats, *Lumia*, *II.*

What is important is that the method pursued should be scientific, for philosophy is a science, if not, indeed, as Bacon has it, the great mother of sciences. There is no need to-day to elaborate this point. But it is necessary to stress the fact that the synthesis offered by Bādarāyaṇa is not only a scientifically drawn up one but has for its essence a system

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Schopenhauer went to the other extreme and said, " Philosophy is not science but an art "—if so, it must be held to be an art based on principles. Otherwise, reasoning which fills so large a space in philosophy would be without any justification and philosophy entirely restricted to an emotional something which can neither be proved nor disproved.

" There is a sharp line of demarcation separating religion and philosophy. The goal of religion is salvation and that of philosophy is truth. Yet even the most abstract type of philosophy contains a religious element, and the greater its development the faster its expansion."—Melamed in *Spinoza and Buddha*, Introduction, page 19.

Professor A. Wolf has recently remarked that " one of the most interesting features of recent and contemporary philosophy is the renewed co-operation between men of science and philosophers ". After warning against the possible " dangers " of a hasty swing of the scientific pendulum, he refers to the " dangers " lurking in " the unusually friendly relationship which is loudly proclaimed to exist now between Science and the Churches ". He suggests that " philosophy will be in a healthier condition when it has entirely ceased to be a handmaid to theology, and pursues its cosmic problems as independently as possible of vested interests " (*loc. cit.*, 589-592).

An absolute divorce between Philosophy and Theology is suggested by Bertrand Russell when he says : " Philosophy cannot itself determine the end of life, but it can free us from the tyranny of prejudice and from distortions due to a narrow view."

Pierre Boyle (1647-1706), author of the famous *Dictionnaire Historique et Critique*, maintains the impossibility of reconciling faith with reason.

of thought which has for its sheet-anchor scientific thinking. His method is strictly scientific. By the term "method" is meant the path by which we arrive at a certain goal; a conscious and orderly way of doing something; a way of planning, organising and ordering one's research and thought. In the West, this problem of "method" was fought and settled, so far as natural science is concerned, some three hundred years ago, after the pioneering of Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Boyle and others, and the settlement provided a basis on which the enormous scientific advances of ensuing centuries became possible. In social science, no such basic method yet exists. "Method" implies understanding and control. Looseness of thought and language are incompatible with it. If we understand Bādarāyaṇa aright, entirely from the mould into which he has cast his *Sūtras*, we have to postulate that to him "method" seemed all-important; for without it, he could not have controlled the seeming contrariety of thought that had come to prevail in the interpretation of Vēdic and Upanishadic texts and the anarchy, as it were, that had been introduced by different schools of thought (*shākhas*) in matters affecting the vital problems of the *Brahman* and the *ātman*. That many such schools existed and had their own separate text-books which had been handed down orally from teacher to pupil for countless generations, seems not open to any doubt. A crisis had evidently been reached in philosophical thought and the necessity of controlling interpretation had become obvious. Hence the rigidly scientific manner in which Bādarāyaṇa applies his mind to the method of *samanvaya*. Where all the texts should be given credence, scientific method, the method by which agreement can be reached, becomes all-important. He begins to question, not only texts in particular, but also the doctrines educed from them by different schools. He seeks, in a word, a basic understanding, so that chaos which was claiming mastery in the philosophical domain, may be put out of court. In the dialectics employed by him, we see he uses rules and modes of reasoning which help to clarify the philosophical standpoint he wishes to vindicate and lay down in authoritative fashion. The doctrine of *samanvaya*, which is the science and art of co-ordination, of re-interpretation of mutually opposing texts, and of educing the highest Truth from a consideration of the fundamental teachings of all Vēdāntic declarations considered collectively, receives in his hands a supremacy that is undisputed. It is no exaggeration to say that of all teachers of ancient times in India, he alone attempts the scientific and methodical approach to the study of Vēdic and Upanishadic texts in all their aspects and thus places the method of study itself on a pedestal that is from every point of view unassailable. The actual effect of this methodology was the restoration of order in place of chaos: those who came under its mighty influence, tried to keep to it, with the result that thinking was rationalized and kept within the bounds of reason instead of running to waste. The principle of *samanvaya* still holds the ground and if anything, has had extended scope given to it. Infallibility and unalterability ceased to be drags on philosophy with its increasing application. Philosophy, indeed, came into its own; it, in fact, came to be something more than a mere intellectual creed or a comforting belief. And its effect on religion was that it came to be regarded as something more than a mere system of ritual. It might, indeed, be claimed that Bādarāyaṇa's method revolutionized philosophical speculation in this country, inasmuch as it found a place under its wide wings not only for the spiritual teachers who stuck to the old order of thinking but also for those seers and seekers after the truth who, while obviously outside the purview of the current schools of thought, had still reckoned themselves to be within their pale by reason of the broadening of the base of philosophical reasoning initiated by him. Intellectualism, cured of its narrow and mechanical outlook, helped to be less destructive than it would otherwise have been. Under the dominating influence of Bādarāyaṇa's method, we have one all-embracing scientific standpoint, owing allegiance to that which is highest and most exalted in Upanishadic speculation, to which all schools of thought owe obedience and respect and from which they derive their main sources of inspiration. The unification in method that has resulted has not impeded diversity in thinking, while it has helped to avoid the rise of a number of warring schools differing in their aims and working exclusively by themselves and endeavouring to exclude one another. The differing schools, as they exist to-day, owe a common allegiance to Bādarāyaṇa, as much because they follow his method of reasoning as for the fact that they have to argue and co-ordinate thought on the basis laid down by him. In him they find a common meeting point and through his method they are making their own contribution to the building up of a philosophical system which can be rightly termed universal. The texts of the *Vēdas* and the *Upanishads* are there; the doctrines and theories are there imbedded in them; it is only the method of co-ordinating them and interpreting them that is new. Bādarāyaṇa's great contribution is that he introduces a new method, a new manner of reading the texts, and a new way of interpreting them. With the march of time, changes in view-points should naturally vary. What satisfied one could not satisfy another. The highest expression of any philosophical truth at any given time cannot but be the expression of the highest philosophical consciousness of that time. If that be so, while the older formulæ may be retained, the frank recognition is inevitable that they are out of date in certain respects and that they ought to be re-interpreted in such a manner as will bring them into conformity with the highest philosophical consciousness of our own time. Bādarāyaṇa's perception and avowal of this fact is what makes him great in the Indian philosophical field. That is the very reason that we find no complaint against him for the departure he makes. On the other hand, there is a singular unanimity of opinion that his method is the right one and that is the reason why it has won universal approval among his successors. The fact of the matter is that as with Bādarāyaṇa, so with us, the measure of our light is always far in excess of the measure of our obedience, though this is never explicity proclaimed and all the time the legal fiction prevails that no change has been made in the position. It is thus that Bādarāyaṇa's method has helped to introduce scientific order and research in the study and interpretation of the *Vēdas* and the *Upanishads.* With its aid, the conclusions of the past are being continuously brought into line with the findings of the present with the result that philosophy has never languished in this country, as the rise of the successive schools of thought bears eloquent witness to; in fact, it has contributed to the building of these living schools of thought, which, whatever may be their defects, have never agreed that the principle of scientific thinking can be set aside with impunity. It is this principle too that has helped to give universality and catholicity to Upanishadic views in the world of to-day.

The *Sūtras* are there to elucidate Bādarāyaṇa's position; for even without the commentators who have, each in his own way and from his own point of view, endeavoured to make known to us what they consider to be his views and opinions, there is enough in them to prove that the attitude assumed by him is demonstrably scientific. And that attitude is one that could only be postulated of one who is strictly scientific in his method. Bādarāyaṇa provides, in brief, an epitome of the *Upanishad* doctrine in his work, which accordingly becomes the foundation of the later *Vēdānta.* He shows that Brahman is the first principle of the universe; he proves this by *Samanvaya, i.e.,* "from the agreement" of the *Upanishad* texts (I. 1. 4); and he proclaims the fundamental proposition that "all the texts of the *Vēdānta* deserve credence", *sarva-vēdānta pratyayam* (III. 3. 1). To Bādarāyaṇa, the *Vēdas* may be supernatural in origin and he may be held to construct his entire doctrine from them, but it is undoubted that where the meaning of a text is doubtful, he does not hesitate to call in the aid of experience to settle the sense. Inspiration and revelation give way to reason and ratiocination.[4] One who is in search of the first principle of the universe cannot well avoid being fundamentally scientific in his outlook. It was so with Parmanides; it was so with Plato; and it cannot well be otherwise with Bādarāyaṇa, who is out to prove that the first principle of the universe is Brahman. The impression he has left on generations of scholars who have read and interpreted him has been this and there is no fear that generations of scholars yet unborn will not be impressed by the self-same fact. He throughout stresses reason rather than authority, re-interpretation rather than the blind acceptance of ancient views because they are ancient and scientific synthesis rather than a conglomerate of what seem mutually destructive texts. The *Sūtras*, indeed, challenge with scientific precision the validity of what appear to have been popular concepts that were still—in Bādarāyaṇa's time—the source of dangerous confusion to men, even to men learned in the *Vēdas* and the *Upanishads*. To those trained in the exact sciences and bred up in the atmosphere of the law, where rules of interpretation demand an exactitude in their application that could only be associated with a scientifically trained mind, a study of the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa generates the feeling that they are dealing with a philosopher whose first and last concerns are scientific thinking and scientific method. He was a master in his line; he was that because his knowledge was profound and supreme. His intellectual eminence seems unquestionable from the evidence afforded by the *Sūtras* themselves, quite apart

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[4] In this he followed, as a Mīmāmsa teacher, the Mīmāmsa rule of interpretation which lays down that when two texts differ,

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reason must be allowed to prevail in practice. (*Yagnavalkya*, II. 21). Manu also stresses reason as the final source of authority. Where no authority is available, Manu says that *ātma-tushti*, that which is in consonance with the reason of the virtuous, shall be allowed to prevail. According to the commentators, reason should prevail not only where a case cannot be decided by any other authority but also in cases where an option is allowed. Manu, indeed, sets down a high place to reason when he lays down the law: "Let him adopt the course of action which is deemed right by pure reason" (*Manu*, VI. 46).

from the form in which they are cast. He reduced his knowledge pertaining to their subject-matter to a system; arranged it and systematised it; and gave it out with full regard to its due bearings and connections. If one who does that cannot be described as possessing a scientific mind and if the method pursued by one such cannot be described as scientific, it is impossible to see who else and what else can be so described. It may be that to some the *Sūtras*—all *Sūtra* literature is like that—seem "conundrums" but that is a different matter. To those who have had the requisite training to understand them and to follow them in the manner they should be—and all sciences require training to understand and follow them—there can be no question that they bear ample testimony to the greatness of Bādarāyaṇa as a philosopher. To his philosophic mind, no circumstance, however trifling, was too minute. It was allowed its due weight and if rejected, rejected for right reasons. In him, the art of *Sūtra* making reaches its high water-mark, the very climax of perfection. That is so because his mind was clear; his method perfect; and his matter of supreme value. If any one can be named as deserving of the special title, in the whole Indian field of philosophy, of a master-mind, there is hardly any doubt his name would be the first to be mentioned. And if any one deserved the name of philosopher, it would undoubtedly be he—for he tries in one large sweep, as it were, to account for all the phenomena of the universe by a reference to ultimate causes. There is no system of thought, no school of metaphysics, and no department of theoretical knowledge known in his time that is not laid under contribution by him in the making up of his *Sūtras*. If philosophy is the science of all known sciences and if a philosopher is one who subordinates his mind to the strict discipline of scientific principles of thinking and enunciation of matter, the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa enshrine such a philosophy and Bādarāyaṇa himself—whether he wrote the *Sūtras* himself or inspired a school of his own to do it, it does not really the doctrines and theories selected by him as fundamental to the position assumed by him—for he has by no means exhausted all, though he has hinted at most of them and dealt only with those which are really primal in character—and the varied but suggestive argumentation, producing conviction now by starting from causes, now by going back to facts, and now again by referring to texts, but always unassailable, irrefutable, exact and scientific in spirit. He is almost mathematical in his thought, in fact Euclidean in his method. What shall we mention as his special merit—his faculty for constant co-ordination, economy, orderliness, or the force with which he establishes every point? If one adds to or takes from it, he will recognize that he departs thereby from science, thus tending towards error. What is most difficult in each science is to choose and dispose in suitable order the elements from which all the rest may be derived. Whatever the case with others, Bādarāyaṇa has neither increased his first principles nor diminished them; neither has he abridged his proofs nor has he enlarged them indefinitely. In a treatise of the kind contemplated by him—convenient, catchy, topically arranged texts, easy of remembrance as Euclid's definitions, postulates and axioms—it was necessary to avoid everything superfluous, to combine everything that might be deemed essential, to consider principally, clearly and briefly all that might be held fundamental, to give propositions their most general form for, as a teacher, he should have realized that the detail of teaching particular cases only makes the acquisition of knowledge more difficult. Bādarāyaṇa's purpose in composing his *Sūtras* cannot have been, by any means, the writing of an encyclopædia of philosophy, which was obviously impossible in the limits he set to himself, but rather to offer to mature thinkers an introduction to the study of the method of reasoning to be adopted generally in regard to the interpretation of texts of the *Upanishads*, which, in its turn, was to prove a necessary preparation for the science of Brahman as worked out in them. Hence the particular emphasis Bādarāyaṇa lays on formal and logical method as well as the deliberate omission, except by implication, of all practical applications. He has, indeed, helped towards the construction of a logic (*Brahma-tarkaḥ*) which has proved the best conceivable method of effective inquiry. On an analysis, it would be found to be one which, without breach of continuity, can be applied as much to belief on the one hand as to metaphysics on the other. He primarily aims at the flawless logical derivation of all philosophical propositions from premises stated in advance. Making necessary allowance for undoubted and, in some cases, serious uncertainty of text, it might be broadly remarked that the great historical significance of Bādarāyaṇa's *Sūtras* consists in the fact that through them the ideal of a flawless logical treatment of Upanishadic texts was first attempted to be transmitted to future times. As to the manner in which Bādarāyaṇa executed his work, it must be admitted that it is throughout well done, though from our modern standpoint we may think that too much is expected from the student. But we should remember it was not intended for the beginner but for the mature student of the *Upanishads*. It presumes a close knowledge of and a constant reference to the *Vēdas*, the *Upanishads*, the *Pūrvamīmāmsa*, the whole of the *Sūtra* literature generally, including the *Āpastamba*, the *Gautama* and the *Nyāya Sūtras*, the *Smritis* generally, including *Manu* and *Yāgnavalkya*, and the *Purāṇas*, including the *Vishṇu-Purāṇa*, and the epics, including the doctrines familiarized later by the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, *Pāṇini*, etc. Details of importance are accordingly omitted, and the uncertainties of the text render more difficult in some places the intentions of Bādarāyaṇa. But the whole development of ideas is natural, easy and impressive to a degree and makes understanding of the view-point assumed possible, which would have been infinitely more difficult in other circumstances. This is so because Bādarāyaṇa had before him in one conspectus, as it were, the whole position envisaged by him, from first to last. But it must be confessed, though such a confession cannot mean any reflection on the author of the *Sūtras*, that his great emphasis on the logical renders it difficult to understand the subject-matter as a whole, and its internal relations, especially to one who has not had the requisite previous training in the study of the *Upanishads*.

The *Sūtras* will remain for all time the best and if one may assert without claiming over much for them, the only perfect model of logical exactness of principles and of rigorous development of propositions. The science of Brahman as developed by Bādarāyaṇa in his *Sūtras* may be capable of endless disputation as to what it connotes—that depends on our interpreter—but it cannot be improved upon from the point of view of the technique from which it is built up. If one would like to see how such a science can be constructed and developed to its highest stage from an extremely limited number of simple definitions and propositions, by means of rigorous syllogism, which at no time seeks any aid except what is derivable from the *Upanishads* and one's own reasoning faculty, one must turn to Bādarāyaṇa's *Sūtras*. Their universally admired perfection must be set down by the philosophical historian as the natural result of a long criticism which was developed in the constructive period of Indian philosophy ranging from the Vēdic sages to Kapila, to whom the Sānkhya system is attributed. Bādarāyaṇa's method of reasoning has, since his time, left its permanent impress on his successors. After him, began a series of great commentators, who have fully illustrated, despite the differences between them, the real significance of the illustrious Teacher's methods and principles, by means of which they themselves tried to interpret and conquer the paradoxes concerning the Brahman. The fact that there has been no synthetic movement in the domain of Upanishadic philosophy since his time suggests the obvious inference that Bādarāyaṇa has not been exhausted by his commentators and commentators on commentators. The make-up of the *Sūtras* has, however, been vigorously assailed by modern Western critics, or rather by critics trained in the Western school of thought. To say that he is "amibguous" or that he is unintelligible, cryptic or difficult is to confess lack of understanding on our own part. The merit of a *Sūtra* is its flexibility; it should be capable of interpretation and re-interpretation. Where metaphysical speculation is active, no philosophical conception can remain stationary. If it was capable of growth, it was transformed and allowed to grow. This process of re-interpretation was rendered possible in India because of the succession of great seers and philosophers who dominated its life since the Vēdic days. The process went on as much, indeed, on the Hindu legal and ritual sides as on the philosophical. No school of thought which makes this right of re-interpretation impossible can hope to survive, much less prove a leader in philosophical speculation. Without it, intellectual growth is impossible; and every limiting of it means the crippling of philosophical development and restricting the study of philosophy to mediocres and traditionalists, which means the ultimate barring of the growth of ideas. On the other hand, if the function of re-interpretation is clearly understood, then the difficulty of understanding the *Sūtras* will largely vanish. The many-sidedness (*viśvatō mukhaḥ*) that is stressed as one of the prime characteristics of a *Sūtra* means no more than that it should afford full scope for interpretation—scientific, consistent and co-ordinated and not arbitrary, meaningless and self-destructive.

Both the *Pūrva* and *Uttara Mīmāmsas* deal primarily with the principles of interpretation, which evidently had long been in vogue. Jaimini, the reputed author of the *Pūrva Mīmāmsa*, is mentioned by Bādarāyaṇa, while Bādarāyaṇa is himself mentioned by Jaimini. They probably were contemporaries (third century B.C.). Jaimini set down the rules of interpretation to be followed in regard to ritual, while Bādarāyaṇa laid down those that should regulate the interpretation of conflicting Upanishadic texts. That Jaimini's methodology was capable of a wider application, as much in the ritual as in the philosophical region, was demonstrated by Bādarāyaṇa. The method itself was much older than Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, being traceable to the *Brāhmaṇas* but these, among others,[7] perfected it and set them down in their respective domains in authoritative fashion. In Bādarāyaṇa's hands, the method, perhaps, attained its widest scope and highest perfection, dealing as it did with philosophical speculations enshrined in the *Āraṇyakas* and the *Upanishads*.

It was said of Plato that philosophy did not find him noble, it made him so. In the case of Bādarāyaṇa, it may be said that philosophy found him noble and left him nobler. It was not the path of the passions which led him to philosophy but the patient search after Truth. And that pursuit led him to a conception of Truth which was all-embracing. And if he taught by his example, he but illustrated the great saying that the true Teacher does not teach but only tells. And what is Philosophy to him as gleaned from the *Sūtras* which bear his name? To him, in his calm and serene light, philosophy is not doubt. It is positive, provable and proved knowledge. It is to him a body of methodized essential Truth, whose single aim is the absolute understanding of the Self and its place in the universe—the very highest it is or can attain to. To vary the language, philosophy is to him as thorough a knowledge as can be acquired of man and his nature, his genesis and environment, and his relationship to what surrounds him and to what is above and beyond him. It is, however, something more than mere moral duty done or religious sanction obeyed. It is the perfect life; for, in the perfected understanding which to him is philosophy, he suggests is the only possible satisfaction of human nature. "Know Brahman—Become Brahman."[8]

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[7] Bādari and Ātrēya, for instance, are mentioned both by Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa in their respective *Sūtras*. Labukāyana, Aitasāyana, etc., are others named by Jaimini.

[8] *Cf.* texts of the *Upanishads* like the following which are the staple food of commentators on Bādarāyaṇa:—"*Brahmavidāpnōti param*"; "*Tamēvam viditvā atimrutyumēti*"; "*Brahmavēda Brahmaiva bhavati*"; "*Yadā paśyaḥ paśyatē rugmavarṇam*"; "*Manō Brahmētyupāsita*", etc., which may be rendered thus: "He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest"; "Having known Him thus

That is the way to perfect life. This theory of philosophy which makes complete knowledge the ideal life, is developed by him in the *Sūtras* as the direct result of his personal experience. The tone that dominates the *Sūtras* shows that they are the work of a person who has passed through the stress of the struggle indicated in them—of choosing between opposing views, of weeding out rejected opinions and of selecting approved doctrines—and attained peace.

And here Bādarāyaṇa touches on the kernel of the problem of Truth. Philosophy had made great progress since the days of the *Vēdas* and the *Upanishads*. The Vēdic speculations—as found in the latest hymns of the *Rig-Vēda* and in the *Atharva-Vēda*—on the origin of the world and on the eternal principle by which it is created and sustained, had undergone great change under the influence of philosophical ideas. The cosmogonic legends of the *Yajur-Vēda*—describing how the creator brings into being all things by means of the omnipotent sacrifice—had also been deeply affected by the philosophic thinking that is enshrined for us in the earlier *Upanishads*. The idealistic turn that philosophy took in both the later hymns of the *Vēdas* and in the earlier *Upanishads* was not, however, left undisputed. Beside it grew an empirical school, which about 600 B.C., threw out the two great religious systems of Buddhism and Jainism, which though offshoots of Upanishadic thought, were still independent in their outlook. The *Upanishads* thus gave scope for different schools of thinking with the result that a number of them, which in later times theorists included under the well-known nine systems of thought, had come into existence at least as early as the sixth century B.C. The chaos that had been introduced into the Upanishadic philosophy may thus be imagined until Bādarāyaṇa, three centuries later, tried

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he passes beyond Death" ; " He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman" ; " He who knows this shines, warms" ; "Let him meditate on mind as Brahman," etc., etc. (*Taitt. Upa.*, I. 1. ; *Śvēta. Upa.*, III. 8 ; *Mund. Upa.*, III. 2. 9 ; *Ibid.*, III. 1. 3 ; *Chch. Upa.*, III. 18. 1, etc.)

to restore order into it. Another three more centuries were required to systematise the resultant teachings in manuals which to-day remain the main repositories of their doctrines. The contrast between the Vēdic times, which believed in an universe full of gods and mythical forms and the *Sankhya*, which postulates the absolute distinction between soul and matter and the twin systems of Vaisēshika and Nyāya which explain the origin of the world from atoms shows vividly the gulf that separated the earlier from the later thought. The spirit of free inquiry, however, was not by any means confined only to the schools of philosophers; there is reason to believe that teachers like Buddha and Mahāvīra tried to extend it to the masses by the zeal they displayed in the propagation of their ideas. This was inevitable, especially as views of life and religion are deepened and broadened by criticism, reflection and re-thinking. The zeal for critical investigation was, if the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa are evidence of anything, intense, and extended to metaphysical problems of every kind, including those concerning life hereafter. The coming of philosophy foreshadowed in the Vēdic theogonies and cosmogonies was fully realized. In the systems of philosophy associated with the names of Mahāvīra and Buddha, the tendency to independent thinking receives its fullest development. The conscious effort is made to understand the meaning of the cosmos; system after system is offered to clear up the riddle of the universe; many are the metaphysicians—some mentioned by Bādarāyaṇa himself—who tried to solve the mysteries of being and becoming; the chief objects of interest were what is man, what is his place in nature and what becomes of him. Teacher after teacher tried to reach definite conclusions on these great questions which have eternally agitated this mundane world by conclusions reached in the metaphysical region. The age—sixth to third century B.C.—was undoubtedly one of enlightenment. It developed individualism. Authority was at a discount. The critical habit of mind, indeed, tended, with the undoubted good it did, to end in intellectual sterility, if not, in practical subjectivism. One man's opinion was as good as that of another. Scepticism thus reigned supreme in the land. Discipline had lost its sway. But conservatism of the old type was not dead in the land. It found expression in writers like Jaimini, who opposed the new thought and tried to tighten the grip of the ancient order of things. The exponents of the new age were both intrepid and wise. They travelled and propagated their doctrines and attracted attention everywhere. But as their earnestness showed signs of abatement, the desire to merely outshine in debate mastered them. This eventually led to their downfall. But for the time being the set-back that philosophy received was very real. The critical spirit, which philosophy itself had helped to develop, began to affect adversely all metaphysical thinking. Philosophical speculation thus came into temporary disrepute, the more so as no two thinkers seemed disposed to agree on the question of the essence of reality. But this could not and did not, in fact, continue for any length of time. It was soon discovered that while criticism was necessary for developing sound metaphysical conceptions, it had its limits. While the appeal to reason seemed justifiable in itself, it was realized it lost its value if it did not use it in a constructive spirit. The new disputants no doubt brought philosophy from the heavens above to the abodes of men below on the earth and turned the attention from external nature to man himself. But they little saw the universal element in man. They made more of the differences in human judgments than of the agreements between them. They stressed more the accidental and the subjective elements in human knowledge than the objective, the principles which command universal acceptance. However this may be, their very criticism of knowledge led to a more serious study of the problem of knowledge. This, in fact, forced philosophy to examine the thinking process itself and paved the way for a theory of knowledge. In a word, the new movement awakened thought and challenged philosophy and the life based on it and compelled them to justify themselves to reason. It became imperative to go back to first principles to build on more secure foundations. What is knowledge? What is truth? What is right? What is the cosmos? And what is man's place in it? These are the questions philosophers like Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa set themselves to answer.[9] Bādarāyaṇa considered it his first duty to address himself to the challenge of the new movement, which, in undermining knowledge, threatened almost the very basis of being, of ethics and of society. To him, philosophical reflection was the most necessary and practical of duties to be performed, if scepticism was not to rule supreme in the land and nihilism to attain the upper hand in social conduct. He perceived more clearly than any of his contemporaries that the ethical fallacies and philosophical errors of the new movement arose from a gross misconception of the meaning of truth. To him, it was clear that the key to the problem of truth lay in knowledge. If the new movement denied the possibility of knowledge, it was up to him to demonstrate that in knowledge lay the secret it had missed. With this firm conviction and with even firmer faith in the power of human reason to meet the exigencies of the situation, he started on his work. His aim appears to have been as much the construction of a system of philosophy as to fill men's minds with the love of truth, of virtue and of the knowledge which could, in his opinion, enable them to think right, in order that they may live right. His aim was not less practical than speculative; he was as much intent on the correct method of acquiring knowledge as in constructing a theory of such a method. He was as much offering a theory as practising a method, which, by living it himself, he bade others to adopt. A careful analysis of his first four *Sūtras*, on which his whole teaching may be said to be based, shows this in more simple fashion than a written volume could. In the first, he stresses, as against the prevailing contradictory views and opinions, the need for a knowledge of the Brahman, the highest knowledge, which will open the key to the truth of being and becoming, of cosmos and man, and of here and hereafter. Then, in the second *Sūtra* he answers the question what is Brahman? *i.e.*, he suggests it is that which gives us knowledge of creation, *i.e.*, of the cosmos. In the third, he refers to the source of knowledge, and throws down the hint that *Sāstra* (Scripture)[10] forms the source. Lest you should run away with the idea that the very contradictions he condemns, cannot be the source of knowledge, he lays down in the fourth *Sūtra* the proposition that true knowledge is to be sought in agreement, not in contradiction. Bādarāyaṇa concedes, as it were, the fact that it is difficult to know the truth. But he suggests, that it can be. Every stray opinion, he says, is not truth. If it is natural to differ, to hold contradictory opinions and to put view against view—it is equally easy to sift these opposing thoughts and clear the ground. It is indeed our duty to clear up our ideas, to grasp the real meaning of the terms we employ, to define definitely our notions and to know precisely what we are trying to interpret or to formulate. We should have reason too, to support our views. We should try to prove our propositions; we should put our views to the test, verify them by the facts we can gather, weigh them scrupulously and impartially, and finally educe the truth. Think before you theorize. The Sānkhyas, Nayāyikas, Vaisēshikas, Mādhyamikas, Chārvākas and the rest of them may each put forth their own views;[11] these may differ from one another; may contradict each other; some of these may even deny truth, or say they know it not, or suggest that one view is as good as another. This, opines Bādarāyaṇa, is not right. If there is diversity of thought, it is our duty to see whether in the very conflict of opinions that is perceived there may not be agreement, some common ground on which all can stand, some principle to which every school of thought can subscribe or agree. To evolve such universalized propositions was the aim and object of Bādarāyaṇa. That was the sole purpose of his method—the method of *Samanvaya*. If the Socratic method was "an ingenious method of cross-examination" to evolve certain generalizations of perfect validity, the *Samanvaya* method was the double-distillate of a critical method employed to arrive at the indisputable truth. It is the method of orderly development of ideas, of propositions, of Truth. So skilful is its handling by Bādarāyaṇa that, if the early commentators are any guide, of what he meant and if the text of his *Sūtras* is any evidence of his method, the opponents of Truth are soon seen to oppose each other, himself seeming to know no more of the proposition disputed than either or all of them, yet, all the while quietly driving them, as the shepherd does his lost sheep, into his own fold. Such is the force of the *Samanvaya* irony that we see Bādarāyaṇa often acting as though he knew less than those whom he makes participants in his discussions. He raises most of the questions when he knows precisely how they stand. No wonder that the disputants saw their notions and theories shaping themselves before their very eyes into propositions of invulnerable Truth. Bādarāyaṇa had not learned the art of a *Vyāsa*[12] for nothing. If Bādarāyaṇa had his chronicler, as Socrates had his own in Xenophon to describe his method, we would perhaps have had many a young Euthydemus confessing his ignorance before him. But it is, perhaps, not wholly a misfortune that he had none such, for the *Sūtras* would then have lost their value to us not a little. The very cast of these *Sūtras* shows that before beginning an argument, he set down a proposition or propositions of which the truth had to be generally acknowledged. Thus, he not only laid a sure foundation for his reasoning but also was sure of assent to it from all sides. That is just what might be expected from the expounder of the *samanvaya* method, a method that made it possible to form one's reasoning on points acknowledged by all who could reason rationally. *Tattu samanvayāt*: That (the Truth) can be reached only by the method of reasoning.

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[9] Jaimini's first *Sūtra* (I. 1. 1) is: *Athāto Dharmajignāsā*, while Bādarāyaṇa's (I. 1. 1) is: *Athāto Brahmajignāsā. Jignāsā* is literally the desire to know. While Jaimini starts with an enquiry into what is duty, Bādarāyaṇa begins with an enquiry into what is knowledge, the knowledge of Brahman, the highest knowledge.

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[10] *Sāstra* here means the eternal *Vēda*, not any written text. The source of knowledge is knowledge itself. As Sankara expressively puts it, "the origin of a body of scripture possessing the quality of omniscience cannot be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself." See Sankara, *Brahma-Sūtra*, I. 1. 3. That is knowledge which helps you to know Brahman; if you know Brahman, you have the means to test Truth itself. The Truth cannot be known by perception alone; the super-sensuous is beyond perception, deduction, inference, I. 1. 3.

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[11] These are among the very schools considered, according to the commentators, by Bādarāyaṇa in I. 1. 1 to I. 1. 1-4.

[12] Literally an arranger. He was called *Vyāsa*, "the arranger", because he is supposed to have arranged the *Vēdas* in their present form.

To Bādarāyaṇa, then, knowledge is possible. Truth, according to him, can be attained; only we must follow the right method. We must define our terms correctly; we must go back to first principles; we must adhere to orderly treatment; and we must see to it that agreement is sought out as between opposing views. Knowledge has to do with the universal and the typical, not with the particular and the accidental. The new Schools failed to realize this fundamental issue, and went wrong. Bādarāyaṇa set them right and pointed the way to the realization of Truth. In doing this, he did the greatest service to philosophy and to humanity as well. The leaders of the new movement failed to note that Truth is many-sided; that it will not do for a man to say that what he feels is right *is* right even for himself, or what he perceives is truth *is* truth even for himself. They failed to grasp the essential fact that there is such a thing as universal good; a thing that all rational creatures recognize and accept when they come to think the problem out in all its bearings. Bādarāyaṇa suggests that there is such a thing as *the* good and *the* truth, the *good* or the *truth* for which all else is good or true, the highest good, the highest truth. Knowledge, he says, is the highest good—knowledge of the

Brahman. That is *the* knowledge you should seek for, inquire or pursue—the highest knowledge. And the highest knowledge is not only true happiness here but also in the hereafter. Hence he starts his work with the famous declaration—*Athāto Brahmajignāsā* : *Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman, i.e.*, an enquiry that will enable you to *know the Truth* you are desirous of. If you *know* Brahman, you *know the Truth*.

Bādarāyaṇa not only laid down the correct method of acquiring knowledge, but he also evolved a theory of such a method. He not only offered a theory but also practised it. He was, in a word, a Socrates and a Plato rolled into one. He taught by his example both the theory and the practice of it. He coupled his theory of knowledge with the ultimate nature of being, and correlated their study by making them interdependent. Knowledge is of little use if it has no reference to reality ; and reality is meaningless if it is not based on knowledge. Being has no meaning if it is not related to Becoming ; and Becoming is impossible without Being. Bādarāyaṇa interweaves the ideas of Being and Becoming, the one into the texture of the other ; he interlocks the two concepts in a manner that makes his successors wrestle with his text in a hundred ways to distill out his intended meaning. In the later stages, perhaps, some of these exaggerated the dialectical phase of his teaching and revelled in many kinds of subtleties. That was due to the training they had had in other fields of study. There is hardly any doubt that Bādarāyaṇa himself never intended it, for we have clear indications in the methodology elaborated by him that he was against such hair-splitting. The doctrine of *samanvaya* limits such a tendency.[13]

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[13] Good examples illustrative of this limitation are to be seen in, for instance, Rāmānuja's commentary on IV. 3. ; IV. 4. 4 ; IV. 4. 12. These may be taken as fair but random examples of the method of *Samanvaya* enunciated by Bādarāyaṇa. Of course, examples of this kind abound in the comments of the other equally great commentators.

This apart, Bādarāyaṇa stands out as the chief reconstructor of the philosophic thought of his age. He gave out the correct method of acquiring knowledge; he outlined a theory of knowledge, and he elaborated a theory of the cosmos. He employed the art of *samanvaya* to evolve the truth. But for the help he received from it, he would hardly have been able to produce the wonderful synthesis he has presented us with. From first to last, it is conceived in a manner which shows not merely mastery in the art of reasoning but also discloses the theory of the method he employed to reach the Truth. The logical operations which enable him to do this are laid bare before us. Indeed, he lets us into the secret of his logic. There is no mistaking the development of his thought, his reasoning and his objective. The great point about him is he shows not merely how to reason but also how he himself arrives at the conclusions he does. He shows by the method he adopts that the problem of knowledge cannot be solved without understanding the system of harmony and order that marks the cosmos. He leads you on step by step—*Sūtra* by *Sūtra*, if you like—and demonstrates that to *know* reality is to know Brahman.[14] But "knowing" other things is not the same as "knowing" Brahman. You may "know" the empirical sciences but yet not "know" Brahman.[15] What is an aid as regards knowledge in the world of sense may prove a snare in regard to knowledge of Brahman. Knowledge of empirical reality may, indeed, become an actual hindrance to the knowledge of Brahman. Sense-perception would not lead you to Brahman. The world of forms, names and works veils the Brahman.[16] *Amritam satyēna channam*, the immortal (Brahman) is veiled by the (empirical) reality—the word *satyam* here signifies the reality of experience.[17]

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[14] "The *Ātman* is truth, he should be seen, heard, comprehended, reflected upon" *Brihad. Upa.*, II. 2. 45; "The Self that we should search for and endeavour to know." *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 7. 1.

[15] *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 1. 2.

[16] *Brihad. Upa.*, I. 6. 3.

[17] *Brihad. Upa.*, I. 6. 3. Parmenides and Plato affirmed that the knowledge of the world of sense was mere deception.

Brahman is the *satyasya satyam*[18]—the reality of reality. Interpreted with reference to the context, this means that the vital spirits (together with the worlds, Gods, and living creatures, as may be inferred from what precedes) are the reality, and Brahman is their reality.[19] He is the actual reality of the so-called reality. Only of Him is there knowledge, all else is not knowledge. It is only of Him, that a real knowledge is possible.[20] All other knowledge—including the four *Vēdas* and the empirical sciences—is "mere name" (*nāma ēva*). Nārada, who was well versed in such knowledge, finds himself in darkness, from which he is delivered first by the knowledge of Brahman.[21] True knowledge thus is only of Brahman, knowledge that rests upon experience being mere ignorance. Ignorance is the fleeting, knowledge is the eternal: *ksharam tu avidyā hi amritam tu vidyā*.[22] Here knowledge is the "eternal" in the sense that it is an object of knowledge. The goal of ignorance is pleasure (*prēyas*), the goal of knowledge is salvation (*srēyas*). Those in pursuit of the former say "this is the world" (*ayam lōko*), and deluded by the troop of pleasures aimlessly tramp hither and thither like blind men led by comrades blind as they themselves, while the latter direct their attention to gain knowledge, with their gaze on another world.

If you desire, then, to know reality, you should know Brahman; if you know Brahman, you know the essence of reality. To know the oneness, the completeness, the comprehensiveness of Brahman is the all-important task—that is, the task that Bādarāyaṇa sets himself to in the very first *Sūtra*. What follows is a development of the idea that the Brahman can be known only when the world-order is realized and the method of knowing it is clearly grasped.

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[18] *Brihad. Upa.*, II. 1. 20.

[19] *Chch. Upa.*, II. 4. 7-9.

[20] *Chch. Upa.*, VI. 1. 3.

[21] *Chch. Upa.*, VII. 26. 2.

[22] *Svēta. Upa.*, V. I. Compare with Plato who held the view that only the eternal is an object of knowledge.

No wonder that Bādarāyaṇa before he has finished with the fourth *Sūtra*, has developed in characteristic fashion a universal system that is fully illustrative of his method. The harmony and order that governs the cosmos should guide your understanding of it. That is knowledge that helps you to do this and that is reality that you reach by its aid.

Bādarāyaṇa stressed, as no body did in his time, the importance of the problem of knowledge for a correct understanding of the philosophy of Brahman. His dialectics is the natural result of his love of truth. The form in which he has cast the third *Sūtra* (I. 1. 1) *Sāstra-yōnitvāt* shows he rejects the position that perception can lead to knowledge.[23] No known kind of perception can lead to the Brahman; neither can inference help us in the matter; nor even can the generic way of induction afford any assistance. Propositions based on perception or inference would thus prove fallacious. Hence the dictum in the *Sūtra* that the Brahman is not cognizable by any other means of proof but solely by a reference to the *Sāstra*, which, as has been remarked, stands here not for any written text but for what is the eternal truth in its widest sense interpreted with the aid of the doctrine of *Samanvaya*.[24] This leads on to the fourth *Sūtra* which lays down the doctrine itself. If perception does not help us to reality, then true knowledge cannot be reached through its aid. What rests on mere feeling, on mere self-persuasion or perception is thus no knowledge. True knowledge, then, can be reached only on reasoning, reasoning that can help to make certainty doubly sure. Such reasoning is attained to by the method of *Samanvaya* on which is based the art of *Brahma-Tarka*, the logic that helps knowledge to authenticate itself; helps to make it know it is knowledge.[25] It is only love of truth that can lead you to this: you should desire the truth and you should will the truth. The contemplation of the Truth will lead you to the realization of Truth.[26] But the process is the process of reasoning having an all-round regard to every thing relevant. Thus the love of truth is the rockbottom foundation of the doctrine of *Samanvaya.* It is the love of truth that impels us to *jignāsā*; this to dialetics; and dialetics to the rejection of perception as a source of knowledge; this leads us from the particular to the general. The method of *Samanvaya*, then, is made up of two parts: first, putting together of particulars in one idea; and second, in making the idea yield the generalization. Correct reasoning is possible only on this basis. With such reasoning we pass from concept to concept, particularising or generalising,[27] analysing or synthesizing as we proceed. But such reasoning would be of no avail if it did not aim at true knowledge. And true knowledge should have reference to the highest aim of man—the knowledge of the Brahman, knowledge which assures felicity, happiness and final absolution. That is the end of true knowledge; that has connection with the highest aim of man, that is, the highest objective aimed at by him. Knowledge that has no reference to it is not knowledge. Man is thus the measure of all things, of all truth; because there lie hidden in the innermost recesses of his soul certain universal principles, concepts or ideas, which form, as it were, the starting-point of all his knowledge. Such principles or concepts, thus, do not have their origin in sense-experience. Particular circumstances may be the means of bringing to consciousness such a principle or notion, which *ab initio* has existed in the soul.[28] When the principle or notion has been thus developed, other principles or notions may be deduced from it, and thus we would be enabled to end in reaching certain knowledge. Plato puts forth a similar theory of knowledge but he does not show why the individual soul should implicitly carry with it the principle or notion or how any circumstance can help bring it to its consciousness. Bādarāyaṇa offers the explanation that because the individual soul is the Brahman itself.[29] Until we reach modern times—the period marked by Spinoza's advent—we do not hear of an explanation in Western philosophy which approximates that of Bādarāyaṇa.

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[23] See Rāmānuja's *Srī-Bhāshya*, I. 1. 3.

[24] *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 1. 5 and VIII. 7. 1-3; "He (the Self) desires the truth and wills the truth." Compare with *Pūrvamīmāmsa* III. 4. 12 and III. 5. 21. Rāmānuja commenting on I. 1. 3 makes the Mīmāmsaka objector say that the "*Sāstra* has a meaning only in so far as it relates to what has not been already arrived at".

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[25] He (the Self) desires the truth and wills the truth. *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. I. 1. 5.

[26] *Cf.* "Verily, my dear one, the self has to be seen....has to be steadily maditated upon." *Brihad. Upa.*, II. 4. 5., "He (the Self) has sought after, He has to be specially desired and known". *Chch. Upa.*, VIII. 7. 1, etc.

[27] Rāmānuja has made the acute observation in concluding his commentary on I. 1. 4. that if reasoning—based on Upanishadic texts—does not lead to reality, "then," he says, "although they give rise to the (conceptual) knowledge of the Brahman, there would be (to those passages) no finality in utility."

If Bādarāyaṇa postulates a metaphysical doctrine—the doctrine of the Brahman—for proof of the validity of knowledge, Plato does the same by appealing to his world-view. Plato's world-view is based on his doctrine of ideas, ideas or forms being not mere thoughts in the minds of men or even in the mind of God, for even divine thought is dependent on them. He conceives them as existing in and for themselves. They are substantial forms, existing prior to things and apart from them, independent of them and uninfluenced by the changes to which they are subject. The forms too are numberless, though they constitute a well-ordered world. The idea of the good is the supreme; it is the source of all the rest. Unity therefore includes plurality; in the intelligible or ideal world, as Parmenides said, there is no unity without plurality and no plurality without unity. Plato's universe is thus a logical system of ideas, forming an organic spiritual unity, governed by a universal purpose, the idea of the good. It is accordingly a natural moral whole. Its meaning cannot be grasped by the senses, which perceives only its imperfect and fleeting reflections and never rise to a vision of the perfect and abiding whole. How is the ideal world related to the real? What is meant by the statement that the particular objects in nature are copies of ideas? How can the pure and perfect, changeless principle be responsible for the incomplete and ever changing world of sense? To answer this, Plato develops a philosophy of nature which is redolent of pluralism. According to him, there is another principle, which is everything that idea is not, and to which sensuous existence owes its imperfections. This principle—designated by Aristotle as Platonic " matter "—forms the basis of the phenomenal world. It is, as such, the raw material upon which the forms are somehow impressed. It is perishable, unreal and imperfect—non-being; whatever reality, form, or beauty the *perceived* world has, it owes to ideas. Plato thus needs such principle besides the idea to account for our world of sense, or nature, which is not a mere illusion of the senses, but an order of a lower rank than the changeless ideal realm. This substratum, untouched by the ideal principle, is conceived of as devoid of all qualities—formless, undefinable, unperceptible. It is non-being, not in the sense of being non-existent but in the sense of having a lower order of existence. The sensible world partakes of a measure of reality or being, in so far as it takes on form. Ideas, thus, are somehow responsible, according to Plato, for all the reality things possess. They owe their being to the presence of ideas, to the participation of the latter in them. At the same time, the substratum—non-being—is responsible for the diversity and imperfection of the many different objects bearing the same name. Non-being is, as Zeller remarks, a second kind of causality, the causality of a blind, irrational necessity. There are thus two principles, mind and matter, of which mind is the true reality, the thing of most worth, that to which everything owes its form and essence, the principle of law and order in the universe. While the other element, matter, is secondary, a dull irrational recalcitrant force, the unwilling slave of mind, which somehow, but imperfectly, takes on the impress of mind. Form is the active cause, matter is the co-operative cause. Since the world of ideas is identical with the good, the non-ideal *must* be evil. If we had to label this part of the Platonic system, we should call it, with Thilly, *dualism.*[30] Plato makes no attempt to bridge the gulf that exists between mind and matter. Bādarāyaṇa, though he also falls back on metaphysics for his explanation, connects the two by his doctrine of Brahman, and makes his philosophy of nature—unlike Plato—a consistent, scientific, logical whole. Unlike Plato, too, Bādarāyaṇa does not trench on the mythical ground for explaining the origin of nature. Aristotle's reconstruction of Plato's theory was, indeed, intended to remove the inconsistencies inherent in it and to make it scientific and logical.[31] But Plato, it must be confessed, at various points, approximates to Upanishadic views. Thus, his theory, that all knowledge is reminiscence, by which he teaches that the soul somehow possesses ideas prior to its contact with the world of experience, that it has viewed such ideas before but has forgotten them, that the imperfect copies of ideas in the world of sense bring back its past, reminding it, as it were, of what it has been before, comes as near as may be to the doctrine of *pūrvapragnā*, which is imbedded in the doctrine of

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[28] This would seem to follow from the doctrine of the Brahman. See II. 1. 15 ; for, according to it, it is Brahman itself which constitutes the individual soul ; Brahman alone takes upon itself the condition of the individual soul in all living bodies. *Cf.* "Having entered into them with living Self" (*Chch. Upa.*, VI. 3) ; "The one God hidden within all beings" (*Svēt. Upa.*, VI. 11) ; "The one God entered in many places" ; "That Self hidden in all beings does not shine forth" (*Kath. Upa.*, I. 3. 12) ; "There is no other seer but he"; (*Brihad. Upa.*, III. 3. 23), etc. The many individual souls are the reflection of the one Brahman. They are liable to "impurity" because "of their limiting adjuncts."

[29] See II. 3. 42, *Amsōnānā vyapadēśāt*, etc. The commentary of Ānandatīrtha will be found interesting in this connection from the purely dualistic point of view. See his commentary on the whole of the Adhikaraṇa entitled *Amsādhikaraṇa*.

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[30] Frank Thilly, *History of Philosophy*, 66. Thilly's account is both lucid and critical.

[31] Thilly, *loc. cit.*, 75-76.

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transmigration.[32] Similarly Plato's explanation of how the pure rational soul happens to unite with a body, is, apart from the mythical parts of it, based to some extent on the doctrine of transmigration, derived through Pythagorean sources. But here too, his theory of knowledge is overburdened by his mythical ideas and it is found unequal to the demands made on it.

To Bādarāyaṇa, then, sense-perception is no source of knowledge. The truth is beyond it. And to reach it, he stresses the art of *Samanvaya* reasoning. Within its framework, he combines and transforms the teachings of the philosophers who thought before him and during his own times. With the Sānkhyas he agrees that being is plural; with Patanjali, that mind is the means of salvation; with Jaimini, that knowledge is uncreated and eternal; with the Vedāntists that being is one and indivisible and like a mirage unperceivable; with the Nayāyikas, that perception, inference and deduction are means of knowledge, though not exclusively so; with the Vaisēshikas, that a strict classification of ideas is necessary for knowledge; with the Chārvākas, that matter is real; with the Bauddhas, that the universe of (appearances) is momentarily fluxional; with the Jainas, that continued existence cannot be disputed; with nearly all rational thinkers, that the world is governed by harmony and order. Whether he owed anything to his predcessors or not,[33] there can be no question that his system represents the high water-mark of Upanishadic interpretation of his time and a crown of glory to his reasoning powers.

Whatever the case with the classical tradition of Christian philosophy, which passes among Roman Catholic scholars as *philosophia perennis*, the perennial philosophy which Dean Inge, in his latest lectures,[34] speaks of as not merely the only possible Christian philosophy but is the only system which will be found ultimately satisfying, philosophical writers in India have given the widest vent to their views and critiques of existing or extinct systems of thought in a manner which, if it is not putting it too high, has wrung admiration from Western scholars. Commentators on synthetic philosophy of the kind evolved by Bādarāyaṇa have filled a useful rôle and have helped to advance, not retard, the progress of philosophy in India. But for the tradition created by them, we would have lost not only a Śankara, a Rāmānuja and an Ānandatīrtha but a whole host of others who have modelled themselves on them and their predecessors. The best part of their thinking—hard and fruitful thinking too it is—is in their commentaries and if they endeavoured to separate and stress the elements combined by synthetists like Bādarāyaṇa to build up their particular theories, why independence of thought in the realm of philosophy should be killed, or why dogma and religious creed should clog the wheels of their thought, or why indeed there should result the "universal inertia" so impressively urged on us, it is impossible to perceive. It would be just as correct to say that St. Thomas Aquinas, perhaps the greatest theologian the Western Church has known, because he wrote a commentary on Proclus' *De Causis*, despite the fact he was quite unaware of what he had done, impeded the march of scholastic philosophy, though his voluminous writings constitute, with those of his rival Duns Scotus, the high watermark of scholastic philosophy and the watershed of its divergence into the philosophico-speculative thought on the one hand and the ethico-practical (or realism) of modern times on the other.

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[32] *Brihad. Upa.*, IV. 4. 2-6; III. 2. 13. The chief text of the doctrine of transmigratian is *Chch. Upa.*, V. 3-10, which may be compared with *Brihad. Upa.*, VI. 2.

[33] Deussen thinks he did. He says: "It was undoubtedly on the foundation of older and earlier works that Bādarāyaṇa formally undertook an epitome of *Upanishad* doctrine in the *Brahmasūtras*; the foundation of the later Vedānta." See *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, 27.

The truth of the matter is that until recently men in the West had not recognized that knowledge is "a world whose margin fades for ever and for ever as we move". They had believed that truth was something definite, which might be grasped by the aid of a clear head, diligence and a sound method. Hence the tone of confidence that breathes through their inquiries; and hence too the completeness they aimed at. This tone of confidence and this aim at completeness have both died out, the first because it has been perceived that there is no ground for it and the second because completeness is unattainable. "The time has passed," as Pollock himself observes, "when systems of philosophy could be regarded as final and absolute ...... Science has for good and all abandoned the dream of finality. The discoverer well knows that his discovery while it brings new certainty and new power over things, will also throw open a new series of questions."[35] But the work done by the pioneers and later inquirers—the products of their thought—have proved valuable in many ways undreamt of by them, their first fashioners, and long after their original use had become obsolete. Though their systems may have proved inadequate or defective as a whole, they have helped to enrich the world of ideas in a manner and to an extent which cannot be over-estimated. If no system is to be entirely true, it ought to be equally clear that no system can be entirely original. Each must in great measure be the re-combination of elements supplied by its predecessors. To this rule, the Indian commentators are no exception. Many of their leading ideas may—as they themselves frankly acknowledge—be traced to earlier thinkers and in the last resort to those great sages who contributed to the making up of the *Upanishads* and the *Vēdas*. Still, we need not deny originality to the later thinkers any more than we can to the earlier. The writers of glosses and commentaries have had a useful rôle to fill. As Professor Alexander has pointed out, in his lecture on *Spinoza and Time*, a commentary must be and is historically true and as such marks the exact extent of the teacher whose work is expounded by the commentator. A gloss is widely different;

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[34] W. R. Inge, *God and the Astronomers*, containing the Warburton Lectures, 1931-1933, (1933), Preface vii.

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[35] Sir Frederick Pollock, *loc. cit.*, 76–77.

if it deals with the subject-matter of a work in an unhistorical manner, it seeks to recognize the real greatness and spirit of a writer and endeavours to appreciate it by asking "not what he said himself but what he may lead us to say". In the philosophical field, this is the very method that fructifies thought and helps to advance originality. The text may be there, but the glossator is not more concerned with it than with his gloss. A great man need not be followed slavishly and may be more honoured by divergence than by obedience. That is the line of advance that has marked the work of Indian glossators on Bādarāyaṇa's text and the various commentators who have tried to elucidate him for centuries. To say that thought has not advanced during the period covered by them or that philosophical teaching has proved to be sterile is to deny patent facts and to own ignorance of the many works that have come down to us which tangibly demonstrate how philosophical thought has kept pace with the march of time in this country.

Of the commentator Srīpatipaṇḍitāchārya, whose work we are dealing with here, the reader will find all that can be gathered about his life and work in the Introduction that follows. He lived, from the data so far available, about 1400 A.D., and his view-point is summed up in the term *Dvaitādvaita*, unity in duality. This conception of Reality goes back to a period long anterior to the composition of the *Brahma-Sūtras*, as it is imbedded in them. A long line of commentators have either adopted it or criticised it. Sankara criticizes one such theory attributed to Bhartriprapancha, said to have been a commentator on the *Brahma-Sūtras* and the *Upanishads*, who is not mentioned by name but alluded to in his commentary on the *Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* (V. 1. 1). Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa are others of the same persuasion criticized by Rāmānuja in his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras* (II. 1. 15). These and others are dealt with in detail in the Introduction.

The two leading exponents of the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsa*, Prabhākara and Kumārila, took opposite views in this connection. Kumārila, in discussing causation, urges the reality of non-existence, thus postulating the co-existence of existence and non-existence. Everything, to him, has two aspects: its own existence as regards its self; and its non-existence as regards anything else. Both are real; otherwise, it would be impossible to differentiate things. Prabhākara denies reality to non-existence. According to Kumārila, in the one case, there is actual and in the other, mental perception.[36] Similarly, rejecting both the *Sūnya-vāda* and the *Nyāya* views as to the difference of the whole from its parts, Kumārila takes the middle view that a whole may be, in one sense, different from its constituent parts.[37] The whole being indivisible, the idea of its relation to its constituent parts in whole or in part is a question which can arise only in respect of the constituent parts, and would be meaningless as applied to the whole. This theory has been sometimes described as *Bhēdābhēda* and sometimes, again, as *Samuchchayavāda*,[38] differentiating it from *Vivartavāda* and *Pariṇāmavāda.* The *Vivartavāda* postulates the doctrine that the visible world is illusory and that Brahman alone is the real entity, the unreal or illusory appearance being caused by *avidya* or human error. As a serpent (*sarpa*) is a *vivarta* of a rope (*rajju*), so is the world a *vivarta* of the real entity Brahman, the illusion being removed by true knowledge (*vidya*). The *Pariṇāmavāda* postulates the transformation of the Brahman into the names and forms of the phenomenal world. The *Samuchchyavāda* endeavours to combine the *Bhēda* and *Abhēda* views on the analogy of the serpent and its coils and the sun and its radiance. The doctrine of *Dvaitādvaita* as propounded by Srīpatipaṇḍitāchārya will be found to possess this fundamental merit that it tries to combine harmoniously the opposing views of *Dvaita* and *Advaita.* How this combination is reached will be better

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[36] *Slōkavārtika*, 473-492.

[37] *Slōkavārtika*, 632-634; also A. B. Keith, *The Karma-Mīmāmsa*, Chap. III, 44-60.

[38] The idea underlying the term *Holism* of General Smuts would seem to be correctly conveyed by the Sanskrit term *Samuchchayavāda*, the *doctrine of the whole*, from *Samuchchaya*—collection, assemblage, aggregation, mass, etc. It is interesting to note in this connection that the word *whole* was formerly *hole*, *hool*, the *w* being erroneously attached to the word. It has been derived from Anglo-Saxon, *hāl*, whole, sound, safe and Gothic *hails*, healthy, sound, whole. The term *Samuchchayavāda*, which may be literally translated the *doctrine of the whole*, is evidently derived from the figure of speech of the same name, *Samuchchaya*, which is defined by the *Kāvyaprakāśa* as joining together of two or more things independent of each other, but connected in idea with reference to some common action. (See *Kāvyaprakāśa*, 10, *kārikas* 115-116.) In the *Upanishads*, holism may be said to be well summed up in the *Brihadāraṇyaka* text *Ōm Pūrṇamadaḥ pūrṇamidam pūrṇāt pūrṇamudachyate pūrṇasya pūrṇamādāya pūrṇamēvāvasishyatē* which may be thus translated: *Ōm, That* (*Brahman*) *is Whole, and this* (*Universe*) *is Whole. The Whole proceeds from the Whole.* (*Then*) *taking the Whole of the Whole, it remains as the Whole* (*Brahman*) *alone.* It may be

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added that there are as many theories of holism as there are schools of philosophy in India, for each school has its own special theory of holism. See *Brihad. Upa.*, V. 1. 1, which reiterates what is enunciated in I. 4. 10. With this text may be usefully compared *Kath. Upa.*, IV. 10. See also the commentaries of Sankara on *Brihad. Upa.*, V. 1. 1 and the commentaries of Ānandatīrtha as well on the same text. By "holism" General Smuts means a tendency to the formation of systematic wholes, each of which is more than the bare sum of its component parts. A whole is not a mere aggregate of parts but has a certain structure in virtue of which it has greater potentialities than a mere aggregate of similar parts could have. Smuts suggests that this tendency to whole-making is traceable in all types of reality, and is the ground of what has been called creative or emergent evolution, which is inconsistent with bare mechanism. He also contends that modern science supports "holism". Matter conceived as a system of electric charges, organisms consisting of multitudinous cells. Mind and Personality are examples of the "holistic" structure of matter propounded by him. The *summum bonum* of holistic philosophy is free and harmonious self-realization. The holistic nisus of the universe is regarded as a guarantee that the ideals of Well-being, of Truth, Beauty and Goodness are firmly rooted in the nature of things, and are likely to be realised eventually. (See *Holism and Evolution*; for a succinct summary of the theory see A. Wolf's chapter on *Recent and Contemporary Philosophy* in *An Outline of Modern Knowledge*, 588-589.)

appreciated from a study of the text of the commentary itself in the original, though the main points of the argument will be found set out in the Introduction. Srīpatipaṇḍitāchārya's chief merit consists in thinking a thought through to the uttermost end. He presents his theory to the final conclusion, with a conviction in its potency that is as impressive as it is suggestive. He was the systematiser of a very ancient world-concept, a concept that has had very wide vogue, both in the East and in the West. A brief reference to Western exponents of the *Bhēdābhēda* theory—or a theory akin to it or containing many of its cardinal elements—will be found in the Introduction. The reader will, perhaps, realize even from this altogether inadequate treatment of a large subject, how the theory has had attracted to itself some of the ablest philosophical thinkers the world has so far known. Among these, in the West alone, are—to name only a few—Spinoza, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Lotze, T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, Bosanquet, Croce, Royce, James Ward, Sorley, Taylor, Lossky, Husserl, Bergson, James, Alexander, L. T. Hobhouse, Whitehead, etc. The bare mention of these names ought to suffice to indicate the importance of the theory which our commentator deals with.

A word of explanation may, perhaps, be added in regard to the mode of presentation adopted in the Introduction. It is primarily an exposition. But it also attempts to be critical. Exposition in a sense involves interpretation, and interpretation merges imperceptibly sometimes into comparison and at others into criticism from the opposite points of view. Early training has induced a personal preference to what is called the historical method, that is, treating things historically. This is no mere academic penchant but a necessity when one has to deal with a writer of the type and character of Srīpatipaṇḍitāchārya. Learned and profound, he is ever ready to throw a challenge to his adversaries. Not only that; his frequent references to previous writers, his astounding knowledge of the epics and Purāṇas and his consummate skill in getting over what seem moot points render necessary a mode of treatment that would help to elucidate rather than cloud the points at issue. It has been impossible to fix his date without a variety of historical research which has necessitated a certain deviation from the subject-matter of his great work. It will be found, however, that the historical part is strictly limited to the collation of the requisite data for elucidating the position of Srīpatipaṇḍitāchārya among the great commentators on the *Vēdānta-Sūtras*. The views of the leading commentators, besides Śankara, Rāmānuja and Ānandatīrtha, have also been set down as gleaned from their own works entirely in the view that they may prove helpful from a comparative standpoint. The theories of Śankara, Rāmānuja and Ānandatīrtha which are frequently adverted to by Srīpatipaṇḍitāchārya are summarised as propounded by Srīpatipaṇḍitāchārya himself and not by themselves. A statement of their doctrines according to themselves is not attempted here except to a limited extent, for that would carry the purpose of this work beyond its legitimate sphere. Readers will, it is hoped, bear this fact in mind in judging the position assumed in the Introduction.

What is the attitude of Srīpatipaṇḍitāchārya to his predecessors? This question is discussed at more than one point in the Introduction, and it is needless to say more than to observe that while he steers clear of both Śankara and Ānandatīrtha, while he is highly critical of Rāmānuja and while he writes approvingly within limits of Srīkaṇṭha, he is tenacious to a degree of his own position. He adopts a middle course, avoiding extreme positions and is accordingly able to outline a philosophy which, in its essence, is universal.

In discussing the viewpoint of Srīpatipaṇḍitāchārya, occasion has been taken to go into the relationship of the so-called Eastern and Western systems of philosophy. The subject is too vast to be dealt with at any length in a special work of this nature, but it was felt necessary that the tendencies of modern criticism in this regard should be made known. How far Neo-Platonic thought influenced the making up of Western philosophy in general and how far it helped to mould Christian philosophy in particular during the earlier centuries of the Christian era are questions of vast import to students of Indian philosophy as they indicate, at any rate to some small extent, the influence that Upanishadic thought has exerted on both philosophy and religion in the West during the ages they were in the making. The space devoted to the discussion of these topics, including the sources of the system of Spinoza, perhaps the greatest name in Western philosophical thought, will, it is hoped, be not deemed altogether wasted, especially as they tread a ground not hitherto familiar at least to Indian scholars. Philosophical truths, whether propounded in the East or in the West, know no bounds and the fact that the East has influenced the West more than the West has the East in this connection, does not mean that the East has little to learn from the West in the domain of philosophy. If modern trends of thought indicate anything, they show that the East and the West have yet to learn a great deal from each other in this as in other fields of study.

I have been unsuccessful in obtaining a copy of the *Vritti* on the *Bhāshya* referred to in the Introduction (see page 3). I much regret this and can only express the hope that Mr. Kundakuri Bālasūrya Prasādarow Garu will himself make it available to the public at no distant date.

The work is published in two volumes, the first being devoted to the Introduction and the second to the Text, with the Appendices.

In translating passages, clearness has been preferred to elegance. Philosophical terms have been rendered on an uniform basis, all attempts at subtlety being avoided. Well-known philosophical terms have, however, been retained. The use of Sanskrit terms and phrases which have acquired a definite significance, has more than mere utility to commend it. While it is difficult to find exact English equivalents for them, their frequent use is likely in the long run to popularize Indian thought in the West.

Footnotes have been given chiefly with a view to elucidate the text or the *Sruti* passage quoted.

The editing of this work has had to be carried out under difficulties, chief among which must be stated to be the want, in Bangalore, of an up-to-date and well-equipped library for the use of scholars interested in Oriental literature. It is undoubted that scholars will find much to criticise in it. It is, however, earnestly hoped that they will view with some indulgence its shortcomings, whatever they may be, especially because neither time nor trouble has been stinted in its production. The main object aimed at has been to give an adequate exposition in understandable English of Srīpati's view, so that those who desire may be enabled not only to appreciate it at its full value, but also to judge, in the fulness of time, the validity of any particular interpretation to which they may be personally inclined. As Dr. Thibaut has suggested, this question—the question as to what the *Sūtras* really teach—is a critical, and not a philosophical one. And if it is to be solved at all, it can only be, as he adds, when the entire body of the *Sūtras* has been submitted to a detailed investigation "with the help to be derived from the study of all the existing commentaries". The present attempt is to facilitate the realization of this much-to-be-desired objective. Apart from those who are either commentators on commentators or mere glossators, there are at least ten well-known leading commentators, whose commentaries deserve to be made available to scholars for solving the problem of the true meaning of the *Sūtras* which stand coupled with the illustrious name of Bādarāyaṇa. It is to be hoped that this attempt will be made and that scholars with adequate equipment will be forthcoming to undertake it, while a discerning public will find the means to support such a very laudable venture.

In conclusion, I must record my thanks to Pandit S. Venkata Rao, who has proved himself highly useful in getting up the text of the work and in passing it through the Press. He has also helped in the checking of references and in a variety of other ways which it would be difficult to pass over lightly.

I feel I must also express my deep sense of gratitude to Sir K. P. Puttanna Chetty, Kt., C.I.E., the President of the Mysore Lingayet Education Fund Association, for the warm and continued personal interest he has evinced in connection with the publication of this work. To him is justly due the credit of its publication in its present form to a wider world. To him accordingly are due the thanks of the reader for any enlightenment he may derive from it.

BANGALORE,
30th June 1935.

C. HAYAVADANA RAO.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

GENERAL PLAN.

Vol. I: Introduction in English
Vol. II: Sanskrit Text with Commentary

VOL. I. INTRODUCTION

TOPICAL CONTENTS

PAGE
Preface ix
MSS. of the Work 1
Name of the Work 4
The Author of the Work 7
Object of the Bhāshya 24
The Vriththi on which it is Based 24
Siddhāntas mentioned in the Bhāshya 26
The Author's Date 29
Light from Inscriptions 31
Posterior to Nīlakaṇṭha, Author of Bhāshya on *Sūta Samhita* 33
Posterior to Śrīkaṇṭha, Author of *Brahma Mīmāmsa Bhāshya* 36
Date of Śrīkaṇṭha from Literary Data 37
Śrīkaṇṭha's Date as determined from Inscriptions 38
Śrīkaṇṭha and Meykandar 47
Srīpati anterior to Śivalinga-Bhūpati 49
Srīpati posterior to Revanārya, Author of 'Siddhānta Sikhāmani' 53
Probable Date of Revanārya 54
Srīpati's Native Country 56
Srīpati's Learning and Profundity—
  (i) Vēdas 57
  (ii) Upanishads 61
  (iii) Purāṇas and Ithihāsas 67
  (iv) Other Authors Quoted by Srīpati 78
Popularity of Srīpati's Commentary 86
Philosophical Standpoint of the Work 89
Srīpati's Criticism of Śankara 90
Criticism of Rāmānuja and Pāncharātra Āgama 91
Pāncharātra Āgama Assailed 92
Examination of Visishtādvaita 94
Objections against Dvaita 95

PAGE
Srīpati's Exposition of Visēshadvaita 98
Doctrine of Shatsthala 100
Connection between Jaimini Sūtras and Bādarāyaṇa Sūtras .. 102
Do the two Mimāmsas form one whole? 106
View of Śankara 108
View of Surēsvara 109
Truth underlying the modern view 112
The Earliest Commentators on Brahma-Sūtras: Those referred to by Śankara 114
Those mentioned by Bhāskara 117
Commentators mentioned by Rāmānuja 129
Those mentioned by Rāmānuja's Commentators 131
Those referred to by Madhva 133
Other Commentators and their Works 134
Nimbārka and His Date 134
Story of Nimbārka's Life 136
His System of Vēdānta 138
Vallabha and His Date 139
His Life and Wanderings 140
His Disciples and Literary Works 142
His 'Anubhāshya' 144
His Disciples and their Works 146
His Indebtedness to Vishnuswāmi 149
His System of Vēdānta 150
Vignāna Bhikshu and His System of Vēdānta 153
Baladeva and His Works 180
His System based on Chaitanya's Teachings 181
Chaitanya's Indebtedness to Madhvaism 183
Baladeva's Commentary based on Ānandatīrtha's 184
Date of Baladeva 185
Suka and His Commentary 186
Suka Bhāshya Tika 217
Śrīkaṇṭha 218
Chief Commentators in Chronological Order 221
Other Commentaries Current 225
Other Supplementary Commentaries 226
Style of Srīpati 229
An Outline of Srīpati's View—
  The Nature and Object of Jignyāsa 232
  Harmonising Sruti Texts 243
  Meaning of Atha 244
  Atha means After Dīksha 250
  Devadhāraṇa Necessary for Jignyāsa 281

PAGE
  Object of Jignyāsa is Brahman 284
  The Theory of Nirvisēsha Brahman 285
Sabda and Brahman 293
Prakriti and Pratyaya 298
Brahmatva of Śiva 307
The Attributes of Brahman 315
Śiva as Parabrahman 347
Shatsthala Parasiva Brahman and other Deities 368
Jagad Vyavahārika Khandanam 386
The Repudiation of Sānkhya-Dvaita 409
The Bhēdābhēda Theory 418
The Nature and Character of Mukti 439
  Srīpati's Final Summing up 484
  The Dvaita View 490
Srīpati's Philosophical Standpoint—
  His Conception of the Material World 492
  Brahman and the Material World 511
  The Purpose of Material Creation 515
  The Nature of the Jīva 516
  Origin of Soul 540
  The Attainment of Mukti 575
Srīpati's Position Defined 586
Later Critics of Bhēdābhēda 590
  Rāmānuja's Criticism of Bhēdābhēda 662
  Sankara's Criticism of Bhēdābhēda 679
  Srīpati's View of Bhēdābhēda 693
  Differences between Śankara, Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇtha, Ānandathīrtha and Śrīpati 698
  Western Thought and Bhēdābhēda 704
Spinoza's System of Philosophy 748
Influence of Spinoza : Bhēdābhēda in the West 763
Spinoza, Father of Modern Western Philosophy 786
Spinoza and Modern Science 787
Upanishadic Origin of Spinoza's Root Ideas 789
Mr. Melamed and Spinoza 827
Spinoza's Indebtedness to Hindu Metaphysicians 828
Mr. Melamed's Views Examined 832
Differing Saiva View-points 840
Rudra the Counterpart of Siva in the *Rig-Vēda* 841
Identification of Rudra with Siva 844
Siva in the *Yajur-Vēda* 845
Siva in the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Atharva-Vēda* 845
In the *Mahābhārata* 846

PAGE
Purāṇas about Siva and Vishnu 848
Siva in the *Svētāsvatara Upanishad* 849
Siva in the *Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad* 850
In the *Bhagavad-Gītā* 850
Linga Worship in the *Rig-Vēda* 851
Linga Worship in the *Yajur-Vēda* and the *Mahābhārata* .. 853
In the Post-Vīrasaiva Period 854
Evolution of Philosophical Theories 855
The Pāsupata School 855
The Saiva Siddhānta School 855
The Spanda and the Pratyabhijna Schools.. 856
The Vīrasaiva School 856
Influence of Bhēdābhēda on the later *Upanishads* 863
Appendices—
Comparative Table showing the *division* of the *Brahma-Sūtras* into Adhikaraṇas and Sūtras according to four principal Bhāshyakāras 867
Comparative Table showing the *number* of Adhikaraṇas and Sūtras according to four principal Bhāshyakāras.. 877
Table showing the *differences* in Adhikaraṇas and Sūtras according to four principal Bhāshyakāras 878
Table showing the *number* of Sūtras in each Pāda of Adhikaraṇa as appearing in the four principal Bhāshyas 880
The Use and Significance of *Ōm* 881
Neo-Platonism and Christianity 884
List of Abbreviations Used 886
Addenda et Corrigenda 887

INTRODUCTION.

In a paper submitted to the Indian Oriental Congress, held at Allahabad in November 1926, I gave a short but comprehensive account of this little known but from several points of view important commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyana by Srīpati Panditāchārya, a Vīrasaiva teacher of note. What was stated in it was the result of a cursory examination of the work and is, it is needless to add, entirely superseded by what is mentioned in this Introduction after a closer study of it.

A brief statement of the circumstances under which a critical edition of this work is being issued now, may not, in the first instance, prove uninteresting to the reader. The existence of a commentary on the *Bādarāyana Sūtras* under the name *Srīkara Bhāshya*, by one Srīpati Panditāchārya has been well known for many years, but no attempt has so far been made to critically examine its contents or to evaluate its position as a standard commentary.

MSS. of the Work.

An incomplete edition of the text of the commentary in the Telugu script was published in the cyclic year Vijaya, corresponding to 1893, at the Srī Lakshmī Vilāsa Press, situated in Tirumalgiri Street, Secunderabad, and owned by one Nyālapalli Rāmaiya. The MS. of the work was, it would appear, first critically examined for publication by one Kōtilinga Sāstri of the family of Vēmanārādhya. After further re-examination by one Mallikārjuna Sāstri, son of Nandīsvara Sāstri and grandson of Basavēsvara Sāstri, who is spoken of as the moon born in the ocean of the family of Srīpati Panditārādhya, its publication was undertaken. Mallikārjuna, we are told, purged the MS. of all the errors committed by copyists. This edition of Mallikārjuna was printed by Bhairavārādhya, who, it is added, belonged to the family of Udbhatārādhya.

Bhairavārādhya states that he issued the edition for the benefit of Vīrasaivas and for their advancement everywhere in this world throughout the whole time the sun and the moon last. It is further mentioned that the printing was rendered possible by the assistance given by one Talagadadivi Hanumantha Rao. Bhairavārādhya, who evidently took the leading part in the publication of this edition, has prefixed to the text an account of his own family, which he, appropriately enough, calls *Bhairavavamsāvali.* Though there is nothing in it to connect him with Srīpati, the author of the *Bhāshya*, it is of interest mainly because it indicates that he himself belonged to a highly respected and learned Vīrasaiva family, originally of Benares, and that at the time of the printing of the *Bhāshya* he was a highly respected *Guru*. This *Vamsāvali* is in Sānskrit. Descent is traced from Visvēsvara of Benares; from him was descended Udbhatārādhya, known also as Visvanātha, who was, it is said, initiated by Rishi Bharadvāja. (Evidently he belonged to the Bharadvāja *Gōtra*.) Some generations after Visvanātha, came Mallikārjuna, whose son was Chandrasēkhara, of Shanmukhāmsa. The latter married Annapūrna and had by her two sons. Of these, the elder was Bhadra *alias* Vīrabhadra, author of *Saivānhika*, and the younger, Kumāra *alias* Mallikārjuna, who was the author of two works, called *Kunda* and *Darpana*, besides a *Kōsa*, evidently a dictionary of some kind. Mallikārjuna had three sons Buchchalinga, Sōmārādhya and Vīranārādhya. Of these, the last had two sons, Rājalinga and Bhairavārādhya. Bhairava left two sons, Lingārādhya and Nāgalingārādhya. Of these, the latter had as his sons Lingārādhya and Bhairavārādhya. It is the latter who was responsible for the publication of the *Bhāshya* and after whom the *Vamsāvali* is named. Of him we have a long panegyric, of which only the gist need be given here. He and his elder brother were, we are told, initiated and instructed by one Channamallēsvarārādhya. They were subsequently taught by Kēdāralinga-guru in *Siva-tatva*, *Vēda*, *Purāna*, etc. From the high praise bestowed on both these teachers, we have to infer that they were learned Vīrasaiva teachers. Kedāralinga-guru was possibly a *Sanyāsin.* Under his tuition, Bhairavārādhya became, we are told, a great Vīrasaivavādin and overpowered in argument the followers of the Buddhist, Advaita, Visishtādvaita and Dvaita systems of philosophy. He was on earth, it is added, the *very Mrigēndra* (*Sākshān Mrigēndrō bhuvi*).[1] He bore the title of *Saivēndra Chūdāmani.* He was, we are told, born as the son of Nāgalinga, to establish the Vēdic Saiva faith by the publication of Srīpati Panditārādhya's *Bhāshya,* which is described as a great work containing the essence of the true meaning of every system of Vēdānta (*Sarva Vēdānta Satyārtha Sārabhūtam*), as the conqueror of the pride of evil opponents, as the destroyer of evil desires, as the bestower of the sanctified wealth of *Sivagnāna,* and as the means of salvation from worldly bondage.

This Telugu script edition is incomplete inasmuch as it omits the following parts from the original MS. work :—

Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtras :—3, 4 and 5.
Adhyāya II, Pāda III, Sūtra :—46.
Adhyāya II, Pāda IV, Sūtras :—1 to 14.

The Government Oriental MSS. Library at Mysore has a small portion of this printed edition of the *Bhāshya.* Kandukūr-Bālasūrya Prasādarow of Devidi House, Vizagapatam, possesses two palmyra-leaf copies of this work and one copy on ordinary paper with the *Sūtra-vritti.* These are all in the Telugu script and preserved in the Saiva Grantha Kāryālaya at Devidi, in the Ganjam District. Rāja Bālasūrya Prasādarow has also a copy of the Secunderabad Edition in the Telugu script, of which copies are now difficult to secure.

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[1] The reference here is to the "Illustrious Mrigēndra", an eminent authority on the *Saiva Darsana* quoted by Mādhava in his *Sarvadarsana Sangraha.* See Cowell and Gough, 116 and 120. Cowell has suggested the identification of Mrigēndra with Meyganda *Ibid.* 116 *f.n.* 3, but this seems groundless. (As to the dates of Mādhava, surnamed Vidyāranya, and others bearing that name, see *Mysore Gazetteer*, 1930 Edition, II, iii, 1433-1446.)

The late Mr. Basavārādhya, B.A., B.L., of Bangalore, had in his possession a hand-written paper copy. This has been carefully compared and checked with the text of this Edition. The present edition is wholly in the Dēvanāgari script. It is being undertaken under the auspices of the Mysore Lingāyat Education Fund Association, Bangalore, a well-known and enlightened body which has been doing much for the social and spiritual betterment of the large and progressive community of Vīrasaivas in Southern and Western India. The first MS. copy was prepared under the direct personal supervision of Rājasabhābhūshana Dewān Bahadūr Sir K. P. Puttanna Chetty, Kt., C.I.E., Retired First Councillor, Mysore State, who is the President of the Association and whose unabated interest in the work requires special mention on the present occasion. The idea of securing the MS., getting it critically examined and making it available for publication in proper form, has been entirely his. The Association has, under his inspiration, generously undertaken to meet the cost of the publication of the work. The Committee of the Association, which includes leading members of the Vīrasaiva community, deserves special thanks for the unstinted manner in which it has helped in the undertaking from the start. It is needless to state that an edition of this work in the Dēvanāgari script, which is now being supplied, has been long a great desideratum.

Name of the Work.

In the Preface to the Secunderabad edition, this work is described under three different names:—*(1) Vaiyāsika-Brahma-Sūtra-mukhyārtha-prakāsakam*, *(2) Sarvōpanishat-sahaja-samanvaya-dvaitādvaita-siddhānta-pradīpakam*, and *(3) Srīkara-Mahābhāshyam*. The first of these titles means no more than that it is the enlightener of the gist of the *Brahma-Sūtras* of Vyāsa; the second suggests that this *Bhāshya* conveys the real meaning of all the Upanishads taken together and interpreted in the light of the *dvaitādvaita* system of the propounder; and the third is a mere repetition of the name given by the author himself in Adhyāya I of his work which is referred to below.

The author speaks of his work in a variety of ways:—(*a*) Dvaitādvaitābhidhāna Visēshādvaita Siddhānta Sthāpaka Brahma Mīmāmsa Sūtrārtha Vīrasaiva Siddhānta Prakāsika:—(Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Colophon).

(*b*) Bhēdābhēdātmaka Viseshādvaita Vīrasaiva Siddhānta Vyavasthāpaka Brahma Mīmāmsa Sūtrārtha Prakāsika:—(Adhyāya II, Pāda I, Colophon).

The difference between the two descriptions "Bhēdābhēda" and "Dvaitādvaita" Visēshādvaita contained in the two colophons mentioned, deserves to be noted.

An alternative name for the work as given by the author in the 16 colophons of the work is *Srīkara Bhāshya*. In Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra I, line 26, the name of the work is also described as "Sūtra Vriththim Samālōkya Kritham Bhāshyam Sivamkaram". In other words, the term *Sivamkara* seems to be set down as the equivalent of *Srīkara*. It is possible that the author is trying to impress upon the reader the point that Srīpati Panditāchārya named the commentary that he wrote, not after his own name, but after Srīkara or Sivakara, *i.e.*, the Lord Siva himself. Hence the alternative name, mentioned in every colophon, of *Srīkara Bhāshya*, which, in Adhyāya I, Pāda I as above stated, is turned into *Bhāshyam Sivamkaram*. It is thus evident that the commentary which is known as *Srīkara Bhāshya* is named virtually after Siva himself, Siva having inspired him, as the author elsewhere states, to undertake the work. Hence, some writers refer to this commentary not as *Srīpati's Bhāshya* but as *Srīkara Bhāshya*. That the suggestion that this *Bhāshya* is named after Siva is not without some foundation is seen from the name *Gōvinda Bhāshya* given to Baladēva's commentary. This commentary was written by Baladēva and it is called the *Gōvinda Bhāshya*, because it was written—so it is said—at the command of Lord Gōvinda. Baladēva's commentary is based on that of Ānandatīrtha, whom he mentions. He belonged to the Kanyakubja country and followed dualism as taught by Chaitanya. His great-grandfather Murāri was the *guru* of Pratāparudra Gopāladāsa, King of the Utkala country. (Madras *T. C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV. i. A. R. Nos. 2989 and 2990, pages 4343-4347.) His *Bhāshya* has been translated by Rao Bahadur Srīsachandra Vidyārnava (Panini Office, Allahabad).

There is, however, one further point requiring consideration. It might be suggested, with some plausibility, that *Srīkara* is an alternative name of *Srīpati* and that the *Bhāshya* is, therefore, called by both names. The colophons lend some support to this view. A closer study of the colophons, however, shows that Srīpati named the *Bhāshya* as *Srīkara Bhāshya*, with the definite view that it should be so perpetuated. The name *Srīkara* itself is rather an unusual one, though it occurs as part of a personal name mentioned in a lithic inscription at Kōtūrpalli Strōtriyam, Rapur Taluk, Nellore District, which records the fact that one Nārapa Sahni Bhīmanāyakundu, a feudatory of Erra Siddhi Chōda, had for his preceptor *Srīkara Kantha Kēsayyangāru*, who is called a great *yōgin*. (*Nellore Inscriptions* III, 1252-56, Rapur 37.) The inscription is not dated but since it mentions that the Chief Nārapa Sahni Bhīmanāyakundu was a contemporary of Erra Siddhi Chōda, it may be set down·to the close of the 12th century A.D. (See V. Venkayya, *Ancient History of Nellore District* in the *I. A.*, XXXVII and XXXVIII, 99 and 7, where it is pointed out that Manmasiddhi and Tammusiddhi, sons of Errasiddhi, were feudatories of Kulōttunga-Chōla III, who ruled between 1178-1218 A.D.) It would seem to follow from this fact that Errasiddhi should be set down to about the close of the 12th century. The identification accordingly of Srīkara, the author of the *Bhāshya* named after him, with this Srīkarakantha—taking it for granted that he was called both Srīpati and Srīkara—seems impossible, for Madhvāchārya, whom the *Srīkara Bhāshya* mentions, came long after the close of the 12th century A.D. Moreover, in the record quoted above, the name appears in the alternative forms of *Karakanthadēva* and

Srīkarakantha Kēsayyagāru, thus suggesting that *Srī* here is the usual prefix of honour added to the name of *Karakantha Kēsayyagāru.* (See the original text of Rapur 37 at pp. 1254-1256, in the last of which the name appears also as *Karakantha Kēsavayyagāru.*)

The Author of the Work.

The author calls himself *Srīpati Panditāchārya*; also *Srīpati Pandita Bhagavadpādāchārya.* He gives also his titles when he describes himself *Srīmān Nirabhāra Vīrasaiva Yathi Vraja Parivridha Srīpati Pandita Bhagavadpādāchārya.* It will be noted that he calls himself *Nirabhāra Vīrasaiva Yathi Vraja Parivridha.* The term *Nirabhāra* means being free from the cares of a worldly life and is always applied to a *Sanyāsin;* similarly *Yathi Vraja Parivridha* means encircled by a multitude of those who have renounced the world and controlled their passions, *i.e.*, ascetics. It would, therefore, be right to assume that Srīpati Panditāchārya, later in his life, assumed the *status* of a *Sanyāsin* and had a number of ascetics either as his students or as his followers. The term Vīrasaiva, as is well known, distinguishes those who follow the tenets of that religion from the Sāmānya, Misra and Suddha Saivas. The Sāmānya and Misra Saivas worship Vishnu as well as Siva. The Suddha Saivas and Vīrasaivas are devoted exclusively to Siva. The Vīrasaivas differ from Suddha Saivas by the portable *linga* (literally meaning a symbol) that they wear on their body, preferably on the head, or suspended from the neck. The Vīrasaivas accept the twenty-eight *Saiva Āgamas*, especially the later ones, as also the *Siva-Gīta*, to which they assign an important place in their religious works. Among the leading doctrines of the Vīrasaivas are the *Ashtāvarna* and *Shatsthala.* Srīpati not only describes himself as a *Vīrasaiva* but also refers specially to the doctrine of *Shatsthala* repeatedly in his work. Srīpati Panditāchārya—or Panditārādhya as he is described in certain works to be referred to below—was thus professedly a Vīrasaiva and his *Bhāshya* must be taken as an authoritative commentary on the *Bādarāyana Sūtras* from the Vīrasaiva standpoint.

That Srīpati Panditāchārya was a Vīrasaiva is also otherwise clear from the opening verses of his *Bhāshya*. He there refers to Rēvanasiddha Guru and speaks of him as *Rēvana Kalpavriksham* and *Rēvana Dēsikēndra*. He also praises Marula Prabhu, in other words Marula-Siddha. Next he mentions Ēkōrāma Siddha, whom he terms as *Saiva Samsthāpanādhyam*. He also describes the last as profoundly learned in Tarka, Vyākarana and both the Mīmāmsas and as shining in the hermit's robes. He speaks of him as *Ēkōrāma Yathīndra Sēkhara Sivāchārya* and calls upon him to bless him in the work that he is undertaking. The author calls his work the gist or essence of the meaning of the *Vaiyāsika Brahmasūtra*. Seeing that he praises Ēkōrāma so highly in his prefatory verses, it might be inferred he was connected with Ēkōrāma's Mutt, which is the well-known Kēdāra Mutt, on the Himalayas. This is one of the five famous Mutts of the Vīrasaiva faith—*Ādi Pancha Mathas*. There is a tradition that Srīpati wrote on the *Prasthāna Traya* —Āgama, Nyāya and Vēdānta—besides commentaries on the ten principal *Upanishads*, the *Gīta* and other works as well. Some of these are said to be still available in MS. form, at Haiderabad, Urlam, and other places but my enquiries have not proved successful in locating copies of them there. The Madras and Mysore Government Oriental MSS. Libraries have no copies of any of Srīpati's works—not even the *Bhāshya*, barring of course a part of the printed Edition of the *Bhāshya*, in the Mysore Oriental MSS. Library, referred to above. In view of the fact that Srīpati describes himself a *Siddhānta Sthāpanāchārya* and a *Bhagavadpādāchārya*, it is possible he wrote the works attributed to him as above. It is undoubted that he was an eminent Vēdic and Upanishadic scholar, besides being well versed in *kāvya*, *nātaka*, *āgama* and other literature.

In the Preface to the Secunderabad Telugu script edition, spoken of above, there is a long panegyric of Srīpati. He is there referred to as proficient in all the *Vēdas*, *Āgamas* and the *Ubhaya-Vēdānta* (*i.e.*, Dvaitādvaita); as a constant meditator on Siva, with all his Ashtāngayōgas; as a strict observer of the prescribed mode of conduct; as one who was absolutely free from all doubts in Vēdic procedure and firm in his absolute belief in Siva-tatva and capable of teaching and convincing his disciples of the Ishta Linga, Bhāva Linga and Prāna Linga aspects of Siva-tatva; as one who had suspended at the end of a *Sami* branch the fire collected and tied in a piece of cloth; as a *Sarvaparipūrna*, quite contented; as one who was capable of viewing Paramākāsa Parabrahma; as one who could fully comprehend Siva-tatva throughout without a break; as one who was born in the Nārāyanāmsa (*Nārāyanāmsya sambhūta*); as one who was the destroyer of the pride of every evil opponent who had built up a mountain of argument based upon a stray text of the *Srutis*; who was the *Guru* of the three worlds (*Trijagad-guru*), *i.e.*, the Advaita, Visishtādvaita and Dvaita worlds, etc. In this description, we have five points of interest to note: (1) that Srīpati was a great Vīrasaiva teacher; (2) that he was a great scholar in the *Vēda* and the *Vēdānta*; (3) that he was a keen-witted controversialist; (4) that he had performed what might be called a miracle in tying up burning coals in a piece of cloth and suspended the same by means of a *Sami* branch; and (5) that he was born in the Nārāyanāmsa. As regards the fourth of these points, there is independent testimony in certain literary works to which reference will be made below.

Apart from this panegyric, I have been able to trace some specific references in Telugu and Sānskrit literary works to Srīpati-Panditāchārya—who is styled in them as *Srīpati Pandita*, *Panditārādhya Dēsika*, *Srīpati Panditārādhya* or simply *Panditārādhya*. As mentioned below, Srīpati himself uses *Ārādhya* for *Āchārya* and *Dēsika* for *Āchārya* in his references to Srīkanta Sivāchārya. As a matter of fact, *Āchārya* and *Ārādhya* have long been treated as convertible terms of title. Literally *Ārādhya* means *fit* to be worshipped or propitiated, a sense in which it is used by Kālidāsa in his *Raghuvamsa* (XVI. 12). It is the equivalent of *Ārādhanīya.*[2] *Āchārya* literally means a teacher or preceptor, particularly a religious teacher or spiritual guide, as also one who propounds a particular doctrine. In the case of Srīpati, this title is particularly apposite as he was both a religious teacher and the propounder of a new philosophical doctrine, the *Bhēdābhēda.* The term *Dēsika* means a *spiritual teacher* or *guide* and is generally used in the sense of *guru.* With these observations, we may refer to certain Telugu works in which Srīpati Pandita is mentioned. The first of these is the *Manuvamsapurānamu*, a work in five *Āsvāsas*, which professes to be a Telugu rendering of the Sānskrit work *Khandakapālākhyāna* (Madras Oriental MSS. Library, *Telugu D.C.I.* No. 160). It is said to have been originally narrated by Mahēsvara to Umādēvi, and describes the origin and greatness of the Tēlikas. It is stated that some of the Kshatriya descendants of Manu were cursed by a sage named Visvamitra and they were born as Tēlikas. It is said that they were devotees of Srī Mallikārjuna, the presiding deity at Srīsaila, that they revelled (*i.e.*, lived) on the banks of the great and meandering Krishna at Vijayavātika (modern Bezwada); that they were possessors of bodies which had been purified by the benign, gracious and kindly glances of Panditārādhya Dēsika, who had been specially blessed with countless good qualities by Nitalāksha (*i.e.*, Lord Siva); that they had settled at Kanakapuri, Ayōdhya, Gajapura, Vijāpura and Vijayavātika; and that their fame had spread all over the worlds. The author of the work, Pōchirāju Vīranāmātya, son of Vīrabhadra Mantri and Mūrtamāmba, of Sāndilyagōtra, declares himself a protégé of these Tēlikas of Bezwada and dedicates his work to God Mallēsvara of that place. In the introductory verse, he praises God Mallikārjuna of Srīsaila and then proceeds to narrate the circumstances under which he undertook the task of composing this *mahāprabandha*. It is in setting out these details that he tells us that the Tēlikas of Bezwada were disciples of Panditārādhya Dēsika and that they had won that great teacher's special grace. Not only that, poet Pōchirāju Vīranāmātya sets down his own genealogy at some length and narrates the grants made to the leaders of the Tēlika (oil-pressing) caste by former kings of the country. Thus, he states that the grants made to Peda-Vēgi Erra Pōthanna Setti, Nidadavole Pōli Setti, Vaddādi Sāmi Setti, Tatikelapūdi Bommi Setti, Bezwada Varna Rāmi Setti and others of the Tēlika caste are to be found recorded in detail on the stone pillars to the east of the Mallikārjuna temple at Bezwada, the moon, the stars, the heavens and the earth being witnesses to the grants. Pratāpachōla, it is said, granted to several other Settis the towns of Bezwada, Peda-Vēgi, Jananāthapura, Dhananjayapuram, Tatikelapūdi, Padmāvati, Bhōgavati, Chintalapūdi, Gāthavaram and Sākēta, towns in Panchāla and other kingdoms, including Ātreyapuram in Madura and Manikarnika—in all fourteen towns to be enjoyed by them solely by themselves. He then adds the following:—

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[2] The term *Ārādhya* was evidently at one time used as the equivalent of *Āchārya*. Thus Chinnabhatta in the colophon to his *Tatvabhāshāprakāsika* describes himself as the son Vishnudevārādhya. This Chinnabhatta speaks of himself as the younger brother of Sarvajna and a dependant of Harihara II. Rai Bahadur V. Venkayya identifies this Sarvajna with Sarvajna, the *guru* of Sāyana (see Aufrecht, *Cat. Cat.*, *Sāyana*; *E.I.*, III, 118). If this be so, the title *ārādhya* was in the 14th century as much in use among Vīrasaiva Brāhmans as among other sects of Brāhmans.

"Thus with these towns and with wealth of every kind, they (*i.e.*, the Tēlikas of Bezwada and other towns) lived happily by the good graces of the *guru* and Mahēsvara, protecting the poor, the whole being praised and blessed by Brāhmans as respected merchants, as descendants of Manu, as fortunate and lucky (people). They lived thus in the reign of that ornament to the Chālukya dynasty, King Vishnuvardhana Mahārāja Devabhallāna Vīra-Perumāl

Pratāpachōla, rendering bright (the greatness) of the *guru*, God (Mahēsvara) and the throne. While they were thus prospering, in Saka 1109, some of the Tēlikas of certain towns lacking in good sense, said to their brethren at Bezwada: "As Bezwada, the Krishna river and God Mallikārjuna are (specially lovable) to you, to us are Nellore, the Pennar and God Mūlasthanēsvara. So you and we cannot commingle." So saying, they departed southwards to Nellore. Then Rāmi Setti, with the aid of such of the more well-to-do merchants (of Bezwada) as agreed with him, built a temple of many pillars to the Mallikārjuna temple and arranged for the conduct of the daily worship in it."

The following three points emerge from the above narration of poet Vīranāmātya: (1) that Srīpati Pandita was not only the *guru* of the Tēlikas of Bezwada and other towns but also that of the then reigning king whose name he gives, as Chālukya Vishnuvardhana Mahārāja Dēvabhallāna Vīra-Perumāi Pratāpa-Chōla; (2) that both Srīpati Pandita and the king lived in Saka 1109 (= A.D. 1127); and (3) that the Tēlikas of Bezwada and round about separated into two sections in that year, one portion of the caste going southwards to Nellore and settling itself there and the other continuing to live in Bezwada and the adjoining towns. Among the latter were Rāmi Setti—evidently the poet's chief patron—and others, who built the temple of Mallikārjuna and arranged for daily worship in it.

Inscriptions now found at Bezwada throw some light on the above statements made by Vīranāmātya. A mutilated lithic record, discovered in the courtyard of the Mallēsvara temple at that place, which mentions the Pallava king Mahāmandalēsvara Pallaketa as a subordinate of the Chālukya king of Vengidēsa, registers among other things that Panditārādhya came to Bezwada and there proclaimed the superiority of Sivabhaktas to Brāhmans by holding live coal in a piece of China-muslin with the tender twig of a *Sami* tree (*M.E.R.*, 1910, No. 536 of 1909; see also paras 8-9 of Part II of the *Report*). The reference is undoubtedly to Srīpati Pandita's exploit already referred to above. The date of this inscription is unfortunately lost, but the late Rao Bahadur H. Krishna Sastri, Government Epigraphist for India, has suggested that it might be referred to the period of the Kākatiya King Ganapati (1199-1260 A.D.) and his daughter Rudrāmba (1295-1323 A.D.). That this date is a little too early for Srīpati will be made clear below. The inscription gives some interesting anecdotes relative to the Mallēsvara temple at Bezwada and it is necessary to set them down here. It is recorded that prior to the Kali Age, the sage Agastya had named the god at Bezwada as Jayasēna. Arjuna, the *Mahābhārata* hero, whose capacity for wrestling (*Malla-yuddha*) is famous, next called him, it is said, Mallēsvara. "The thus famous Siva," says the record, "graces with his presence the blessed town Vijayavāta, the ornament of which is the river Krishna." In the Kali Age, again, as early as the Saka year 117 (295 A.D.), there was a king famous on earth by name Mādhavavarman. The son of this king having killed a child of the woman "who eked out her livelihood by selling shoots of the tamarind tree (*tintrini-jīvani*)", the king sentenced him to be hanged in order to meet the ends of justice. On seeing this, God Mallēsvara was pleased and rained (on him) a shower of gold which brought back to life the deceased prince and the dead body of the child of the beggar woman. Thus the God Mallēsvara established in this world the fame of the great king (Mādhavavarman). Later on, the record continues, came a pious devotee of Siva by name Panditārādhya who proclaimed to the world that the devotees of Siva were superior to the divine sages (perhaps, Brāhmanas) and illustrated the truth of it by bundling up live-coal in a piece of China-muslin, with the tender twig of a *Sami* tree—of course without burning the cloth! God Mallēsvara was pleased and manifested himself in the presence of his devotee. Such is Mahādeva Mallēsvara "the endless one, the lover of his devotees worshipping whom the lords of the earth prospered of old." (See *M.E.R.* for 1910, para 8.) Such is the story told in the lithic record. But as Mr. Krishna Sastri has pointed out, an archaic Telugu record found at the same place and assigned by him to the 9th century A.D. (*M.E.R.*, 1910, Part I, page 3) registers the building of a temple at Bezwada for the God Kumāraswami (or Kārtikēya) by a certain Nripadhāmundu, while King Rājasalki Rājāsraya Satyatrinētra Yuddhamalla, the beloved (son ?) of Nripānkusa, was ruling. Another part of the same inscription states that the king built for the merit of his grandfather Mallaparāju, a mansion for (the god) and placed a pinnacle (*Kalasa*) over it. The third part of the same inscription adds that on the occasion of the king's coronation (?) a certain Mallundu, son of Trinayana, came to Bezwada from Chēbrōlu in order to attend a public festival (*jātra*) when, finding there the manifest presence of God Kārtikēya, he raised this temple for him. From these statements, Mr. Krishna Sastri traces the historical origin of the modern town of Mallēsvara to the founder Yuddha-Mallundu *alias* Nripadhāmundu. If this be so, then the question arises how a temple dedicated to Kumāra (Skanda), who is generally worshipped in the form of an image, came to be the shrine of a *linga*? Mr. Krishna Sastri suggests an answer to this query when he states that "perhaps the subsequent history of the temple, as given in the mutilated record under discussion, which reveals how in a later age a Saiva Ārādhya established the superiority of the Saivas over the (Brāhmana) sages, may give a clue as to the period when the Kārtikēya temple at Bezwada was converted into the modern temple of Siva, Mallēsvara" (*M.E.R.* for 1910, para 9). It would seem to follow from this suggestion that the conversion of the temple should have taken place as the result of Srīpati Panditārādhya's influence at the place. That Srīpati was against idol worship (*Saligrama Silā-pūja*) will be clear from what is stated below.

There are at least two literary references to Srīpati's exploit. One of these occurs in Sankarārādhya's *Basavēsa-vijaya*, where it is thus referred to:—

प्रसादः पावन इति प्रतिज्ञायाग्निमंशुके ।
बध्वा बबन्ध यश्शम्यां जीयाच्छ्रीपति पंडितः ॥

Prasādaha pāvana iti pratignāyāgnimamsukē ।
Badhvā babandha yassamyām jīyāchchrīpati panditaha ॥

Let Srīpati live long, who avowing seriously that His grace is holy and purifying, tied up fire in the folds of his cloth, and suspended it in the *Sami* tree.

Gubbiya Mallanna, the Kannada poet, in his *Bhāvachintāratna*, praising the *Vīrasaiva Panditatraya*—Sivalenka Manchanna, Srīpati Panditārādhya and Mallikārjuna—refers to Srīpati's exploit thus :—

ಹರಿಯನಭವಂಗೆ ವಂದನೆಗೆಯಿಸಿ ಶಿಖಿಯನಂ-।
ಬರದಲ್ಲಿ ಕಟ್ಟಿ ಮೂರ್ಧಾಕ್ಷಿಗಳ ಪಡೆದು ನಿ-।
ಷ್ಠುರ ವಕ್ರಮಂದತೀವ್ರದ ದುರ್ಗಣಗಳ ವೈಷ್ಣವ ವಿಪ್ರಜೈನರೆಂಬ॥
ವರವಾತಪಿತ್ತದುಶ್ಲೇಷ್ಮಮಂ ಕಿಡಿಸಿ ಶಂ-।
ಕರಲೆಂಕ ಮಂಚಣ್ಣ ಶ್ರೀಪತೀಶ್ವರದೇವ ।
ಸುರುಮಲ್ಲಿಕಾರ್ಜುನಂ ಪಂಡಿತತ್ರಯವಾದರೆಮ್ಮ ಭವರೋಗಗಳಿಗೇ॥

Hariyanabhavange vandanegeyisi sikhiyanam- ।
Baradalli katti mūrdhākshigala padedu ni- ।
Shthura vakra manda tīvrada durganagala Vaishnava
Vipra Jainaremba ॥
Vara vāta pittha dusslēshmamam kidisi San- ।
Karalenka Manchanna Srīpatīsvaradēva ।
Nurumallikārjunam panditatraya vādaremma bhava-
rōgagaligē ॥

"Having bowed to Siva, the destroyer of sorrows, Sankaralenka Manchanna, Srīpatīsvaradēva and Mallikārjuna, tied up (the god of) fire in a cloth and obtained pre-eminence and stupefied the crowds of wicked, hard-hearted, crooked, sluggish (in movement) and quick-witted (in argument) Vaishnavas and Jainas and became the *Panditatraya*—they proved spiritual physicians to those suffering from the diseases arising from the (wrong modes of) searching Brahma just as temporal physicians are to those who are suffering from the diseases arising from (the preponderance of) excessive *vāta*, *pittha*, and *dusslēshma*.[3]

In the above verse, though praise is bestowed on all the three great Vīrasaiva Pandits—Sivalenka Manchanna, Srīpati Panditārādhya and Mallikārjuna Panditārādhya—the exploit of tying up the fire in a cloth belongs to Srīpati alone. The story goes that Srīpati took a vow that Siva's blessing was all supreme and collected Agni (the god of fire) in a piece of cloth and tied him up to a *Vahni* tree, with the result that for seven continuous days Agni—having been thus tied up—was unavailable. Brāhmans living in the vicinity feeling that their daily ceremonial, which involves the worship of Agni, whether for sacrifices to be offered to the gods or to ancestors, would be rendered wholly impossible by this act of Srīpati, waited on him and handing him a certificate of victory, obtained back Agni from him. (See R. Narasimhachar, *Karnātaka Kavicharite*, Ed. 1924, 212-13.)

This miracle of Srīpati evidently produced a great impression and his fame spread far and wide, so that long after he ceased to exist, it appears to have given him a pre-eminence wherever Vīrasaivas lived. That is how we are to understand the references to it in the works of Sankarārādhya and Gubbiya Mallanārya. When was the miracle wrought? The inscriptional record in which it is referred to has been assigned, as we have seen above, to the reign of Rudrāmba, the Kākatīya Empress, who ruled from 1295 to 1323 A.D. This may be temporarily accepted, provided it is understood that the event is set down to the end of Rudrāmba's reign rather than to its beginning. This is the more necessary, as Srīpati appears as a critic of Madhvāchārya's views in his Commentary and sufficient time should be allowed for such a dissemination of his views as to require pointed refutation at his hands. On this ground alone, I would suggest that Srīpati was a younger contemporary of Queen Rudrāmba and lived long after the close of her reign. This view is strengthened by the Kondavīdu lithic record of 1405 A.D. which mentions Srīpati's grandson (see below).

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[3] In this Kannada verse there is a pun on the words *Bhava* and *Pandita*. The whole verse is an example of what is known as the double entendre.

We may here dispose of another suggestion that Srīpati should be assigned to the 12th century A.D. Mr. R. Narasimhachar in his *Karnātaka Kavicharite* states that as Vīrasaiva poets mention always together, at the commencement of their poems, the three Pandits, Sivalenka Manchanna, Srīpati Pandita and Mallikārjuna Pandita, and praise them quoting *Basava Purāna* (Sandhis 9 and 58), they should have been contemporaries of each other and of Basava. This suggestion cannot be maintained in view of the fact that as Basava lived about 1160 A.D. in the reign of King Bijjala (1156-1167), Srīpati would have to be assigned to about 1167 A.D. to make him his contemporary. As a matter of fact we find him refuting the doctrines of Madhvāchārya, mentioning him both by name and by implication. As Madhvāchārya lived on and after 1238 A.D., Srīpati should be referred to a date posterior to him. As pointed out above, Gubbiya Mallanna, the Vīrasaiva poet, who flourished about 1513 A.D., mentions Srīpati (he calls him *Srīpatīsvaradēva*) in his *Bhāvachintā-ratna*. As Gubbiya Mallanna specifically states that he wrote the *Bhāvachintā-ratna* in Saka 1435 (A.D. 1513), there can be no doubt about that date. This fact leads us to the conclusion that the upper limit for Srīpati's time should be set down at about 1400 A.D. allowing about a hundred years for his attaining the status of an ancient worthy to be associated with the earliest resuscitators of Vīrasaivism and quoted with respect by Mallanna. It follows from this that Srīpati's date should be between 1238 A.D. and 1400 A.D. We may not be far wrong if we tentatively assigned him to about 1400 A.D. This would allow just a century and a half for the development of Madhva's system which Srīpati criticises in some detail.

Reverting to Vīranāmātya's reference to Srīpati, we have to enquire who was the king of Peda-Vēgi whose *guru* was Srīpati. Vīranāmātya gives his name as "that ornament to the Chālukya dynasty King Vishnuvardhana Mahārāja Dēvabhallāna Vīra Perumāl Pratāpa-Chōla," who is coupled with the Saka date 1109 (A.D. 1187). This prince may be identified with Bhallanarēndra (or Ballādhinātha) who is mentioned in a couple of inscriptions at Peddakallepalli in the Krishna District. Both of these records are to be found on the Nandi pillar at the Nāgēsvara temple at that place, one dated in Saka 1076 (A.D. 1154), recording gifts of gold (*Kulōttunga-māda*) for lamps by Somaladēvi, queen of Bhallanarēndra (Ballādhinātha), the son of Chālukya Bhīma and Abbaladēvi and grandson of Balla of the lunar race (*M.E.R.*, Nos. 131 and 132 of 1897; as to Chālukya-Bhīma I, see C. P. Grant No. 14 of 1908-09, *M.E.R.*, 1909, pp. 108-09 and *E.I.*, V. 127-137). As the difference between the date given by Vīranāmātya and that mentioned by the two inscriptional records is only 33 years, it may be conceded that the king's name is correctly given, though it has to be remarked that Srīpati could not have lived so early as 1187 or 1154 A.D., which is nearly a century earlier than the date of Madhvāchārya, whose views he criticises. The only possible inference is that Vīranāmātya has mixed up the dates of Srīpati and Bhallanarēndra and ante-dated the former, by nearly two centuries. It is possible that he did so in order to make Srīpati's connection, as their *guru*, with the Tēlikas, which was a fact, look more ancient. While Srīpati might not have been the *guru* of Bhallanarēndra, it is possible he was actually the *guru* of certain princes of his own time, as we know from other sources that Saiva teachers were actually during many centuries *gurus* of kings all over Southern India.

Pōchirāju Vīranāmātya also calls himself as Kolakatūri Virāna, he being named after Kolakatūri Vīrabhadra, his family God. He was the author of many other Telugu works including *Krishnārjuna Samvāda*, written in his 14th year, *Vibhūtimāhātmyam* (in *dvipada* metre) in his 22nd year, *Mārkandēyacharitram* in his 26th year and *Srīmuktādēvukatha* in his 36th year. He states he composed the *Manuvamsapurānamu* in his 30th year. He also rendered Sankarāchārya's *Ānandalahari* and *Soundaryalahari* and Bhartruhari's *Subhāshita* into Telugu *Satakas*. One other work of his of interest to us is *Bhallānacharitramu*, in which there is a further reference to Srīpati Panditāchārya (Madras Oriental MSS. Library, *D.C.* II, No. 600). The genealogical verses and colophons of *Manuvamsapurāna* and *Bhallānacharitramu* agree throughout, while in the introductory verses of the latter Vīranāmātya acknowledges his authorship of *Manuvamsapurāna*, which he styles *Manuvamsamukhya-nripa-purāna*. There is, therefore, no doubt that he is the author of both these works, besides many others, for in the *Manuvamsapurāna* he states that he had spent many days most piously in composing stories relating to Siva.

శివకథా రచనాది విశేషభక్తి ।
యుక్తి దినములు గడుపుచునున్నవాడ ॥

Sivakathā rachanādi visēsha bhakti ।
Yukti dinamulu gadupuchununnavāda ॥

He was evidently an ardent Saiva—probably a Vīrasaiva—of the Krishna district. There are vivid descriptions of Masulipatam (or Bandar) and Bezwada in his work. Though he belonged to Kolakatūru, he probably had made Bezwada his headquarters. Here he found a patron in a painter (of the *Chitrakāra* caste) named Dāmu Moggana, the second of four sons of Peddaya and Venkamāmba. His *guru* was, we are told, Sambhulinga, son of Mahādeva-Dēsika, who was born of the family of Srīpati Panditārādhya of the prosperous town of Vijayavātika (*i.e.*, Bezwada). This part of the text may be quoted :—

శ్రీ లలిత జయవాటికానగర సంస్థాన......శ్రీపతిపండితారాధ్య వంశ సముద్భవ మహాదేవాఖ్య దేశికాత్మసంభవ శంభులింగ నామ గురు కరజన నుండును......

Srī lalita Jayavātikānagara samsthāna· · · Srīpati-panditārādhya vamsa samudbhava mahādēvākhya Dēsikātma sambhava Sambhulinga nāma guru karajananundunu.

Vīrana states that it was at Moggana's instance that he undertook to compose the *Bhallānacharitra* (also called *Bhallānanripu-Katha*). He was entrusted with this work, because Moggana knew that poet Vīrana was a learned poet in both Sanskrit and Telugu and that he had made an intelligent study of the works in those languages. These are statements put into the mouth of Moggana about himself and may be taken as evidence of his intimate knowledge of Sānskrit and Telugu literature. *Bhallānacharitra* was, however, not dedicated to Moggana, who, though only a painter by profession, had humility enough to suggest to Vīrana that he should compose his work in the name of Mahēsvara. From the manner in which Dāmu Moggana is mentioned—holding court surrounded by his castemen, etc.,—it would seem he was a flourishing merchant who had evinced some interest both in religion and literary effort. His patronage of Vīrana helps us to realize the fact that Srīpati Panditārādhya had left an abiding influence in his native district of Krishna and round about and that he had a large number of followers even among the humbler classes, who looked to his descendants for their spiritual welfare. Evidently Srīpati's name was still—in Vīrana's time—a name to conjure with; otherwise Vīrana would not have taken the trouble to mention Sambhulinga's descent from him. Srīpati's name evidently added, in Vīrana's opinion, to the weight of his patron's position and status in society.

The selection of *Bhallānacharitra* for the display of his poetical talents would seem to indicate that both Vīrana and his patron were ardent Saivas—and Vīrasaivas too. This inference is partially at least confirmed by the mention of the name of Srīpati Pandita as the ancestor of Sambhulinga, the *guru* of Vīrana's patron. The *Bhallānacharitra* narrates the story of Bhallāna, a devotee of

Siva, who is said to have pleased Him by sacrificing his dearest things for His sake. That it is a highly popular *Sivakatha* is evidenced by the fact that besides Vīrana's poetical version of it in Telugu, there are two others of it, one by Mallavarapu Vatēsvara (see Madras Oriental MSS. Library, *Telugu MSS., D.C.* VI, No. 598) and another by Kūchimanchi Timmaya, the well-known author of the *Achcha Telugu Ramayana* (see *ibid.*, *Triennial Catalogue*, Telugu, Part III, No. 59).

The next literary reference to Srīpati Panditārādhya is in the *Pattābhirāmavilāsamu* by poet Nāgalinga, son of Vīranārādhya (or Virēsalinga), grandson of Sambhulinga, and a descendant of Srīpati Panditārādhya. This Sambhulinga may be identified with Sambhulinga, the *guru* of Moggana, to whom Vīrana dedicated the *Bhallānacharitra.* (Madras Oriental MSS. Library, *Telugu MSS.*, *T.C.*, Part III, No. 16). In the introductory verses we are told that Nāgalinga was well versed in Sānskrit and Telugu and that he was a great grammarian in both these languages. Also, he is spoken of as proficient in different kinds of poetry—such as *bandha*, *chitra*, etc.—and that he was a handsome-looking person and bore a character for equanimity of temper. It is specially mentioned that he was a descendant of the family of *Panditārādhya* (*i.e.*, Srīpati Panditārādhya). The exact words used are:—పండితారాధ్యవంశ సంభవుఁడు (*Panditārādhya vamsa sambhavundu*). In the colophon, we are further told that he belonged to the Kausika-gōtra, and that he was born as the moon to the ocean of the family of Srīpati Panditārādhya. The actual words used are :—

....కవితామాధురీధురీణ కౌశికగోత్రపవిత్ర శ్రీపతిపండితారాధ్యవంశ పయః పయోరాశి రాకాసుధాకరాయమాన ...... శంభులింగారాధ్య పౌత్ర వీరనారాధ్య సత్కవిపుత్ర సకలసుకవివిధేయ నాగలింగాభిధేయ ప్రణీతంబైన ....

....*Kavitā mādhurī dhurīna Kausikagōtra pavitra Srīpatipanditārādhya vamsapayah payōrāsi rākāsudhākarāyamāna* ....

If, as suggested above, Sambhulinga, the grandfather of Nāgalinga, may be justifiably identified with Sambhulinga, the *guru* of Chitrakāra Moggana of Bezwada, to whom Kolakatūri Vīrana dedicated his *Bhallānacharitra*, then these two works—*Bhallānacharitra* and *Pattābhirāmavilāsamu*—cannot be separated from each other by a long distance of time. Probably a period of fifty years separated them from each other in regard to the date of their composition.

Nāgalinga, the author of *Pattābhirāmavilāsamu*, dedicated his work to Venkatarāya, a Madhva Brāhman, whose genealogy is given at length by him in the introductory verses. He evidently belonged to a respected family which had for some generations been connected on the maternal side with the family of Kondavīti Appāji, whose descendants had administered the territories dependent on the fortresses of Vinukonda, Bellamkonda and Kondavīdu, in the present Guntur district.

Another reference to Srīpatipandita is to be found in a work called *Gurustōtram*, which is in praise of one Paramārādhya. This Paramārādhya is described as the son of Mallikēsvaralinga, who again is spoken of as a descendant of Srīpatipandita. As Paramārādhya is said to have belonged in this work to the Jayavātika family, it has to be inferred that Srīpatipandita's family was familiarly known by this name, because Srīpati had made himself famous in Vijayavātika (*i.e.*, Bezwada). The following verse from the *Stōtra* gives the above information:—

श्रीमच्छ्रीपतिपण्डितान्वयसुधा सिन्ध्वादि मूलोगुरुः ।
स्वामिश्री जयवाटिकानगर संतानो द्विजाग्रेसरः ॥
श्रीमल्लेश्वर लिङ्गगर्भ जननः शृङ्गार भास्वद्वरो ।
धामार्यः सकलार्थमुक्तिफलद स्तंभावयेऽहं सदा ॥

Srīmad Srīpati Panditānvaya sudhā sindhvādimūlō guruhu ।
Swāmi Srī Jayavātikānagara santānō dvijāgrēsaraha ॥
Srī Mallēsvaralinga garbhajananaha sringārabhāsvadvarō ।
Dhāmāryaha sakalārthamuktiphaladaha tam bhāvaye aham sadā ॥

10635

"I meditate upon him always who is the chief descendant of the family of Srīpatipandita of spotless fame and who is the best among the *Dwijas* of the Srī Jayavātikānagara family; who was born in the parentage of Mallēsvaralinga, who was shining resplendent in good qualities and who was the chief source for granting the fruit of salvation (*Mukti*) to many of his adorers."

Perhaps the title of "Jayavātika" was applied to by Srīpatipandita's descendants to distinguish them from the descendants of other Srīpatis known to Sānskrit literature, *e.g.* Srīpatidīkshita and Srīpati, the author of *Jyautisharatnamāla*, *Siddhāntasēkhara* and other astrological works. (See Madras *D.C. Sānskrit* XXIV, R. No. 13423 at p. 9049; R. No. 13506 at p. 9125, etc.) Srīpatidīkshita was the father of Dēvarādīkshita or Dēvarāya, the author of *Prasannarāmāyana*. (*Ibid.*, XX, No. 11607 at p. 7780.) There was, besides, a Srīpatibhatta, who was the father of Nārāyanabhatta, author of a commentary on Vādirāja's *Rukmaṇīsavijaya*. (See *ibid.*, XX, R. Nos. 11717 and 11718.)

The combined testimony of inscriptions and literary references so far put forward may be held to establish the following facts:—(1) That Srīpati Pandita was a person of great fame as a Vīrasaiva teacher and was not improbably the *guru* of the ruling king of Vegi of his time; (2) that he lived about *circa* 1400 A.D.; (3) that Bezwada was the centre of his religious activities, at least before he attained to *Sanyāsa*; (4) that the miracle of bundling up live coals in a China-muslin cloth was performed at Bezwada; (5) that one of the effects of his activities and of the miracle performed by him was probably the conversion of the old temple of Skanda there into that of Mallēsvara, probably after the famous god of Srī-saila, to whom he was devoted; (6) that his influence spread as far as Srī-saila in the Kurnool district; (7) that he had a large number of followers in what are now the Guntur, Nellore, Kurnool and probably also Gōdāvari districts; (8) that influential industrial and mercantile classes like the Tēlikas, Chitrakāras and others more largely adopted Vīrasaivism as the result of his activities; (9) that he belonged to a highly literary family, learned in both Sānskrit and Telugu; (10) that some of his descendants distinguished themselves as religious teachers and as poets; and (11) that there is every reason to believe that he was himself instrumental in popularizing the Vīrasaiva faith over a wide extent of country.

Object of the Bhashya.

The *Bhāshya* is intended to put down, Srīpati says in his work, the pride of evil opponents. He further praises his work as follows:—As one putting an end to all evil deeds and results; as one honoured by wise men; as one which sheds light on the eternal truth; as one containing the essence of all Upanishads; as forming an ornament to Visēshādvaita; and as a Sūtra Bhāshya which inculcates Sivagnāna.

Srīpati adds that he specially composed the work for the benefit of Vīrasaivas, whom he thus describes:—

> The Saivas who have knowledge of the Vēdas and Āgamas and their inner spiritual meanings; who are fired with the desire to attain Mōksha; who are followers of the Vēdic path; and who are strict in following the tenets of pure or strict Saivism.

The Vriththi on which it is Based.

Srīpati Panditāchārya suggests that his exposition of the Visēshādvaita from the point of view of the Vīrasaiva doctrine is in consonance with the declared views of all the Smrithis. He also mentions the further fact that his *Bhāshya* follows in its interpretation of the Sūtras of Bādarāyana, the *Vriththi* of Agastyamuni. (See Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 1, Mangalācharana Sloka, No. 16, page 27, line 26.) Apparently as Sankara followed the *Varāha Sahōdara Vriththi*, Rāmānuja the *Bodhāyana Vriththi*, and Madhva the *Hayagrīva Brahmavidya*, Srīpati seems to have followed the *Agastya*

Vriththi. This *Agastya Vriththi*, which must be presumed to be an ancient work, should not be confounded with *Agastya Sūtras*, a Sūtra treatise evidently modern in diction and style, written in imitation of *Vyāsa Sūtras*, which are apparently intended like the very similar work *Sāktadarsana*, to establish that Sakti is the supreme deity. (See *Triennial Catalogue of MSS.* of the Madras Oriental MSS. Library, Vol. I, Part I, Nos. 89 and 778.)[4]

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[4] Agastya is often described as the progenitor of the civilization of the South of India. In a MS. included in the Mackenzie Series, an account of this great *muni* is given, based partly on the first section of the *Kāsi Khanda* of the *Skanda Purāna* and partly on local legends. (See *Agastya Varalar*, Wilson's *Mackenzie MSS.*, p. 242, No. 17.) In this work, he is said to have come from the North of India, and settled finally in the South, where he composed the first elements of Tamil Grammar. His grammatical writings no longer exist in consequence, it is said, of an imprecation upon him by his disciple Tolgāppiyar. All the same, a short grammar of the Tamil language—called *Agastya Vyākarana*—is known (*ibid.*, 248). In another MS. work called the *Agastya Jnyāna* in the same Mackenzie series (*ibid.*, 227-228), Agastya is himself made to declare that he was originally a Sūdra and that he was subsequently purified by his Brāhman preceptor. The story, which is set down in a hundred verses, is interesting as showing how closely Agastya is connected with Siva and the religion named after him. "I declare," he is made to say, "that I obtained the eminent name of Agastya, because I was formerly a Sūdra, my preceptor being a Brāhman who resided in the South of Mahāmēru. Before receiving his instructions, I purified my animal frame of all imperfections by abstract devotion. I forsook the world, and lived in caves and rocks, when my holy preceptor appeared and said, 'Come, I admit you as my disciple'. I assented and followed. He lighted a sacrificial fire, and placed in it a jar, into which he commanded me to leap. I did so, and was consumed, and was born again, and issued from the jar, which was then changed into the form of a woman. Verily that jar was a form of Mahēswari, and the Brāhman of Mahādēva, who were my parents. They brought me up, and trained me in all learning and finally Siva conferred on me immortality." Later, by command of Siva, he repaired to the South to illuminate the darkness of the people. Here he invented, it is added, eighteen languages, including the Sen Tamil, the old or poetical Tamil. Finally, under the order of Siva, he

Siddhantas mentioned in the Bhashya.

Among the Siddhāntas Srīpati refers to are the *Kānva Siddhānta*, from which he differs, and the Sankara, Bhatta, Bhāskara, Naiyāyikamata, etc., *Naiyāyakamatasiddhānta*, evidently meaning *Nyāya siddhānta*, *i.e.*, the Siddhānta of the Nyāya School. There are several works of this school such as *Nyāya Kaustubha*, which is a treatise on Nyāya logic by Mahadeva Panatāmakara (Punatambakar), son of Mukundapandita (Madras *D.C.* VIII, No. 4200);

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composed various Sāstras and wrote works on *Rasāyana* (Alchemy), Medicine and Divine Wisdom. Most of his works are said to have perished, though a list of those bearing on medicine is given in the MS. above referred to (*ibid.*, 228). Agastya is said to have taken up his residence on Podimalai, at the source of the Tāmbraparni river, mythologically described as his daughter by adoption, given to him by Siva. The Mackenzie MSS. include a number of works on medicine attributed to him. Among these are:—(1) *Agastya Vaidyam*, which treats of the preparation of medicines; (2) *Agastya Purāna Sūtra*, which is a work on mystical and alchemical medicine, on the cure of diseases by religious rites or visiting holy shrines: it also comprises the *Pūjā-Vidhi*, which treats of the worship of Siva and other deities and the *Dīkshā-Vidhi*, which treats of the *Dīksha* or ceremony of initiation in the Saiva faith; (3) *Bhasmamore*, a work on alchemical or metallic medicines, containing rules for their calcination and reduction to powder, the preparation of different kinds of oxides, and the extraction of sulphuric acid; (4) *Bālachikitsā*, a treatise on the diseases of infants, difficult parturition, puerperal fever, etc.; (5) *Agastya Vaidya Munnūr*, a tract on the calcination and reduction of various vegetable and mineral articles to powder, for use in medicine; and on the extraction of essential oils, etc.; (6) *Agastya Vaidya Nūthiyambid*, a treatise on the purification of various poisonous substances and their employment in medicine; (7) *Agastya Vaidya Nappatettu*, a short tract on the cure of gonorrhœa: (8) *Vaidya Sūtra Nūru*, a set of hundred verses on different diseases and modes of treatment; and (9) *Muppu*, a tract on preparing medicines of the alkaline ashes of vegetables, etc. (Wilson, *Mackenzie MSS.*, 245-246). Other works attributed to Agastya in Tamil are: *Agastya Tirattu*, *Agattiyam*, etc. A disciple of Agastya is said to have written *Pannirupadalam*, on which is based the *Purapporul Ventamālai*, written by Aiyanāridanār, a descendant of Chēra Kings. (See Madras *D.C. Tamil*, I, No. 78.) Agastya is thus suggested to be the original civilizer of the South and as the

Nyāyachūdāmani, another work on logic by Ramakrishnādhwarin, son of Dharmarājavarīndra (*ibid.*, No. 4201); and *Nyāyapārijāta* by Yallayārya (*ibid.*, No. 4202). Other well-known works are *Nyāyaprakāsika*, a commentary on the *Tarkabhāshāprakāsika* of Chennabhatta, by Naraharimisra; *Nyāyaratnatīka* (or *Dyutimālika*), a commentary on Manikantha's *Nyāyaratna* by Nrisimhayajvan; and *Nyāyasāstrārthadīpa* by Sasādhara, which is better known as *Sasādharīya* after the author. A commentary on this work is the *Prathā* by Bhishagratna. Another commentary, called *Nyāyaratna*, is by Dharmarājādhvarīndra. Finally there is the *Nyāyasiddhāntamanjari* by Jānakīnātha *alias* Chudāmanibhattāchārya. There is a commentary on this work, called *Tarkaprakāsika*, by Srīkanta.

Bhatta is, we know to be, Kumārila Bhatta, the great Mīmāmsa commentator, who lived about 730 A.D. He was the author of *Tantravārtika*, a commentary on Sabara Svāmin's *Bhāshya* on the *Mīmāmsa Sūtras*, perhaps the oldest *Bhāshya* on the *Mīmāmsa* in existence, going back to probably the first century B.C. On the *Bhātta-mata*, as his system is called, there are many valuable unpublished commentaries in the Madras Government Oriental MSS. Library. Prabhākara is another commentator on the *Mīmāmsa* and his system is known

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originator of the Tamil and other languages current in it. His close connection with the Saiva religion is also more than hinted at in some of the Tamil MSS. above referred to. A Sānskrit MS. describes him as the author of *Panchadasi Mūlamantra Vyākhyā*, which is a commentary on the *Panchadasi Mūlamantra*, which is an alternative name for *Panchadasākshariмantra*. This *mantra* is addressed to Tripurasundari and consists of fifteen syllables. It is supposed to have power to confer prosperity on one and to make him a great poet. The commentary is sometimes called *Srīvidyatīkā*. (See Madras *D.C.* XIII, No. 6552; also Nos. 6548 to 6550.)

There is thus some reason for connecting Agastya with Saivism. Evidently Srīpati echoes the tradition when he states that he follows the *Vriththi* of Agastyamuni in his interpretation of Bādarāyana's *Brahma Sūtras*. The suggestion seems to be that the interpretation is an ancient one and is based on the traditional views attributed to Agastya.

as *Prābhākara-mata*. He is not mentioned by name by Srīpati. On his work, the *Brihati*, which is a commentary on Sabara Svāmin's *Mīmāmsa Sūtra Bhāshya*, there is an excellent commentary written by Sālikanātha, a well-known exponent of Prabhākara doctrines. It is known as *Rijumālāpanchika*, a MS. copy of which is in the Madras Government Oriental MSS. Library. Both Bhatta and Prabhākara are mentioned by Mādhava in his *Sarvadarsana Sangraha* in his chapter on the *Jaimini-Darsana*. The difference between these two exponents is well brought out by him in his account of them. The followers of Bhatta maintained, he says, that words signify something definite by themselves, apart from the sentence. Those of Prabhākara, on the contrary, held that the whole sentence is a command relating to the sacrifice, as they maintain that words only signify an action or something to be done. The former are called *abhihitānvaya-vādins* and the latter *anvitābhidhāna-vādins*. The Prabhākaras are referred to by Rāmānuja in his *Srī-Bhāshya* (Adhikarana 1, Sūtra 1) as "those who maintain that the syntactical meaning of sentences is to be finally found in action," etc. Bhāskara is another commentator mentioned by Srīpati. As there are many authors, ancient and modern, of this name, it is necessary to point out that the Bhāskara referred to by Srīpati is the earliest and most famous of them all. He was an early commentator of the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyana and is referred to and criticized by Rāmānuja (see *Srī Bhāshya*, II. i, 15) and by the author of the *Madhva-vijaya* (*Sarga I*) as one criticised by Ānandatīrtha. In the colophons to his work, called *Sārīraka Mīmāmsa Bhāshya*, Bhāskara styles himself as *Bhāskarāchārya*. He should be distinguished from Bhatta Bhāskara, the commentator on the *Taittirīya Āranyaka*, who is referred to below. He should also not be confounded with the great astronomer Bhāskarācharya, born in 1114 A.D., whose *Siddhānta Sirōmani* is next only in authority to the *Sūrya Siddhānta*, a work that has been referred to about 300 A.D. The Bhāskara of Srīpati notices, with

Sankara, the Lōkāyatikas, a sect of the Chārvākas, in his work. Srīpati's references to Buddha, Rāmānuja and Madhva and their Siddhāntas will be found detailed at some length below. Srīpati also mentions Nīlakantha Bhagavatpāda, Ghantānāda and Jyōtirmatha (Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 21, page 74, line 30).

Nīlakantha is further referred to below. As to Ghantānāda, not much is known. The term, however, appears as a title of Panta Mailāra, described as the great-grandson of Sūra, grandson of Pōta and the son of Mumbāmba and Mummadīndra, a brave lieutenant of Pratāpa-Dēva-Rāya II in battle. At the request of this Mailāra, who, by the way, has been identified with the chief of the name mentioned by Srīnātha in one of his *Chātu* verses, Dēva-Raya II made a grant, dated on the Sivarātri day of the month of Māgha in the year Kīlaka in Saka 1351 (A.D. 1429). Another grant in his favour was made on the 11th day of the bright fortnight of Māgha of the year Subhakrit, Saka 1404 (A.D. 1482) by Dēva-Rāya, who is here spoken of as Praudha-Dēva-Rāya. If the title *Ghantānāda* is identical with this title, Ghantānāda should be taken to be a great religious teacher who lived long before the 15th century A.D., and whose fame was such that his name came to be assumed as a title by Saiva Chiefs in later times (see Sewell's *List of Antiquities*, C. P. No. 87; also Butterworth and Venugopal Chetty, *Nellore Inscriptions*, C.P. No. 18; *M.E.R.* No. 211 of 1894). The *Jyōtirmatha* referred to is quite an ancient system of thought to which we have references in the *Bhagavad-Gīta* and the *Uttararāma Charita* (*Bhagavad-Gīta*, V. 24 and XIII. 17; *Uttararāma Charita*, IV. 18). According to this school of thought, Light is regarded as the Supreme Spirit, the Light referred to being the Light of Brahman. In this school, light is the divine principle of life and of intelligence.

The Author's Date.

As regards the period of time to which Srīpati, the Commentator, should be assigned, it has been pointed out above that judging from certain lithic records and literary references he should have belonged to *circa* 1400 A.D. From the internal evidence afforded by his *Bhāshya* itself, it is clear that he is posterior to Rāmānuja, to whose doctrines he specifically refers by name and which he refutes in detail, especially his regard for Tāntric Āgamas, including idol worship, which Srīpati throughout denounces.

> *Pāribhāshāpradhāna Rāmānuja Sāstram Vēdamūlatvā bhāvāt avaidikam iti ghantāghōshaha* (Adhyāya II, Pāda II, Sūtra 42, line 18, page 247).

There is a reference also to the practices prevailing among the followers of Rāmānuja in regard to the branding of the Sankha and the Chakra and the worship of the Sāligrāma in a passage occurring in Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 12. The relevant passages are as follows :—

तान्त्रिकस्सर्वकर्माणि विष्णुमुद्दिश्य कारयेत् ॥
वैदिकस्सर्वकर्माणि शिवमुद्दिश्य कारयेत् ॥
तथापि शिवोपासनामेव सद्यो मुक्तिः ॥

Tāntrikas sarva karmāni Vishnumuddisya kārayēt ॥
Vaidikas sarva karmāni Sivamuddisya kārayēt ॥
Tathāpi Sivōpāsanāmeva Sadyō-muktihi ॥

Again,

शंखचक्रमुद्राधारणनिरासः ; तथा च सालिग्रामशिलापूजादि अवश्यं वर्जयेत् ॥
Sankha chakra mudrā dhārana nirāsah ; tathācha Sāligrāma silā pūjādi avasyam varjayēt ॥

He is as much against the Tāntric doctrines of Pāsupatas as of Rāmānuja. In Adhyāya I, Pāda II, Sūtra 1, he has the following :—

पाञ्चरात्रादिवत्पाशुपत्यागमानां निरस्तत्वात् ॥
Pāncharātrādivat Pāsupatyāgamānām nirastatvāt ॥

Srīpati is also posterior in date to Ēkōrāma and the five Āchāryas of the Vīrasaiva religion, who, though they are by some modern writers classed (see E. P. Rice's *Kanarese Literature*, 54-55) as contemporaries of Basava, the great reformer, who himself belonged to the third quarter of the 12th century, are undoubtedly considerably more ancient than Basava. Basava's work presumes the

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previous existence of Āchāryas who had prepared the ground for him. Basava's vigorous propaganda resulted in the development of the Vīrasaiva religion. This is entirely in accordance with the view of Sir R. G. Bhandārkar as developed in his *Vaishnavism*, *Saivism*, etc., 132. Though Basava is not referred to by name by Srīpati, it is inferable that Srīpati belongs to the post-Basava period. This could not well be otherwise, as Basava came long after Rāmānuja.

Not only Srīpati refers to and refutes the doctrines of Sankara and Rāmānuja, but also criticizes in more than one place the distinctively dualistic philosophy of Madhvāchārya. Srīpati's date has, therefore, to be fixed as posterior to Madhvāchārya, say between 1300 and 1400 A.D. This date may be taken as approximately correct, though it is not quite in agreement with what Mr. P. Gopinath Kaviraj has suggested (1200 A.D.) in the *Hindustan Review* for January 1923. Seeing that Rāmānuja lived in the first half of the 12th century, during the reign of the Hoysala King Vishnuvardhana (1111 to 1141 A.D.) and that Srīpati is posterior in date to Basava, who lived about 1167 A.D., and that Madhvāchārya lived from and after 1238 A.D., this date being fixed with reference to the Sri Kūrmam inscriptions of Narahari Tīrtha and Mutt traditions combined, it seems safe to assume the date mentioned above.[5] This date will allow a certain period of time for the promulgation of the doctrines of Rāmānuja and Madhvāchārya for them to assume a predominance, which required refutation at the hands of a Vīrasaiva teacher of eminence like Srīpati Panditāchārya.

Light from Inscriptions.

A few lithic inscriptions lend additional weight to this deduction. The most important of these is one which comes from a ruined *mantap* at Kondavīdu, the celebrated hill capital of the Reddis, who ruled from 1328 to 1427 A.D. This is a Telugu record and is dated in Saka 1327, cyclic year Pārthiva and registers that the stone beam in the *gōpura* of the Visvēsvara temple there was presented by one Damalapati Chennamanenimgāru for the merit of his spiritual teacher Srīgiriayyamgāru, who was the grandson (?) of Panditārādhyadēva (*M.E.R.*, 1910, 539 of 1909). There is little doubt that the Panditārādhyadēva referred to in this record is the same as Srīpati Panditārādhya, he having been, from what has been stated before, known more commonly as *Panditārādhya* (see above quotation from *Pattābhirāmavilāsamu*). This identification being conceded, we have the date Saka 1327, Pārthiva, for his grandson Srīgiri. Saka 1327, Pārthiva, corresponds to A.D. 1405. Taking it for granted that Srīpati had had a grown-up grandson in the 40th year of his age—a by no means impossible suggestion—his date would fall in or about 1365 A.D., and if he had been alive even a few years before the date of this grant in favour of his grandson—who himself is spoken of as a spiritual teacher in this record—he would have to be set down to *circa* 1400 A.D., a date which is in agreement with our deductions from independent sources as to his time. On a pillar of the same *mantap* on which the above-mentioned record is found, there is another one—a mutilated one—of Reddi King Peda-Kōmati-Vēma dated in Saka 1330, corresponding to 1408 A.D. (*M.E.R.*, 1910, No. 538 of 1909). This record is dated only three years later than the one recording the gift in favour of Srīgiri, grandson of Srīpati Panditārādhyadēva. Peda-Kōmati-Vēma, as we know, was the author of *Sringāradīpika*, a commentary on the *Amara Sataka*. Evidently, Srīpati Pandita was a contemporary of Peda-Kōmati-Vēma. The Reddi chief, Damalapati Chennamanenimgāru, who presented the stone beam for the merit of Srīpati's grandson, was evidently the descendant of a Tamil chief who had long held sway in the

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[5] According to lithic inscriptions dated in 1281 and 1293 A.D., Naraharitīrtha, the Madhva saint—third in succession to Sri Madhvāchārya—who is mentioned in them should have lived about that time. (See *M.E.R.* 1896 and 1900.) He is believed to have lived up to 1333 A.D.

Kondavīdu country, as his title "Damalapati" (*i.e.*, Dramilapati, or Dravida lord) shows.

The next record comes from Panem, Kurnool district, but is unfortunately not dated. On a pillar in the *Mukha-mantapa* of the Panikēsvara Svāmin temple at this place is a record which registers the fact that one Vibhūti Gauraya visited the temple. It is mentioned that he was born at Māchirājupalli, near Warrangal, and that he had settled on the top of Srīgiri and was the servant of Panditārādhya, who may be identified with Srīpati Pandita. There are three other records of this Vibhūti Gauraya, who was evidently a person of some importance as the details given about the place of his birth and his settling down at Srī-sailam indicate. The statement that he was the "servant" of Srīpati Panditārādhya signifies possibly his retirement from temporal affairs and becoming a disciple of the great teacher Srīpati Panditārādhya, probably the greatest Vīrasaiva teacher of the time. (*M.E.R.*, 1914, No. 169 of 1913; also 168 of 1913; for the Reddi kings of Kondavīdu, see *E.I.*, XI, 313 *et seq.*; and Venkayya, *Ancient History of Nellore*, 23-24.)

Posterior to Nilakantha, Author of Bhashya on Suta Samhita.

Srīpati quotes from Nīlakantha's *Bhāshya* on *Sūta-Samhita* (on *Dhyāna Yōgakhanda*) in Adhyāya II, Pāda II, Sūtra 42, page 244, line 7; also in Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 21, page 74, line 29, where he refers to Pūrvāchārya Nīlakantha Bhagavadpādāchārya's *Bhāshya* on *Chchāndōgya Upanishad*. I have been unable to trace these works in any of the Catalogues accessible to me. But there is hardly any doubt that this is the Nīlakantha, who is popularly but mistakenly described as an independent Saiva commentator on the *Vēdānta Sūtras*, whose alleged work is called the *Saiva Bhāshya*. Srīpati nowhere quotes the alleged latter work; if it had been in existence, he would have referred to it. He should not be confounded with the Nīlakantha, the best known Commentator of the *Mahābhārata*, who lived and wrote his *Bhāratabhāvadīpa* at Kūrpara, to the west of the Gōdāvari, in Mahārāshtra, and who, according to Burnell, belongs to the 16th century (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.* IV, i, No. 1958; Macdonell, *Sānskrit Literature*, 282, 290). Another Nīlakantha, *alias* Ayya Dīkshita, who flourished in the 1st half of the 17th century, was the author of the *Sivalīlārnava.* He was the grandson of Acca Dīkshita, grandson of Appayya Dīkshita, one of the finest exponents of Saiva Siddhānta. Nīlakanthasivāchārya's alleged *Bhāshya* goes by the name of *Nīlakantha Bhāshya*, which, on closer investigation is found to be only another name for Srīkantha's *Bhāshya*, known as *Brahma Mīmāmsa Bhāshya.* A commentary on the latter is Appayya Dīkshita's *Sivādityamanidīpikā*, in the colophon to which work Appayya Dīkshita plainly states that it is a commentary only on Srīkantha's *Bhāshya* and not on that of Nīlakantha's also, as has been suggested in some quarters. It is more than doubtful if there was really a Nīlakantha or Nīlakantha-Sivāchārya who was also a commentator on the *Brahma Sūtras.* Mr. S. S. Sūryanārāyana Sāstri, the author of *Sivādvaita of Srīkantha*, has, since the above was written, arrived at the same conclusion, arguing from a different point of view (see *Sivādvaita of Srīkantha*, 18, f.n. 23). The doctrines of Saivādvaita religion are propounded in *Sivādvaitanirnaya* by Appayya Dīkshita. The Nīlakantha-Sivāchārya above named should not, further, be confounded with a third person of the same name, who is well known to Vīrasaiva literature. This is Nīlakantha Sivāchārya, whose Sānskrit work, entitled *Kriyāsāra*, is often popularly, but erroneously, described as a commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras.* He is one of the more familiar Vīrasaiva teachers of the Kannada country. As he has been referred to in Mallanārya's *Vīrasaivāmrita-purāna*, a work which belongs to 1530, he must have been anterior to Mallannārya. How much exactly anterior to him, it is not known. But he has been assigned to the 14th century, though this seems a little too early for him. He cannot have lived earlier than Srīpati. In some MS. copies of his work, he is called Nīlakanthadīkshita or simply Nīlakantha. His work is also alternatively known as *Nigamāgama Sārasangraha*. It is not a *Bhāshya* on the *Bādarāyana Sūtras*. It is a work which, as the author himself states, treats of the quintessence of action as derivable from the Vēdas and Sāstras (*Nigamāgama Sārabhūta Kriyāsāra*) in the spirit of the teachings of the *Vyāsa Sūtras* (*Upōdghāta*, verses 11 and 12; *Prathamōpadēsa*, verse 1). He styles his work a *Prabandha* or treatise. It is divided into 32 *Upadēsas* and treats of a variety of topics, including the fundamental tenets of the Vīrasaiva faith. It is, in fact, a hand-book of interpretation of Vīrasaiva doctrines and beliefs. Even the 18 Purānas (including the *Rāmāyana*, the *Bhāgavata*, etc.) are interpreted in this work from the Vīrasaiva point of view. The point to note in regard to it is that it is undoubtedly a work much later than that of Srīpati. Its style is modern and somewhat artificial in character. The author's knowledge, though undoubtedly great, nowhere approaches the profundity of Srīpati. Srīpati shines as a learned scholar, an acute thinker and a great dialectician of a rare type, who had drunk deep at the fountain-head. Nīlakantha, who describes himself as the knower of the secret of the *Ēkōththara Sathasthala*, shows himself as a redactor and popularizer intent on interpreting everything known from the Vīrasaiva point of view. Nīlakantha refers to another work of his at the end of the nineteenth *Upadēsa* of his *Kriyāsāra*, but its name is not mentioned. His philosophical standpoint is also *bhēdā-bhēda* (see 3rd *Upadēsa*, verse 3) which is in keeping with Srīpati's teaching. Srīpati uses the phrase *Ubhaya Vēdānta Nigamāgama* repeatedly in his work and the fact that Nīlakantha gives this name to his work and suggests that his doctrine is also *bhēdā-bhēda*, shows that he was not unaware of Srīpati's work, to which he does not, however, so far as can be seen, directly refer by name. It is strange, however, that in the colophons appearing in the *Kriyāsāra* in the MS. copies of this work as found in the Madras Oriental MSS. Library (see *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.* in the Madras Oriental MSS. Library, XI, Nos. 5438 and 5549) and as printed in the Telugu script edition published by Mr. Vīrasangappa, at the Mysore Sārada Press, in the year Tārana, the work is described as that of the teacher Nīlakantha, who possessed the secret of the doctrine of *Ēkōththara Sathasthala* of the *Visishtādvaita* philosophy. A possible explanation is that the reference here is to *Saivavisishtādvaita* and not to Vaishnava or Rāmānuja's *Visishtādvaita*, for the *Ēkōththara Sathasthala* doctrine is not part of the latter's *Visishtādvaita* philosophy. The Vīrasaiva standpoint, though described by Nīlakantha in his colophons as *Visishtādvaita*, evidently following Srīkantha, who called his system Siva Visishtādvaita, is also plainly called by him *Bhēdābhēda*, which is in keeping with the Vīrasaiva standpoint as propounded by Srīpati in his *Bhāshya*.

Posterior to Srikantha, Author of Brahma Mimamsa Bhashya.

Srīkantha-Sivāchārya, whose *Bhāshya* on the *Brahma Sūtras* is also well known, though not a professed Vīrasaiva, approaches the Vīrasaiva point of view (see Bhandārkar's *Vaishnavism*, *Saivism*, etc., 137 ; Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.* X, p. 3874). Srīkantha-Sivācharya is referred to by name by Srīpati in Adhyāya II, Pāda I, Sūtra 22, page 200, line 8, as *Saivāgraganya Srīkantha Sivārādhya* and he quotes from Srīkantha's work *Brahma Mīmāmsa Bhāshya*. He again refers to him in Adhyāya III, Pāda II, Sūtra 8, page 320, line 33. Here he refers to Srīkantha as *Sivāchārya* and cites him in connection with the discussion of *Bhāva* and *Abhāva*, the leading topic of Sūtra 8. The change from Srīkantha *Sivārādhya* to Srīkantha *Sivāchārya* should be noted. The former designation would seem to indicate his being claimed as a Vīrasaiva by Srīpati.

Srīkantha Sivāchārya was the author of a Saiva commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras*. The work is commonly called *Brahmasūtrabhāshyam*, though in the colophon the author styles it more formally *Brahma Mīmāmsa Bhāshya*, the name by which it is actually cited by Srīpati. The most famous commentary on it is the work entitled *Brahmasūtra Bhāshya Vyākhyāya: Sivādityamanidīpika* by Appayya Dīkshita. Srīkantha Sivāchārya is sometimes briefly referred to as Srikanthāchārya, while he appears simply as "Srīkantha" in the colophons contained in his *Bhāshya*. Appayya Dīkshita wrote his *Nakshatravādāvali* (also called *Vādanakshatra Mālika*) to support the views of Srīkantha. (See Madras *D. C. of Sānskrit MSS.* X, Nos. 5079 and 5092, pages 3857 and 3874.)

Date of Srikantha from Literary Data.

The date of Srīkantha is not yet definitely settled. It has been suggested, on the basis of verbal and doctrinal resemblances, that he probably flourished close to the period of Rāmānuja, who, as we know, lived about the beginning of the 11th century A.D. But it has been stated that it is difficult to decide the question of priority and that there is also the possibility of explaining the resemblances referred to on the basis of a common original. The suggestion has been made that Srīkantha's treatment of Sūtras III, 3, 27-30, where he criticizes views which are said to be those of Rāmānuja and Nimbarka, who, chronologically speaking, came some time after Rāmānuja, is fairly conclusive in the matter. Mr. S. S. Sūryanārāyana Sāstri, who puts forward this view (*vide* his *Sivādvaita of Srīkantha*, 45 *et seq.*), holds that Srīkantha's criticism is effective and is not attempted to be met in any other commentary. Briefly put, this criticism bases itself on the position that until the attainment of Brahman, bondage continues (even after death) and that bondage without Karma is inconceivable. This position, it is remarked, has not been controverted elsewhere. Mr. Sūryanārāyana Sāstri also states that there is an inversion in the order of Sūtras 29 and 30, as read by other commentators and the inversion is not noticed by others. On these grounds, he suggests that it is "likely that Srīkantha came after all these, probably some time in the 13th century, when the Saiva Siddhānta was taking shape in the hands of the Santāna Āchāryas." There is, however, little in this reasoning, to support the question of date. Nor is there anything in the criticism of Rāmānuja that is novel; and as regards the inversion in the order of the Sūtras, such inversions occur in Srīpati's commentary also. This by itself cannot, therefore, be accepted as settling the question of the priority of Rāmānuja to Srīkantha. A writer in the *Jignyāsa*, suggests the opposite view that Srīkantha preceded Rāmānuja (see *Jignyāsa*, Part II, article on *Srīkantha*). In commencing his work Srīkantha states that he has corrected the errors (*kalusha*) of the commentators who preceded him and that Āryas and pious Saivas would find his commentary a great treasure (*mahānidhi*) (see Madras *D. C. of Sānskrit MSS.* X, p. 3874 *et seq.*, at page 3875; also *M.E.R.*, No. 188 of 1905). The words are:—

Pūrvāchārya kalushitam Srīkanthēna prasūdhate ||
Sarvavēdāntasārasya saurabhāsvādamōdinām |
Āryānām Sivanishthānām Bhāshyamētanmahanidhihi ||

Who were these commentators whom Srīkantha corrected? This statement would seem to indicate that several commentators had preceded him. Until we have definitely fixed his date, the reference to previous commentators cannot be correctly explained. Epigraphic records appear to throw some light on his date and to this we may now turn our attention.

Srikantha's Date as determined from Inscriptions.

Numerous inscriptions mention or refer to persons bearing the name of Srikantha and as the references occur at different intervals of time, it is of some interest to see which of these relates to Srīkantha, the author of the ***Bhāshya.*** First in order of date, perhaps, should have been the Srīkantha after whom the Srīkantha-Chaturvēdimangalam, a village in the Musuri taluk, Trichinopoly district, is named. This place is referred to in as many as fifteen lithic records dated from the 30th year of the reign of the Chōla King Parāntaka I to the 3rd year of Rājarāja III. It would seem to follow from these inscriptions that the Srīkantha after whom it was named should have flourished anterior to the rule of Parāntaka I (907-948 A.D.). Who he was, it is not possible to determine. A person bearing the name of Tiruvaiyan Srīkantha, *i.e.*, Srīkantha, the son of Tiruvaiyan, is mentioned in an inscription, dated in 965 A.D., found at Grāmam in the present South Arcot district (*M.E.R.*, No. 74 of 1905). He figures in it as a Vaidumba feudatory of the Rāshtrakūta King Krishna III (*M.E.R.*, 1901, page 42). Whether he could be identified with the name-father of Srīkantha-Chaturvēdimangalam is difficult to say in the present state of our knowledge of the history of Vaidumbas. The following is a list of the records in which *Srīkantha-Chaturvēdimangalam* is mentioned:—

(1) 600 of 1908 at Tirupattur, Musuri taluk, Trichinopoly district. Reign of Rājarāja III (18th year). Grant by a native of the place, a *brahmādāya* of Uratturnādu.

(2) 511 of 1912 dated in 13th year of Vikrama-Chōla (1118-35). Sale of land in this village, also called Nambikurichchi.

(3) 512 of 1912 dated in Vikrama-Chōla's reign. Land sale in the same village.

(4) 97 of 1914 dated 25th year of Rājarāja I. Grant of gold to the temple at the place.

(5) 100 of 1914 dated 3rd year of Rājēndra-Chōla I. Gifts to the temple at the place by one of the members of the village assembly.

(6) 102 of 1914 dated 7th year of Rājakēsarivarman. Land granted for digging a channel from the tank at the village for irrigating the lands.

(7) 105 of 1914 dated 7th year of Rājakēsarivarman. Sale of right to a private party to levy a definite quantity of paddy on the lands of the village for digging a channel.

(8) 111 of 1914 dated 30th year of Parāntaka I.
Grant of land to the temple.
(9) 114 of 1914 dated 4th year of Rājakēsarivarman, Rājarāja I.
Grant of gold for lamp, etc., to the temple.
(10) 117 of 1914 dated 5th year of Rājakēsarivarman.
Gift of a lamp to the temple.
(11) 119 of 1914 dated 18th year of Rajakēsarivarman.
Gift of a lamp to the temple.
(12) 120 of 1914 dated 7th year of Rājēndra-Chōla (1050-62).
Remission of taxes to the temple at the place.
(13) 123 of 1914 dated 3rd year of Rājakēsarivarman.
Sale of land.
(14) 133 of 1914 dated 5th year of Rājakēsarivarman.
No taxes should be levied on the temple belongings.
(15) 136 of 1914 dated 3rd year of Rājarājadēva III. (=13th February 1219 A.D.)
Gift of land. Village called also *Malari.*

As will be seen, these inscriptions range in their dates from the reign of Parāntaka I to Rājarāja III.

A Telugu-Sānskrit record dated in Saka 1193 (corresponding to 1271 A.D.) cyclic year Prajāpati, which comes from Tripurāntakam in the Markapur taluk, Kurnool district, mentions a Brāhmana resident of Madhurāntaka (perhaps the village of that name in the present Chingleput district) who bore the title of Chōdamandala-pratisthāchārya, and a certain Srīkantha-siva, probably a Saiva ascetic. In another record at the same place, wholly in Telugu, dated in Saka 1192, cyclic year Pramōdūta, corresponding to 1270 A.D., in the reign of the Kākatīya queen Rudrayyadēva Mahārāja (Rudramma), we have mention made again of a Srīkantha-siva (*M.E.R.*, No. 246 of 1905). Another record comes from Tiruvidamarudur in the modern Tanjore district, dated in the fourth year of the Chōla King Vikrama-Chōla, who reigned from 1118-1135 A.D. (*M.E.R.*, No. 301 of 1907). It records a gift of land to the image of Kulōttunga-Chōlīsvaramudaiya-Mahādeva (named after Kulōttunga-Chōla I) set up by Svāmidēvar Srīkantha-siva, who has been identified (wrongly as will be shown below) with Srīkantha, the commentator. (*Ins. in Madras*, II, p. 1276, No. 328.) Mr. V. Venkayya has identified this Svāmidēvar Srīkantha with Srīkantha-Sambhu, the father of Sōmēsvara or Īsvara-Siva, the *guru* of Kulōttunga III. (*M.E.R.* 1908, p. 64.) As Srīkantha's son, Sōmēsvara or Īsvara-Siva, who wrote the *Siddhānta Ratnākara*, was the *guru* of Kulōttunga III (1178-1216 A.D.) and consecrated the temple built by Kulōttunga III at Tribhuvanam, in the Tanjore district, it has to be presumed that his father Svāmidevar Srīkantha-siva himself had passed away by then. Vikrama-Chōla, in whose reign the grant was made, ruled between 1118-1135 A.D., while Kulōttunga-Chōla I, in whose name the image was set up, ruled between 1070-1120 A.D., and preceded him. Sōmēsvara or Īsvara-Siva, the son of Svāmidēvar Srīkantha-siva, who set up the image, was the *guru* of Kulōttunga III, who ruled between 1178-1216 A.D. Thus nearly a century separated Kulōttunga-Chōla I from Kulōttunga-Chōla III. Taking it for granted that the image was consecrated in the year in which the grant was made to it, *i.e.*, in the fourth year of Vikrama-Chōla's reign, corresponding to 1122 A.D., Svāmidēvar Srīkantha should have been living in that year, while his son Sōmēsvara or Īsvara-Siva belonged to the period 1178-1216 A.D.

Svāmidevar Srīkantha cannot, therefore, be identified with the Srīkantha of the two Tripurāntakam records, dated in 1270 and 1271 A.D., though this (Svāmidēvar) Srīkantha was evidently a great Saiva teacher. His son Sōmēsvara is, indeed, described as well versed in the *Saiva-Darsana* and the eighteen *Vidyās* and as having expounded the greatness of Siva as taught in the Upanishads. As remarked above, Sōmēsvara was also the author of *Siddhānta-Ratnākara*. Sōmēsvara was also known as Īsvara-Siva, a name which the late Mr. Venkayya was inclined to identify with Īsāna-siva, which was borne by a Saiva teacher who wrote the *Siddhāntasāra*. In the same line of teachers there was also a Srīkantha. Both Īsāna-siva and Srīkantha are mentioned by the Saiva teacher, Vēdajnāna, in his *Ātmārthapūjā-paddhati*. This Īsāna-siva has, however, to be distinguished from the person of the same name who belonged to the Āmardakamatha and wrote a work called *Krinākramadyōtika* (see Hultzsch, *Report on Sānskrit MSS.*, II, xvii; also *M.E.R.* 1908, para 64). There is a Srīkantha mentioned in a record, dated in the 21st year of the Pandya King Māravarman *alias* Tribhuvanachakravartin Sundara-Pāndya I (1216-35 A.D.), " who was pleased to distribute the Chōla country ". This records a sale of land to Srīkantha-siva, one of the Āchāryas residing in the Tirugnānasambanda matha at Tirupattur (the place of that name in the present Ramnad district) by a local chief. From the point of view of dates, the Srīkantha of this record—whose date works out to 1236 A.D.—may be the same as the Srīkantha of the Tripurāntakam records, which belong to 1270 and 1271 A.D. If the Srīkantha of these records is Srīkantha, the commentator, then he should be assigned to about 1270 A.D. In this case, he should be held to come long after Rāmānuja and Nimbarka and not before them.

There remain three others of the name of Srīkantha to consider. One of these is Srīkantha, the Tāntric writer, who belonged to the Kashmir School and composed the *Ratnatraya Parīksha* prior to the 10th century. He has to be distinguished not only from the Srīkantha, who lived from about the first quarter to the third quarter of the 13th century A.D., but also from Svāmidēvar Srīkantha, father of Sōmēsvara, the *guru* of Kulōttunga-Chola III above named (see Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, X, 5092, pp. 3874-7; also Hultzsch, *Search for Sānskrit MSS.*, No. II, p. xvi, for Srīkantha, the Kāshmirian author). Another is the Srīkantha, identified with the Srīkantha-nātha mentioned in the undated records in the Arulāla-Perumāl temple at Conjeevaram as the preceptor of the Vēdic scholar Sāyana, whose " master " was Sangama II, the son of Kampa and grandson of Sangama I. (*M.E.R.* 1893, p. 5, para. 13; Inscription No. 50 of 1893; *E.I.*, III, 118-19.) This Srīkanthanātha has been identified with the person of the same name mentioned as the preceptor of Sangama II, son of Kampa I and grandson of Sangama I, in the Bitragunta grant of Sangama II, dated in Saka 1278, Durmukhi, corresponding to 1356 A.D. (*Nellore Ins.* I, C. P. Grant No. 20; *E.I.*, III, 21-25.) This grant records the gift of the village of Bitragunta to twenty-eight Brāhmans at the request of the king's (Sangama II's) preceptor Srīkanthanātha, on the anniversary day of the king's death. In consequence, the village came to be known as Srīkanthapura. At the request of the same *guru*, Sangama II granted another village, called Sinhēsari, identified with Sankēsari, near Pushpagiri, in the Nellore district. The question arises whether the Srīkanthanātha mentioned in the Arulāla-Perumāl temple and Bitragunta records, both doubtless referring to the same person, can be identified with the Srīkantha-siva of the Tripurāntakam and Tirupattūr records mentioned above. The Bitragunta record is dated in 1356 A.D., while the Tripurāntakam records belong to 1270 and 1271 A.D. and the Tirupattūr one to 1236 A.D. As the hiatus of time that separates the Bitragunta and Tirupattur records is about 120 years, it seems doubtful if they can be identified. It is possible that the Tripurāntakam and Tirupattūr records refer to Srīkantha, the commentator, while the Bitragunta one refers to a later successor of his who lived about the first half of the 14th century A.D.

Finally, there is a Srīkanthadēva mentioned in an undated record on the north wall of the Ilamīsvara temple at Tārāmangalam, Omalur taluk, Salem district. It mentions a certain Srīkanthadēva, who bore the title of *Gaudachūdāmani* and *Vidyāsamudra* and records a gift of land made to his father as *gurudakshina* by the six Vellālas of the place, of whom Nalla Udaiyappar was one. (*M.E.R.* 31 of 1900.) It is rather difficult to identify this Srīkanthadēva, though it is quite possible, judging from his high sounding titles and the Vellāla disciples he possessed, that he might have been the same as the Srīkantha-siva mentioned by Aghōra Sivāchārya in his *Mahōtsavavidhi*. He belonged to the Āmardakamatha above named. His predecessors in order were :—Paramēsvara ; Hridaya Sankara ; Dhyāna Siva ; and Srīkantha-Siva-Dēsika, who, it is said, was an immigrant from the Gaudadēsa (modern Bengal). This Srīkantha, it is added, moved south to offer worship to the god at Chidambaram, and became thereafter the *guru* of Vikrama-Chōla, son and successor of Kulōttunga-Chōla I. Vikrama-Chōla ruled from 1118-1135 A.D. and was a devout Saiva, though not intolerant of Vaishnavism. (See *Mysore Gazetteer*, Ed. 1930, II, ii, 1133-1134.) The fact that this Srīkantha was from the Gaudadēsa, which is noted by Aghōra Sivāchārya, enables us to identify him with the Srīkantha mentioned in the Tārāmangalam record, who, it is mentioned in it, bore the title of *Gaudachūdāmani*. Whether this Srīkantha, who is alleged by Aghōra Sivāchārya to have been the teacher of Vikrama-Chōla, can be identified with the Srīkantha-siva, who set up the image in the name of Kulōttunga-Chōla I, in the fourth year of the reign of his son Vikrama-Chōla, is a moot point. If Aghōra Sivāchārya is correct in his statement, the two Srīkanthas would have to be identified. If this be so, the Tārāmangalam record would have to be referred to about 1135 A.D.

The above identification of Srīkantha, the commentator, with the Srīkantha-siva of the Tripurāntaka and Tirupattūr records would fix him up to about the third quarter of 13th century A.D., which would allow a sufficiency of time for his being honoured as a great authority by Srīpati, about a century later. If this be so, Srīpati, who quotes Srīkantha, with evident feelings of regard, should have come long after him. This brings us again to about the middle of the 14th century A.D. (1350-1400 A.D.). The date of Bhatta Bhāskara, from whose writings Srīkantha has undoubtedly borrowed (see *Bhatta Bhāskara*, Mys. Ed., pp. 34, 81, 82 and 138 and Srīkantha's *Br. Mīmāmsa*, IV. 4. 19 ; I. 3. 12), may be fixed from an epigraph found on the base of a mantapa in front of the central shrine in the Saumyanāthaswāmi temple at Nandalūr in the Pullampet taluk of the present Cuddapah district (see *M.E.R.* 1908, App. B., No. 577 of 1907). It is a Grantha and Tamil record recording a gift by Bhujabala Vīra-Nārāyana Āhavamalladēva Mahārāja and mentions Bhāskarabhattōpādhyāya. The king mentioned is undoubtedly the Kalachurya king Āhavamalla, who possessed the title of *Vīra Nārāyana* or *Rāya Nārāyana*, as a record in the Shimoga district mentions it (*E.C.* VII, Shikarpur 245), and was also known as *Kalachurya Bhujabala Chakravarti*, etc. (see *Mysore Gazetteer*, Ed. 1930, II, ii, 896-97). We know he succeeded his brother Sankama in or about 1181 A.D. and reigned up to 1183 A.D. Though this inscription is undated, it has to be referred to one of the four years ranging from 1181-1183 A.D. Accordingly, the Bhāskarabhattōpādhyāya referred to in it would have to be set down to about the same period. The name as given in the inscription may be interpreted as "the teacher Bhāskarabhatta," which in later times came to be "Bhatta Bhāskara", evidently to distinguish him from many other persons of the name of "Bhāskara". If Bhatta Bhāskara is the person referred to in this record, as it seems probable, then he should be taken to have lived at about 1183 A.D. and was the recipient of a gift at the hands of the Kalachurya king Āhavamalla. This king is referred to in another record found at Chintalapattūru, in the Cuddapah taluk, in which he is termed a Mahāmandalēsvara (*M.E.R.* 320 of 1905). This record may have to be referred to 1179 A.D. or even before that year, when he was associated with his brother Sankama, a division of the kingdom having been effected about that year (*Mysore Gazetteer*, Ed. 1930, II, ii, 896).

This *Bhāskarabhattōpādhyāya* should not be confused with the *Bhāskarabhatta*, who was the author of a work called the *Vaikhānasasūtra Vyākhyānam*, otherwise known as *Bhāskara Bhattīyam.* In the colophons to his work, this writer styles himself *Bhāskarāchārya* or *Bhāskarasūrin* and describes himself as the son of Nrisimhāchārya of Gautamagōtra (Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, i, B.

No. 3463 (*b*) at pp. 5173-74). The scribe who copied this MS. calls its author Bhāskara Bhattāchārya. Tenāli Gōpanārya in his *Vaikhānasa Sūtrānukramanika* refers to this work and states that this was written by *Bhāskarabhatta* (Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, i, B. No. 3473 (*a*), pp. 5185-86). There is hardly any doubt that he is not the *Bhāskarabhattōpādhyāya* referred to in the Nandalūr epigraph and that the latter has to be identified with the famous Bhatta Bhāskara, the commentator on the *Taittirīya Āranyaka*. Āhavamalla as also the rest of his dynasty were, it is true, Jains, but there is nothing to show that they were not generally tolerant towards Saivism, which, in fact, was revived under the influence of the great Basava and his followers in the Kalachurya period (*Mysore Gazetteer*, Ed. 1930, II. ii, 898-99). The gift in favour of Bhatta Bhāskara, the eminent teacher of the Upanishads, by Āhavamalla may be taken to be an act of recognition on his part of Bhatta Bhāskara's known popularity, piety and talents as a scholar. Bhatta Bhāskara may be taken to be the first philosophical fruit of the Saiva cult of the 12th century in which Siva is described as the transcendental Brahman. If this be so, then Bhatta Bhāskara should be assigned to about 1183 A.D., or the last quarter of the 12th century A.D. Accordingly Burnell's suggestion, based on tradition, that he belonged to the latter half of the 12th century has to be given up. He may have been an Āndhra in the sense that he lived in or about the modern Cuddapah district, where the grant in his favour has been found. As enough time will have to be allowed for him to become a well-known authority, at least to be adopted without citation as a leading authority on the Upanishads by Srīkantha, we will have a period of about a century between the two, if we take the Srīkantha of the Tripurāntakam and Tirupattūr records as Srīkantha, the author of *Brahma Mīmāmsa*, and the Bhāskarabhattōpādhyāya of the Nandalūr epigraph as Bhatta Bhāskara, the author of the commentary on *Taittirīya Āranyaka*. This identification will also possess the merit of allowing sufficient time for Srīpati in his turn quoting Srīkantha as an eminent authority on the *Brahma Sūtras*.

Srikantha and Meykandar.

While Srīkantha has been identified by some with Meykandar (Meykandadēvar), the author of the Tamil translation of the famous Sānskrit work, the *Sivagnānabōdham*, his *guru* has been identified by others with Mrigēndra, the author quoted by Mādhava in his *Sarvadarsana Sangraha*. (See Cowell and Gough, translation of *Sarvadarsana Sangraha* 116, f.n. 3.) Both these identifications seem unsatisfactory. It may be pointed out that while Meykanda belonged to Tiruvennanallūr, on the south bank of the Malattar, about 14 miles south-east of Tirukkōyilūr, in the South Arcot district, Srīkantha, according to inscriptions, was connected with Madhurāntakam in the Chingleput district. There is at Tiruvennanallūr a shrine in honour of Meykanda, not far away from the new Chuttram in existence there, while there is a temple in honour of Srīkantha at Vada-Tirumullaivayil in the Chingleput district. On the north wall of the Arunāchalēsvara temple at Tiruvennanallūr, there is an inscription dated in the 16th year of the Chōla King Rājarāja III (1216-48 A.D.) corresponding to Saturday, 22nd May 1232 A.D., which records a gift of land to an image set up by Meykandadēvar of Tiruvennanallūr (*M.E.R.*, No. 485 of 1902; see *E.I.*, VIII, 268). This record fixes definitely the date of Meykandadēvar, who declares himself the disciple of Paranjōti Muni, to about the middle of the 13th century. How long before 1232 A.D. did Meykandar set up the image for which the grant of land was made in that year? This may be fixed up with the aid of a lithic record which comes from Chidambaram. Meykandar, it is said, was the son of one Achyuta Kalappālan of Pennāgadam, who, it has been suggested, may be the Achyuta Kalappālan of Chidambaram, mentioned in a work called the *Tamil Nāvalar Saridai* as the person who had taken captive the kings of Chēra, Chōla and Pāndya countries. Whether this is so or not, there seems to be some ground for identifying this Kalappālan with the Kalappālarāyar who, in the eighth year of the reign of the Pāndya King Jatāvarman *alias* Tribhuvana Chakravartin Sundara-Pāndyadēva—probably Jatāvarman Sundara-Pāndya I, 1251-1264 A.D.—made a grant of land for conducting festivals and providing offerings in the temple of Mākāli (at Chidambaram) which, the record states, was founded on the south side of the road by which the god was taken in procession for the sea-bath (*M.E.R.*, 297 of 1913). The eighth year of Jatāvarman Sundara-Pāndya I would be 1259 A.D. If the grant of Kalappālarāyar was accordingly made in that year, Achyuta Kalappālan, the father of Meykanda, should be assigned to about the middle of the 13th century A.D. He was evidently already an important person at the time—he is styled *Rāyar*—and may have been old enough to have had a fairly aged son. The difference in time between 1259 A.D., the date of the Chidambaram record of Kallappālarāyar, and 1232 A.D., the date of the Tiruvennanallūr record registering a grant to the image set up by Meykanda, is about 27 years. The Tiruvennanallūr record is thus 27 years earlier in date than the Chidambaram one, which would confirm the suggestion that at the time of the latter record Meykandar was already a well-known personage. Evidently Meykandar had, in the lifetime of his father, already become famous by his philosophical studies and religious zeal, as we see a grant being made for an image set up by him. In any case, there can be hardly any question, with these two epigraphic records before us, to doubt any longer that Meykandar actually lived about 1235 A.D., if not indeed a little earlier than that date. As we have seen above, we have independent inscriptional records which agree in fixing Srīkantha, the commentator, to about 1270-71 A.D. It is possible that Meykanda and Srīkantha were contemporaries, and this contemporaneity ought to suffice to clear up the confusion as to the identity of Srīkantha's *guru* with Meykanda. Men of nearly the same age and celebrity, referred to in contemporaneous inscriptional records, in which they are spoken of as religious preceptors, cannot have been *guru* and *sishya*. There are, besides, as pointed by Mr. Sūryanārāyana Sāstri, doctrinal differences between these two religious teachers which appear too fundamental to enable us to identify them. Srīkantha's system, as he points out, considers the world as due to the transformation of the Lord through His *Chitsakti* ; it makes no independent provision for the creation of the material world; it does not specifically recognize *ānava mala* ; it is extremely doubtful if it recognizes *jīvanmukti* ; and while Meykandar seeks to establish his system on reasoning, Srīkantha appears to fight shy of it and so takes refuge in *Sruti*. It is hardly likely that a system with so many variations from the Saiva Siddhānta, could have owed much to the protagonist of the Siddhānta (*Sivādvaita of Srīkantha*, 22). As a matter of fact, Srīkantha's *guru* was one Svētāchārya, a name which *prima facie* has no relationship with that of Meykanda-Dēva. (See Srīkantha's *Brahmamīmāmsa Bhāshya*, stanza following the colophon.) The identification suggested by the writer in the *Journal of Oriental Research* has been answered at length by a contributor in the *Jignyāsa*, I. ii, to which further reference may be made by the interested reader.

Sripati anterior to Sivalinga-Bhupati.

Among the writers quoted by Srīpati is Haradattāchārya, a famous Saiva sage. His date can be fixed with some degree of certainty. As Srīpati quotes him and speaks of him with reverential awe, it might be presumed that he had, by Srīpati's time, receded into the dim past. How far he was actually removed from Haradatta may be ascertained both from the story of his life as given in the *Bhavishyōttara Purāna* and from the writings of his commentator Sivalinga-bhūpati. From the *Bhavishyōttara*

Purāna, which gives the story of Haradatta who is considered an incarnation of God Siva, we learn that he ascended to Heaven in a *vimāna* when the Kaliyuga was past 4000 years *minus* 21, *i.e.*, 3979 years, which corresponds to 879 A.D.—in the year Vilambi, Pushya month, Panchami, first half of the lunar month, Thursday, on the banks of the Cauvery at Kamsagrāma. Though in the *Sivarahasya*, Kaliyuga 3000 is given as a rough approximation as the date of Haradatta, the former has been accepted by Professor M. Seshagiri Sastri as the more correct one.[6] He also identifies this Haradatta as the author of the *Harihara-tāratamya*, and the *Chaturvēda-tātparya-sangraha* and with the Haradattāchārya who is quoted in Mädhava's *Sarvadarsana-sangraha* in the chapter dealing with the Nakulīsa-Pāsupata system (see *Report on Sānskrit and Tamil MSS.*, No. 2, 13-17). He also sets out the story of the birth of one Sudarsana, son of Vāsudēva, a devout Vaishnava at Kamsapura (now Kanjānur) in the Tanjore district and how he became a Saiva through the will of Siva and assumed the name of Haradatta and how he converted his parents, the king and the people of his native town (*Ibid.*, 14-15). This Haradatta has been distinguished from two other Haradattas, also eminent authors: (1) Haradatta, the commentator on the *Āpastamba Sūtra*, whom Bühler has assigned to some time between 1300 and 1450 A.D.; and (2) Haradatta, the author of the *Padamanjari*, a commentary on the *Kāsikāvritti* of Jayāditya Vāmana, who wrote the *vritti* on the *Sūtras* of Pānini. The second of these was the son of Rudrakumāra and younger brother of Agnikumāra and was evidently a resident of the Telugu country (*Ibid.*, 13, 16 and 17). Haradatta, the Saiva teacher, who wrote the *Harihara-tāratamya* and the *Chaturvēda-tātparya-sangraha*, and who is quoted in the *Sarvadarsana-sangraha* (see Cowell and Gough, *Sarvadarsana-sangraha*, 104) is undoubtedly the Haradattāchārya referred to by Srīpati. Though he is referred to by Srīpati, there is no mention made by him of Sivalinga-bhūpati, the commentator of *Chaturvēda-tātparya-sangraha*. This would seem to show that Sivalinga-bhūpati wrote his commentary on Haradatta's work *after Srīpati's time*.

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[6] It has been suggested by Mr. Sūryanārāyana Sāstri that as the date given in the *Bhavishyōttara Purāna* is not exactly correct in as much as, if the details given are reliable, the day should fall in the dark half of the month and not the bright half of the month mentioned in it, we would have to take the cyclic year alone into consideration and identify it with 1119 A.D. in which year there was a Friday which was the fifth day of the bright half of the month of Pushya. Though it is usual to stress the cyclic year in cases of this nature, still the date given in *Bhavishyōttara Purāna* correctly works out to Friday, 16th January 879, though the Friday falls in the dark half of the month of Pushya. This is a detail in which a mistake might have been made. As regards the story of the ordeal that Haradatta had to undergo to prove the superiority of Siva, it is a familiar embellishment intended to glorify his greatness and no more. Moreover, we are still to know the exact conditions prevailing in South India at the close of the 9th century A.D., when the Imperial Chōlas under Vijayālaya and Āditya I began their sway over Southern India. Finally, there is no reliable evidence tending to confirm that there was religious intolerance in or about the reigns of Vikrama-Chōla and Kulōttunga-Chōla II, in whose reign Rāmānuja appears to have lived. (See *Mysore Gazetteer*, 1930 Edn., II, ii, 1141-1143.) In these circumstances the shifting of the date of death of Haradatta from 879 A.D. to 1119 A.D., on the grounds mentioned by Mr. Sūryanārāyana Sāstri, cannot prove acceptable. The doctrinal similarities he points to as existing between Haradatta and Srīkantha, from which he draws the inference that either Haradatta came *after* Srīkantha or at least was an younger contemporary of his, are capable of being as satisfactorily explained by supposing that Srīkantha as often elaborated the arguments of Haradatta as he barely adopted them on other occasions or simply set down the points raised by his

In the colophon to his commentary, Sivalinga-bhūpati describes Haradattāchārya as *Sarvagnya Sirōmani*

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predecessor. It is, however, hardly necessary to elaborate on the danger of arguing on the basis of doctrinal similarities, for its inherent weakness is frankly admitted by Mr. Sūryanārāyana Sāstri when he concedes that "it goes, however, without saying, that it is extremely unsafe to rely on a conjecture based on information, which is itself at least partially incorrect" (*Sivādvaita of Srīkantha*, Chap. I. 40-44 and Appendix II).

Paramasiva Yōgi (see Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, X, p. 3854, No. 5077). The commentary is called in one colophon as *Sruti-sūkti-vilāsa* (*ibid.*) and in another as *Girīsa Sruti-sūkti-mālā* (*ibid.*, p. 3855, where the blank space left should be filled in, with the aid of Hultzsch's *Reports on Sānskrit MSS. in Southern India*, II, MS. No. 28, page 94, by the words गिरीस श्रुति सूक्तिमालायां). This commentary (*Girīsa Sruti-sūkti-mālā*) was composed by the Reddi prince Sivalinga-bhūpati. From the details given of his parentage, there can be little doubt that he belonged to a collateral branch of the Reddi dynasty, of which Kōmati-Prola or Pola, son of Vēmaya, was the founder. Sivalinga-bhūpati traces his descent from Kōmati; his fifth son Malla; latter's only son Pina-Kōmati; latter's third son Māchа; latter's first son Kōmati; his second son, himself (Sivalinga). (See Hultzsch's *Report on Sānskrit MSS. in Southern India*, I, page xii and 91-95.) This genealogy agrees with that which has been reconstructed with the aid of copper-plate and other records, except that in the latter, the collateral branch to which Sivalinga-bhūpati belonged is not set out (see *Nellore Inscriptions*, III, 1462; *M.E.R.* 1899-1900). This lacuna is filled in by the commentary above named. Sivalinga-bhūpati states that he ruled our Skandapuri, a town to the south-east of Srī-saila. (This town is now represented by the village of the same name at the foot of Srī-saila, where pilgrims halt for the night during the Kārtīka *Jātra* time and proceed to mount up the Hill at dawn. The place is notoriously deficient in water.) He was a devotee of Sōmēsvara, the presiding god of Skandapuri. He was a liberal donor of gifts, having exhausted the gifts mentioned in Hēmadri's *Dānakhanda*. He was a great supporter of Bharata-mata, *i.e.*, the arts of dancing and music. His *guru* Kondayōgi belonged to the Gangādhara *vamsa*, noted for its learning. Kondayōgi was the grandson of Tripurāntaka and son of *guru* Srīgiri, brother of Bhimēsasvāmi and Tripurāntaka Desikamuni. Kondaya was the *guru* of the country around Srī-saila. Through this *guru's* grace, Sivalingabhūpa says, he wrote his fine commentary called *Girīsa-sruti-sūkti-mālā* on the "great work" of Haradattasūri (*i.e.*, Haradattāchārya). From these details given us by Sivalinga himself, we can fix his date. His father Mācha was a brother of Srīsa Srīgiri, for whom we have the dates 1397-98 and 1400-1. Another brother of his was Rācha-Vēma, for whom we have the date 1397-98 (or 1398-99). For Srīsa Sivagiri's first son, Kōmati, we have the dates 1409, 1415 and 1430-31, while for his second son Mallaya or Srīgiri Malla, we have 1406-1407 and 1408-1409. Macha's son Sivalinga, a cousin of Kōmati and Srīgiri Malla, cannot have been far removed from them in date. We may, therefore, set him down from about 1408-09 A.D. to 1430-31, or about the first quarter of the 15th century. (See *Nellore Ins.*, III, App. I, Reddi Dynasty, 1462-64; *M.E.R.* 162 of 1899 and 543 of 1909; see also V. Venkayya, *History of Nellore*, 24.) From this it would seem to follow that he lived and wrote about 1430 A.D., from about a quarter to half a century later than Srīpati. That is, perhaps, the reason why we do not find mention of Sivalinga but only of Haradattāchārya in Srīpati's *Bhāshya*. Sivalinga quotes—without acknowledgment—from Srīkantha's *Bhāshya*, which accordingly should be presumed to have been known to him. Since Sivalinga came after Srīpati, Srīpati is the earliest author now known who quotes Srīkantha by name—barring, of course, the specific reference to Srīkantha in the *Pauskara Bhāshya* attributed to Umāpati Sivāchārya, the author of *Samkalpa Nirākaranam*. It is, however, more than doubtful if this Umāpati was really the author of the *Pauskara Bhāshya*. (See Sūryanārāyana Sāstri, *Sivādvaita of Srīkantha*, 24, f.n. 31; 32-33; and Note A to Chapter I.)

Sripati posterior to Revanarya, Author of 'Siddhanta Sikhamani'.

Another authority quoted by Srīpati is Rēvanārya's *Siddhānta Sikhāmani*, a work held in the highest esteem by Vīrasaiva teachers, ancient and modern. This is a

Sānskrit work available in print. Its popularity is betokened by its translation in the 17th century into Tamil by Turaimangalam Sivaprakāsaswāmi, of the Bommaiya-pālaiyam Periya-matham, near Pondicherry. (Ed. S. C. Nagichetti and published by Messrs. Gooroo Basava & Co., at the Kalāratnākaram Press, Madras.) Rēvanārya in his work says that the doctrines enunciated by him were first learnt from Rishi Agastya by Rēnuka, who made known to the world the Vīrasaiva-Samaya (*i.e.*, Siddhanta). According to him *Sivādvaita-Siddhānta*—evidently that is his philosophical standpoint—sets down the *ākāra* of Siva and bestows the *ānanda* of *Shatsthala.* In the introductory verses he states he bows down to Sānta Mallēsvara, who is the Lord Siva at Srī-saila, whom he describes as *Vēdāgama-Shatsthalarūpam.* As regards himself, he gives his name as Rēvanārya, son of Rēvanasiddha and grandson of Vīranārādhya. He claims to have been descended from the *kula* of Rēnuka himself. He thus sets down his descent:—Visvanātha, then Sarvēsa Dēsika, then Vīranārādhya, then Rēvanasiddha, and finally Rēvanārya, the author of *Siddhānta Sikhāmani.*

Probable Date of Revanarya.

One Bhoga Mallēsa wrote a commentary on the *Siddhānta Sikhāmani*, of which a copy is available in the Madras Oriental MSS. Library (see Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, X, No. 5119). He praises the *Siddhānta Sikhāmani* thus:—"It is pre-eminently the best among Saiva Sāstras and revels in the name of *Siddhānta Sikhāmani* in this world; it incorporates the gist of all the (Saiva) Sāstras; it is the essence of all Saiva *tantras*; it brings to light Sivabōdha and gives a man a firm knowledge in Saiva Sāstra." As to the date of this work, there is no clue available in it. But as he says he belonged to the family of Rēnukāchārya, the great Vīrasaiva teacher, and was about five generations removed from him, the period of time that should have elapsed between him and the great teacher, may be set down as approximating about 100 years. Since the original Rēnukāchārya (also called Rēvanasiddha) is said to have been a contemporary of Rajēndra-Chōla I, the great Chōla king (1013-1045 A.D.), whose daughter he is said to have married, he would have to be set down to *circa* 1000 A.D. Whether he married that great king's daughter or not, it might be allowed that tradition assigns Rēnuka to Rajēndra-Chōla's period of rule. If so, Rēvanārya, his descendant and author of *Siddhānta Sikhāmani*, should have lived about *circa* 1200 A.D. But Rēvanārya, the author, is not *exactly* correct when he suggests that he was only five generations removed from Rēnuka, his ancestor, as we have independent evidence that he has omitted some steps in his account. As a matter of fact, we know from other sources, that Rēnuka had a son named Rudramuni, whose name is not mentioned by Rēvanārya. Making allowance for such omissions, we may take that Rēvanārya, the author, flourished approximately about 1250 A.D. This would allow him about 100 to 150 years to become a renowned authority to be quoted from by Srīpati with respect in his *Bhāshya*. (As to Rēnukāchārya, see Narasimhachar's *Karnataka-Kavi-charite*, I. 162; also *Rēvanasiddhēsvra Purāna*, *ibid.*, II. 139.)

Rēvanārya (or Rēvanārādhya), the author of *Siddhānta-Sikhāmani*, wrote four other works, each of which is a commentary on the work of his grandfather Sōsali-Vīranāradhya. These are:—(1) *Pancharatnavyākhyā* (or *Tantrasāraprakāsika*), which is a commentary on the *Tantrasārapancharatna* of Sōsali-Vīranārādhya; (2) *Tārakapancharatnavyākhyā* (or *Tārakapradīpika*), which is a commentary on the *Tārakapancharatna* by the same author; (3) *Pancharatna-vyākhyā* (or *Sivatattvaprakāsika*), which is a commentary on the *Sivaratnapancharatna* by the same author; (4) *Pancharatnavyākhyā* (*Srutyārthapradīpika*), which is a commentary on the *Srutipancharatna* by the same author. This work is also called *Srutyārthaprakāsika*. In it, Rēvanārādhya mentions both his father's and grandfather's names, Rēvanasiddhēsvara and Sōsali-Vīranārādhya, which appear in the *Siddhānta Sikhamani* as

Rēvanasiddha and Vīranārādhya, and his own name as Rēvanārya. This establishes the identity of the author of the above works with the author of *Siddhānta Sikhāmani* beyond all doubt. (MSS. of these works are in the Madras Government Oriental MSS. Library. See Madras *D.C.* X, Nos. 5087-5090.)

Sivaprakāsaswāmigal of Turaimangalam, the Tamil translator of this work, is also the author of a Tamil rendering of the *Vēdāntaparichchēda*, which forms part of the *Vivēkachintāmani*, a work in Kannada by Nijagunasivayōgi. It explains the differentiations between the perceiver and the thing perceived, the nature of bliss arising from understanding the Mahāvākyas and the nature of the identity of the individual soul with Paramātman as stated in the *Uttaramīmamsa*. Sivaprakāsaswāmi's work is known as *Vēdāntachintāmani* (see Madras *D.C. Tamil*, III, No. 1604). Sivaprakāsaswāmi is held in the highest respect as a Saiva Siddhānta writer. His writings are not only inspiring to a degree, but also full of refined feeling. In the *Abidēkamālai*, a Vīrasaiva poem, we have his praise sung for us in a manner which shows the great hold he has on the Vīrasaivas of Southern India (see Madras *D.C. Tamil*, I, No. 333).

Sripati's Native Country.

In view of the fact that Srīpati is a confirmed Vīrasaiva teacher, the opinion may be hazarded that he belonged to the country which has long been inhabited in vast numbers by this community, *i.e.*, the country lying approximately between the Krishna and the Gōdāvarī rivers. It is now clear from the authorities quoted above, that he hailed from the country round about what is now Bezwada, in the Guntur district, where some who claimed to be of his family flourished as religious teachers and poets. If this is so, it is not altogether unlikely that he was by birth a Telugu-speaking Ārādhya Brāhmana, belonging to the Krishna-Gōdāvari country, where the Ārādhya Brāhmanas are even now strong in numbers and from where they have migrated to parts near and far. Srīpati's descendants, from the latest information I have been able to collect, live at Kāladhari village, Tanuku taluk, West Gōdāvari district. One of these, Bhīmalinga Ārādhya by name, lives at Kāladhari village. Three or four other descendants of his found in this village claim to belong to the family of "Vijayavātika Srīpati", which confirms the literary tradition above referred to which ascribes to him the surname "Vijayavātika".

Sripati's Learning and Profundity.

Srīpati was highly learned not only in the Vēdas and the Vēdanta but also in the *Itihāsas*, *Purānas* and *Āgamas*. As many ancient authorities are quoted by him, short descriptive accounts of the works quoted by him are given below. It should not, however, be understood that the list is in any sense, exhaustive.

(i) Vedas.

Āpastamba Grihya Sūtram.—The rites conducted with the domestic fire as dealt with by Āpastamba in the 27th Prasna of his *Kalpasūtra* (Madras *D.C.* II, Nos. 1180 to 1184).

There are commentaries on it :—

(1) By Kapardasvāmin (*ibid.*, Nos. 1186 and 1187) called *Āpastamba Bhāshyam.*

(2) By Sudarsanāchārya—called *Grihya Tātparya Darsanam* (*ibid.*, No. 1188).

(3) By Kapardi—called *Kapardikārika* (Report II, No. 6). Kapardi is referred to by Rāmānuja.

(4) By Haradattāchārya—called *Āpastambapāribhāshasasūtravyākhyā.*

The *Pāribhāshaprahasana* is a portion of the 24th Prasna of the *Āpastambakalpasūtra.* On it, Haradatta wrote his commentary (Madras *D.C.* II, No. 1075).

Bōdhāyana Sūtra (or *Bōdhāyana Dharmasūtra*).—This is devoted to the religious and social laws of Brāhmanism as taught by Bōdhāyana (Madras *D.C.* II, No. 1208).

There is a commentary on it called *Bōdhāyanavyākhyā* by Govindaswāmi.

Jaimini Sūtra (or *Jaimini Grihya Sūtram*).—The Brāhmins who follow this *sūtra* are not so numerous as the followers of the Drāhyāyana and other Grihya Sūtras belonging to the *Sāma Vēda*. It is divided into two *prasnas*—the first consisting of 25, and the second 9, *khandas*. Copies of this *sūtra* are rare. A copy of it was found by Prof. Seshagiri Sāstri at Trichinopoly and the Madras Oriental MSS. Library copy is a manuscript copy from this MS. (see Madras Report on MSS. I, page 2, No. 8; also see Madras *D.C.* II, No. 1168).

There is a metrical commentary on this *Sūtra* called *Jaimini Kārikā*, written by Bītāgnihotrin, a disciple of Venkatanātha Dīkshita, a native of Nāgārjunagrāma (see Madras Report on MSS. I, p. 3, No. 9 and Madras *D.C.* II, No. 1169).

Another commentary is by Srīnivāsa. This is called *Jaiminivyākhyā* (see Madras *D.C.* II, No. 1170; also Report on MSS. II, p. 7).

Vājasanēya.—This is a part of the *Yajur-Vēda*, called *Vājasanēya Yajur-Vēda*, a Samhita complete in 40 *adhyāyas*.

Satarudrīyam.—*Rudrasārasangraha*, which investigates the meaning of the fifth Prasna of the fourth Kānda of the Black Yajurvēda, has been commented upon by Nīlakanta, son of Govindasūri, in his *Rudrasārasangraha Vyākhyā*, otherwise known as *Rudramīmāmsa*. This work is, in its turn, based in *Satarudrīya* as acknowledged by the author himself in the beginning of his work. (See Madras *T. C. of Sanskrit MSS.*, III, i, A, No. 2070. For *Satarudramantrabhāshya*, which describes itself as *Satarudra-upanishad*, see *Deccan College Collections of MSS.*, I, p. 384, No. 541.)

Rudrādhyāya (or *Rudrādhyāmantra*).—This is the *Namaka* part of the *Namaka-Chamakam*. The first of these is the name given to the 5th Prasna of the IV Kānda of the *Taittiriya Samhita* and the second consists of the 20 Panchāsats in the beginning of the 7th

Prasna of the same Kānda. The two Prapāthakas are called the *Namaka* and *Chamaka* from the repetition of the words *Namas* in the first and *Cham* in the second (नमस् and चम्). The first is also called *Rudraprasna*, *Satarudrīya*, *Rudrādhyāya* or *Rudrōpanishad* (see Madras *D.C.* I, ii, Nos. 113 to 141).

Several MSS. of the *Rudraprasna*—which is the most popular name for the *Namaka* part—give the *Nyāsas* with it. It is a highly popular part of the *Taittirīya Samhita* and has had many commentaries on it, in Sānskrit, Telugu and Kannada. Among the Sānskrit commentaries are those of Sāyana (or Vidyātīrtha) and Bhattabhāskara, of which a free Telugu rendering is known (Madras *D.C.* I, ii, No. 123). A Kannada translation of Bhattabhāskara by Gurunanja is also known (Madras *D.C.* I, ii, No. 116).

Bhattabhāskara's commentary is called *Jnānayagna* (*ibid.*, No. 134). A Sānskrit abridgment of Bhattabhāskara's commentary is also well known (*ibid.*, No. 136). While Sāyana's commentary is famous, Bhattabhāskara's is highly popular. A commentary (*Rudrabhāshyam*) attributed to Vidyāranya is also known but it has been found that it does not agree with Sāyana's commentary on the portion of the *Krishna Yajurvēda* as found in its IV Kānda. Moreover, it does not begin with the Mangalaslōka found in all the Vēdic commentaries of Sāyana (*ibid.*, No. 140). As an abridgment of this work is found attributed to Vidyātīrtha (*ibid.*, No. 141), it has been suggested that this may be the commentary by Vidyātīrtha, who is said to have been a *guru* of Vidyāranya (*ibid.*, No. 140).

Two commentaries on the 5th Prasna of the IV Kānda of the *Taittirīya Samhita* of the *Yajurvēda* written from the Purānic and the later Vedāntic points of view are worthy of note. One of these is *Namakārtha Prākasa Sangraha* by Abhinava Nrisimhāsrama (Madras *T.C.* III, i, A, No. 2163). Another is *Rudrasārasangrahavyākhyā* : *Rudramīmāmsa* by Nīlakantha, who interprets the hymns in reference to the Kāsikāstōtra and the manifestation of God Siva therein.

Rudrayāmala.—It is also known as *Bhairavayāmala*. It consists of several parts and embodies a *Samvāda* between Umā and Mahēsvara. Amongst its various parts are :—

(1) *Ganapatisahasranāmastōtram*, which gives the significant names of Ganapati, beginning with the letter ग्; its colophon states that it is taken from the *Rudrayāmala*. (See Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, No. 2546.)

(2) *Bālātripurasundarīkavacham* or *Bālākavacham*, which is a *mantra* addressed to the Goddess Tripurasundari conceived as a young girl. It is believed to be efficacious in securing protection. The colophon to this work says that it is taken from the *Rudrayāmala*. [See Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XIII, No. 6376; also Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, B, No. 2546 (*c*).]

(3) *Bālamālamantrah.*—This *mantra* is intended to propitiate the Goddess Dēvi conceived as Bāla. The colophon acknowledges that it is taken from the *Rudrayāmala*. [See Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, B, No. 2546 (*d*).]

(4) *Bālāstavarājah.*—A eulogy on the Goddess Bāla, who is a manifestation of Sakti, sometimes called also as *Tryaksharastōtra*. The colophon in it acknowledges its source to *Rudrayāmala*. (See Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, B. 2546 (*c*) ; see also Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XIX, Nos. 10792-10805.)

(5) *Bālatripurasundarīpatalam.*— Bālatripurasundari is only a manifestation of Pārvati, to whom this Patala is devoted. It is in praise of her greatness. Its colophon acknowledges its source to *Rudrayāmala*. [See Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, B, No. 2546 (*f*).]

(6) *Bālatripurasundaryastōttara Satanāmastōtram.*—The 1000 names of Bālatripurasundari. In its colophon it acknowledges its source to *Rudrayāmala*. (See *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XVII, No. 9157.)

There is also a work of the name of *Rudrayāmalōttarasatakam*, with a commentary called *Kuladīpikā* on it. It is a work of six *Patalas*. (See Madras *D.C.* XII, Nos. 4365, 4367, 4434 and 4435 ; and 4435-37.)

Laghusūtravriththi.—This is a work I have been unable to trace. Whether it is the same as the *Laghuvriththih* is not certain. The latter is a commentary on *Uchchōdarki*, a work on the determination of the two accents, *Uddāta* and *Prachaya*, they having to be indicated by the fingers of the reciter, each in a peculiar way, when a Svarita accent is followed by an Uddāta or Prachaya. [See Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, II, No. 878; also Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, B, No. 2591 (*k*).]

(ii) Upanishads.

Srīpati was conversant with the ten principal Upanishads, *Dasōpanishad.* Among those quoted by him are the following which come under the 108 or 98 *Upanishads*, sometimes called the *Akshamālika Upanishads*, after *Aksha*, a bead, and *mālika*, a rosary, meaning a rosary of beads. (See Madras *D.C.* I, iii, 246 and 247.)

Atharvasira Upanishad.—This treats of the attributes pertaining to Siva who is taught in it as the Supreme Being. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, Nos. 257 to 263. Compare with this *Atharvasikhōpanishad*, which also treats of the superiority of Siva and the sanctity of the syllable *Ōm*. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, Nos. 250 to 256.)

Nārāyanatapinyupanishad.—This Upanishad explains how the eight-syllabled *mantra* "*Om Namō Nārāyanāya*" represents Siva and the ten *avatars* of Vishnu. It enumerates a number of mystic formulæ connected with this *mantra* and describes the *yantra* or magic figure to be used in the worship that is conducted with the aid of this *mantra*. Lastly, it describes the high value of the *mantra* and the greatness of God conceived as Nārāyana.

Aitarēyōpanishad.—One of the *dasōpanishads* and forms part of the Āranyaka of the *Rig-Veda* and consists of Adhyāyas 4 to 7 of the second Prasna. Some copies contain the whole of the second Prasna of the Āranyaka. The 2nd and 3rd Prasnas of the Aitarēya-Āranyaka are known by the general name of Upanishad, sometimes as *Bahvirchōpanishad* or *Mahaitarēyōpanishad*, while Adhyāyas

4 to 7 of the second Prasna are more particularly called the *Aitarēyōpanishad*. Hence some copies give—as above remarked—the whole of the second Prasna as the *Aitarēyōpanishad*; and it is for this reason obviously that the commentary on this Upanishad by Sankarāchārya deals with the whole of the second Prasna. (See Madras *D.C.* I, iii, Nos. 323-325; Nos. 325 and 331.) It teaches that Ātman is the cause of the manifested universe, that the knowledge of Ātman which leads to salvation is the result of renunciation, and that the nature of Ātman is consciousness though variously thought of. Sankara has a commentary on this Upanishad called *Aitarēyōpanishad-bhāshyam.* It is according to Advaita Vēdānta. There is a gloss on it called *Aitarēyōpanishadbhāshyasya-tippanam* by Jnānāmrita-Yati. In some MS. copies, this gloss forms part of Sāyana's *Vēdārthaprakāsa*, dedicated to his brother Mādhava. The current idea that Sāyana took much help from others in composing his Vēdic commentaries is clearly borne out by the inclusion of this gloss in his *Vēdārthaprakāsa.* (See Madras *D.C.* I, iii, No. 332.) Another commentary on this Upanishad, called *Aitarēyōpanishad-bhāshyam*, is by Ānandatīrtha from the Dvaita standpoint.

Brihadāranyakōpanishad.—This Upanishad consists of 6 Adhyāyas from the 3rd to the 8th Adhyāya of the Āranyaka of the *Sukla-Yajurvēda.* After treating of *Avidya* in the opening chapter, it gives in the next three, a lengthy discourse between Janaka Videha and Yāgnavalkya regarding the true nature of the Supreme Being and of His relation to the universe. The 5th and 6th chapters deal with a number of Upasanas or modes of meditation and worship as leading to the salvation or Moksha, or to the attainment of the higher wisdom, which delivers one from the bondage of Karma and reincarnation. Among the commentaries on it are the following :—

(*a*) *Brihadāranyakōpanishad Bhashya.*—Commentary by Sankarāchārya. A gloss on Sankara's commentary, *Brihadāranyakōpanishadbhāshya-Tīka*, is by Ānandajnāna, pupil of Suddhānanda. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, No. 645.)

(*b*) Another commentary on this Upanishad is by Nityānandāsrama, pupil of Purushottamāsrama. This is known by the name of *Mitākshara* (not to be confounded with the legal work of the same name).

(*c*) There is a metrical commentary on this Upanishad by Ānandatīrtha.

Brihajjābālōpanishad.—This Upanishad consists of 8 Brāhmanas and explains the origin of the sacred ashes of Saivism known as Bhasma or Vibhūti, its preparation, the deities presiding over it, the various ways in which it is to be used and the virtue or merit attached to its use, illustrating it all with a story. It also gives the legendary origin of Rudrāksha and describes the merit that would accrue to the wearer of a string of Rudrāksha beads. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, Nos. 629-632.)

This comes under miscellaneous Upanishads. It may be added that the *Jābālupanishad* and *Rudrāksha Jābālōpanishad* belong to the *Sāma-Vēda* Upanishads; the *Jābālōpanishad* to the *Sukla Yajur-Vēda* group of Upanishads; and the *Vriddhajābālōpanishad* to the group of Upanishads classed under the head "Miscellaneous". (See *Tanjore Catalogue*, II, Contents ii-iv.)

Chchāndōgyōpanishad.—This Upanishad first explains the two different results accruing from the practice of Karma, according as it is or is not associated with the knowledge of certain Vidyas, and then proceeds to set out the nature of the highest knowledge to be attained and examines the different means of securing it. Sankara has a commentary, *Chchāndōgyōpanishadbhāshyam*, on it from the Advaita standpoint. A gloss on it, from the Visishtādvaita portion, is by Rangarāmānuja. Ānandatīrtha has a metrical commentary on it from the Dvaita standpoint.

Hamsōpanishad.—This Upanishad teaches that the Supreme Being is to be identified with Hamsa and is to be conceived as immanent in the human body. He has to be meditated upon and worshipped by the *Hamsa-mantra*. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, Nos. 841 to 850.)

Mantrōpanishad.—One outside the 108 mentioned in *Muktikōpanishad.* (See Madras *D.C.* I, iii, 710; but see No. 285, where the Upanishad is mentioned as occurring with the *Ātmaprabōdhōpanishad.*)

Īsāvāsyōpanishad.—This Upanishad teaches the omni-penetrativeness and other qualities and characteristics of the Supreme Being and the insufficiency of either works (*Karma*) or knowledge (*Gnāna*) alone to lead to bliss.

Among the commentaries on this Upanishad are the following:—

(*a*) By Sankara called *Īsāvāsyōpanishadbhāshyam*, a gloss on which is *Īsāvāsyōpanishadbhāshya-tippanam* by Sivānandayati. (See Madras *D.C.* I, iii, No. 312.)

(*b*) Another by Sankarānanda, pupil of Ānandātma. (*Ibid.*, No. 316.)

(*c*) A third one called *Īsāvāsyōpanishadbhāshyam* by Ānandatīrtha. This is in *metrical form* and is according to the Dvaita School of Vēdānta taught by him.

(*d*) A fourth one by Vēdāntadēsīka, called *Īsāvāsyōpanishad-bhāshyam*, according to the Visishtādvaita School.

Jābālōpanishad.—This Upanishad deals with a particular kind of *yōgic* meditation in which the aspirant is asked to concentrate his vision on the junction-point of the nose and the eyebrows and to repeat the Satarudrīya prayer; it further deals with the Sanyāsa *āsrama* or the religious life of asceticism and describes the Sanyāsin who deserves to be called *Paramahamsa.*

[In the Kshūrikōpanishad, which is not referred to by Srīpati, the practice of *Yōga* is explained at some length and then it is declared that *Yōga* is capable of cutting like a razor the endless cord of Samsāra. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, Nos. 418 to 421.)]

The *Jābālōpanishad* above mentioned should be differentiated from the *Jābālyupanishad,* which explains the terms *Pasu* and *Pati* as used by the Pāsupatas. It teaches that the smearing of the *Vibhūti* is capable of leading to the acquisition of the knowledge which is essential for attaining salvation. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, No. 476.)

Then, again, the Upanishad called *Tārasārōpanishad* agrees in its first *khanda* with that of *Jābālōpanishad*, though the two differ from the second *khanda*. The *Tārasārōpanishad* teaches that the Nārāyanāstaka mantra is a mystic prayer-formula possessing the power of leading human souls to salvation, when men use it in the practice of yōgic meditation. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, Nos. 478-479.)

Kaivalyōpanishad.—This Upanishad teaches that salvation is to be attained only by realizing that Siva or Nīlakantha of innumerable attributes and powers is identical with the attributeless Self. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, Nos. 395-410.) There is a commentary on it, according to the Advaita system, by Sankarānanda, pupil of Ānandāsrama. It is called *Kaivalyōpanishad Dīpika.* (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, Nos. 411-413.)

Kathavallyupanishad.—Mrityu (the God of Death) teaches to Nāchikētas the fruitlessness of worldly pleasures, the greatness of eternal freedom and the immortal and blissful nature of Ātman. Sankara has a commentary on it called *Kathavallyupanishadbhāshya.* A gloss on it called *Kathavallyupanishadbhāshyasya-tippanam* by Sivānanda, who mentions his name in the colophon to his gloss. Ānandatīrtha has a metrical commentary on it.

Kausītakyupanishad.—In this Upanishad, the Saguna and Nirguna forms of worship and the nature of the Supreme Being are described and explained.

Māndūkyōpanishad.—This Upanishad describes the meaning and the power of *Pranava* as a means of knowing the nature and the reality of the Self. Some copies of this Upanishad contain a number of *slōkas* by Gaudapāda in interpretation of it. Some think that these *slōkas* form part of the Upanishad itself. These latter are divided into 4 *prahasanas* and expound the Advaita School of the Vēdānta and are intended to meet certain objections that may be raised against that school. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, No. 694.)

Sankara's commentary on it is called *Māndūkyōpanishadbhāshyam.* A gloss on it by Ānandātman is called

Māndūkyōpanishadbhāshyasya-tippanam. Sankarānanda's commentary is called *Māndūkyōpanishad Dīpika.* Ānandatīrtha's commentary is called *Māndūkyōpanishadbhāshyam.*

Mundakōpanishad.—This Upanishad first premises that wisdom acquired by the study of the Vēdas and the Sāstras is lower and that the other wisdom which results from the knowledge of the Immortal One is higher, and that Karma associated with wisdom leads to the salvation of Mōksha. Then it treats of the characteristics of the Supreme Being as well as of the nature and the origin of the Universe. It enjoins renunciation and asceticism and Yōgic meditation as the means of attaining the higher wisdom and almost discards the Vēdic religion of rituals.

Sankara has a commentary called *Mundakōpanishadbhāshya* on it. On it is the gloss called *Mundakōpanishadbhāshyasya-tippanam.* Ānandatīrtha's commentary is also known as *Mundakōpanishadbhāshyam.*

Nārāyanōpanishad.—This Upanishad teaches that the Universe proceeds from and returns unto Nārāyana, that he is the universe and that the eight-syllabled *Mantra—Om Namō Nārāyanāya*—is the means of worshipping Him and thus winning salvation.

Svētāsvatarōpanishad.—This Upanishad explains the characteristics of the Supreme Being and the individual soul, and teaches meditation and worship by means of the Pranava, the Supreme Person being identified with Rudra as the bestower of salvation.

A commentary on it, called the *Svētāsvatarōpanishad Dīpika*, is by Vijnānōttama, pupil of Jnānōttama. It is from the Advaita standpoint. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, No. 810.)

Taittirīyōpanishad.—This Upanishad, after describing the importance of the Pranava and mentioning certain rules of conduct, explains the nature of the Supreme Being and of the worship and meditation which lead to the salvation of Mōksha.

A commentary on this Upanishad is by Sankarāchārya called *Taittirīyōpanishad Bhāshyam.* A gloss on Sankara's commentary is by Achyuta Krishnānanda Tīrtha, pupil of

Svayamprakāsa Sarasvati. (*Ibid.*, No. 509.) It is called *Taittirīyōpanishad Vyākhyā Navamāla.* (*Ibid.*)

An unknown author has another commentary on it. (Madras *D.C.* II, iii, No. 508.) It is called *Taittirīyōpanishad Vyākhya.*

Another gloss of this Upanishad is the *Taittirīyōpanishad Dīpika* by Sankarānanda, pupil of Ānandātma. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, No. 511.)

Another commentary is by Sāyanāchārya and is part of his commentary on the *Krishna Yajurvēdaka.*

Another commentary on this Upanishad is by Rangarāmānuja Muni according to the Visistādvaita system of Vēdānta. (Madras *D.C.* I, iii, No. 513.)

There is a metrical commentary on this Upanishad by Ānandatīrtha.

(iii) Puranas and Itihasas.

Harivamsa.—A supplement to the *Mahābhārata* and deals with the story of Krishna and his descendants. (Madras *D.C.* IV, i, Nos. 1968 to 1973.)

Sivagīta.—A work in 16 Adhyāyas. Said to be a portion of the *Padma Purāna.* (See Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.* III, i, A, No. 2114; Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, ii, No. 2546.) Aufrecht, in his *Cat. Bodl.*, No. 61, gives the contents of the chapters of this work. This work is intended to establish the superiority of Siva, as God. In the Madras Oriental MSS. Library there are five copies of this work. (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, ii, Nos. 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549 and 2550.) There is a commentary on it, called *Sivagīta-tātparya Prakāsika*, in 16 Adhyāyas by Paramasivēndra Sarasvati, who describes himself as the disciple of Abhinavanārāyanēndra Sarasvati. There are three copies of this in the Library above named.

It is stated in the *Sivagīta* that its greatest secrets were narrated by Siva to Rāma in the forest of Dandakāranya, the same being again narrated by Skanda to Sanatkumāra. In the colophon to this work it is described as an Upanishad occurring in the *Padma Purāna.*

Siva Purāna.—This is a work in 75 Adhyāyas in the Pūrva Bhāga. (Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, III, i, A, No. 2476; *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, ii, Nos. 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363 and 2364.) It is a Purāna treating of the greatness of Siva and the manner of His worship. It also gives many details about Saivism. A list of contents of this Purāna is given by Aufrecht in the *Cat. Bodl.*, No. 113.

Vāyavīya Samhita.—It is a part of the *Siva Purāna* which consists of many different parts—*Dharmasamhita*, *Vāyavīya Samhita*, etc. It is described in 2 parts of 30 Adhyāyas in the *India Office Library Cat.*, I, p. 1314; also see Madras *D.C.* IV, ii, No. 2364.

A *Vāyavīya Purāna* is also known. (See Madras *D.C.* I, ii, No. 140, at p. 184.) It is cited by Sāyana in the commentary (attributed to him) on the *Rudraprasna.* (*Ibid.*, No. 140, p. 182.)

Brahmāndapurānam.—This *Purāna* contains:—

1. *Arthapanchakavivarana*, which in 30 Adhyāyas treats of the five essentials of religion—*svasvarūpa*, *parasvarūpa*, *upāyasvarūpa*, *pūlasvarūpa* and *virōdhisvarūpa.*

2. *Kshētramāhātmyakhanda* (1 to 12 Adhyāyas)—

(*a*) Srīrangamāhātmya; (*b*) Venkatagirimāhātmya, etc.

3. *Adhyātma Rāmāyanam.*—Treats of the story of Rāma as an incarnation of God in 7 Kāndas. There is a commentary on this work by Rāmavarman, king of Sringiberapura, son of Himmativarman and pupil and patron of Nāgēsabhatta. The commentary is called *Adhyātmarāmāyanasētu* (Madras *D.C.* IV, i, No. 2159). This part of the Purāna is highly popular with religiously inclined people in Southern India.

Many MSS. of this work are known (Madras *D.C.* IV, i, Nos. 2145 to 2149).

Vishnudharmōttaram.—A portion of the *Gārudapurāna*, intended to establish the supremacy of Vishnu above all other gods and to teach how Vaishnava worship is to be conducted. (Madras *D.C.* IV, i, Nos. 2111—2118.)

Parāsarapurāna.—A work complete in 18 Adhyāyas, said to contain 1008 stanzas. An *upapurāna* attributed to Parāsara. A list of its contents will be found in the *India Office Library Cat.*, page 1230. (Madras *D.C.* IV, ii, No. 2348.)

Linga Purāna.—A Mahāpurāna of 159 Adhyāyas treating mainly of the Linga and the various forms of Siva. It also gives a few genealogical events from Priyamvrata to Krishna. It also narrates the stories of the destruction of Tripura and other demons by Siva, besides instruction for the performance of the different ceremonies in honour of Siva. Aufrecht gives a list of contents of this work in the *Bodleian Library Catalogue*, No. 101. There are three MSS. of this work in the Madras Oriental Library. (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.* IV, i, Nos. 2257 to 2259.) This Purāna is said to be narrated to Nārada and the Rishis in the Naimisha forest by Sūta, who heard it from Vyāsa.

Kāmigāmah.—This voluminous work of over 136 Patalas deals with the worship of Siva and the performance of the various religious festivals in Saiva temples. (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XI, page 4227, Nos. 5431 to 5432.) Though it is described as a *Māhātmya*, it also deals with the construction of temples, making of images, etc. It has a bearing on sculpture which cannot be over-estimated.

Skāndapurāna.—This Purāna is the storehouse of all the stories connected with Siva and his greatness. It contains many sections, each a separate work in itself:—

Nāgarakhanda; Umāsamhita; Bhīmakhanda; Sankarasamhita; Sētumāhātmyam; Isānasamhita; Brahmōttarakhanda; Kālikakhanda; Kāsīkhanda; Jambūdvīpōdbhava; Dharmakhanda; Sūtasamhita; Saurasamhita; etc. Each of these is again sub-divided into a number of parts, with further sub-divisions among each of them. Thus, the *Nāgarakhanda* has 13 Adhyāyas and deals mainly with the artisan descendants of Visvakarman, *viz.*, goldsmiths, carpenters, etc. This is described in detail in the *India Office Library Catalogue*, page 1347. The *Hātakēsvaramāhātmya* is included in it. (See *India Office Library Catalogue*, page 1348; also Madras *D.C. of*

Sānskrit MSS. IV, No. 2302.) The *Umāsamhita* treats of the story of the *Rāmāyana.* The *Bhīmakhanda* deals with the object of pilgrimages and the many benefits to be derived from them. (See *India Office Library Catalogue*, page 1357; Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.* IV, i, Nos. 2310-2311.) The *Sankarasamhita* treats of Vīramahēsvaraprasamsa, Sivabhaktadhyānapūja and Laukikāchārya. (See Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.* IV, i, Nos. 2287 and 2313.) A *Khanda* of *Sankarasamhita* is *Sivarahasyakhanda*, which, in its turn, has included in it the Upadēsakānda in 85 Adhyāyas treating of Kailāsa and its Lord (*ibid.*, No. 2314); the Sāmbhavakānda, the Asurakānda, the Vīramahēndrakānda, the Yuddhakānda, the Dēvakānda and the Dakshakānda (*ibid.*, Nos. 2314 to 2318); also the Mōkshakānda, which sets out the incarnations of Vishnu and treats of rules of conduct and of the means of salvation. (*Ibid.*, No. 2312.)

The *Sanatkumārasamhita* which includes the Sivatattvasudhānidhi, Jīvanmuktaprakarana, Vidēhamuktaprakarana, and the Mahāvākyaprakarana. (See *ibid.*, No. 2287.) The *Srīsailakhanda* is also a part of it. It treats of the sacredness of Srīsaila and the places connected with it. (Madras *D.C.* IV, i, Nos. 2319-2320.) The *Tungabhadrākhanda* forms part of this Samhita. It treats of the greatness and holiness of the Tungabhadra and of the holy places and tanks near it. (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, i, No. 2298.)

The *Sētumāhātmya* treats of the sacredness and greatness of Sētu. (*Ibid.*, No. 2287.)

The *Īsānasamhita* treats of Sivarātriprādurbhāva-tadvratapūjāvidhāna, Sukumāraganēsvarapradāna and Sivarātrimāhātmya. (*Ibid.*, No. 2288.)

The *Brahmōttarakhanda* treats of the greatness of Siva and of the value of devotion to him. (*Ibid.*, Nos. 2303, 2309; also Aufrecht, *Bodleian Catalogue*, Nos. 127 and 128.)

The *Kālikākhanda* treats of the greatness of Siva, and of the wearing of the Rudrāksha beads and sacred ashes.

It criticizes the practice of branding the body with the marks of conch and wheel, the emblems of Vishnu, and the wearing of the Urdhvapundra. It also narrates various stories to prove the superiority of Siva to Vishnu. (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, i, 2290.)

The *Kāsīkhanda*, which is in 100 sections, treats fully of the greatness and sanctity of Kāsi and the places connected with it. (See Aufrecht, *Bod. Cat.*, No. 120; Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, i, No. 2291.) A commentary called *Padyōjana* has been written on it. (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, i, Nos. 2294-2296.)

Jambudvīpōdbhava has included in it the following:—Sahyāmalakagrāmamāhātmya; Kēralakhandavarnana; Dakshinakānda; Kēraladvīpavarnana; Nīlanadīvarnana; Hēmādrikhanda; Muktāpurīvarnana; Hēmēsvarīmāhātmya; Bhavishyadvamsāvalīvarnana; Madhyāranyamāhātmya; Vatēsvarakshētramāhātmya; Srīmukhakshētramāhātmya; Bhavishyatkathānuvarnana. (*Ibid.*, No. 2297.)

In the Dharmakhanda, the story of the early life of Vālmīki is given and occasion is taken to inculcate certain moral and religious *dharmas* based on it. The greatness of *Rāmāyana* is also set out in it at some length. (See *ibid.*, No. 2299.)

The *Sūtasamhita* is in four Khandas and is separately dealt with below. The same remark applies to the *Saurasamhita*.

Sūtasamhita.—This is a work in four Khandas, namely, Sivamāhātmyakhanda, Jnānayōgakhanda, Muktikhanda and Yagnavaibhavakhanda, in the last of which the Uparī Bhāga containing Brahmagītā and the Sūtagīta occur. (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, i, Nos. 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326 and 2327.)

A detailed description of this work will be found in the *India Office Library Catalogue*, pages 1377-1380. Briefly put, it is a collection of Saiva doctrines and legendary illustrations, especially according to the Yōga practices collected from and forming part of the Skānda Purāna. Later treatises on Saiva ritualism and philosophy are avowedly based on what is contained in the *Sūtasamhita* (see, for example, *Kriyākramōdyōtānikā*, which deals with the rites to be performed in Siva temples and *Sivakalpadrumah*, which treats of Saiva philosophy, both of which quote the *Sūtasamhita*, see Madras *T.C.* IV, i, B, pp. 4919 and 4988, Nos. 3304 and 3348). There is a well-known commentary on this work which is called *Sūtasamhitavyākhyā*, otherwise known as *Tātparya Dīpika*. This commentary is, according to the work itself, by Mādhavāchārya, who is spoken of in it as the pupil of Kāsīvilāsa Kriyāsakti. (See Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, i, Nos. 2328-2331.) This work has been published in the Ānandāsrama Sānskrit Series.

Mādhava mentioned as the author of this *Vyākhya* has undoubtedly to be identified with Chāunda Mādhava, the general and minister of Bukka I, the Vijayanagar king, who is mentioned in a lithic inscription, dated in 1368 A.D. (*E.C.* VII, Shikarpur 281). According to this record, this Mādhava called, for the sake of differentiating him from others of the same name, Chāunda Mādhava, was known for his ascetic virtues and belonged to the Āngirasa-gōtra. He has to be distinguished from Mādhava, surnamed Vidyāranya, of the Sringēri Matha, who was a contemporary of his and who belonged to the Bhāradvāja-gōtra. Chāunda Mādhava was a *Saiva*, whereas Mādhava, the son of Māyana and brother of Sāyana, was an Advaitin of Sankara's School. Of Chāunda Mādhava, the inscription above quoted states that he was an astonishing expert in policy, as great as Brihaspati in wisdom and a learned man engaged in composing poetry which gave great pleasure to the minds of all. Through the grace of his teacher Kāsīvilāsa Kriyāsakti, he attained, we are told, great celebrity as a Saiva. He is also described as the conqueror of many countries on the shores of the Western Ocean. This statement is confirmed by the Goa plates and other records and is therefore no empty boast. Kriyāsakti is described in this inscription as "the manifest incarnation of Siva".

It was at his instance, we are told, that Mādhava, his disciple, made the grant of the three villages, mentioned in it to Kashmir Brāhmans, who were "travellers to the farthest points of the *Chārāyanīya-aticharanāmnāya*, daily observers of all the rites appointed in the pure *Sivāmnāya*, ever devoted to the worship of the Ashtamurti" (*i.e.*, the Vidyēsvaras, who were the objects of adoration in his vow). A few points worthy of note in connection with this grant are:—(1) that the three villages gifted were re-grouped into one and called Vidyēsvarapura and made over with the consent of King Bukka-Rāya I; (2) the gift was made in order to fulfil the great Saiva vow, which Mādhava had commenced with special rites a year before as directed in the *Siva-āmnāya*; (3) the gift was made by Mādhava after obtaining due permission for so doing, from his sovereign by petition, saying, "From the funds of my own property, I will carry out your order; give me leave"; (4) that after obtaining Bukka's permission for the gift, Mādhava purchased the three villages situated in his own *Mandala* (*i.e.*, the province over which he himself governed as Viceroy)—"purchasing," we are told, at the price of the day, with the knowledge of the authorities of the *Mandala*, which speaks eloquently to his high character, he not taking any advantage of his position as Viceroy in a transaction so personal to himself; (5) the gift was made in the month of Kārtika, the day being Monday, both being sacred to Siva; and (6) the grant was undertaken on the advice of the Sivaguru Kāsīvilāsa Krīyāsakti. "In order to have an oversight of that kingdom (*i.e.*, the Āraga province of Vijayanagar, which extended as far as the shores of the Western Ocean with which Mādhava was entrusted by Bukka), without trouble, before making the gift, Mādhava", we are told, "worshipped in the manner of the *Sivāmnāya*, the god of gods embodied in his own favourite *Linga*, Tryambakanātha, by means of daily special ceremonies, and by a number of rites and practices." (See *E.C.* Shimoga VII, Shikarpur 281.) There can be scarcely any doubt that Chāunda Mādhava, the author of the *Tātparya-Dīpika*, was as great as a warrior and administrator as a poet and philosopher. Nor is there any room for suspicion that the Mādhava of Shikarpur 281 is the same as the Mādhava described as the author of the *Tātparya-Dīpika*. While the *Sūtasamhita* is mentioned by Srīpati, he does not mention Chāunda Mādhava's commentary on it. This may be taken as evidence of the fact that he was a contemporary of this Mādhava, both having probably lived, as above indicated, about the third quarter of the 14th century. (We know from the inscription quoted above that Chāunda Mādhava lived about 1368 A.D. and that Srīpati's grandson mentioned in the Srīsailam record had probably just died in 1405 A.D., for the gift of the beam therein referred to was made for his merit."[7])

Sankarasamhita.—A part of *Skānda Purāna* of which a part (Adhyāyas 180 to 183) treating of Vīramahēsvaraprasamsana, Sivabhaktadhyānapūja and Laukikāchāra is available in the Madras Oriental MSS. Library. (*D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, No. 2313.)

Saurasamhita.—A portion of the *Skānda Purāna*, treating mainly of Siva as the Supreme Being, his nature and attributes. It is of 16 Adhyāyas described at length in the *India Office Library Catalogue* (p. 1382). (See Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, IV, i, Nos. 2332 and 2333.)

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[7] In his *Sūtasamhita Vyākhyā*, otherwise known as *Tātparya-Dīpikā*, Mādhava styles himself *paramabhakta* of Kāsīvilāsa Kriyāsakti, and *Srimat tryambaka pādābja sēvā parayanēna* (one who is devoted to doing service at the lotus feet of the sacred Tryambaka). The inscription referred to in the text describes not only as the disciple of Kāsīvilāsa Kriyāsakti but also as deeply devoted to Tryambakanātha *i.e.*, Siva. In the beginning of his *Vyākhyā*, Mādhava describes himself as the worshipper of *Kāsīvilāsākhya Krīyāsaktīsa*, *i.e.*, Kāsīvilāsa Kriyāsakti who was the manifestation of Siva himself; and further as *Srimattryambaka pādābja Sēvānishnāta Tējasa Vēdasāstra pratishtātra Srīman Mādhava Mantrina.* (See Madras *D.C. Sanskrit MSS.*, IV, i. p. 1588, No. 2323.) In the colophon to the first Adhyāya, he also speaks of himself as *Upanishanmarga pravartakēna Srī Mādhavācharya*, etc. (*Ibid.*) In this MS. there is an interpolation which states that there is a *Sūtasamhita Vyākhyā* called *Advaita-Dīpikā* by Vidyāranya (*Ibid.*, pp. 1589-1590). There is an evident mixing up of Mādhava, the Saiva, and Mādhava, surnamed Vidyāranya. (See for further information, *Mysore Gazetteer*, (1930 Edition), II, iii, 1431-1446).

Sivadharmah.—This is a work descriptive of the details connected with the worship of Siva. (See Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XI, Nos. 5507 and 5508; see also Vol. IV, No. 2325, for description of a MS. of this work under *Sūtasamhita.*)

Vātūla.—This is evidently a shortened form for *Vātūlatantram*, a Saivāgama work which is made up of the following ten *Patalas* :—

1. तत्व भेद् पटल	Tatva bhēda patala
2. वर्ण भेद पटल	Varna bhēda patala
3. चक्र भेद् पटल	Chakra bhēda patala
4. वर्ग भेद् पटल	Varga bhēda patala
5. तन्त्र भेद पटल	Tantra bhēda patala
6. प्रणव भेद् पटल	Pranava bhēda patala
7. ब्रह्माऽभेद पटल	Brahmā-bhēda patala
8. अङ्ग भेद पटल	Anga bhēda patala
9. मन्त्र जात पटल	Mantra jāta patala
10. मन्त्र कील पटल	Mantra kīla patala

(See Madras *D.C. of MSS.*, XI, Nos. 5477 to 5480.) There is a Kannada *Tīka* (commentary) on this work. (See *ibid.*, No. 5480.)

The *Anubhavasūtram*, a work of eight Adhikaranas, is a part of this exhaustive Āgama treatise. This part is devoted to the topic of the realization of Siva as the Supreme Being in self-realization. (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, X, 5074.) A part of it is *Sarabha Sāluva Mantrakalpa*, which treats of the repetition of the *mantra* addressed to Sarabha Sāluva Pakshirāja. (Madras *D.C., of Sānskrit MSS.*, XV, Nos. 8096-8098.) A rendering in Tamil of the 7th Patala of this work by Ārumugaswāmi, a Brāhman writer of Tirukkoilūr, is known. (Madras *D.C. of Tamil MSS.*, III, No. 1418.)

Vīrāgamaha.—This is a work in two parts, *Pūrvabhāga* and *Uttarabhāga.* (See Madras *D.C. of MSS.*, X, No. 5118.) This work should be distinguished from

Agnirahasya.—Rāmānuja in his *Srī Bhāshya* refers to this work thus (III, 3-19):—(1) "In the book of the *Vājasanēyaka*, called *Agnirahasya*, we meet with a meditation on Brahman called *Sāndilyavidyā*, and there is also a *Sāndilyavidya* in the *Brihadāranyaka*" etc. (Thibaut, 641). (2) Another reference to this work in the *Srī Bhāshya* occurs at III. 3-44 (Thibaut, 668): "In the *Vājasanēyaka*, in the *Agnirahasya* chapter, there are references to certain altars built of mind, 'built of mind, built of speech, etc.'"

(iv) Other Authors Quoted by Sripati.

Among other authors mentioned by Srīpati in the body of his work may be mentioned the following:—(1) Manchana Pandita, author of a commentary on *Guhādhikarana*; (2) Paramasivārādhya Bhattāchārya, who wrote the *Kaivalya Prakāsa*; (3) Dūrvāsa, author of *Kārakavrittilakshana*; (4) Paramānanda Ārādhya; and (5) Jaimini, author of *Vēdapādastavah*. Whether the Manchana Pandita mentioned by Srīpati can be identified with Manchana, the author of a work named *Āsvalāyanasūtraprayōgapradīpika*, is open to doubt. (See Hultzsch, *Reports on Sānskrit MSS. in S. India*, I, page 15, No. 175.) He was also known as Manchanārya. (*Ibid.*, III, No. 1616, p. 5.) He cannot be the Manchana referred to by Srīpati as he is not an author. Another Manchana, son of Rāmarāja Prēggada, minister of King Vēma, and grandfather of Manchirāja, who performed the consecration of two *lingas*, brought from Srīsaila, at the Mandukēsvara temple, at Mānikēsvaram, in the present Guntur district, and made other gifts to the latter temple, is mentioned in a record dated in Saka 1275 or 1353 A.D. (*Nellore Inscriptions* iii, 78, pp. 1037-45.) Whether this Manchana is identical with the *Manchapārya* mentioned as his younger brother by Chāundappāchārya, who wrote a commentary on the *Srauta Sūtra* of Āpastamba, which is a work on Vēdic sacrifices, is also open to question. This work is called *Prayōgaratnamāla* and in its colophon Chāundapa describes himself as the son of Chinnārya and elder brother of

Ādityadēva and Manchapārya and minister of King Bhūpati, son of Bukka II and Tippāmba and grandson of Harihara II of Vijayanagar. He states in the introductory verses that he wrote the commentary at the command of King Bhūpati and that Vidyāranya, having been requested by Pandits like Chāundapārya to comment on the *Srauta Sūtras*, explained its Hautra and Audgātra portions. (Madras, *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, I, i, C, No. 795.) As we know that Prince Vīra-Bhūpati ruled from 1409-1421 A.D., both Chāundapa and Manchapārya have to be set down to about the 1st quarter of the 15th century. This date would seem to suggest that the identification of Manchana, the author of *Āsvalāyanasūtraprayōga*, and Manchapārya, younger brother of Chaundapa, is open to objection. There was a Telugu poet named *Manchana*, who was the author of the Telugu work *Kēyūrabāhucharitram*, which is based on Rājasēkhara's *Viddhasālabhanjika*. As the work is dedicated by Manchana to Nandūri Gundamantri, a minister of King Prithvīsa, described as the son of Rājēndrachōla, he will have to be assigned to about the middle of the 12th century A.D. (See Madras *T.C. of Telugu MSS.*, Part 3, No. 45(*b*), at page 130.) There is nothing to show that this Manchana, though evidently a Sānskrit scholar, ever wrote any work in that language.

Sivārādhya, author of *Sivamānasapūja*, a work on the mental worship of Siva (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XI, No. 5524), is probably the Paramasivārādhya Bhattāchārya, who is referred to by Srīpati as the author of *Kaivalyaprakāsa* and *Sivagnānachandrōdaya*. Two other authors mentioned by Srīpati are Dūrvāsa, author of *Kārakavrittilakshana*, and Paramānanda Ārādhya, the latter of whom is evidently different from Paramasivārādhya. Of these, Dūrvāsa, who is styted by Srīpati *Bhagavadpādāchārya*, appears as a Rishi of the Sāma-Vēda in the *Jaiminigrihyasūtra*. (Seshagiri Sastri, *Madras Report on Sānskrit MSS.*, I, 3.) A work known as *Dūrvāsasamhita* is known (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, VIII, see under No. 10005). To Rishi Dūrvāsa is attributed *Tripurasundarīstōtram*

(Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XIX, No. 10758). Dūrvāsa's work *Kārakavrittilakshana* must be presumed to be a treatise on the meaning and force of declensional cases, like that of Rudrabhattāchārya's *Kārakavādārtha* (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, VIII, No. 3927) and Bhavānanda Vagīsa's *Kārakavivēchana*, which is part of a larger work of his, called *Sabdakhandasāramanjari*. *Kārakavivēchana* contains a clear exposition of the various relations in a sentence that are given expression to by various declensional cases (see Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, VIII, No. 4309). Jayarāmapanchānana was the author of *Kārakavādārtha* [Madras *T.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, I, A. R. No. 114(*c*)], *Pādārthamāla* (*D.C.* No. 4267) and *Samāsavādārtha*, a discussion in the nature of compounds (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XXVI, No. 14842, p. 9881).

We finally come to Jaimini, the author of *Vēdapādastavah*, which is the shortened name of a work more familiarly known as *Sivavēdapādastavaha*. This is a hymn in praise of Siva, the last quarter of each stanza in it ending with a Vēdic passage. The authorship is attributed to Jaimini and the work is declared to be part of the *Brahmāndapurāna*. MSS. of this work, however, differ in the contents of their colophon. Thus while the colophon in one copy mentions it as taken from Vyāsa's *Brahmāndapurāna* and states that Jaimini was its author [Madras *Tri. Cat.*, I, i. B. R. No. 438(*v*)], another copy has a colophon which states that it is from the *Bhavishyōttarakhanda* and it adds that it bears the alternative name of *Pundarīkapurapati-Jaiminisamvāda*. (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XIX, 2, R. No. 11204, at p. 7560.) This description of the work is, however, confirmed in the preliminary part of the MS. copy of this work first quoted above, where it is stated that when Sūta—the narrator of the Purānas—was asked by Saunaka and others as to what Jaimini did when he reached Pundarīkapura, he said that when the reverend Jaimini reached that town he with folded hands sang this hymn of *Vēdapādastava*. A third MS. of the work has a brief colophon which merely states that it is the work of Jaimini. (*Ibid.*, R. No. 11207 at p. 7561.) There is a commentary called *Sivatattvadīpika* on this work, by Sūryanārāyanasūrin, son of Tirumalabhatta of the Pattangi family. He belonged to the Mitrāyavagōtra and dedicates the work to Siva worshipped on the Srīsaila. (*Ibid.*, R. No. 11208 at p. 7561.) The commentator was evidently a native of Chidambaram, whose God he praises. He also notes the fact that the stōtra is taken from *Brahmāndapurāna.*

Another work mentioned by Srīpati is *Sivādvaita-prakāsika* (I. i, 2-2, page 34, line 24). An incomplete MS. copy of this work is in the Madras Oriental MSS. Library with a Kannada Commentary on it (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, X, No. 5114, page 3913). This work treats of Saiva-Vēdānta religion and philosophy. Among the subjects treated in it are :—

(1) *Sarvaprapancha nivriththi kramaha ;*
(2) *Vibhūti rudrāksha dhārana panchāksharōchchārana visvāsa lingādi sthala nischaya kramaha ;*
(3) *Itara dēvatā sakti nirāsādi sthala nischaya kramaha ;*
(4) *Bhāvi sanga nirāsādi ishta lingārpana kramaha ;*
(5) *Bhaktādi saranāntasthala kramaha ; and*
(6) *Gnāna sūnya kramaha.*

In this work the idea is suggested that Siva is *anādi*, beyond all comprehension and all knowledge ; he is beyond all forms and is formless. No one knows him exactly—neither Brahma, nor Vishnu nor Rudra nor Agni nor Vyōma (Akāsa), nor Samīra (Wind-God), nor Ambu (Water-God), nor Bhūmi (Earth), nor the Grahas (the Stars). No phenomenal agents existed then—when Siva was All (or the Only One) that existed. He existed in the form of Satchidānanda and Paripūrna (filled with everything), without a second. Beyond all comprehension and expression, devoid of cause or effect, beginning, end or non-existence, neither in space, nor out of space ; impossible to think of through meditation, or spiritual knowledge ; an empty mark incapable of being sought as an asylum (or support) ; this is the state of absolute non-existence. (*Iti sarvasūnya sthalam sampūrnam.*)

The work ends thus :—" Everything is absorbed in that One comprising all forms of eternal Sat, Chit and Ānanda; in that Parabrahma pervading throughout the firmament. What is the fun of talking jestingly of those who are far beyond the farthest end of the ocean of knowledge and who are one with Paramātma in his Being?"

" In trying to describe such of them, one does not know himself or Brahma, who is unsurpassed, unrivalled and who is in his form of Chit. When actual non-existence results, then everything is absorbed in the Linga (Lingaikya) and all such things as Bhāva and Abhāva with their reflection cease to exist. That state is known to be *Gnāna Sūnya Sthithi* (non-existence) where no feeling or knowledge of Brahma is experienced as the result of being freed from the bondage of Bhāva or Abhāva.

"That is said to be *Gnānasūnya* (the non-existent state of knowledge) wherein the knowledge and the object creating the knowledge with its characteristics are all absorbed in the *gnēyē* (knower) . . . . May Siva (Sasibhūshana) who is unchangeable (*Nirvikalpa*), unprotected (*Nirādhāra*), characterless (*Nirguna*), uncovered (*Nirupādhika*) and who is still the absolute support for the visible universe (*Pratyaksha Jagadādhāra*), protect me."

The name of the author of the work is not known, being not mentioned in the colophons found in the MS. The colophons are short and state merely "*Iti sarvasūnya sthalam sampūrnam*" and so on. This work has nothing to do with *Sivādvaitam* (*ibid.*, No. 5113 at p. 3912), a work of seven *patalas* devoted to the doctrines of Saiva-advaita religion and philosophy. These seven *patalas* deal with :—Tatvabhēda, Varnabhēda, Chakrabhēda, Vargabhēda, Mantrabhēda, Pranavabhēda and Brahmabhēda.

It is interesting to note that among the citations made by Srīpati is one from Kālidāsa, the famous dramatist. The following passage occurs in Adhyāya III, Pāda III ;—

" किमिवहि मधुराणां मंडनं नाकृतीनां ॥ "

Kimivahi madhurānām mandanam nākritīnām.

This passage occurs, as is well known, in Act **I**, Scene III, of *Sākuntala.*

These words, it will be readily recalled, are spoken by King Dushyanta in describing the unadorned beauty of Sākuntala, when he gets a first glimpse of her at the hermitage of Rishi Kanva. Srīpati quotes the passage to illustrate the point that as in Kāvya literature the use of *Avyayas* (adverbs) is sometimes of no consequence for conveying the idea intended to be conveyed by a *Vākya* (sentence), for they do not add to the beauty or effect of a passage though occurring in them, so if the difference between the *Jīva* and *Brahma* is negligible, it should not be taken into account. The idea of servant and master, as between them, is, therefore, non-existent. These, however, are not *one* but the difference between them is so slight *(daram alpam)* that such difference ought to be treated as negligible. This is, in essence, the *bhēdābhēda* doctrine of Srīpati. Elsewhere he quotes the *Bhramara Kīta* theory to support his view (Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 4—*Tattu Samanvayāt*). He says :—" By *Shraddhā*, *Bhakti* and *Dhyāna* in due combination, believe when I say, the Jīva will, by meditation, attain Sivatatva in the same manner as the *Kīta*, though *different* from the *Bhramara*, becomes the *Bhramara.*" The original passage may be quoted :—

"श्रद्धाभक्तिध्यानयोगादवेहि ॥" इत्यादौ भ्रमरकीटवत् परमेश्वरोपासनात्मक ध्यानज्ञानवशात् जीवस्य शिवतत्त्वप्राप्तिरुपदेशात् ॥

" *Shraddhā bhakti dhyāna yogādavēhi*" *ityādau bhramara kītavat paramēsvarōpāsanātmaka dhyāna gnāna vasāt jīvasya Sivatatvaprāptih upadesāt.*

Pranavārthavivaranam is another work quoted by Srīpati. It is mentioned in connection with the derivation of the word " Māya " in I. i, 3. I have been unable to trace out this work. There is a work called *Pranavārthaprakāsika*, which is a commentary on the syllable

Ōm according to the Advaita Vēdanta by one Brahmānandayōginathēndra. (See Madras *T. C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, I. i, A. R. No. 193 (*e*) at page 326.) The work mentioned by Srīpati may be one of this kind and this suggestion may perhaps be not open to doubt, for there is a Saiva work called *Pranavapanchākshariyantra* which treats of *Ōm Nama Sivāya* as a *yantra*. (See Madras *D. C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XI, No. 5417, page 4215.) There is, however, a well-known dispute as to whether the mystic syllable *Ōm* forms part of the aphorisms in Bādarāyana's *Brahmasūtras*. A popular treatise on this subject is the *Pranavadarpana* by Srīnivāsāchārya, son of Srīsaila Tātācharya and Lakshmi and pupil of Srīnivāsadhvarin of Kaundinya gōtra. This is a work by a Srīvaishnava scholar who sets down the Srīvaishnava viewpoint in it and that is that the syllable *Ōm* does not form part of the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyana. (Madras *D. C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, X, No. 4932, page 3726.) This view has been contested by the Madhva-Vaishnavas and their standpoint is summed up in *Pranavadarpanakhandanam* by Vijayīndratīrtha, which is a criticism of Srīnivāsāchārya's above quoted work. (Madras *D. C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, X, No. 4798, page 3588.) According to the followers of Madhvāchārya, the syllable *Ōm* is part of every *Sūtra* of Bādarāyana, and is so for the reason that his Sūtras are definite in their decisions and as such not open to discussion.

Among other works cited by Srīpati in the course of his commentary is the *Sivagnānachandrōdaya* by one Paramasivārādhyaswāmi. I have been unable to trace out this work and its author. Another writer referred to by Srīpati is Paramānanda Ārādhya, who is spoken as a teacher even greater than Ekōrama Siddha Bhagavatpādāchārya, the *guru* of Srīpati. The identity of this writer is also not certain. Paramānanda Tīrtha, a writer on Saiva Vēdanta, well versed in both Telugu and Sānskrit, is known to Telugu literature. He styles himself by the alternative name of Paramānanda Yati. Under the first of these designations he wrote the *Sivagnānamanjari*, a Telugu work on the Saiva Vēdānta in the popular Dvipada metre. In this work, he calls himself a disciple of Dattātrēya. Under the name of Paramānanda Yati, he wrote the *Upadēsakramamu*, another Telugu work, which is in the form of a dialogue between a teacher and his pupil on some of the principles of Advaita Vēdānta. In this work also he calls himself a disciple of Dattātrēya. Similarly, in a third work, called the *Uttaragītavyākhya*, which is a commentary on the *Uttaragīta*, which is an episode in the Asvamēdha Parvam of the *Mahābhārata*, Paramānandatīrtha calls himself a disciple of Dattātrēya. Thus, there seems little doubt that Paramānanda styled himself *yati* and *tīrtha* just as it suited him. Evidently, he treated the terms as synonymous, which they actually are. He was probably a *Sanyāsin* of the Saiva School. His last mentioned work is written in conversational Telugu and is stated to have been composed by him to correct the many errors into which previous authors had fallen in their interpretation of the *Uttaragīta*. [See Madras *T. C. of Telugu MSS.*, II, p. 592, No. 194 (*d*); p. 596, No. 195 (*b*); p. 747, No. 264 (*b*).] Another work by the same writer—Paramānandayatīndra—is *Paramānandasatakamu* which consists of 111 verses in the Kanda metre, in praise of Vishnu and Siva and treating of the Advaitic oneness of the world. Two other *Satakas* by him are *Dattātrēya Satakamu* and *Sampangimauna Satakamu*. [Madras *T. C.* of *Telugu MSS.*, Part III, pp. 173-177, R. Nos. 54 (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*).] The practical question remains whether we could identify this Paramānandatīrtha or Paramānandayati with the Paramānandārādhya mentioned by Srīpati. It has not been possible to fix the age of Paramānandayati *alias* Paramānanda Yōgi and so it is difficult to state whether he came after or preceded Srīpati. Bearing the fact that Srīpati describes him as being even greater than Ekōrama Siddha Bhagavatpādāchārya, it is, in the present state of our knowledge of both of these writers, impossible to identify them.

Popularity of Sripati's Commentary.

Srīpati's commentary seems to have had a wide vogue both in Northern and Southern India. It was evidently studied with some care among Benares *pandits* who followed the Vīrasaiva tenets. There is at least one well-known work in which there is internal evidence of this fact. The *Lingadhārana Chandrika*, the work referred to, does not mention by name Srīpati's *Bhāshya* but it is undoubted that the author of this work was well acquainted with the contents of the *Bhāshya*. This highly popular work was written by Srī Nandikēswara Swāmi and has latterly been edited with a commentary called *Sara* by Pandit Mahāmahōpadhyāya Srī Sivakumāra Swāmi Sarma Misra and published at Benares by Kāsīnātha Sāstri, a resident of Ambigēri village and Adhyaksha of Nandikēsvaramatha, with the sanction of the Swāmis—so we are told in the title page of the work itself—by the Kāsi Jangamavātika Visvārādhyapītha. (See edition published in 1905 at the Medical Hall Press, Benares.) In the *Bhūmika* to this work, we are told that this work was written by Nandikēsvara Swāmi to support the Vēdic origin of Lingadhārana after examining many ancient works on the subject. The difficulties in the work were, we are informed, explained by H. H. Rājēsvara Swāmi of the Jangamavātika Visvārādhyapītha and it was published by Srī Sivakumāra Swāmi with the *tīka* entitled *Sāra*, mentioned above. There can be hardly any doubt that Nandikēsvara was its author as the colophon to Chapter II actually mentions his name. It is also stated in the *Bhūmika* that the work had once been without a *tīka* and that the *tīka* was added by Srī Sivakumāra Swāmi for the benefit of all Vīrasaivas. As regards Nandikēsvara himself, we have little or no information of value. He is mentioned in the work as the son of Mahēshāchārya, who, we are told, was the son of Basavēsvarāchārya. (See colophon at the end of the work, page 311, lines 2-9.) Nor is there any clue to his date. Among the authorities mentioned in the work by Nandikēsvara, in support of his views, are:—*Makutāgama*, *Vīrāgama*, *Siddhānta-sārāvali*, *Siddhānta-sikhāmani*, *Lingapurāna*, *Skānda Purāna*, *Padma Purāna*, *Mahābhārata*, *Gīta*, *Taittirīya Upanishad*, *Svētāsvatara Upanishad* and the *Sivagīta*. As will be seen from what has been stated above, with the exception of *Makutāgama* and *Siddhānta-sārāvali*, all these works are cited by Srīpati in his *Bhāshya*. Of the two excepted works, the *Siddhānta-sārāvali* contains the important teachings found in various Saivāgama works, and it is the work of one Trilōchana Sivāchārya. His date is not definitely known though it is undoubtedly a work later in date than Srīpati. There is a commentary on this work (*Siddhānta-sārāvali*) by Ananta Sivāchārya. (Madras *D. C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XI, Nos. 5554 and 5555.) The *Makutāgama* is one of the several Saivāgamas known to Sānskrit literature. The *Āgamapurānanāmānukramanika* mentions it in its opening verse, which begins with *Kāmika* and other Āgamic works. (Madras *D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XI, page 4218, No. 5420.) The work itself is well known. (*Ibid.*, p. 4255, No. 5464.) Some parts of it deal with the conduct of various religious festivals in Siva temples. One such portion of it, known as *Sivōtsavādivishayah* cites in its colophon this work as its authority. (*Ibid.*, pp. 4306-7, No. 5533, at page 4307.) The very nature of this work shows that it is a late one and cannot be posterior to Srīpati, though the festivals, etc., mentioned in it may themselves go back far into antiquity.

That the *Lingadhārana Chandrika*, which openly admits that it is based on ancient works, appears to owe much to the commentary of Srīpati on the *Brahma Sūtras*, especially, I. i, can hardly admit of any doubt. All the Purānas supporting Lingadhārana appearing in the *Lingadhārana Chandrika* are to be seen in Srīpati's commentary as well. These are tabulated below :—

Work or text quoted	*Srīpati's Bhāshya* (Present Edition)	*Lingadhārana Chandrika* (Edition 1905)
(*a*) *Kaivalya Upanishad* ..	Page 10, Lines 21-23.	Page 12, Lines 8-12.
(*b*) *Sarvalingāni stāpayatipāni mantram.*	Page 8, Line 9.	Page 28.
(*c*) *Sarvānana Sirōgriva* from *Svētāsvatara Upanishad.*	Page 8.	Page 31.
(*d*) *Vrihīn prōksheti vrihīn vahanti.*	Page 14.	Page 29.
(*e*) *Ēshō'sau paramahamsō bhānukōtipratīkāsate.*	Page 57.	Page 25.
(*f*) *Tadādimadhyānta vihīnamēkam*, etc. *Umāsahāyam paramēsvaram prabhum*, etc.	Page 10.	Page 12.
(*g*) *Ritam satyam param Brahma purusham Krishna pingalam*, etc.	Page 54.	Page 8.
(*h*) *Dhaharam vipāpam paravēsmabhūtam*, etc.	Page 8.	Page 4.
(*i*) *Tasmāt dhāryam mahālingam pānimantrēti*, etc.	Page 14.	Page 58.
(*j*) *Agnēyōshta kapālo amāvāsyāyam.*	Page 14.	Page 61.
(*k*) *Yachchandasām Rishabhā visvarūpāha*, etc.	Page 8.	Page 105.
(*l*) *Pavitrānte vitatam Brahmanaspate*, etc.	Page 70.	Page 124.
(*m*) *Mantra sabdasya gaunārthatvāt īkshyat adhikarane*, etc.	Page 14.	Page 68.
(*n*) *Ksharam pradhānam amrutāksharam haraha.*	Page 13.	Page 38.

That even certain of the maxims quoted in the *Lingadhārana Chandrika* should be the same as those found in Srīpati's commentary is not a little strange. Thus :—

Nyaya quoted	*Srīpati's Bhāshya* (Present Edition)	*Lingadhārana Chandrika* (Edition 1905)
(*o*) *Nishādasthapatinyāya* ..	Adhyaya I, Pada III, Sutra 34, Page 154, Line 33.	
(*p*) *Sandigdhē vākya shēshāt* ..	Page 15.	Page 63.
(*q*) *Nishādasthapatinyāya* ..	Adhyaya I, Pada III, Sutra 15, Page 143.	Page 76, Line 3 in the Commentary.

The only possible inference that can be drawn from the above parallelism is that the *Lingadhārana Chandrika* has borrowed much—though without direct acknowledgment—from Srīpati's *Bhāshya.* As the writer of a popular text-book, the author of the *Lingadhārana Chandrika* may not have deemed it quite necessary to cite his authority, the more so as the original sources—assiduously collected in the first instance by Srīpati—are referred to by him. In any view of the case, the practical identity of the authorities cited by both makes it impossible to resist the conclusion that the *Lingadhārana Chandrika* is the borrower and not *vice versa.* The vast differences that exist between the manner of treatment adopted by these two writers—Srīpati and Nandikēsvara—would seem to distinctly prove that Srīpati is the original writer and that Nandikēsvara is the borrower. Finally, it may be added that the *Lingadhārana Chandrika,* the work of Nandikēsvara, should be distinguished from the *Lingadhāranadīpika*, which is a dissertation on whether the wearing of the Linga is obligatory or optional in the case of a Vīrasaiva and *Lingadhārana Lakshanam*, which enjoins the wearing of the Linga by Vīrasaivas after performing the necessary purificatory initial ceremony. (*Ibid.*, pp. 4262-3, Nos. 5473 and 5474.)

Philosophical Standpoint of the Work.

Srīpati writes in a simple and easy style. His mastery of Pānini is visible in almost every page of his work. His varied learning and profundity of thought are conspicuous in his *Bhāshya*. He is, as may be expected, highly critical of the views of his opponents but it must be said to his credit that he nowhere does any injustice to them in propounding their views before attacking them. The really distinctive part of his writing is the statement of views current in his own times among the most progressive Vīrasaivas with regard to the everlasting theme *Tatvamasi*. He combats the view primarily of Rāmānuja, against whom apparently his work is intended, though Sankara and Madhva also claim fair attention at his hands. His philosophical standpoint is summed up in the two or three alternative phrases he uses to describe the nature and contents of his work :—

Visēshādvaita.
Dvaitādvaitābhidhāna.
Bhedābhēdātmaka.
Visēshādvaita Siddhānta Sthāpaka.

The author refers frequently to the Pāsupata school but only to differ from it. The reason is very simple. The Pāsupatas, like the other older Saiva schools, expound the dualistic point of view, while the Vīrasaiva school, as expounded by Srīpati, holds to the *bhedābhēda* doctrine.

Sripati's Criticism of Sankara.

Srīpati refutes the position of Sankara and his doctrine of Māya at length. His argument is too long to summarize here. But it may be stated very briefly to clearly indicate the standpoint taken by Srīpati in regard to Sankara's views. In Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 4, *Tattu Samanvayāt*, Srīpati strongly combats the doctrine of the unreality of the world as propounded by Sankara. His bleak philosophy of negation he rejects at every step. He says that if the world is to be assumed to be real only for the purpose of *vyavahāra* and not for *pāramārthika*, then the doctrine cannot be accepted to be true. What kind of truth is it that is confined to *vyavahāra ?* What kind of truth is it that is only applicable *(gamyatvam)* to *vyavahāra?* And what kind of truth is it that is outside *(bādhita) vyavahāra?* What is this truth which is both truth and not truth? What is this nomenclature which is divorced from Cause and Effect? What is this truth which is the semblance of truth and yet not truth? What sort of object is it which has no basis in Cause? (He answers :—) Therefore the first view is not true, because if Brahma is anything other than *vyavahāra*, Brahma is beyond what is assumed, is unnecessary and is redundant *(ativyāptihi).* This results in muteness as between *guru* and *sishya.* That is, further discussion is unavailing or impossible. So the first Sūtra, *Athātho Brahma jignāsa*, falls to the ground. He then passes on to deny *nirvisēshatvam*, as being inexplicable to everybody. He then vehemently attacks *Nirvisēshamata* as:

स्मार्तान् सर्वमतभ्रष्टान् जगन्मिथ्यात्व साधकान् ।
गणिकाचार संपन्नान् पाषण्डान्परिवर्जयेत् ॥

Smārtān sarvamatabhrashtānjaganmithyātva sādhakān
Ganikāchāra sampannān pāshandān parivarjayēt.

Accordingly he states that that system of philosophy cannot prove acceptable to persons seeking salvation through the Vēda. (Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 20, line 28, page 71.)

Criticism of Ramanuja and Pancharatra Agama.

Rāmānuja's system is referred to in the work as *Visishtādvaita* and refuted as such. The *Pāncharātra Āgama* is also severely criticized by Srīpati in Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 3, *Sāstra yonitvāt.* Rāmānuja's system of *Visishtādvaita* is criticized in Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 20, *Asmin nasyacha tadyōgam sāsthi.* The former may be taken first. Rāmānuja, as is well known, gives expression to the views of the Pāncharātras or Bhāgavatas, an old Vaishnavite sect, whose doctrine is expounded in the *Bhagavad-Gīta* and the *Bhāgavata-purāna*, as well as in the special text-books of the sect. The tenets of the Bhāgavatas, as set forth by Rāmānuja, diverge considerably from those of the *Brahma-Sūtras* on which he has commented. For, according to him, individual souls are not identical with God; they suffer from innate unbelief, not ignorance, while belief or the love of God *(bhakti)*, not knowledge, is the means of salvation or union with God. Mādhava in his treatment of Rāmānuja's system in his *Sarvadarsana Sangraha* also deals with the Pāncharātra.

Pancharatra Agama Assailed.

Srīpati disputes at length the *Pāncharātra Āgama* criticism that the studying of *Siva-Purāna* and worshipping Siva according to it, will certainly result in sin, because *Siva-Purāna* is a *tāmasa-purāna*. As against this position, Srīpati argues that there is no evidence for this from the Srutis. This is, he says, an invention *(kalpitha)* of the Prachchanna Bauddhas (*i.e.*, *Nirvisēsha* Advaitins) and is groundless. Since Vyāsa is the author of both the *Siva* and *Vishnu Purānas*, does the *tāmasatva* extend to both of them or only to *Siva-Purāna?* If to the latter only, that position cannot be accepted as true. Then, again, does the *tāmasatva* extend to the author's (Vyāsa's) works only or both to his works and to himself? If it only applies to his works and not also to him, that position too cannot be accepted. Then, again, if Vyāsa, the author, as a *Sātvika* created the *Vishnu-Purāna*, then, it cannot be held, he became a *tāmasa* when he created the *Siva-Purāna.* In the *Rig* and other Vēdas, both Rudra and Agni, who are treated as synonymous, have been praised. This being so, even the Vēdas, which thus praise Siva under these forms of Rudra and Agni, should be termed *tāmasa*. This Prachchanna Bauddha invention cannot, therefore, be believed. Statements of this kind are, he says, baseless because of want of evidence in their favour. Srīpati also points out the inconsistencies between the statements made in the *Pāncharātra Āgama* and the *Matsya-Purāna* and remarks that in a case of this sort the *Pāncharātra Āgama* cannot but be held as lacking in authority. Apparently during Srīpati's time, the disputation over Hari and Hara had reached its climax. An argument of the kind that Srīpati urges against the votaries of Vishnu is indicative of rival feelings in the matter. The joint worship of Vishnu and Siva in the form of Harihara, declared in the well-known Davangere inscription dated in 1224 A.D., (E.C. XI, Davangere 25) was apparently limited in practice. That this question of superiority and inferiority lasted much longer than the period to which this inscription belongs, is clear from Haradattāchārya's work, *Hariharatāratamyam*, which treats, in Sanskrit verse, of the superiority of Siva over Vishnu. (See Madras *D.C. of MSS.*, X, Nos. 5121 and 5122.) Haradattāchārya was also the author of *Chaturvēdatātparya Sangraha*, which purports to give briefly the essence of the four Vēdas and is in praise of the worship of Siva as the Supreme God. (*Ibid.*, No. 5077.) Haradattāchārya is specifically referred to by Srīpati in Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 26, line 22, page 83, in connection with his exposition of the *Gāyatri* doctrine, where Haradattāchārya's authority is quoted in support of his own position that the *upāsanā dēvata* of Gāyatri is Siva and not Vishnu.

The term *Prachchanna Bauddha* used by Srīpati in describing the followers of Sankara is worthy of note. It is a term that has been made popular by the Madhva writer Nārāyana Panditāchārya as a description of Nirvisēsha Advaitins. He uses the term in his *Madhva Vijaya*, a work of the 14th century, almost contemporaneous with Madhvāchārya. The sloka deserves notice, the more so as it sums up a long disquisition on how Sankara, starting with the idea of pulling down the doctrine of Buddha, himself fell an easy victim to it. In this disquisition, Nārāyana Panditācharya points out how Sankara adopted the cardinal doctrines of Buddhism to suit his own Nirvisēsha Advaita theory and remarks that the variation being only a transparent one, his theory has become renowned as the *Prachchanna Bauddha* theory, *i.e.*, the theory of the hidden Bauddha. That is, *Nirvisēsha Advaita* is, in his opinion, nothing but *hidden Buddhism*. This sloka may be quoted in full:—

असत्पदेसन्सदसाद्विविक्तं मायाख्यया संवृतिमभ्यदत्त ।
ब्रह्माप्यखंडं बत शून्यसिध्यै प्रच्छन्नबौद्धोयमतः प्रासिद्धः ॥

Asatpadēsan sadasadviviktam māyākhyayā samvrithim abhyadatta.
Brahmāpyakhandam bata sūnya sidhyai Prachchanna Bauddhoyam atahprasiddhah.

(See *Madhva Vijaya*, Sarga I, Sloka 51.)

It is possible that this description of Nirvisēsha Advaitins of Nārāyana Panditāchārya was borrowed from him by Srīpati. It might well be, however, that it was part of the current dialectical language of his time and as such adopted by Srīpati.

Examination of Visishtadvaita.

Srīpati's criticism of Rāmānuja's *Visishtādvaita* may now be briefly considered. The followers of Rāmānuja are thus described :—

सदाशेषि शेषवत्व व्यवस्थापक संयुक्ताद्वैत पाञ्चरात्रादिवत् ॥
नचाङ्गाङ्गित्वेन सावयवत्ववादिनः ॥

Sadāsēshi sēshavathva vyavasthāpaka samyuktādvaita pāncharātrādivat. Nacha angāngitvēna sāvayavatva vādinaha.

(Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 1, line 14, page 20.)

He says :—The Ātman is anxious to join the blissful Brahman. This is the central topic of *Visishtādvaita*. But, says Srīpati, this is un-Vēdic, *i.e.*, contrary to the teachings of the Vēdas. Bhatta, Bhāskara and other previous Āchāryas, at the time they propounded their doctrines, discarded this part of the argument. Their reasoning was that *Visishtam advaitam*, *i.e.*, being both simultaneously *Visishtam* and *advaitam* is *yukti virōdham*, *i.e.*, opposed to reasoning, being in fact contradictory to each other. When the term *visishtam* is used, is it used as related to *visēshana* and *visēshya* or as separated from them? If not related, then *advaita*—the quality of being one—does not result. He then applies the *Danda purusha sambandha nyāya* and suggests what follows from it. The man who carries a stick in his hand is called by the *combined* name of Dandi, though he and the Danda (stick) he carries are two different objects. Because he is related to the stick as its carrier, he is to be called by this single conjoint name of Dandi, affixing the *Visishtapratyaya*; both are co-related, not separate. An ordinary man, *i.e.*, one who carries no *Danda*, calls the man who carries one, a Dandi. These two are two different persons, *i.e.*, the man who carries a Danda and the man who calls him a Dandi. Hence *Advaitva* is not proved. The point is thus pressed home that *Visishtādvaita* is against all reason. The ordinary man without a Danda, the man with the Danda, and the Danda itself are three different objects, and there being no union of the Danda and the body of the man who carries it, there is no *advaitva*. As the Danda and the man have nothing physically in common between them, just as a pillar *(Sthambha)* and a man *(Purusha)* have nothing in agreement between them as to their physical attributes, the doctrine of *Visishtādvaita* results in untruth. At all times Danda and Purusha are different. So long as there is no (physical) union between them, they are as different as the pillar and man. For, we cannot say, with any show of reason on our part, that pillar and man are the same. This doctrine of *Visishtādvaita* fails to fully explain the *Visēshana* and *Visēshya*; nor does it show how they can be compromised. As these are not compromised, there is no smell of *advaita* here. Therefore, Visēshādvaita is, according to the Srutis, the only way to salvation.

Objections against Dvaita.

We may now pass on to Srīpati's objections to Madhva and his system. There are at least five specific references to the latter in this work. The first occurs in Adhyāya I, Pāda II, Sūtra 1 (page 20, line 14):—

सदा घटपटवन्नात्यन्त भेदवादिनः ॥

Sadā ghatapatavannātyanta bhēdavādinaha.

Here the expression *atyanta bhēdavādinaha*, *i.e.*, those who insist that there is the greatest difference between

Jīvātma and Paramātma, refers to the followers of Madhva, the expounder of the Dvaita Vēdānta.

The second reference occurs in Adhyāya II, Pāda II, Sūtra 39 (page 235, line 25):—

द्वैत भागवत पाञ्चरात्रादि वैष्णवमत ॥

Dvaita Bhāgavata Pāncharātrādi Vaishnava mata.

Here the term *Dvaita* refers to the followers of Madhva's *Dvaita* system, as they are among the chief adherents of Vaishnavism. Srīpati in referring in this passage, to Vaishnavas, says: "The followers of (Madhva's) Dvaita, Bhāgavata, Pāncharātra and other Vaishnava systems say" etc.

The third reference to Madhva's system occurs in Adhyāya II, Pāda II, Sūtra 41 (page 237, line 27):—

किञ्चैतत्सूत्रे श्रुत्येकदेशप्रामाण्य द्वैतनिरासाद्वैतनिरासाच्च व्यवह्रियते । भागवत पाञ्चरात्र मध्वादि वैष्णवानां जगत्कारणेश्वरस्य शरीरत्व परिग्रहात् घटपटादिवत् अन्तवत्वं विनाशत्वं बालद्वैतवादिनां ब्रह्मणो निर्विशेषताङ्गीकारात् ॥

Kinchaitat sūtrē sruttyēka dēsa prāmānya dvaita-nirāsādvaita nirāsācha vyavakriyatē । *Bhāgavata Pāncharātra Madhvādi Vaishnavānam jagatkāranēsvarasya sarīratva parigrahāt ghatapatādivat antavatvam vināsatvam bāladvaitavādinām brahmanō nirvisēshatāngīkārāt* ॥

Here the system of *Madhva* is directly referred to by name.

The fourth reference is to be found in Adhyāya II, Pāda III, Sūtra 40 (page 273, line 5):—

गौणत्वेन सर्वश्रुतिसमन्वयो निर्दिष्टः । तार्किक मध्वादि केवल भेदवादिनां बौद्धादिवत् सर्वश्रुतिसमन्वयाभावात् । तन्मतं सुतरामसङ्गतम् इति सूत्र सूचित सूक्ष्मार्थः ॥

Gaunatvēna sarva sruti samanvayō nirdishtaha । *Tārkika Madhvādi kēvalabhēdavādinām Bauddhādivat sarva sruti samanvayābhāvāt* । *tanmatam sutarām asangatam iti sūtra sūchita sūkshmārthaha* ॥

Here the descriptive phrase *Tārkika Madhvādi kēvalabhēdavādinām* (*i.e.*, among those who thus strictly maintain are the eternally disputing followers of Madhva and others). The term *Tārkika Madhvas* may be taken as equivalent to the modern popular description of Madhvas as "Tatvādis", *i.e.*, those who maintain the doctrine of essential difference between the Jīvātman and the Paramātman.

The fifth and last reference to Madhva's system is to be found in Adhyāya II, Pāda III, Sūtra 18 (page 263, line 16):—

मध्वाद्वैत क्षपणक तार्किकादयो जीवानां विभुत्वाङ्गीकारात् तन्निरसनार्थं एतदधिकरणप्रारंभः ॥

Madhvādvaita kshpanaka tārkikādayō jīvānām vibhutvāngikārāt tannirasanārtham ētadadhikaranaprārambhaha.

The reference to the followers of Madhva is self-evident at the very beginning of this quotation.

From these references to Madhva's system we can easily grasp Srīpati's attitude towards it. His own theory being styled *bhēdābhēda*, *i.e.*, both *bhēda* and *abhēda*, a theory for which he seeks support from the *Srutis*, he is anxious to prove what he means by *bhēda* and *abhēda* as he understands these terms. He does not agree with the *bhēda* doctrine in full as propounded by Madhva. He, however, admits that there is temporary or transient difference between *Jīva* and *Īsa*. Accordingly, in the first Sūtra, he points out that though he agrees with Madhva only to a certain extent in his doctrine of difference between the *Jīva* and *Īsa*, he does not go the whole length of it with him. The transient difference is, in his view, restricted to the time required for the *Jīva* working out his emancipation after which he becomes *Īsa*, because according to the *Srutis* the *Jīva* is, he says, naturally eternal and full of good qualities.

Commenting, again, on Adhyāya II, Pāda II, Sūtra 39 (*Adhishtānā nupapaththescha*, page 235) he endeavours to prove that he differs from Madhva and other Vaishnava schools who hold that the Creator of the world has bodily lineaments. He cannot, he says, accept this position as such a view would attribute to the Creator the passions (*Rāga*, *dvēsha*, *duhkha*, etc.), which, he says, is not in accordance with the *Srutis*.

Commenting next on Sūtra 41 (*Antavatvam asarvagnatāvā*, page 237), he goes on to prove that Brahman neither has such bodily form as would be liable to destruction nor is there such a difference between the *Jīva* and *Īsa* as is postulated by those who hold the Dvaita, Bhāgavata, Pāncharātra and other schools of Vaishnava thought. According to the latter, Brahman has bodily form though not made of flesh and blood but of *gnāna* and there is difference between *Jīva* and *Ātma*. These systems of thought, says Srīpati, do not, generally speaking, accord with the truth as propounded in the *Srutis* throughout. Also, their views lead to confusion—rather they confuse themselves. If they were fully informed with the truth, they would not, he adds, propound such a theory. Therefore, their views should not be accepted.

Next, in discussing Sūtra 40 (*Amsādhikarana*, page 272) dealing with the difference between *amsa*, the original *Jīva* and *amsi*, its representative in the world, he says that the view of Madhva and others who maintain strictly that the *Jīva* has a separate existence from the *Īsa* is utterly improper inasmuch as it is not in consonance with the teachings of the *Sūtras* as a whole. The *Jīva* has not, he protests, the smallness, the distinctiveness and the subordination to *Isa* which is postulated by these schools nor is it a reflection or an image of the *Īsa* as is represented by them.

Finally, commenting on Sūtra 18 (*Utkrāntigatyādhikaranam*, page 263) dealing with the passing of the *Jīva* from the world, he enters his protest against Madhva's view that the *Jīva* leaves the world after death on its march to *Svarga* (Heaven) or to *Naraka* (Hell) according to the good or bad it has done in this world, and returns back again to this world. Jiva, he says, always goes back to its natural exalted position after death as the Vēdas declare; therefore they cannot go back to the world as is suggested by Madhva. He adds that this Adhikarana is against the view of Madhva.

Sripati's Exposition of Viseshadvaita.

Srīpati's exposition of his own position—*Viseshādvaita*—is contained in different parts of his work. In

Adhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 4, *Tattu Samanvayāt*, for instance, he develops it at some length in criticizing Sankara's *Nirvisēshādvaita*. If *vyāvahārika sathyathva* and *pārmārthika mithyāthva* of the world is admitted, then ultimately why should not the *mithyāthva* of both *Jīva* and *Brahman* be accepted? Such acceptance of *mithyāthva* would be against the Srutis. Such a position is not, he says in effect, supported by the Srutis. Therefore, he urges that the position of the Prachchanna Bauddhas (*i.e.*, Nirvisēsha Advaitins) that the world is unreal except in the *vyāvahārika* sense, though in accordance with their Māyāvāda doctrine, is against the *Srutis*, reasoning and experience, cannot be accepted. This, he adds, is the public declaration (*ghantā-ghōsha)* of the Srauta Saivas, *i.e.*, Vīrasaivas. According to *Nirvisēshādvaita*, *Nirvisēsham Brahma gnānam agnānam va*. That is, is Nirvisēsha Brahman to be understood as *gnānam* (comprehensible) or *agnānam* (incomprehensible)? If incomprehensible, it is against the Nirvisēsha Siddhānta itself, for it declares that *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*, *i.e.*, everything is Brahman. If comprehensible, it becomes *Savisesham*, *i.e.*, it becomes qualified. *Gnāna* is eternal; also eternally qualified. Therefore, even in Mukti, *prapancha* is eternal. In Mukti, if it is declared all qualities are absorbed, even *gnāna* would be absorbed. We thus reach a mutually destructive (or contradictory) position; there is neither object (*i.e.*, Brahman) for *gnāna* to lean on (*nirālambana*) nor the knowledge *(gnāna)* by which the object (Brahman) is to be attained. Having started with the Brahman and its qualities, we thus arrive at a position which negatives both Brahman and qualities. This is *pramēya viruddham*, *i.e.*, against the very hypothesis put forward.

In Adhyāya IV, entitled *Phalā Adhyāya*, Pāda IV, Sūtra *Anāvriththi Sabdāt Anāvriththi Sabdāt*, page 495, Srīpati amplifies his statement of *Visēshādvaita*. All the four Vēdas, the Upanishads and the Purānas, he says, declare that Mōksha or the realization of *Sivatatva* is the highest aim of all religion. He thus states how this object is attained:—

has such bodily form as would be liable to destruction nor is there such a difference between the *Jīva* and *Īsa* as is postulated by those who hold the Dvaita, Bhāgavata, Pāncharātra and other schools of Vaishnava thought. According to the latter, Brahman has bodily form though not made of flesh and blood but of *gnāna* and there is difference between *Jīva* and *Ātma*. These systems of thought, says Srīpati, do not, generally speaking, accord with the truth as propounded in the *Srutis* throughout. Also, their views lead to confusion—rather they confuse themselves. If they were fully informed with the truth, they would not, he adds, propound such a theory. Therefore, their views should not be accepted.

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Correspondingly there are, he says, six lingas:—*Ātmalinga*, *Bhāvalinga*, *Jyōtirlinga*, *Prānalinga*, *Upāsanālinga* and *Dhyānalinga*.

A treatise, entitled *Shatsthala-nirnaya*, deals with this doctrine at length. It sets out the six positions in the progress of the aspirant aiming at the attainment of freedom from the bondage of *Samsāra* through the grace of Siva. (See Madras *D.C. of MSS.* XI, Nos. 5546 and 5547.) Beginning from Basava himself, *Shatsthala* has been the eternal theme of Vīrasaiva writers, who often call themselves *Shatsthala Brahmavādins*. Many works in Sānskrit and Kannada have been written to elucidate this particular doctrine by leading Vīrasaiva writers. The doctrine has also received attention from the Vīrasaivas of the Tamil country. Thus the *Gurulingasangama Paramarahasya Sadattalam*, by an unknown author, is known. Here *Sadattalam* is the Tamil form of *Shatsthalam* (Madras *D.C. Tamil* III, No. 1414). Another work *Sadattalakkattalai* (Shatsthalakattalai) explains the six talas (Sthalas), *viz.*, Battatalam, Mahēsattalam, Pirasādattalam, Prānalingasthalam, Charanattalam and Aikkiyattalam. (Madras *D.C. Tamil*, No. 1417).

Connection between Jaimini Sutras and Badarayana Sutras.

To understand the position of Srīpati among the commentators of Bādarāyana, we have first to determine the place of Bādarāyana in the Hindu philosophic system. Though the philosophical spirit is found markedly developed in the *Rig-Vēda*, its most brilliant literary exposition is to be found in the Upanishads (700—500 B.C.). Jacobi has suggested that the Lokāyata, Sāmkhya and Yōga philosophies had definitely developed by 300 B.C., though not the others. This view, however, based as it is on the mention made of them in the *Arthasāstra*, has not won universal acceptance. Thus Dr. Keith, who suggests *circa* 300 A.D. for the *Arthasāstra*, a date later than the period proposed by others, is rather inclined to the view that we should, in the state of our present knowledge, "content ourselves with the belief that between the dates of the chief Upanishads and the third and fourth century A.D., there proceeded an active stream of investigation, which we have only in its final form." After the period of the Upanishads, the task of systematizing the ideas of the earlier thinkers was gradually taken up and in course of time erected into definite systems of thought—called *Darsanas*—each taught in a philosophic school, in which there was a regular succession of teachers, who expounded and possibly developed its particular body of doctrine. After this development had gone on for some time, the desire to fix in a definitive form the doctrines of the school should have exhibited itself, which should have led to the composition of the *Sūtras*. These *Sūtras* have been framed on the principle of concise aphoristic rules, which were intended to be committed to memory. A common purpose ran through the whole of the *Sūtras* of a particular school, and this was from the first taught by oral exposition. When this exposition ceased—long after the *Sūtras* were framed—attempts were made to crystallize the traditionary teaching in written comments. The oldest comments which have come down to us contain internal evidence that they do not represent an unbroken tradition that had been regularly handed down from teacher to teacher from the original exposition. Later arose independent works within each school, which, while recognizing the authority of the *Sūtras* pertaining to it and conceding that in them lay its essential doctrines, sought the privilege of expounding their contents, without, however, contradicting them. According to Dr. Keith, the *Sūtras* of the different schools —the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsa*,[8] the *Uttara-Mīmāmsa*, the *Nyāya* the division of the *Sūtras* into *Pūrva* and *Uttara* was one dictated by the necessities of the situation. In the one case, it was the reconciliation of Vedic texts bearing on sacrificial rites, and in the other of Upanishadic doctrines touching on the relationship between *Jīva* and *Brahman*. In the one philosophy is subordinated to ritualism, in the other ritualism is subordinated to philosophy. They seek each other's aid to achieve their own objectives; the one does not deny the right of the other to its own individual existence or to expounding its own individual philosophy, however slight or great it might be. Though inter-related in one sense, they are, in another sense, independent of each other. Both pre-suppose systematic enquiries, though the one deals with ritual and the other with Brahman knowledge and the means to attain it. The commentators of the one show a mastery of the other which is eminently impressive and some of them have written commentaries on both.

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[8] Dr. S. Das Gupta, in his *History of Indian Philosophy*, page 68, derives the word *Mīmāmsa* from *man*, to think—rational conclusions. Apte derives it thus: *mi*, to measure and *mān*, to inquire. A more satisfactory derivation seems to be from *mī*, to fix; and *mā*, to measure, mark off or limit. *Mā* in its causative

Do the two Mimamsas form one whole ?

The question whether the two *Mīmāmsas* should be treated as parts of one whole is one on which a difference of opinion prevails. In commenting on *Brahma Sūtras* I.1.1, Sankara says that the word *atha*, *then*, denotes immediate sequence or *anantharya* and not *adhikāra* or beginning of a new topic. It presupposes something antecedent. The antecedent, according to Sankara, is *Sādhana Chatushtaya*, the four-fold discipline of *vivēka*, *vairāgya*, *satasampat* and *mumukshatva*. It is only when a person has passed through this discipline that he is entitled to enquire into Brahman. The word *atha* therefore declares, according to Sankara, that *Brahma-jignāsa* is subsequent to the acquisition of this four-fold discipline. The word, accordingly, does not, in his opinion, refer to the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsa*. If these four conditions exist, a man may engage in *Brahma-jignāsa*, either *before* or *after* entering on an enquiry with active religious duty as set forth in the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsa*. The word *atah*, therefore, which follows *atha*, premises, according to Sankara, the reason for the *jignāsa.* The reason is that the fruit of all actions is transitory. Good actions lead to heaven, but heaven itself is transitory. The knowledge of Brahman gives final release. Thus, the highest that the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsa* can point to as attainable is held to fall far too short of what is required for final absolution. Rāmānuja takes a different view. To him also the word *atha* indicates sequence. But the antecedent condition, according to him, is the study of the *Karmakānda*, or ritualism of the Veda. After the understanding of works, the *jignāsa* into Brahma follows. The word *atha* indicates that the subject of *jignāsa* is Brahman. The person who has followed the *Karmakānda* knows that the fruit of mere works is limited and hence his desire to know Brahman for obtaining final release. His view is that since the fruit of works as taught in the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsa* is limited and transitory, and that of the knowledge of Brahman as taught in the *Uttara-Mīmāmsa* is unlimited and eternal, Brahman should be known after the knowledge of works has previously taken place. According to Rāmānuja, the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsa* of Jaimini and the *Uttara-Mīmāmsa* of Bādārayana form one body of doctrine which should be studied in their due order. This view of Rāmānuja has been elaborated by later Vishishtādvaita writers. Thus in the *Adhikarana Sārārthadīpika* by Mangāchārya Srīnivāsa Sūri, a disciple of Samarapungavāchārya of Vādūlagōtrā, we have this point — the oneness of the *Mīmāmsa* as a *Sāstra* — urged with great force. The work provides us with a summary of the contents of the various *Prakaranas* — or the topical subdivisions of the two *Mīmāmsas* — and shows clearly their interdependence. (See Madras *D.C. Skt.* X, No. 4853.) Similarly in the *Pūrvōttara Mīmāmsaka-Kanthyam*, we have the oneness of the two *Mīmāmsas* put forth in great detail. (See *ibid.*, Nos. 4930 and 4931.) Srīkantha is even more explicit than Rāmānuja. He says that the word *atha* denotes succession and not mere commencement or auspiciousness. The latter is the view of Madhva and the former of Vignānabhikshu. The pre-requisite, according to Srīkantha, is a knowledge of the *Karmakānda*. After a study of the Vēdas, one should enquire into Dharma as taught in the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsa* and then into Brahman. The Karma and Gnāna *conjointly* produce release; hence first Karma should be learnt and then the Vēdānta. Para-Brahman should be enquired into after completing the enquiry into Dharma. *Atah* gives the reason. As Dharma has been investigated, *therefore* one should investigate Brahman to obtain final release. Vallabha's view is directly opposed to that of Sankara. According to Vallabha, *atha* denotes the commencement of a new topic (*adhikāra*). He says that Karma should precede *Brahma-jignāsa;* knowledge of Brahman does not, in his view, result in cessation of activity. Even *jīvanmuktas* perform, he says, all Karmas. In fact, the Karmas performed by the knowers of Brahman alone are such as lead to purely good results. Nimbārka takes a similar view. According to him a person who has read the Vēda and whose mind has been assailed by doubts as to the fruits of actions and who therefore has studied the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsa* in order to remove such doubts and has thereby obtained a clear idea of Karma, its nature, the proper method of performing it and its fruits and whose mind has been drawn away from them by their transitory character, should try to acquire a knowledge of the Brahman. It will thus be seen that except Sankara, most of the commentators agree in interpreting I.1.1. as meaning that a previous study of the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsa* is necessary before the *Uttara-Mīmāmsa* can be taken up, both forming one complete whole.

View of Sankara.

Even Sankara, it will be seen, does not entirely *taboo* the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsa*; he only suggests that it might or might not be studied, as its inadequacy for obtaining final release makes its previous study unnecessary. Sankara elsewhere puts forward the same view. Despite this, attempts have been made to reconcile these two apparently irreconcilable systems of philosophy, notably by Surēsvarāchārya in his *Sambandha-Vārtika*, which is an expansion, as it were, of the introductory part of Sankara's commentary written on the *Brihadāranyaka Upanishad* with the set purpose of showing the connection that exists between the two *Mīmāmsa* parts. Sankara, in this commentary, states that the chapter on rituals is intended to point out special means for him who, knowing that there is a soul in relation to a future body, seeks particular means to attain the desired and to avoid the undesired, as affecting such future body. Later, he adds that the use of knowledge in connection with the ritual of the horse-sacrifice is that those who are not accorded the privilege of performing it, can yet attain its reward by the knowledge in question as declared by the *Sruti* by such texts as "by knowledge or by ritual" and "this too wins the worlds". It cannot be said that the knowledge is only with reference to the rite, for the words of the *Sruti* "whosoever does the horse-sacrifice *or* who knows it as such," are alternative, and occur in a context dealing with knowledge. Since, even in the case of other rites, active acquisition is spoken of, it is evident that their fruit can be got from knowledge. And the horse-sacrifice is the highest of all rites, for it has for its fruit the attainment of the unmanifest (*samashti*) or the manifest (*vyashti*) self. Further, its enunciation here at the beginning of the science of self is intended to show that all rites conduce to births and deaths. *Srutis* speak of the fruit being hunger, which is the same as death. It cannot be said that regularly prescribed rites do not produce fruit with a view to births and deaths, for *Srutis* speak in general terms of the fruit of all actions. (See Sankara's *Commentary on the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad*, Introductory part).

View of Suresvara.

Surēsvara suggests that ritual is an indirect means to liberation, since it purifies the soul and helps towards the acquisition of knowledge. Surēsvara says that the *Brihadāranyaka Upanishad* declares that the fruit of the horse-sacrifice can be obtained by the mere knowledge of it by those who are privileged to perform it. This knowledge cannot be said to be included in the ritual itself, since the *Srutis* speak of rituals and knowledge as alternative means. An equal reward is obtained by the doer of rituals who performs the horse-sacrifice itself; the declaration of fruit is not a mere explanatory passage, much more than so as it is specifically prescribed. If (says the opponent) no more than this is your explanation of the context, then the object is easily gained even if it occurred in the ritual portion of the *Srutis*. Tell me then why this passage should occur in the knowledge portion. It is as an incentive to the acquisition of knowledge that it is declared that horse-sacrifice, though the greatest of sacrifices and though combined with knowledge of itself, is nevertheless productive of bondage (births and deaths). How else can aspirants of liberation strive to know the self,—people who have known only too well the meanness of the fruits derived from all rituals and who do not seek any means other than the knowledge of the self? "You may freely say that the fruit of all rites with special objects is bondage; but since necessary rites have no fruit why not say that their fruit is liberation?" Not so; for *Srutis* speak of all rites in general as bearing fruit. Further, passages like "By rites one attains the world of the *manes*" refer to the fruit of necessary rites alone. If it be said that, since they have fruits, necessary rites are also rites with special objects, we say it is not so; for necessary rites have purification as their aim while the aim of rites with special objects is the enjoyment of pleasure. There is purification even in rites with special objects, but that is for the sole sake of securing enjoyment. For the Kingdom of Indra cannot be enjoyed with the body of a man or of a pig. Since in the case of necessary rites, purification is most important, the enjoyment of fruit is not contradictory thereto. But, in comparison with the purification of intellect, enjoyment is considered perishable. For this reason and by virtue of passages like "This self" etc., people try to know the supreme state by the contemplation of *Sruti* passages and by renouncing all worldly attachment. Regularly prescribed rites render only indirect help by way of purifying the mind, being not inconsistent with the knowledge of self. But they are not direct means like the knowledge of self. They therefore who, giving up all rites and free from attachment, throw off all taints such as passion etc., and direct their intellect to the Supreme Self, realize their own self within themselves (*Sambandha-Vārtika*, stanzas 1133–1134). Surēsvara thus shows an advance on Sankara, developing as he does the view that ritual is a means of liberation, though not so effective as knowledge. This view nearly approximates to the Dvaita position that Karma must lead to Gnāna; rather that Karma which does not lead to Gnāna is no Karma.

According to Madhva, *Uttara-Mīmāmsa* is part of *Mahā-Mīmāmsa* (see Madhva's *Commentary on Brihadāranyaka Upanishad*, VI, 3). Madhva quoting in his *Gītātātparya* the undermentioned *Sruti* text, suggests that *Mīmāmsa* is of three different kinds:

Mīmāmsā trividhā prōktā
Brāhmī daivīcha kārmikī
Brahma tarkancha Mīmāmsām
Sēvēta gnāna siddhayē
Vaidika gnāna vairūpyāt
Nānyat sēvēta panditāha ‖ *iti* ‖

This suggests that Mīmāmsa is of three kinds: *Brahma Mīmāmsa*, *Daiva Mīmāmsa* and *Karma Mīmāmsa*. These (three different) *mīmāmsas* should be studied through the Brahma Tarka method in order to realize the true knowledge. The true knowledge of Vēda consists in knowing all these diverse phases of knowledge. No other method should be had recourse to by a wise man. Madhva holds that the three kinds of *Mīmāmsa* should be reckoned as *Traividyā*. He who does not accept this Traividyā cannot be called a *Vēdavādi*. He who adopts the Traividyā, realizes Parama Vishnu. Thus, it would seem, according to Madhva, that these three kinds should be treated together.

Evidently their interpretation should be on the basis of *Tattu samanvayāt.* If this be so, Jaimini *Sūtras* should be held to be subject to the same mode of interpretation, for they are part of the *Traividyā.* The word *Mīmāmsā* seems to have the derivative meaning of intensification or individualization in the text *Aththātha ānandasya mīmāmsā bhavati* (*Taittirīya Upanishad*, II, 8, quoted by Madhva in his *Commentary on Brihadāranyaka Upanishad*, III, 4).

Truth underlying the modern view.

There thus seems some ground for Jacobi's suggestion that the two *Mīmāmsas* are interrelated, though this cannot mean, especially when we remember the *Sabarabhāshya* and the commentaries of Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhatta on it, that the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsa-Sūtras* have not a philosophy of their own. The interpretation of *Brahma Sūtras* I. 1. 1 above-mentioned pre-supposes a connection between the two *Mīmāmsas*, though such connection need not necessarily deny to either its own philosophy. This mode of approach may possibly reconcile the views of Dr. Keith with those of Jacobi on this point. The position taken by the earliest commentators known on the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsa-Sūtras* helps to confirm this view. Thus of the three early commentators, leaving out of account Hari and Bhartramitra, of whom little is known, the Vrittikāra, who is quoted by Sabarasvāmin (I. 1. 5) introduces discussions as to the validity of knowledge and its different forms, though the *Sūtras* themselves do not go much beyond exalting the Vedic injunctions as the source of the necessary knowledge and deny the validity of perception for the purpose of the knowledge of Dharma. Dr. Keith even suggests that it is legitimate to resume that the Vrittikāra indulged also in metaphysical discussions. The Vrittikāra has been assigned by Dr. Keith to a date not later than the fourth century A.D., though, if we have to put back the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsa-Sūtras* themselves to a date much earlier than 200 A.D., we may have to refer the Vrittikāra also to a date proportionately earlier.

Sabarasvāmin, who evidently came shortly after the Vrittikāra and drew largely on his writings, discusses at length the nature of the soul, though he is usually laconic when dealing with the *Sūtras* themselves. About his time the *Mīmāmsa* enters, in the words of Dr. Keith, "into the whole field of philosophy, while maintaining its primary duty of expounding the rules by which the rituals can be reconstructed from the *Brāhmanas* and the *Samhitās*." Sabarasvāmin was commented upon by a Vārtikakāra[9] who is referred to by Prabhākara. Prabhākara probably lived about the seventh century A.D., and was anterior in date to Kumārila, who criticises him in his works (I. 2. 31; I. 3. 2; 1. 4. 1). Dr. Keith has adduced satisfactory reasons against the traditionary statement that Kumārila was the *guru* of Prabhākara and that they were contemporaries. According to him, at least half a century, if not a century, separated Prabhākara from Kumārila. The suggestion, however, that the *Brihati*, "the great" commentary on Sabarasvāmin's *Bhāshya*, "seems to have passed comparatively early into oblivion" is not quite borne out by the evidence available. There is hardly any doubt that for long after the time of Sankara, the *Mīmāmsa-Sūtras* as commented upon by Sabarasvāmin and elaborated by his commentator Prabhākara in his *Brihati*, were actively studied in Southern India, special grants of land being made for its propagation. Thus in a lithic record, dated in the third year of the Chōla King Parakēsarīvarman, "who took the head of the Pāndya,"—identified with Āditya Karikāla II, who ruled about the middle of the tenth century A.D.,—we are told that the grant of land by a village assembly functioning in the present Kumbakonam taluk, Tanjore district, was made as a *bhattavritti* to those who expounded the *Prabhākaram* in the Nāgēsvara temple at Kumbakonam, where the inscription can still be seen (*M.E.R.*, No. 233 of 1911).[10] Kumārila Bhatta, often styled merely Bhatta, the more famous commentator, has still a large following in the modern South Kanara district. His followers call themselves *Bhattas* and their philosophy goes by the name of *Bhātta-mata.* The chief point to note in regard to Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhatta is that they both agree with Sabarasvāmin in holding that the individual soul, though derived from the absolute Brahman, has an independent existence for ever thereafter. They thus not only declare that the *jīva* is immortal but also definitely reject the theory of Māya.

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[9] The term *Vārtikakāra* denotes literally the writer of an explanatory gloss which explains the meaning of that which is said, of that which is left unsaid, and of that which is imperfectly said. A work that explains what is said or but imperfectly said and supplies omissions is termed a *Vārtika*. The term is particularly applied to the explanatory rules of Kātyāyana on Pānini's *Sūtras*. Accordingly, Kātyāyana is commonly known as Vārtikakāra. Here, of course, the *Vārtikakāra* is a different person.

So far about the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsa-Sūtras* and their relation to the *Uttara-Mīmāmsa-Sūtras.*

The Earliest Commentators on Brahma-Sutras : Those referred to by Sankara.

Among the earliest commentators on the *Brahma-Sūtras* was Bōdhāyana. Though Dr. Thibaut has identified him with the author of the *Kalpa Sūtra*, the better opinion to-day seems to be that the two are different and that they lived in widely separated ages. Sankara in his *Bhāshya* frequently mentions "another commentator" whose name is nowhere disclosed (I. 1. 25; I. 1. 27; I. 1. 31; I. 2. 13; I. 3. 2; I. 3. 13; I. 3. 17; I. 3. 19; III. 3. 39; III. 3. 57; III. 4. 42; IV. 3. 7–14). Gōvindānanda, one of his commentators, suggests that the reference is to the *Vrittikāra* mentioned by Rāmānuja, and Dr. Thibaut has accordingly proposed to identify him with Bōdhāyana (*S.B.E. Vēdānta-Sūtras with Sankara's Commentary*, Introduction XX and XXI). There is really no authority for this proposed identification. In some parts of his *Bhāshya*, Sankara refers to more than one teacher, as in I. 3. 19, where it is said that "some teachers are of (a different) opinion". Again, in I. 3. 19 it is stated that "others again, and among them some of our own are of opinion" etc. Then, again, it is said in III. 3. 19 that some commentators (in the plural) "are of opinion" etc. Next in III. 3. 57, he says that "some commentators here establish the conclusion" etc. Sankara evidently does not agree with their conclusion. Finally, in III. 4. 42, he remarks that "some teachers, however, are of opinion" etc. Thus Sankara had evidently more than one commentator before him when he noted the above differences between himself and them. As Sankara refers to Sabarasvāmin and Upavarsha by their names [see his commentary on III. 3. 53, where Sabara is referred to twice, once by name and another time as "the author of the (*Pūrva-Mīmāmsa*) *Bhāshya*", and Upavarsha, as a commentator of both the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsa* and the *Uttara-Mīmāmsa Sūtras* (*Ibid.*, III. 3. 53 and I. 3. 28)], the references to the "other commentators" may, perhaps, be taken not to include them, the more so as they relate entirely to topics connected with *Sārīraka-Mīmāmsa*. Who these may be it is not possible even to speculate. Gōvindānanda, one of the commentators of Sankara,

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[10] The name *Prabhākara* occurs in certain other inscriptions, but the references in those cases appear to be to persons who were evidently named after the original *Prabhākara*, the Mīmāmsa teacher. Thus, a *Prabhākara Bhatta* is mentioned in three inscriptions of the time of the Chōla king Rājādhirāja I as a Brāhman resident in Āryadēsa. His wife was a devotee of the Siva temple at Tiruvorriyūr, near Madras. These inscriptions are dated in the 3rd, 30th and 31st years of the reign of Rājādhirāja I (1018-1051 A.D.). Accordingly they range in date from 1021 to 1049 A.D. (*M.E.R.*, Nos. 112, 132 and 155 of 1912). Again, in an inscription at Vijayapadmanābhapur, Berhampore taluk, Ganjām district, dated in the reign of Padmanābha Ananga Bhīma of the Kēsari dynasty (13th century A.D.), Samasta 5, Mīna 29, Vaisākha Bahula 1, Wednesday, is recorded the gift of Laddigām and other villages, under the name of Vijayapadmanābhapura, to *Prabhākara Bhatta*, Misra and another. (Rangacharya, *Inscriptions in Madras Presidency*, I, Ganjam District 80, quoting *Mackenzie MSS.*, XIV). These instances appear to

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indicate that the name of the great Mīmāmsa commentator still continued to be remembered in India between 11th and 13th centuries A.D.

suggests in his gloss on Sankara's *Bhāshya* on the *Chchāndōgya Upanishad* (III. 10. 4) that Sankara had followed Dramidāchārya (or Dravidāchārya) in certain respects. Whether this Dramidāchārya is one of those referred to by Sankara and is identical with the person of the same name quoted by Rāmānuja in his *Bhāshya*, is difficult to determine in the present state of our knowledge.[11] Dramida, however, is one of those who is mentioned with others by Rāmānuja in his *Vedārthasangraha* as an authority for his own work. This acknowledgment shows that in the interval between Sankara and Rāmānuja there had come into existence a number of writers on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, who are, however, at present nothing more than mere names to us. Whether any of these can be related back to a date anterior to Sankara and as such taken to be included in his general description of "other commentators" is also difficult to say. A fair inference from the known facts is that long anterior to Sankara there had been well-known commentators on the *Brahma-Sūtras* and that there had come into existence, after him, other commentators who were themselves succeeded by Rāmānuja.

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[11] Dr. Thibaut in his translation of the *Vedānta-Sūtras with the Commentary of Sankarāchārya* (*loc.cit.*, Introd. XXI. f.n. 1), says that the name is sometimes given as *Dramida*, and sometimes as *Dravida*, and suggests, basing his opinion on that of Pandit Rāma Misra Sāstrin of the Benares College, that the former is the correct one. There appears to be authority for both the forms. In a Sānskrit-Kannada record on the four faces of a pillar set up in the courtyard of the Rāmalingēsvara temple at Rāmēsvaram, Proddatur taluk, Cuddapah district, the Rāshtrakūta king, Krishna III (*Duradankakāra*) registers a gift of land and taxes to that temple and incidentally states that the king's general took Kānchi from the "knavish Dramidas" (*M.E.R.*, No. 383 of 1904). The country is called *Dravida-dēsa* in a record dated in Saka 1439 or 1517 A.D. (*M.E.R.*, No. 87 of 1912) and also in a copper-plate grant (*M.E.R.*, 1912-13, No. 8). In a Prākrit record found at Amarāvati, Sattenapalle taluk, Guntur district, the gift of an upright slab at the foot of a *mahāchaitya* by one *Damila-kanha* (*i.e.*, Dramida-Krishna) and *Chula-kanha* (Kshuda-Krishna) and his sister are registered. A Sānskrit-Grantha record dated in Saka 1445 (=A.D. 1523) in the reign of the Vijayanagar king Krishnarāya, found at Nagalāpuram, Ponneri taluk, Chingleput district, records a gift for the recitation of the Sānskrit *Vēdas* and the *Drāvida-Vēda* (*i.e.*, the Prabandha) and the exposition of the *Vēdānta*. The Tamil part of Southern India is commonly known as *Drāvida-Vishaya*. (See Hultzsch, *Report on Skt. MSS.*, III. 59, under *Saubhāgya-Ratnākara*, end verses.)

Those mentioned by Bhaskara.

Of these, Bhāskara deserves special mention. His date is not yet definitely settled. As he is not referred to by Sankara, but mentioned by name and criticized by Rāmānuja, the upper and lower limits of his age may be fixed between the beginning of the 9th century A.D. and the middle of the 12th century A.D. He may probably be put down to *circa* 1000 A.D., as some time will have to be allowed for his attaining that extent of celebrity for his views as to be specially quoted and refuted by Rāmānuja in his *Srī Bhāshya.* That this date is not by any means a mere conjecture will be evident when it is remarked that he has been identified with Bhāskara Bhatta, son of Kavi Chakravarti Trivikrama Bhatta, mentioned in the Nasik copper-plates.[12] These plates state that Trivikrama Bhatta belonged to the Sāndilyagōtra and that his son Bhāskara Bhatta was honoured with the title of *Vidyāpathi* by King Bhōja. King Bhōja, who is said to have thus honoured Bhāskara Bhatta, has to be identified with the famous Paramāra King of Malwa who bore that name. According to the latest view, King Bhōja lived about the middle of the 11th century A.D.[13] Bhāskara Bhatta Vidyāpathi will accordingly have to be set down to about the third quarter of the 11th century A.D. Corroborative of this inference is the statement made by Bhāskarāchārya, the author of *Siddhānta Sirōmani*, who mentions Bhāskara Bhatta

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[12] See *Bhūmika* to Bhāskarāchārya's Commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* edited by Pandit Vindhyēsvarī Prasāda Dvivedin, I to III, Chowkhambā.

[13] Bhōja's date has been variously assigned by scholars. Thus, according to Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, he ruled from 997 A.D. to 1050 A.D. (*Early History of Dekkan*, 214-215). Sir Ramakrishna assigns to him "about fifty-three years". Dr. Vincent Smith, however, says that "he reigned gloriously for more than forty years" and fixes him between 1018–1060 A.D. (*The Early History of India*, 410-411). Apart from the length of his reign, a later date seems

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nearer the truth, for, as suggested by Dr. Bühler and Dr. Zachariæ, some time has to be allowed, if the *Navasāhasānka Charita* referred to at length by them is to be believed; for King Sindhurāja, the father of Bhōja, appears to have reigned for a fairly long period of time before Bhōja actually came to the throne. The *Prabandhas* followed by Sir Ramakrishna do not allow any period of rule to Sindhurāja which is now held to be without warrant. Indeed Bühler and Zachariæ definitely state that "it is necessary to place the beginning of Bhōja's reign further down than is usually done" (*Indian Antiquary*, June 1907, 172). As tradition states that Bhōja ruled in all for 55 years, 6 moons and 3 days, it is possible that this lengthy period includes his years of office as Yuvaraja under Munja and Sindhurāja. Munja began his reign before 974 A.D. and his death occurred in one of the three years 994 to 996 A.D. Sindhurāja, his younger brother, succeeded him and he may be allowed—judging from the active life led by him as detailed in the *Navasāhasānka Charita*—a period of rule commencing from 997 A.D. and ending probably with a year or two before 1019 A.D. which is the first definite date we meet with in Bhōja's life. That year marks the defeat which the Chālukya King Jayasimha inflicted on the confederacy of seven kings led by Bhōja, who was obliged to take to flight (Balagami inscription dated 1019 A.D. See *I.A.*, V. 17; *E.C.*, VII. Shikarpur 125). If this suggestion proves acceptable, Sindhurāja may be set down to 997-1017 A.D., Bhōja following him and ruling from about 1017 A.D. to about 1072 A.D. This would mean a reign of about 55 years for Bhōja, the period fixed by tradition. At least three land grants of Bhōja are known. These are:—(1) The Ujjain copper-plate land grant, dated in Vikrama Samvat 1078, Chaitra Sudi 14, corresponding to 30th March 1021 A.D.; (2) Land grant of his Karana of the Rāja Mrigānka, dated in Saka Samvat 964, or A.D. 1042-1043; and (3) Land grant dated 4th bright half of Māgha of Vikrama Samvat 1176, two years earlier than the Ujjain grant or A.D. 1019. (For these grants, see *I.A.*, June 1907, 170; and September 1912, 201-203.) Besides these, Bhōja's defeat and flight are mentioned in the Balagami record dated in 1019 A.D. Thus, there can be no question he ruled from about 1019 A.D. to 1043 A.D. But if tradition is taken into account, as most scholars have done, he should be held to have ruled, as before suggested, from 1017 to 1072 A.D.

Vidyāpathi and claims him as his ancestor in the sixth degree. As this Bhāskarāchārya states that he was well versed in *Smrithis* and *Srutis* and styles himself Kavi Bhāskara (*Srauta smārtha vichāra sūra chaturō nissēsha vidyānidhi*, etc.), it has to be conceded that Bhāskara Bhatta Vidyāpathi's family was hereditarily one well known for its learning. It is interesting to note that this Kavi Bhāskarāchārya's name is actually reminiscent of Bhatta Bhāskara Vidyāpathi's name as it occurs in the colophons to the *Brahmasūtra Bhāshya*, wherein it appears as Bhāskarāchārya (*Iti Srī Bhagavad Bhāskarāchārya pranītē Sārīraka Mīmāmsabhāshyē*, etc.). What is more important is that Kavi Bhāskarāchārya states that he himself was born in Saka 1036, which corresponds to 1114 A.D., that Bhāskara Bhatta Vidyāpathi was his ancestor in the sixth degree, and that he wrote his work *Siddhānta Sirōmani* in his 36th year. Allowing twenty years for a generation, Kavi Bhāskarāchārya should have come about 120 years after Bhāskara Bhatta Vidyāpathi, which means that the latter should have flourished about 120 years before Kavi Bhāskarāchārya's birth. This works out to 994 A.D. (1114 A.D. *minus* 120 years, which gives us 994 A.D.). From this, it would seem to follow that Bhatta Bhāskara Vidyāpathi lived through the reigns of the Paramāra kings Munja, Sindhurāja and Bhōja, the last of whom is said to have honoured him, quite late in his (Bhāskara Bhatta's) life with the valued title of *Vidyāpathi*. This last fact is mentioned by Udayana, the author of the well-known work *Nyāya Kusumānjali* (see p. 35, line 5). In this work, Udayana writes thus of himself :—*Brahmaparinatērīthi Bhāskaragōtrē yujyate*. A little later he adds :—*Bhāskara tridandimatha Bhāshyakāra*. Since Udayana says he wrote his *Subōdha Kusumānjali* just past Saka 906 (A.D. 984), he must have been a younger contemporary of Bhāskara. If this is conceded—and it has to be, as Udayana states he was of Bhāskara's *gōtra*—then Bhāskara should have been much earlier than Saka 906. Udayana adds that Bhāskara wrote his *Bhāshya* after he became a great proficient in learning. And he mentions that when he had advanced in his age, and had attained great renown, Bhōja conferred on him the title of *Vidyāpathi*. This should have occurred before Bhōja's death, the latest known date for which is 1072-1073 A.D. On these grounds, Bhāskara, the author of the *Bhāshya* on the *Brahma Sūtras*, will have to be differentiated from Bhatta Bhāskara, the teacher who was honoured by Āhavamalla, the Kalachūrya king, who has been identified above (see pp. 45-46) with the commentator on the *Taittirīya Āranyaka*. As will be seen, the latter belongs to the third quarter of the 12th century A.D. and thus came about a century *after* Tridandi Bhāskara, surnamed Vidyāpathi, the author of the *Bhāshya* on the *Brahma Sūtras*. The author of *Taittirīya Āranyaka* also went by the name of Trikānda Mandana Bhatta Bhāskara (see *Bhūmika* to his work in the Ānandāsrama Series).[14] The title *Tridandimatha Bhāshyakāra* affixed to Bhāskara Bhatta Vidyāpathi the author of the commentary on the *Brahma Sūtrās*, shows that he should have been a *Sanyāsin* of the Tridandi order. Since he styles himself *Bhagavat* in his colophons, there can be no doubt, as to this. A *Tridandi* is a *sanyāsin* who has renounced all worldly attachments, indicating such renunciation by carrying in his right hand three long staves (*danda*) tied together so as to form one. Such a *sanyāsin* is said to have obtained command over his mind, speech and body, or rather over thought, word and deed (*cf. Manu*, XII. 10). A *Tridandi* is usually distinguished from an *Ēkadandi*, more commonly called *Hamsa*, who carries a single staff, which is said to represent his *kāya* or body, which he has, by undertaking his vow of *sanyāsa*, thrown off. This staff is buried with him, when he dies and is sainted. The *Ēkadandi* class of *sanyāsins* is, according to Hārita, divided into four orders: *Kutīchakō*, *Bahūdakō*, *Hamsa* and *Paramahamsa*. The last of these is often designated *Parivrājaka*, literally one who has renounced the world and wanders from place to place. Judging from Bhāskara's long and detailed criticism of the status of Paramahamsas, whom he takes as typical of the *Ēkadandi* class, and the praise he bestows on that of the *Tridandis*, when commenting on the Sūtra *Sarvāpēkshā cha yagnādisrutērasvavat* (III. 4. 26), it would seem that he belonged to the *Tridandi* order of *sanyāsins*. He plainly suggests that the status of the *Tridandi*, with the right to wear the *sikha* (tuft of hair on the head), the *yagnōpavīta* (the sacred thread) and the rest, is a much superior one to that of Paramahamsas, who though they are supposed to renounce everything belonging to the world—including all *karmas*—are still in the world and move in it and have much to do with it. This is probably the reason why Bhāskara came to be known—if Udayana is to be believed—as *Tridandimatha Bhāshyakāra*, the espouser of the doctrine of the *Tridandi* class.[15]

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[14] In the *Bhūmika* referred to, it is stated that this Bhatta Bhāskara lived before Mādhavāchārya, the author of the *Sarvadarsana Sangraha ;* for he mentions Bhatta Bhāskara in his *Sankara Vijaya* (Sarga XV, sloka 80) as having disputed with Sankara. This is an anachronism. It will be seen that according to the inscriptions mentioned at pages 45-46 of this Introduction, he was honoured by Āhavamalla, the Kalachūrya king, between 1181-1183 A.D. Tradition assigns him to 950 A.D., evidently confusing him with his namesake who lived during the reign of King Bhōja. In a verse which occurs at the end of his commentary on the *Taittirīya Samhitā*, it is said he lived in *Nishpāvakē Sākē*, which Professor M. Seshagiri Sastri read as *Nishpāpakē Sākē*, thus changing Saka 1410 into Saka 1110. This change of reading (of *va* into *pa*) can be supported on three grounds :—(1) It gives a more intelligent meaning to the verse than the one assigned to it by Dr. Burnell ; (2) it makes Bhatta Bhāskara, the author of the *Taittirīya* commentary anterior to Mādhavāchārya, the author of *Sarvadarsana Sangraha*, which tradition avers ; and (3) the date Saka 1110 corresponds to 1189 A.D. which would only mean that Bhatta Bhāskara, who was honoured by Āhavamalla, the Kalachūrya king, in 1181-1183 was still living in 1189 A.D. when he wrote or finished his commentary on the *Taittirīya Samhitā*, which *prima facie* seems quite acceptable.

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[15] The fundamental difference between *Tridandis* and *Ēkadandis* is in regard to the performance of *karma*. The former is only a *Phalatyāgi*, *i.e.*, one who has given up the fruits of his *karma*, while

In commenting on the Sūtra *Utpaththya-sambhavāt* (II. 2. 42), Bhāskara holds, with Sankara, that it refers to the Pāncharātra doctrine and not to the Sakti, as is suggested by Ānandatīrtha and Nimbārka. He, however, defends the Pāncharātra doctrine, definitely arguing against the views of Sankara. He holds that Pāncharātra is not against the *Srutis*. Vāsudēva is *upādāna kārana* and *Jaggatu* is *nimitta kārana*. Pāncharātra sets down the relationship between these two *kāranas*. This is exemplified in *dēvārchana*, *dhyāna*, *samādhilakshana* and *karmagnāna*. In none of these four is there anything against the Srutis. *Dēvārchana* is the worship of Vāsudēva-rūpa ; *dhyāna*, the

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the latter is not only a *Phalatyāgi* but also a *Svarūpatyāgi*, *i.e.*, one who has also given up his physical body. The *Ēkadandi* is, in fact, taken to have given up everything, both *karma* and its *phala*. He accordingly shaves the tuft off his head, gives up his *yagnōpavīta*, etc., which signify *karma*, and completely transforms himself in his physical appearance. He no longer is of this world ; he is a true *sanyāsin*. On the other hand, the *Tridandi* being only a *Phalatyāgi*, retains his connection with the world and as such he is bound by *karma*. He accordingly wears the *sikha* (the tuft of hair on his head), the *yagnōpavīta* (the sacred thread) and performs his *nitya-karmas* just like a householder. He is, however, subject to the discipline of his order in regard to other matters. Among the Visishtādvaitas (Srī-Vaishnavas of both sects, Vadagalai and Tengalai) *sanyāsins* are wholly of the *Tridandi* order, while among the Smarthas and Madhwas (*i.e.*, Advaitins and Dvaitins) they are entirely of the *Ēkadandi* class. It is interesting to note that Bhāskara, the author of the *Brahmasūtra Bhāshya* was a *Tridandi*. He not only preceded Rāmānuja in point of time but also belonged to Central India. These facts coupled with the references that are to be found in *Manu*, *Hārita*, etc., it would seem that the order of *Tridandi* is quite an ancient one and has been in considerable vogue both in the north and south of India for ages long anterior to Rāmānuja. Of Rāmānuja, it was foretold in the *Vriddha Pādma Purāna* that he would be a sage of the *Tridandi* order and restore the lost faith to its original brilliancy. It is said that Tanka, Bharuchi, Guhadeva, Dramila, Yāmunāchārya and others referred to by Rāmānuja belonged to the *Tridandi* order. Tradition, as recorded in the Vadagalai *Guruparampara*, states that Rāmānuja became a *sanyāsin* of this order and, what is more, converted his former *guru*, meditation in Sankarshana-rūpa; *samādhi* (Sūkshma-rūpa) in Pradyumna; and lastly, *karmagnāna* is seen in the Sthūla Aniruddha-rūpa. These being exemplified in Pāncharātrāgama, it is not against the *Srutis*. This Sūtra accordingly is devoted to the consideration of the characteristics of the *sakti* which is implicit in the Pāncharātrāgama. Hence the invented statement (*kalpana*) that Pāncharātrāgama is against the *Srutis* is false (*anupapannam*). He quotes the Chchandōgya text: *Adhigamanōpādānējyāsvādhyāya yōgaihi Bhagavantam Vāsudēvamārādhya tamēva pratipadyata* and says that what is stated to be against the *Srutis* is really well known to them. Accordingly, he holds that the suggested contradiction is a mere invention.

Yādavaprakāsa, also into one such after making him renounce formally the *Ēkadandi* order to which he belonged by undergoing once again the *chaula* (tonsure) and *upanayana* rites and then assuming at his (Rāmānuja's) hands the *Tridandi* staff and the orange-tawney robe. It is said that before he could renounce the *Ēkadandi* order he felt he should undertake, by way of penance, a circumambulation of the holy places of the Earth, for which he was too old. In these circumstances, he was advised to go round Rāmānuja *once* and seek re-initiation at his hands. This done, he was made a *Tridandi* and duly invested with the insignia of that order. (See *Prapannāmritam*, *Rāmānujāchārya Divya Charitai*, etc.) According to the *Prapannāmritam*, since he had all his life carried on a tirade against *Tridandins*, criticising their religious life and observances, Yādavaprakāsa was commanded by Rāmānuja to compose a work on the duties of *yatis*, reconciling all the conflicting passages in the *Smrithis*. Agreeing, Yādavaprakāsa, who had been renamed Gōvinda Jeer, wrote, it is said, the *Yati Dharma Samuchchaya* in eleven chapters, a work which has survived to this day.

The *Tridandins* are thrice referred to by Manu in his *Laws*, once in Chapter IX dealing with the *Duties of Kings* and twice in Chapter XII dealing with *Transmigration* (IX. 296, page 395; XII. 10-11, page 485). The first of these shows the rigour with which the three kinds of discipline to which the *Tridandin* was subjected were insisted on. Each constituent part of his three-fold discipline was, it would seem, important for the maintenance of each of the other two. Manu says:—"Yet in a kingdom, containing seven constituent parts, which is upheld like the triple staff (of an ascetic), there is no (single part) more important (than the others) by reason of the

That Tridandi Bhāskara had in view some of the previous commentators is made plain in the opening verse of his own *Bhāshya*, which reads thus :—

जन्मबन्धविनिवृत्तिकारणं ब्रह्मसूत्रमिदमुद्बभौयतः ।
श्रोतृचित्तकमलैकभास्करं बादरायणमृषिं नमामि तम् ॥
सूत्राभिप्रायसंवृत्या स्वाभिप्रायप्रकाशनात् ।
व्याख्यातंयैरिदंशास्त्रं व्याख्येयं तन्निवृत्तये ॥

This verse explains why Bhāskara undertook the task of composing a new *Bhāshya*. He says that he bows down to Bādarāyana, whose genius produced the *Brahma Sūtras* to relieve people from the bondage of birth. Bādarāyana, he says, is like the Sun (Bhāskara), who dispels the darkness of the minds of those who pray for such relief. Then he adds : " Embodying the teaching of the *Sūtras*, I make known my own meaning of them in the interpretation (*vyākhyātam*) I offer. I am interpreting (the *Sūtras*) because I am desirous of removing the doubts caused by my several predecessors (*vyākhyātam yairidam sāstram*) because such doubts ought to be removed (*tannivrittayē*)." The use of the plural (*yairidam*) indicates more than one previous commentator. Bhāskara should, therefore, be

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importance of the qualities of each for the others." This three-fold discipline is thus described in Chapter XII. 10-11 :—" That man is called a (true) *Tridandin* in whose mind these three, the control over his speech (*vāgdanda*), the control over his thoughts (*manō-danda*), the control over his body (*kāyadanda*), are firmly fixed." As Bühler suggests, though this verse (XII. 10) gives the usual description of a true *Tridandin* as an ascetic who holds three staves (*danda*) tied together, according to it, this outward sign avails nothing. That man only deserves the name *Tridandin* who keeps a three-fold control (*danda*) over himself. The maintaining of the three-fold discipline over himself is more important than carrying the triple *danda*, which signifies him. The fruit of this three-fold discipline is described in the next verse (XII. 11) as final liberation. It says :— " That man who keeps this three-fold control (over himself) with respect to all created beings and wholly subdues desire and wrath, thereby assuredly gains complete success " *i.e.*, final liberation. As to the duties of the *Sanyāsin*, see Bühler, *Manu*, VI, 33-97 ; also *Vishnu Purāna*.

taken to suggest that he is controverting not only Sankara,[16] his immediate predecessor in the field, but also some of Sankara's own predecessors, from whom he evidently differed in certain respects. Though he generally agrees in the matter of the text of the *Sūtras* with Sankara, Bhāskara differs from him sometimes, as, for example, in I. 2. 19; II. 2. 18; II. 2. 31; II. 2. 38; III. 4. 46; IV. 3. 5; etc. Not only are there differences in regard to the text between the two but Bhāskara does not also agree with Sankara in his conception of the general import of the *Sūtras.* Bhāskara's standpoint is that of *Bhēdābhēda*,[17] while Sankara's is that of a confirmed Advaitin. In commenting on the Sūtra *Ātma krutē parināmāt* (I. 4. 25), Bhāskara criticizes at some length Sankara's statement postulating Adhyāsa on account of which everything is destructible. This, he suggests, is nothing more than naked Mahāyānism of the Bauddha system. He says:—*Tathācha vākyam parināmasthusyādivadati vigītam vichchinnamūlam mahāyānika Bauddha gāththitam māyāvādam vyāvarnayantō lōkān vyāmōhayanti.* He thus very plainly states that what is postulated by Sankara is manifestly contained in the Bauddha system of Mahāyānism. Thus saying, he adds, Sankara is making people lose themselves in Buddhism. Again, commenting on the Sūtra *Vaidharmyāchcha nasvapnādivat* (II. 2. 29), Bhāskara states that those who follow the Bauddha system are Māyāvādis and that they are among those who are with justice rejected by the Sūtrakāra. He says:—*Yētu Bauddhamatāvalambinō Māyāvādinastēpyanēna nyāyēna Sūtrakārēnaiva nirastā vēditavyāha.*[18] His own position, Bhāskara makes plain in his comments. Thus, while explaining the Sūtra *Adhikantu bhēdanirdēsāt* (II. 1. 22), he states that the *jīva* is different from *para*, for the *jīva* cannot be said, he says, to create himself and destroy himself. But he is only different from *para* up to a particular stage. The indeclinable *thu* in the Sūtra, according to him, applies to both sides—*bhēda* and *abhēda*. He then asks: "*Nanu bhēdābhēdau katham paraspara viruddhō sambhavētām*" and answers the question thus: *Naisha dōshaha*. And he quotes the following slōka:

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[16] Bhāskara's *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshyam*, edited by Pandit V. P. Dvivedin, *Bhūmika*, 9.

[17] Pandit V. P. Dvivedin quotes Bhattōji Dīkshita's *Vēdānta tatva vivēka tīkā vivarana* in support of this description of Bhāskara's standpoint. Bhattōji Dīkshita calls Bhāskara a "Bhēdābhēda vēdānta siddhānta vādi." See Pandit V. P. Dvivedin's Edition of Bhaskara's *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshyam*, *Bhūmika* 9, f.n. 1.

[18] Among King Bhōja's possible contemporaries were Rāmapāla (1084-1130 A.D.) and Gōvindapāla (1175 A.D.). During their

Pramānataschētu pratīyate kōvirōdhō ayamuchyatē ।
Virōdhēchāvirōdhēcha pramānam kāranam matam ॥

This may be broadly set down thus: That authority which we set down in support, how can we postulate of it that it is in contradiction with our own view; an authority which is quoted in support of an argument, if it proves it without contradicting it, then alone will it be universally accepted as an authority (*pramānam*).[19]

Similarly, in commenting on the Sūtra *Nasthānathōpi parasyōbhayalingam sarvatrahi* (III. 2. 11), Bhāskara reiterates his position.

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reigns, Buddhism, though declining in Hindustān, was flourishing in the Pāla dominions, the monasteries of Magadha being crowded with thousands of residents. Rāmapāla was, according to inscriptions, followed by five kings. It was during the reign of Indradyumnapāla (1197 A.D.) that the Pāla kingdom was subverted by the Muhammadan invasion led by Kutb-ud-dīn's general, Muhammad, the son of Bakhtyar and the Buddhist monasteries destroyed (Vincent Smith, *The Early History of India*, 419). Buddhism was accordingly still a dominant religion in India about 1150 A.D., when Bhāskara lived and wrote.

[19] An authority is usually quoted to support and not to contradict the position taken. An authority is sought for only when there is *anumānam*, *i.e.*, doubt as to the authenticity of the position taken. *Cf.* the following quoted by Ānandatīrtha as from the *Mahākaurma*, when commenting on the Sūtra *Sāstra yonitvāt*:

Nischayāt sādhayēt artham pramānāntara mēvacha ।
Sruti smrithi sahāyam yatthu pramānāntaramuttamam ।
Pramāna padavīm gachchēt nāthra kāryā vichāranā ॥
Purvōttarāvirōdhēna kōtrārthō abhimatobhavēt ।
Ityādyamūhanam tarkaha shushka tarkantu varjayēt ॥

This Sūtra, he says, deals with the *jīva* in its condition of sleep (*suptāvastha*) and its relation to *Brahman* in that condition. Of course, it is stated in connection with the Sūtra *Īkshiter na sabdam* and the following Sūtras that *Chētanam* is Brahman and that it is the chief cause for the creation of the world. Therefore, that Brahman is the chief Sat (in *Chētana*) is established. What is explained in this Sūtra is what is the result of such a combination. This may be admitted. It is also proved that Brahman is of a *bhēdābhēda rūpa.* Now, it is to be understood clearly whether the *bhēdābhēda rūpam* is to be meditated upon or whether all which appears to be different is one in its entirety (*Samastha bhēdamabhinnam sallakshana bōdharūpam upāsyam*). This is the question that is considered in this Sūtra. The fact is that Brahman is *nirguna* ; but according to those well versed in Sāndilya Vidya, this Brahman is *saguna* ; and therefore it has to be proved whether Brahman is *saguna* or *nirguna.* Here and there, it can be clearly seen as proved that Brahman is to be meditated upon as *saguna.* The *pūrvapakshin* raises the doubt whether Brahman is to be meditated upon as one of *sākāra* or *nirākāra* or in a form which is a combination of both, and also as having a bodily form (*prapanchātmanā cha*). At any rate, it is but right that the actual form should be meditated upon. Amidst so many doubts, it is stated in the Sūtra *Nōbhayalingam Brahmōpāsyam prapanchākārēna sākāram nirākāram cha* (neither both forms nor the form of the *prapancha* consisting of *sākāra* or *nirākāra*). For the word *lingam* means *lakshana*, *chinha* (characteristic symbol), etc. Truly, the formless form of Brahman should be meditated upon as being *Shuddhakārana-rūpa.* For it is stated in the *Sruti* text *astūla mananva hrasva miti iti*, there is no such form of Brahman as the *prapancha* form. Because the essential (*svathasya*) form of Brahman is an entire, undivided (*kūtastham*) and everlasting (*nityam*) form. This is declared by the *Sruti* text *Ekamēva advitīyam*, etc. Afterwards Brahman assumes a secondary form, at times, on account of certain changes (*vikāra*) ; when the changes disappear, that form ceases to exist and Brahman assumes its original state of oneness. Therefore, in conclusion, the *nirākāra* form of Brahman, *i.e.*, the *kārana-rupa*, is the one to be meditated upon. Therefore, the *svarūpa* of Brahman in whom the worldly form is also combined, should be meditated upon. It is said that such a form should not be worshipped, for in this Sūtra it is clearly stated—

> *Naprithivyādi sthānatōpi parasthōbhayalingitha* ।
> *Svathō abhinnatvāt āganthukatvāchcha* ॥

(Brahman has no material or worldly form; and therefore he has no two different forms; he himself being undivided and incapable of any division, cannot have two different forms.) The mundane form of Brahman (as declared in the Upanishads) is simply for namesake (*nāmarupa panchaka*); it is not his real form (*na prapanchātmakam Brahman*) just as the ocean is not a mere collection of water (*yatha samudrātmaka samudra iti*). Then, if it is asked how does it reach (the "collection" in the end), the answer is that as throughout the Vedānta it is said that the *nishprapancha Brahma* (*nishprapancha Brahmōpāsyam*) should be meditated upon, therefore such a form only should be meditated upon. In the *Sruti* text *asabdamasparsya marūpamavyayam* । *sa yēsha nēti nēti ātmā sthūla miti cha*, the material form of Brahman is denied. The whole of this comment shows that Bhāskara holds *bhēda* as a transient state of Brahman and *abhēda* as his permanent state.

In commenting on the Sūtra *Anāvritti sabdāt anāvritti sabdāt* (IV. 4. 23), Bhāskara after mentioning the classes of people for whom "no return" is prescribed in the *Srutis*, says that they go to Brahma-lōka and thus attain the state from which there is no return (*na cha punarāvartatē*). They reach, he says, Sūrya's abode and there unite with Brahman (*sāsambhūtah*) in his *virāt* form (*Vairaja sarīra*); there they become equal to Brahman. There, all the worlds, all the *Vēdas*, all the Dēvas are united (*sāsambhūtah*).[20] So, it is said in the *Mantrāvarna* (*Upanishad*):—*Prachāra chakri parivardhamānē taramtīmam*

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[20] *Sa*=*saha*, together, and *sambhūti*=join or unite with.

tushita trishitā bhuvanāni visva, etc., which states that while the wandering wheel of time keeps turning, the *ātma* crosses over these material worlds of the universe. Then having realized his own *ātma* (*tadantharātman prathamam prāpya*), he realizes Paramātma (*tataha paramātmānam pratipadya*) and in his company enjoys (*ēkībhūya Brahmanā mōdate*). The union here suggested, looking to the *chaturthi vibhakti* used (*Brahmanā*) and not *panchami* or *saptami*, is one of company and not *aikya* with Brahman. The use of the word *mōdate* as the finite verb also suggests that the released *ātma* enjoys *in company with* Brahman and does not find *aikya* in him. This shows that there is, according to Bhāskara, no union with Brahman in the sense of *aikya* but only the privilege of being in company with Brahman and there, in his world and in his presence, enjoying perfect bliss, along with Brahman.

Commentators mentioned by Ramanuja.

In the opening part of the *Srī-Bhāshya*, Rāmānuja makes it plain that it is based on Bōdhāyana's *Vritti*. Referring to Bōdhāyana, he says :—*Bhagavad Bōdhāyana-kritam vistīrnam Brahma-Sūtra vrittim pūrvāchārya samchikshipustanmatānusārēna sūtrāksharāni vyākhyāsyante* (I. 1). This statement may be taken to record the fact that Rāmānuja's commentary is written in accordance with the abridgments made by former teachers of Bōdhāyana's lengthy gloss (*vritti*). There was evidently more than one such "abridgment" of Bōdhāyana available for use by him in his time. By whom these had been composed, it is not clear. Rāmānuja refers at the same time to a *Dramida-Bhāshya* (I. 1. 1 and below). That the author of the *Vritti* and the author of *Dramida-Bhāshya* are different seems also evident from his work, for he refers to both in almost consecutive sentences and the context shows that they are being referred to by him as absolutely different authorities, one supporting the view of the other. He also refers to a *Vākyakāra*, whose identity is not easily established. (Four times in I. 1. 1 and again in I. 3. 14.)

The *Vākyakāra* appears to be quoted as supporting the *Sūtrakāra* in certain places. We know the latter is none other than Bādarāyana but the identity of the *Vākyakāra* is not so easily made out. He cannot obviously be the same as the *Vrittikāra*, as the latter is quoted by the latter term. Some light is thrown on this point by the *Prapancha-hridaya*, which has been issued in the Trivandrum Sānskrit Series (No. XLV). From its contents, this work has to be assigned to a date posterior to Sankara who, though not mentioned by name, is probably meant to be referred to under the respected title of *Bhagavatpāda*. As its name indicates, this work is a sort of encyclopædia. Among other things, it mentions, besides the *Brahma-Sūtras*, a *vritti* on it by Bōdhāyana, called *Kritakōti*, and an abridgment of the latter by Upavarsha. It is not a little curious that this work, while it mentions Bhāskara's *Bhāshya*, which belongs, as we have seen above, to the 12th century, makes no reference to either Rāmānuja or to Srīkantha. This apart, it is a question if Upavarsha, the author of the abridgment of Bōdhāyana, is referred to by Rāmānuja as *Vākyakāra*. It is possible that one of the "abridgments" of Bōdhāyana available to Rāmānuja in his time was that of Upavarsha, who, however, is not mentioned by him in his *Bhāshya*, though, as we have remarked above, he is twice mentioned by Sankara in his *Bhāshya*. There is no means of knowing what other "abridgments" of Bōdhāyana, Rāmānuja had before him when he wrote his *Bhāshya*. In one place, Rāmānuja refers to the *Bhāshyakāra* (I. 1. 1). Who this is, it is difficult to say, though Dr. Thibaut identifies him with Dramidāchārya, the author of the *Dramida-Bhāshya*. Similarly the *Vākyakāra*, mentioned above, is identified by Dr. Thibaut with Tanka, who, as referred to below, is mentioned by Rāmānuja in his *Vedārthasangraha*. It is not possible to say if these identifications are correct. As Rāmānuja actually quotes from the *Bōdhāyanavritti*, Rāmānuja must be held to have had either the text of Bōdhāyana himself before him, or to be merely quoting him from the "abridgments" available to him. There is some ground for the belief that Rāmānuja did know Bōdhāyana first hand, for tradition states that he had to journey as far as Kashmir to secure the text of Bōdhāyana. Hence possibly the direct references to the *Vrittikāra*, meaning the *author of the Vritti, i.e*, Bōdhāyana himself, in other parts of his work (I. 1. 10; I. 2. 2; I. 3. 7; and I. 3. 32) as distinguished from the *Vākyakāra*, in the several places quoted.[21] As has been mentioned above, Rāmānuja refers to a Dramidāchārya (II. 2. 3) and quotes from him. He is doubtless "the author of the *Dramida-Bhāshya*", who is twice referred to by him in his *Bhāshya* (I. 1. 1 and II. 1. 14). Rāmānuja also quotes Bhāskara, the commentator on the *Brahma-Sūtras* (II. i. 15) and Yādavaprakāsa (*Ibid.*). The latter may be identified with the person of the same name, who, according to tradition, was his own teacher. The latter should accordingly be taken to have composed a commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, which, in some respects, was from a point of view different from that of Rāmānuja.

Those mentioned by Ramanuja's Commentators.

In his *Vēdārthasangraha*, described as his first work, Rāmānuja mentions not only Bōdhāyana, but also Tanka, Dramida, Guhadēva, Kapardin and Bharuchi.[22] Of these, quotations from Bōdhāyana and Dramida appear in the *Srī-Bhāshya* but not from the others. Commentators on Rāmānuja's *Bhāshya*, however, state that they base their works not only on Bōdhāyana's *Vritti* but also on Tanka and the other authorities mentioned by Rāmānuja. Thus,

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[21] The difference between *Vrittikāra* and *Vākyakāra* may be noted here. *Vrittikāra* literally means *the writer of a gloss* or *a critical commentary*, while *Vākyakāra* signifies *one who explains the meaning of a sentence*. To carry on a dispute about the meaning of a sentence is to engage in a *Vākyārtha*, which, in its derivative sense, means a disputation. Accordingly *Vrittikāra* would indicate a critical commentator, while *Vākyakāra* would suggest a person who merely explains the writings of another person.

[22] Quoted twice by Rāmānuja in his *Srī-Bhāshya*, I. 1. 1.

Ranga-Rāmānuja in his *Mūlabhāva-prakāsika*, a commentary on the *Srī-Bhāshya* (see preliminary verses), states that his work is based on Bōdhāyana's *Vritti*, in an abridged form, and on the teachings of Tanka, Dramida and others. He also says that he presents Bōdhāyana's work for modern students with a view to show where he differs from Sankara. Sundararāja-dēsika, author of *Brahma-Sūtrabhāshya Vyākhya*, a commentary on the *Srī-Bhāshya*, likewise states that his work is based on Tanka, Dravida, Guhadēva and Bōdhāyana (see introductory part). A similar statement is made by the author of the *Brahmasūtra-bhāshya Sangraha Vivaranam*, which is a short exposition of the *Srī-Bhāshya* (see opening verses). Srīnīvāsadāsa, author of *Yatīndramatadīpika*, a work embodying the main principles of Rāmānuja's system, makes a similar acknowledgment and mentions amongst his chief authorities Bōdhāyana, Guhadēva, Bharuchi, Brahmanandi, Dramidāchārya, Srīparānkusanātha, Yāmuna, Yatīsvara, etc. (see introductory verses). Finally, Srīnivāsadīkshita, in his *Virōdhavarūthini-pramāthini*, states that he follows the *Bōdhāyana Vritti* (see opening verses). It is possible that all these later writers are only repeating the names of these different authorities from Rāmānuja's *Vēdārtha-sangraha*, for some at least of them belong to quite modern times, when they cannot have had direct access to them. (See for these different writers Madras *D.C. of Skt. MSS.* X, pp. 3737, 3748, 3749, 3758, 3759, 3773 and 3787.) While we know that Bōdhāyana was the author of a *vritti* on the *Brahma-Sūtras* and Dramida was the author of a *Bhāshya* on the same work, we do not know if the rest of those mentioned above were writers of similar *vrittis* or *Bhāshyas* on that work. From the mention made of them in connection with the *Brahma-Sūtras*, it has to be presumed that they were commentators of one kind or another on it. Since they are approvingly referred to by Vaishnava writers, it might be suggested that they wrote from the Vaishnava standpoint. It is worth while, at this point, to note what Rāmānuja states as to how he came to write his

Srī-Bhāshya. At the commencement of his work he remarks that Bādarāyana's work, which, he says, "was brought up from the middle of the milk-ocean of the Upanishads," had been "well guarded by the teachers of old" but whose meaning had been "obscured by the mutual conflict of manifold opinions." Hence, he undertook the composition of a new *Bhāshya*, about which he expresses the hope: "May intelligent men daily enjoy that (the nectar of the teaching of Vyasa) as it is now presented to them in my words." These pious wishes of Rāmānuja show that during a long period anterior to himself—indeed long anterior to Sankara—there had come into existence a plethora of commentators on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, who had, by their interpretations, obscured the real meaning of the *Sūtras*. His own commentary was intended to restore Bādarāyana's meaning, in the light of Bōdhāyana's *Vritti.* None of those mentioned by Rāmānuja and his commentators has survived, except that of Bhāskara of which MS. copies have come down to us. (See Madras *D.C. Skt. MSS.* XX, Nos. 4687 and 4688.)

Those referred to by Madhva.

Madhvāchārya refers only once in his *Bhāshya* to the commentators who had preceded him. This reference occurs in his comments on I. 1. 5, where, adverting to the word *Asabda*, he says, that "other (commentators)"—*itara siddham*,—have put upon it an interpretation which cannot be justified. It is a characteristic feature of Madhvāchārya's writings that he never refers to any of his opponents by name, though he is found criticising their views. In his *Nyāyavivarana*, for instance, Madhvāchārya refers to disputants of the opposite school, but does not name any of them specifically. In the opening verse of the *Nyāyasudha*, Jayatīrtha says that Madhvāchārya did not refer to any of the previous commentators on Bādarāyana (*anyaihi anyathā vyākhyātini Brahmasūtrāni*), because they did not, in his opinion, convey the right meaning attaching to his *Sūtras.* The suggestion seems to be that he ignored them and wrote his own commentary. This statement of Jayatīrtha has to be understood in a restricted sense, for Madhvāchārya, though he does not mention the names of those prominently associated with the rival schools, is ever at pains in criticising their views at almost every stage in his many works. A careful reading of his own comments on I. 1. 5 itself and a comparison of the same with those of Sankara and Rāmānuja shows that he is referring to these two, though he does not name them.

Other Commentators and their Works.

Among other commentators on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, whose writings have actually come down to us, are the following :—Nimbārka, Srīkantha, Kēsava Kāshmīrin, Vallabha, Vignānabhikshu, Baladēva and Suka.

Nimbarka and His Date.

Of these, Nimbārka has been assigned by Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, on the basis of a rough approximation, to the middle of the twelfth century, his death being fixed at 1162 A.D. Since he shows, in some respects, strong resemblances to Rāmānuja's views, he may perhaps be put down at least a century later, if not more. There is the greater reason for assigning a later date to him, for his theory is a kind of *Bhēdābhēda*, which presupposes the existence of a strong *dvaita* school of thought at the time he propounded his teaching. Nimbārka, in his exposition of I. 1. 4, asks the question, Is Brahman describable by words or not describable by words? If he is describable by words, what will become of those passages which declare that Brahman is not describable by words? If he is not describable by words, what will become of those passages which say that he is describable? To remove this objection, says Nimbārka, we take our stand on the theory of *Bhēdābhēda*. Therefore the Omniscient, the cause of the origin, sustenance and destruction of the universe, the Brahman possessed of inconceivable energies, is apprehended through the authority of scripture alone, and is separate from everything and also inseparable from everything. He is the lord Vāsudeva. He is the object of our enquiry in this *sāstra* and in him alone all diverse scriptures of the world find their complete reconciliation. This is the settled conclusion (*siddhānta*) of all the *Upanishads.* Since Srīkantha refutes the view of Nimbārka (see comments of Srīkantha and Nimbārka on III. 3. 27-30), it has to be presumed that Nimbārka preceded Srīkantha. Since, as we have seen above, Srīkantha lived about 1270 A.D., Nimbārka should be taken to have lived some time before that date. How many years before Srīkantha, Nimbārka actually lived, we have no materials at present to determine. But his lower and upper limits are fixed by Rāmānuja and Srīkantha, that is, between *circa* 1138 and 1270 A.D. Pandit Vindhyēshvara Prasāda Dvivedin has assigned Nimbārka to a date between 1041 and 1199 Vikrama Era, or 985 and 1143 A.D. This seems clearly inadmissible, judging from the independent evidence that has been adduced above for the date of Srīkantha and the impossibility of making Nimbārka anterior to Rāmānuja, to whom he owes intellectual allegiance.[23]

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[23] Pandit Vindhyēsvara Prasāda Dvivēdin in the introduction to his edition of Nimbārka's *Bhāshya* (see p. 3, *f.n.* 3) quotes the following from the concluding part of the *Bhavishyad-Purāṇa*:—

Vishnuswāmi prathamatō Nimbādityō dvitīyakaha |
Madhvāchārya strītīyastu turyō Rāmānujastatha ||

It is needless to say that this order of chronology is wholly at variance with what we know as a fact about the dates of Rāmānuja and Madhva, both from tradition and inscriptions.

The *Sampradāya-dīpa* describes the birth of Madhvāchārya as having occurred in the reign of Kumārapāla, King of Gujarat, in Western India. Kumārapāla was anointed to the throne, according to Mērutuṅgāchārya's *Prabandha Chintāmaṇi*, in Vikrama year 1199 (A.D. 1143). As we know from inscriptions that Madhvāchārya lived between 1238 and 1317 A.D., this date seems impossible. Kumārapāla became a convert to Jainism in A.D. 1159. (See A. K. Forbes, *Ras Māla*, *Hindoo Annals of the Province of Goozerat in Western India*, 2 Vols., Richardson, (1856), Vol. I, Ch. 11; see also Vincent Smith, *E.H.I.*, p. 190, *f.n.* 3).

Story of Nimbarka's Life.

Nimbārka was a Telugu Brahman by birth and is reported to have lived at Nimba, identified by Sir R. G. Bhandarkar with Nimbāpura in the Hospet Taluk of the present Bellary District.[24] He is described as the

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That Nimbārka was indebted to Ānandatīrtha and not Ānandatīrtha to Nimbārka seems also inferable from a comparison of their commentaries on the *Brahma-Sūtras*. Wherever their views are identical, it is generally to be seen that Ānandatīrtha's position is fully supported by argument and citation of authorities whereas Nimbārka's seems but a bare assertion which presumes much on the part of the reader. (*Cf.* the comments of these commentators on III. 2. 11—*Nasthānatōpi paratyōbhayaliṅgam sarvatrahi*; II. 2. 42—*Utpatyasambhavāt*.)

[24] See *Vaishnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems*, 62, quoting MS. No. 706 of the (Bombay) Collection, 1884-1887. At Nimbāpura, there is a Sanskrit-Kannada epigraph of Immadi Praudha Dēvarāya Mahārāya dated in 1450 A.D. This king should be identified with Mallikārjuna, the son of Dēvarāya II. This Mallikārjuna was also known as Immadi-Praudhadeva Mahārāya (see *Mysore Gazetteer*, new edition, II, iii, 1600). Sir R. G. Bhandarkar derives the name from *Nimba* and *arka*, meaning *the Sun of Nimba* (see *Vaishnavaism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems*, 62, *f.n.* 2). In the *Sampradāya Kuladīpika* by Gada, a follower of Vitthala, son of Vallabhāchārya, the founder of the Vedānta system known after him, Nimbārka is referred to as *Nimbāditya*, which is only another form of *Nimbārka* (see *Madras Report on Sānskrit and Tamil MSS.*, I, 16). In explanation of the name Nimbāditya, the following anecdote is narrated:—Nimbāditya was engaged in conversation with an Advaitin. As they were conversing long on a theological topic in the evening, the sun set in the west. The Advaitin seeing that the time for the evening ceremony was past, wanted to stop the conversation and perform the ceremony. But Nimbāditya remarked that the sun had not set and showed the sun to his fellow-disputant through a Nimba tree by his supernatural powers (*Ibid.*, p. 16, *f.n.*). This story suggests an apocryphal attempt at explaining a personal name. In the *Bhaktimāla* the following story, which is a variant of the one given above, is narrated:—Once upon a time, a Dandin—evidently an ascetic of the *Tridandi* Order—arrived at Nimbārka's house and was welcomed by him. Asked to partake of his hospitality, he agreed. But

son of Jagannātha, a Bhāgavata, and Sarasvati. In the *Sampradāya Kuladīpika* of Gada, a disciple of Vitthala, son of Vallabha, Nimbāditya is said to have been instructed in the Vaishnava religion by God Pānduranga, the presiding deity at Pandharpur. (See Seshagiri Sastri, *Madras Report on Sānskrit and Tamil MSS.*, I, No. 35, pp. 14-17.) It may be inferred from this statement that he was an ardent devotee of this deity and that he made Pandharpur his head-quarters. His followers are now to be found widely scattered all through Northern India, though they are especially numerous in Bengal and in Mathura. Nimbārka himself lived at Brindāvan, near Mathura, which accounts for the preference he showed to the Rādhā-Krishna form of Vaishnavism. Nimbārka's commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras* is a short one and goes by the name of *Vēdāntapārijāta Saurabha*, copies of which are hardly to be found in the MS. Collections of Southern India proper. In the colophons found in his work, he is styled *Bhagavān* and his work is described as *Sārīraka Mīmāmsa Vyākya.* Sir Rāmakrishna Gopal Bhandarkar's account of Nimbārka's system is almost exclusively based on his *Siddhāntaratna*, which is also known as the *Dasaslōki*, from the ten stanzas of which it is composed. Srinivāsa, a direct disciple of Nimbārka, wrote a commentary, called *Bhāshya Bhāvārtha Prakāsika Vēdānta Kaustubha*, on the *Vēdāntapārijāta Saurabha*, while Harivyāsadēva, a later successor, wrote another on the *Siddhāntaratna.* Kēsava Kāshmīrin, the thirtieth in the list of Nimbārka's successors, composed an independent

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before the things required could be got together, the Sun set and it became dark. The Dandi said: "I cannot take my meal as the Sun has set and it is night now." Nimbārka, it is said, prayed to Srī Krishṇa and by his grace Srī Krishna held his Sudarsana Chakra against the Sun and prevented the Sun from setting. Nimbārka took the Dandi to a Nimba tree near by and having made him to get it up, showed him the Sun that was still shining. The Dandi took his meal and said, "I have dined now; you will become famous from now as Nimbārkāchārya."

commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, which has attained some celebrity.

His System of Vedanta.

Brahman is omniscient, omnipotent and is the storehouse of all excellent qualities. He is the controller of Brahma, Siva and even Time. He is the Cause of the Universe and he is the purport of all scriptural teachings. Karma leads to knowledge; because the performance of Karma kindles a desire to know something higher than Karma itself. All Vedic texts have their unity and reconciliation in Brahman. This is so, because all objects, however different they may be, are one in Brahman. This, again, is so because Brahman is their essence without any difference or distinction and because Brahman is referred to in them all. Is Brahman describable by words or not? If he is, what becomes of the texts which say he is not so describable? If he is not so describable, what becomes of those which say he is so describable? To meet this objection, we—says Nimbārka—take our stand on the theory of *bhēdābhēda*. Brahman is, therefore, separate from everything, while at the same time he is inseparable from everything. He is the Lord Vāsudeva and is the Self of the Universe. All the scriptures find their reconciliation in him. He is the Cause of the Universe, because consciousness is attributed. Therefore Pradhāna of the Sānkhya philosophy, which is non-sentient, cannot be its cause. Pradhāna is not *sat*; for while devotion to *sat* leads to *mukti*, even the Sānkhya philosophy does not teach that devotion to Pradhāna leads to *mukti*. If Brahman is the efficient cause, may not Pradhāna be the material cause, as clay is to the potter? No—says Nimbārka—Brahman is unlike an ordinary human being who wants materials to make his things. He is the all-powerful, highest personage who, by his mere will, thought-power, creates the world. Thus declares the *Sruti*, " He said, ' May I be many, may I grow forth.' " (*Taitt. Up.*, II. 6). Thus, from the mere wish of Brahman, the world has come into existence.

Brahman is different for *jīva* (individual soul); for that by union with which the *jīva* gets Ānanda (bliss) must be different from that *jīva*. The *Sruti* teaches the union of *jīva* with that Ānanda. In the text, we read "Verily he is sweet, by perceiving that sweetness one perceives Ānanda" (*Taitt. Up.*, II, 7). Brahman is accordingly not only *sat* being (existence), but also *chit* [illegible] (intelligence) and *ānanda* (bliss). Brahman's extraordinary qualities do not belong to the *jīva*. The inanimate world and the *jīva* are thus distinct from Brahman. But as they have no existence independent from Brahman, they are identical with Brahman. They are distinct from Brahman, because they do not possess the extraordinary qualities of Brahman. Brahman possesses the qualities of both the animate and inanimate worlds. Brahman is their essence. These qualities contain in them the rudiments of these worlds and by realizing them, Brahman becomes their material cause.

Vallabha and His Date.

Vallabha comes next in point of time. He was a Velanāti Brāhman and belonged to the Telugu country. He was the son of one Lakshmana Bhatta and Elamāgāra. He was born in the Vikrama year 1535, or A.D. 1479. (See Yagnēsvara, *Āryavidyāsudhākara*, quoted by Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaishnavism*, *Saivism*, etc., 77, *f.n.* 1; see also Gada, *Sampradāya Kuladīpika*, third Prakarana; Seshagiri Sastri, *Report on Sānskrit and Tamil MSS.*, I, No. 35, p. 16; and Muralīdhara, *Srī Vallabhāchārya Charita*, *ibid.*, No. 51, p. 23.) His birth would, therefore, have to be assigned to the reign of the Vijayanagar king, Mallikārjuna (1446-1487 A.D.), who was succeeded by Sāluva-Narasimha I, the founder of the Second Vijayanagar dynasty (see *Mysore Gazetteer*, new edition, II, iv, 1600-1666). How long he lived is not determined yet. There is, however, a Sānskrit copper-plate record found at Gōvāda, in the Tenāli taluk of the present Guntur District, dated in Saka 1466, or A.D. 1544, cyclic year Krōdi, Sunday, Paurnami, in the reign of the Vijayanagar king, Sadāsiva Rāya, which registers a gift of that village to Vallabhāchārya himself, who is highly praised as a Vaishnava teacher in it. (See *Inscriptions in Madras Presidency*, II, Guntur 825, quoting *Local Records*, Vol. 48, pp. 29-37 and Vol. 42, p. 274 *et seq.*) This inscription would seem to suggest that Vallabha was 65 years old at the time of the grant referred to in it. There is nothing improbable in this, the more so as the inscription bears eloquent testimony to the fact of the great fame that Vallabha had attained by that time. If this be so, he should have lived down to the early years of Sadāsiva Rāya's reign (1542-1570 A.D.) (see *Mysore Gazetteer*, II. iii, 2012). In Gada's *Sampradāya Kuladīpika*, which was written in 1544 A.D., it is stated that at a meeting held at the court of Krishnadēva-Rāya, the Vijayanagar king (1509-1530 A.D.), over which Vyāsatīrtha, the Madhva *guru*, presided, Vallabha defeated the opponents of Vaishnavism. (See Seshagiri Sastri, *Report on Sānskrit and Tamil MSS.*, I, No. 35, p. 16.) The statement is repeated in Muralīdhara's *Srī Vallabhāchārya Charita*. This would suggest that Vallabha visited Vijayanagar during the reign of Krishnarāya, the great Vaishnava king. As Chaitanya lived between 1486-1534 A.D., it would seem that he was a junior contemporary of Vallabha, though he died earlier than the latter.

His Life and Wanderings.

Both the *Sampradāya Kuladīpika* and the *Srī Vallabhāchārya Charita* give long accounts of the life of Vallabha. (See Seshagiri Sastri, *Report on Sānskrit and Tamil MSS.*, I, Nos. 35 and 52, pp. 14 and 25.) The first of these, though an early work—having been written within ten years of the Gōvāda record—is somewhat legendary in character and in parts anachronistic. For instance, Vishnuswāmi is represented to be earlier than Sankara and Rāmānuja posterior to Madhva. But there is no need to condemn it as wholly worthless. Though it might be wrong in regard to particulars relating to others, it might be held to be fairly correct where it gives details about Vallabha himself. Among the statements made by it in connection with him are that he was a staunch defender of Vaishnavism; that he defended the Vaishnava faith at the court of Krishnadēva Rāya, the Vijayanagar king, with Vyāsatīrtha presiding over the public disputation; that he defeated his opponents there; that he went northwards to Prayāg, near Allahabad, thence to Sthanesvar, near Haridwar; that he converted one Rāmānanda by performing a miracle (that of breaking a *Sālagrāma* and then reuniting it in its original form); that at the request of one Kēsavabhatta, he commented on the *Bhāgavata* fully; that he also wrote *Bhāshyas* on the *Bhagavad-Gīta* and fifty of the *Upanishads* and taught them to his two disciples Nārāyana and Achyuta; that he then reached Ganges (at Benares) and became a *Tridandayati*[25] and that he then turned a householder and had two sons Gōpinātha and Vitthalēsvara, the former of whom had a son Purushōttama and the latter had many sons, one of whom was Giridhara.[26] The *Srī Vallabhāchārya Charita* adds the statement that Vallabha was god Vishnu incarnate on earth. It also states that he was given birth to by his mother on the way to Benares in the 8th month of her pregnancy and that accordingly, he was, as a child, abandoned by his parents in a forest; but found safe on their return journey. It also gives out the facts that Vallabha began his wanderings in his 22nd year, that Dāmōdaradāsa was his first disciple and that he paid a visit to his maternal uncle at Visākhanagar (Vizāgapatam). It also records, as already mentioned, the success he attained over the opponents of Vaishnavism at Krishnadēva Rāya's court at Vijayanagar. He then went up northwards to Gōkul and Brindāvan, at which latter place he engaged in the constant worship of Srī Krishna. Thence he proceeded to Marwar propagating all the while the Vaishnava religion. The miracle of the broken *Sālagrāma* is duly recorded in this work also, which further sets down another miracle. In the course of his peregrination, he met a person—we are told—who was searching for a lost *Sālagrāma* of his. Vallabha, it would appear, made a whole tree appear to the person full of *Sālagrāmas* hanging on its branches, each of which was like the one for which the person was seeking. He next visited Pandharpur and worshipped god Vitthala there and then proceeded to Benares where, in accordance with a divine injunction, he became a married man, taking for his spouse the daughter of one of his own disciples. He had two sons, Gōpinātha and Vitthala, the latter of whom had seven sons, the names of four of whom are mentioned in this work. The sons and grandsons, we are told, constantly preached and propagated the worship of Srī Krishna and won adherents to Vallabha's faith.

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[25] See page 121 *ante* for the meaning of *Tridandi*. Evidently Vallabha was at first an ascetic of the *Tridandi* order and subsequently turned a householder and begot two sons, who carried on his work.

[26] Besides the two sons, he had a daughter who, it is said, married Lālubhatta, the author of *Lālubhattika*, an incomplete *tīka* on the *Anubhāshya*. (There is another *tīka* on the *Anubhāshya* by Vrajanātha Gōswāmi, son of Raghunātha.) If Vallabha was born in 1479 A.D. and was still living in 1544 A.D., as the Gōvāda copper-plates suggest, there is scarcely any reason to doubt the correctness of the dates assigned to his son Vitthala. Vitthala is said to have been born in V.S. 1572, or A.D. 1516 and died in V.S. 1642, or A.D. 1586. He is said to have been a contemporary and personal friend of Akbar, the Mughal Emperor (1556-1605 A.D.). At the time of Vitthala's death, Akbar should have been in the 30th year of his reign. Vitthala's son Gōkulanātha is said to have been a contemporary of Jahangir, the son of Akbar, who ruled between 1627 and 1658 A.D. A study of the above dates for Vallabha, Vitthala and Gōkulanātha show that there is nothing *prima facie* wrong about them.

His Disciples and Literary Works.

Such are the stories told in the MSS. referred to above. There can be hardly any doubt that Vallabha belonged to the Telugu country, that he was learned and wrote many works, that he travelled extensively to propagate Vaishnavism and that he finally settled down in Upper India. Tradition of a well-authenticated kind states that he lived at Adail, some eight miles from Allahabad and that he died there. Those who follow his religion are to be found mostly in Bombay, more especially in Guzerat, Rajputana and Muttra. There are, however, a few immigrant merchants in the Madras Presidency who are adherents of Vallabha's religion. Accordingly MSS. of his works are occasionally to be met with in Southern India as well. (See for references to these, Seshagiri Sastri, *Madras Report on Sānskrit and Tamil MSS.*, I, Nos. 26-42, 46, 46*e*, which is wrongly described; also *Madras D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XI, Nos. 5123-5156.) Among these are the following:— *Brahma-Sūtrabhāshya*, which is a commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras* of Vyāsa, *Bhāgavatatatvadīpika*, also called *Tattvadīpanibandhana* or simply *Tattvadīpa*,[27] which fixes the meaning of the *Bhāgavata*, a work very similar in intent to Ānandatīrtha's *Bhāgavatatātparyanirnaya ; Sannyāsanirnaya*, which inculcates the methods of *Sannyāsa*; *Antaha-karana-prabōdha*, well described as an apostrophe to the mind in which Vallabha declares that Srī Krishna is the Supreme Being and that devotion to him in love and faith brings salvation ; *Jalabhēdastōtram*,[28] a work classifying the divine qualities of Vishnu according to the qualities found in certain varieties of water ; *Vivēkadhairyāsrayanam*, on the need of wisdom, courage and faith in God for the attainment of salvation ; *Sēvāphalam*, which sets forth the advantages to be derived from piety and loving devotion to Lord Srī Krishna ; and *Bālabōdha*, which deals with the two ways of pursuing the objectives *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mōksha*. The *Pushtipravāha-maryāda*, which is attributed to *Āchāryachandra*, may perhaps be also set down to Vallabha. This work is devoted to the doctrines of the Pushtimārga, the name given to the primary doctrine of Vallabha.

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[27] Vallabha was the author of only a part of this work. He composed the commentaries on the first three *Skandhas* of the *Bhāgavata*, the rest being done by his son Vitthala as is clear from the colophon to the fourth *Skandha*.

[28] There is a commentary called *Jalabhēdatīka : Bhāvapūrna*, on this work by one Kalyānarāya (*Madras D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XI, No. 5126).

His 'Anubhashya'.

About his *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshya*, a few more words have to be added. It is called *Anubhāshya*,[29] because it is written briefly. Vallabha is said to have written another commentary (*Bhāshya*) of which only a portion is said to be available.[30] Mr. P. S. T. Pāthak, who has edited the *Anubhāshya*, says that he has filled in the gaps found in this work from the fragments of the other commentary he was able to secure. He also states that much of the matter contained in his other commentary has also been incorporated by him in his commentary called the *Bālabōdhini*, which really makes up Vol. II of his edition. Vallabha, however, was not the sole author of the *Anubhāshya*. It is held by some that while the first eleven *Sutras*—upto and inclusive of *Ānandamayābhyāsāt*—was composed by him, the rest of this work, upto its very end, was written by his son Vitthala. Whether this is so or not, the fact that Vitthala was part author of the *Bhāshya* appears to be acknowledged by him in his comments on III. 2. 34, *Sthāna visēshāt prakāsādivat*. Mr. Pāthak points out that from this *Sūtra* onwards, the *Anubhāshya* upto its end was composed by Vitthala (*Anubhāshya*, II. 47).

This is so despite the fact that the colophons to the work uniformly read that "this work, being a commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, entitled the *Anubhāshya*, was composed in accordance with the school of Vēdavyāsa by Vallabhāchārya." Evidently, though Vitthalēsa composed part of the *Bhāshya*, it having been commenced by his father, he composed the colophon in his name, or may be, left the original colophon untouched. This inference seems to be confirmed by what he says in concluding his commentary on the IV Adhyāya. Here Vitthalēsa states that he offers this commentary (*Anubhāshya*), which he styles *Bhāshyapushpānjali*, a handful of flowers called the *Bhāshya*, at the feet of his venerable *Āchārya*. He adds: "May he be pleased with this my humble presentation" (see *Anubhāshya*, IV. 4. 22, verse preceding the colophon). Mr. Pāthak correctly suggests that the term *Āchārya* here means *Vallabhāchārya* and not *Vyāsāchārya* as has been suggested by some authorities. As Mr. Pāthak suggests, the word *asmābhiti* indicates that Vitthalēsa carried out the duty of completing the commentary in accordance with the directions of his father and teacher.

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[29] Edited by Pandit Sridhar Tryambak Pāthak, Shastri, Deccan College, Poona, in two Parts, in the Bombay Sānskrit and Prākrit Series, 1921, of which it forms Vol. LXXXI.

[30] Was this the first commentary written by him of which *Anubhāshya* was a short summary? *Cf.* Ānandatīrtha, of whose *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshya* his *Anubhāshya* is a further exposition.

A few of the differences observable between Vallabha and Vitthala as commentators may be noted. In the first two Adhyāyas, for which Vallabha was responsible, there are no *slōkas*. These are a feature in the two other Adhyāyas which Vitthala composed. While long, involved sentences (*dīrgha samāsas*) are to be found in the son's part of the *Bhāshya*, they are scarcely to be seen in the father's. In Vallabha's portion, we have occasional implicit references to previous commentators, but in Vitthala's such references are not to be seen. Vallabha depends for his interpretations on the *Samhitas*, which he frequently quotes; Vitthala, beyond the references he makes to the *Isāvāsya*, *Gōpālatapani* and a few other Upanishads, hardly ever puts the *Samhitas* to a similar use. Vallabha was evidently a highly learned personage, being greatly proficient in Patanjali's *Mahābhāshya*. In his *Tatvadīpanirnaya* (II. 50), he shows as great skill as Patanjali himself does in his comment on *Sūpakōpōyūpa* in his own *Bhāshya* (I. 3). A point worthy of note in regard to Vallabha is that he made the *Bhāgavata* the basis for his interpretation of the *Brahma-Sūtras*. He reads the *Sūtras* in the light of the *Bhāgavata*. The opening part of his *Bhāshya* is much like that of *Bhāgavata*. He takes the following verse from the *Bhāgavata* (VI. 9. 36) and makes it the foundation for his commentary on the sūtra, *Srutestu sabdamūlatvāt* (II. 1. 27):

" अर्वाचीन विकल्प वितर्क विचार प्रमाणाभास कुतर्कशास्त्रा कलिलान्तःकरणाश्रय दुरवग्रहवादिनां विवादानवसरे " । *Bhāgavata*, VI. 9. 36.

Arvāchīna vikalpa vitarka vichāra pramānābhāsa kutarka sāstrā kalilāntahkaranāsraya duravagraha vādinām vivādānavasarē iti ।

Though, in his commentary, *Pushtibhakti* (firm faith) is highly inculcated, Vallabha had profound regard for the *Vēdas.* He, however, does not seem to admit that they have any meaning other than what they *prima facie* declare. He does appear to admit, like others, that the Vēdas have an inner meaning of their own.

His Disciples and their Works.

Of the two sons of Vallabha, Vitthala, the younger, wrote the *Bhaktihamsa*, which inculcates the doctrine that the Brahman cannot be reached by knowledge, discussion and learning but only by the devotion of the worshipper and the pleasure and permission of the Supreme Being. Besides completing his father's commentary, the *Anubhāshya*, he wrote the *Subōdhini-tippani*, *Vidvan-mandanam* and the *Sringāra-rasa-mandanam*, *Nibandha-prakāsa*, etc. Another work of his is a commentary called *Pushtipravāhamaryādavivaranam*, on his father's work *Pushtipravāhamaryāda*. He also wrote the *Bhaktihētunirnaya*. He besides completed his father's work, the *Bhāgavatatattvadīpika*, as remarked above. On this work there is a commentary called *Bhāgavatatattvaprakāsārnavabhanga*, by one Pītāmbara, who was evidently a pupil of Vallabha himself, as he pays homage to him in his work. Srī Krishnatīrtha, author of *Paratattvavilāsa*, was perhaps another disciple of Vallabha, for he mentions the latter in it with great respect. The work itself inculcates the idea that Srī Krishna should be worshipped as the Supreme Being. Gōpīnātha, the elder son of Vallabha, wrote the *Sādhanadīpika* and some hymns (*sēvā slōka*). He left a son who died without issue. Giridhara, son of Vitthala, wrote the *Suddhādvaitamārtānda*, which is a standard work on Vallabha's religion. He had a number of learned disciples, prominent among them being Muralīdharadāsa, Gada and Raghunātha. All these wrote on Vallabha's religion and thus propagated it. Gada[31] wrote in 1554 A.D. the *Sampradāya Kuladīpika*,[32] above referred to. It may be described as a general history of Vaishnavism ending with Vallabha. Muralīdharadāsa was a more prolific writer. Among his works are:—*Bhagavannāma-vaibhava*, which treats of the greatness of singing the name of Srī Krishna; *Sēvākalpataru*, which treats of the way in which Srī Krishna should be worshipped; *Bhaktichintāmani*, which treats of the saving efficacy of piety and loving devotion to Srī Krishna as the Supreme Being; *Bhagavannāmadarpana*; and the *Paratatvānjana*, which inculcates the worship of Vishnu under the name of Srī Krishna. This last mentioned work is really a commentary on the *Bhāgavata*, which is represented as an eye-salve to discover the treasure of God. The supreme deity Srī Krishna is to be pleased, according to this work, by rejoicing in singing and hearing of his deeds and qualities. According to the *Pushtimārga*, God is to be approached only by his mercy and with affection for him. But the greatest of all the works of Muralīdharadāsa is the *Bhaktisūtrabhāshya*, which is a commentary on the *Bhaktisūtra* of Sāndilya. This work is divided into three *Adhyāyas*, each of these, again, being sub-divided into two *āhnikas*. The total number of *Sūtras* is ninety-nine. The work starts with *Aththathō bhaktijignāsā*, in which the word is interpreted in keeping with the highest Vaishnava tenets that *bhakti* (worshipping the Supreme Being) is to be considered the fifth object of humanity, the four others being *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mōksha*, and that devotion is better than mere knowledge and contemplation. Muralīdharadāsa, besides, wrote the *Srī Vallabhāchārya-charitra*, which is a short prose work giving the story of the life of Vallabha. This work has already been referred to above. In it Vallabha is represented as an incarnation of Srī Krishna. Raghunātha, another disciple of Vallabha, wrote the *Bhaktihētuvivritti*, which is a commentary on Vitthala's *Bhaktihētunirnaya*, above mentioned. Purushōttama, a disciple of Vallabha, wrote the *Suvarnasūtra*, which is a commentary on *Vidvanmandanam*, a work dealing with the tenets of Vallabha's faith. Another Purushōttama, who was the son of Pītāmbara, disciple of Vallabha, wrote the *Siddhāntarahasyavivaranam*, which is also a work devoted to the origin and tenets of Vallabha's religion. Among other works expository of it are *Ātmanivēdanam*, which stresses the value of self-surrender to the will of God as a means of salvation ; *Haridāsasiddhānta* by Haridāsa, which inculcates self-surrender to Srī Krishna as the way to realization; and *Prēmabhaktirasāyana*, by an unknown author, who was probably a disciple of Vitthala. The last of these sums up the Vallabhite position in characteristic fashion. The *jīvātman* is a part of the *Brahman*. When it is separated from the *Brahman*, the *jīva's* qualities of *sat*, *chit* and *ānanda*, become invisible to the *jīva*, being lost in worldly life, the Brahman, though he is living in him, seems far away. The Jīva, though separated from the Brahman, may be united with him. This union may be one of the five different kinds :—*Sālōkya*, living with him in the same place ; *Sārūpya*, possessing the same form ; *Sāmīpya*, living in his vicinity ; *Sāyujya*, union with him ; and lastly, the rejoicing at the singing and hearing of his deeds (*rāsalīlādilakshana bhajanānanda*). Closely connected with the doctrine of *Bhakti* as taught in this school is the allied one of *Nirōdha* in relation to it. Many treatises have been written on this topic. Thus, in the *Nirōdhalakshanam*, Pushtipravartakāchārya defines what is indicated by *Nirōdha*,[33] which means complete annihilation, in relation to *bhakti*. Other notable works on the subject are *Nirōdhavivritti*, by Lālūbhatta *alias* Bālakrishna, and *Nirōdhavritti-Samsayavamsachcheda*. The first is really an explanatory gloss on the *Subōdhini*, which itself is a commentary on the tenth *Skandha* of the *Srī Bhāgavata ;* and the second is a further commentary on the *Nirōdhavritti*. Bālakrishna was also the author of *Pramēyaratnārnava*, a standard work on Vallabha's religion which has been published in the Chowkhambā Series. Lālūbhatta wrote, besides, *Anubhāshya-tīka*, *Nibandha-tīka*, *Subōdhini-tīka* and *Sōdashabandha-tīka*.

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[31] Also called Dvivedi-Gada.

[32] Sometimes also called *Sampradāyapradīpika*. (See *Madras T.C. of Sāṇskrit MSS.*, I, i. A, No. 32.)

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[33] With the Buddhists, *Nirōdha* meant the suppression of pain. In Vallabha's system, it means something quite different.

His Indebtedness to Vishnuswami.

Vallabha's system of Vedānta is said to have been based on the writings of one Vishnuswāmi, of whom little credible is known. The *Sampradāya Kuladīpika* of Gada, a disciple of Vitthala, the younger son of Vallabha,[34] describes him as the son of a minister of a king who ruled for some years "after the commencement of the Kaliyuga". It speaks of him as an incarnation of Vishnu. Later it adds that he was instructed in the Visishtādvaita faith by god Vishnu himself, and that Bilvamangala spread his doctrines. (See Seshagiri Sastri, *Report on Sānskrit and Tamil MSS.*, I, No. 35, p. 15.) Sir Ramakrishna Gopala Bhandarkar quotes Yajnesvara (*Āryavidyāsudhākara*, p. 228) for the statement that Vishnuswāmi was the son of the councillor of a Dravida chief and assigns him to the middle of the thirteenth century A.D., on the basis of Nabhāji's assertion in his *Bhaktamāla*, that Vishnuswāmi's successors were Jnānadēva, Nāmadeva, Trilochana and Vallabha. The first of these three was the author of a commentary on the *Bhagavad-Gīta*, dated in 1290 A.D.[35] This seems too early a date, for this would make Vishnuswāmi practically a junior contemporary of Madhva, whereas the system of Vishnuswāmi, apart from its philosophical aspects, had nothing to distinguish it from Madhva's, except his worship of Rādhā in conjunction with Krishna. Nor is the suggestion of the *Sampradāya Kuladīpika* that Vishnuswāmi was taught the Visishtādvaita system by god Vishnu himself

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[34] See below, where the work is further referred to.

[35] *Vaishnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems*, 77.

Brahman creates through his own nature. Brahman is, however, not only *sat* and *chit* but also *ānanda* (joy.) In his view the eight *sūtras* commencing with *ānandamaya abhyāsāt* propound this view. *Ānandamaya* is the cause, according to him, of all the modified forms of *ānanda* that we find in this world. As the *sat-chit* Brahman in his substance is unmodified, though he is the substantial cause of all worlds, so this *ānandamaya* modified is the cause of all diversities of *ānanda* in this world. For the *jīva* to enjoy all blessings along with Brahman, it is necessary to show that it possesses the same attributes as the Brahman, for two things cannot enjoy a common experience unless they belong to the same category. It became, therefore, necessary to prove that the *jīva* is made on the image of Brahman. This the *Taittirīya Upanishad* proves. The *annamaya* (physical body) is built on the mould given by the *prānamaya* (astral body). This, in its turn, is built upon the mould of the *manōmaya*, which again is built on the mould of the *vijnānamaya*, which finally is built on the mould of the *ānandamaya*. The *ānandamaya* being Brahman, the *jīva* which is *vijnānamaya*, is built on the image of the *ānandamaya* or Brahman, and is fitted to enjoy all blessings along with Brahman. Therefore, this *ānandamaya*, the inmost, is the real agent, and is the *paramaphala*, the highest fruit, reached by the *jīva* and this *ānandamaya* is the topic of the whole of the second *valli* of the *Taittirīya Upanishad*. The whole of this *Upanishad* leads up to this *ānandamaya* as the highest fruit obtained by the knower of the Brahman. Thus *ānandamaya* is the highest Brahman. When a *jīva* comes to know Brahman, it becomes *ānandamaya*. This *ānandamaya* vesture is a superphysical one. The *jīva*, however, is not *ānandamaya*. This is because of the impossibility of its being so. It is true in the state of Brahma-knowledge it enjoys *ānanda*, but it cannot be said to *become* on that account *ānandamaya*. For then the *jīva* would also become the creator of worlds like Brahman; and where would then be the transcendental uniqueness of the Supreme? *Ānandamaya* is the *giver* of bliss to the *jīvas* and so he cannot be the *jīva*, as there is always a distinction between the obtained and the obtainer, the giver and the donee.

In commenting on I. 1. 31, Vallabha states that the attributes of the *jīva* are not in conflict with those of Brahman, because all the activities of the *jīva* are under the control of Brahman ; *āsritatvāt* because of being under his protection. Brahman is the support of the *jīva* also ; therefore all the activities of the *jīva* are under the command and control of Brahman. Therefore, *jīva* attributes may be properly said to be the attributes of Brahman. Thus, in his system of Vēdānta, Vallabha states that whatever view you may take—the *jīva* being a part of Brahman, or a combination of certain aspects of Brahman—the part being contained in the whole, the attributes of the *jīva* may be applied to Brahman. According to him, the word *iha* used in the *sūtra* (I. 1. 31) applies to both, *i.e.*, *iha āsritatvāt* and *iha tad yōgāt*. He says that this is so in his own system of Vēdānta—the Brahmavāda system as he calls it. In his system, *jīva* and *Brahman* are real and therefore we can properly say that Brahman is the support and *jīva* the supported. But according to Māyāvāda—the system of Sankara—*jīva* and *Brahman* are identical and so there can be no relation of the support and the supported between them. Similarly the *dharmas* of the principal life-breath may appropriately be applied to Brahman because of *iha tad yōgāt*. *Tad yōga* means *union with that*, the existence of the attributes of *prāna* in Brahman is not incompatible. Because *prāna* is in constant relation with Brahman, the qualities of *prāna* may also be said to be qualities of Brahman.

Vignana Bhikshu and His System of Vedanta.

The next commentator on the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyana was Vignāna Bhikshu, who is more famously known as the commentator on the *Sānkhya Sūtras*. He has been assigned to about the middle of the 17th century. His commentary on the *Bādarāyana Sūtras* is known as *Vignānāmrita*

Bhāshya, which is written from the Sānkhya standpoint. He is more inclined to theistic than to atheistic Sānkhya. His other works, the *Sānkhyapravachana-bhāshya*, which has been translated by Garbe, the *Yōgavārttika*, the *Yōgasāra*, the *Sānkhyasāra*, the *Upanishad-bhāshya*, etc., show that he agrees with the Sānkhya doctrine as propounded in the Purānas, where both the diverse *purushas* and the *prakriti* are said to be merged in the end in Īsvara, by whose will the creative process again begins in the *prakriti* at the end of each *pralaya*. He could not avoid the distinctively atheistic arguments of the *Sānkhya Sūtras*, but he remarks that these were used only with a view to showing that the Sānkhya system gave such a rational explanation that even without the intervention of an Īsvara it could explain all facts. (See Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, I. 222-223 ; see also page 220.) He is independent and rational in his interpretation of the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyana. Thus, as we have seen his interpretation of "*atha*" in I. 1. 1 that it occurs in Sūtra works and indicates the commencement of a new subject, is a thoroughly natural one and one to be expected from him. Though like Vallabha he interprets I. 1. 4 in such a manner as to make Brahman the material cause of the universe, his material cause is wholly different from that of Vallabha. If he treats the Sānkhya as an aspect of Vedānta, he makes the Vedānta itself square with the rationalism of the Sānkhya. He refuses to admit the *māya* theory of Sankara, for as an ardent exponent of the Sānkhya, he adheres to the personal individuality of souls. He, indeed, protests against Sankara's view which, he says, makes Brahman nothing more than the *sūnya* of the Buddhist School.

Vignāna Bhikshu is described as an ascetic who belonged to the Gauda country, corresponding to the modern Northern Bengal. Before he became a *sanyāsin*, he is said to have belonged to the Karnākarnika caste.[38]

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[38] *Karnākarnika*: A Kāyastha Brāhman. A Brāhman who followed the occupation of a Kāyastha is called a *Karnika*. A *Karnika* means *one in a Karana* or office, *i.e.*, an official. (*E.I.*,

In the colophons found in his *Bhāshya*, he calls himself sometimes as *Vignānayati* and sometimes as *Vignānabhikshu*, the terms *yati* and *bhikshu* being synonymous and meaning an ascetic. He calls his work *Brahma Mīmāmsa* and not *Sārīraka Mīmāmsa*. He describes his *Bhāshya* as *ruju Bhāshya*, *i.e.*, true Bhāshya. The term *Vignānāmrita-Bhāshya* would seem to indicate a *Bhāshya* of undoubted brilliance and wisdom by Vignāna Bhikshu, there being a play on the word *Vignāna*, the title of the work. In this *Bhāshya* which has been printed in the Chowkhambā Series (Nos. 30, 31, 34, 35, 37 and 40), Vignāna Bhikshu refers to another work of his named *Upadēsaratnamāla*, which he calls a *prakaranam*.[39] (See his *Brahmasūtra Bhāshya*, Part I, page 62, line 20.) Copies of this work have not so far been traced. Pandit Mukunda Shastri, the editor of his *Bhāshya*, states that it is inferrable from his works that he wrote a *Gītā-Bhāshya* as well, but copies of it have not so far been found.

Kashmi

From the opening verse of his *Bhāshya*, we learn that Vignāna Bhikshu was the disciple of a *guru* whom he honoured as his Supreme Preceptor (*Antaryāmi Guru*). From this *guru*, Vignāna Bhikshu received enlightenment in Vedānta. At his feet he places his *Bhāshya* as his *guru-*

1, 77 ; *E.I.*, IV, 104 ; *E.I.*, VIII, 153.) Brāhman Kāyasthas are even to-day in the majority in Upper India. (See Sherring's *Hindu Tribes and Castes*, 305 ; 308.) In Bombay, the Kāyasthas are described as a sub-caste of Brāhmanas. (*Revised Lists of Antiquarian Remains in Bombay Presidency*, VIII, 369.) For Kāyastha Brāhmanas, see *Bombay Gazetteer*, XVI, 41. A Kāyastha-Brāhmana grantee of a gift made by Govindachandra of Kanauj in Samvat 1171 (or A.D. 1115), describes himself thus : "The illustrious Jalhana, the learned, born of a Karnika and resembling Chitragupta in worth, wrote the grant with delight for his fame." (*E.I.*, IV, 104.) On the subject of the *Origin and Status of the Kayasthas* see *Man in India*, XI, 116-159, where the whole evidence is set out and discussed ; also D. R. Bhandarkar's article on *What is a Kāyastha* in the Puja Numbers of the *Amrita Bazaar Patrika* for 1930 and 1931.

[39] *Lit.* a topic ; in modern parlance, it might be more properly described as a monograph, as it deals with a single topic.

dakshina. He churned, he says, the Sruti, Smriti and Nyāya Sāstra with the aid of Brāhmans[40] and the result was the great nectar of knowledge—*Gnānāmrita*—(*Vignānāmrita Bhāshya*) which he placed before his guru to win his grace. Kutarkins and Pākhandas (who are compared to dānavas and *asuras* of old) are said to have been deceived and defeated by the confusion (*mōha*) caused among them by those who had partaken of the nectar of his *Bhāshya*. Vignāna Bhikshu prays that these also may attain the feet of his *guru*, for their work—like his own—was equally meritorious. Who are the *Kutarkins* and *Pākhandas*[41] whom his *Bhāshya* helped to confound? The false logicians and heretics referred to are obviously those whom he stigmatizes as those who postulate *akhandataya*.[42]

According to the Sruti texts *Brahmavidāpnoti param*, *Brahmavēda Brahmaiva Bhavati*, *Tamēvam viditvā atimrutyumēti*, etc., Brahmagnāna is the chief factor for realizing Paramapurushārtha. And the Śruti texts *Ātmētyēvōpāsītha sama ātmēti vidyāth tamēva dhīrō vignāya pragyām kuruvīta Brāhmana iti*, etc., declare that Brahman should be meditated upon in the form of *ātma* according to the *vidhi* prescribed in Srutis. Then arise the questions: (1) What is Brahman (*Kim Brahma*)? (2) What is the state of Brahman (*Kim Brahmata*)? Is it beyond conception? What is *Brahmagnāna*? And what is the result of realizing *Brahmagnāna*? These questions engage the minds of all *Mumukshus* (*i.e.*, those in search of *Mōksha*). In the Srutis, however, there are seeming contradictions, perhaps due to the differences in the opinions of the Rishis who belonged to different Sākhas. And, therefore, in order to determine that *gnāna*, the help of *Brahma Mīmāmsa* is desired. Verily, it may be said that in *Pūrva Mīmāmsa* alone, Dharmajignāsa and the ways and means of determining Brahmagnāna are dealt with. This is the most important dharma (*ayantu paramō dharmah*): Yoga from which, according to the Sruti, *ātmadarsana* is attained. The *āchārya* says that throughout the Vedānta, what is expounded in the Sūtra *sarva vēdānta pratyayam chodanādya visēshat*, etc. (*If you want to attain Brahmagnāna, you should examine the whole of the Vedānta*) is what is chiefly dealt with in it—the means for the attainment of *Brahmagnāna*. Here some *Kutarkins*, while acknowledging the Vedānta for the purpose of attaining *gnāna*, afterwards discard it. This should not be so. Though generally speaking Dharma has been clearly explained in the *Pūrva Mīmāmsa* in order to fix *Brahmagnāna*, the *Kalpa Sūtras* set out in brief and in detail the manner of effectuating *Brahmagnāna* (*Brahmagnāna Sādhana*). The Sruti texts *Satyam gnānamanantam Brahma*, *Vignānam ānandam Brahma*, etc., determine Brahmasvarūpatva which can be realized by *jignāsa*. It is only in Sānkhya Sastra that *jīva chaitanya* principles (*siddham*) are clearly explained. If it is asked what is this *chaitanyam* and what is its form, the reply is that that is verily the beginning of the *Brahma Mīmāmsa* Sāstram, wherein Bhagavān Vēdavyāsa formulated the Sruti text *Athāthō Brahmajignāsa*.

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[40] *Bhūdēvēbhyō* is the word used.

[41] *Cf. Pākhanda Chandāla yōhō-pāpārambhakayō-mrigīva vrikayō-bhīrurgatāgōcharam.* Kālidāsa, *Mālavikāgnimitra*, V. 24.

[42] The following is a condensed rendering of the opening verses of Vignāna Bhikshu's *Bhāshya* :—

My prostrations are due to him who pervades the universe and in whom everything has its being and by whom all is created.

I bow to him who is in the Supreme form of Chidachidsakti.

I, Vignāna Bhikshu, who having been taught by my holy preceptor (*antaryāmi guru*), who ever remains in my heart of hearts and from whom I received this great enlightenment, to him I tender this *Bhāshya* on the *Brahma-Sūtra* as *guru-dakshina*.

After having churned the milk ocean of Sruti, Smriti and Nyāya, with the aid of all Brāhmans, the nectar of knowledge (*gnānāmrita*) came into being. That I place before my *guru* to win his grace.

Let those who partake of this nectar by deceiving the array of *dānavas* in the shape of false arguers (*Kutarkins*) by *mōha* (*i.e.*, confounding them by arguments) and winning (victory) over the large array of *asuras* who masquerade in the guise of *pākhandas*, swallowing it through their meditation and wisdom, attain the feet of my *guru*.

In commenting on Sūtra, I. 1. 1., *Athāthō Brahmajignāsa*, Vignāna Bhikshu says that *Aththa* indicates by mere utterance authority and auspiciousness (*adhikāravāchaka* and *mangalarūpa*). Authority shows the exact subject that it deals with in particular. *Brahma* is the only subject for discussion as agreed to by others also ; and this is to be proved and established as realized. And all other subsidiary discussions lead to the same Brahman, beyond which there is none other. Hence, finally, Brahma alone is realized (*Brahmaiva labdham*). Therefore, realization of Brahman is the sole use for the word *Atha* (*i.e.*, the use of the word *Atha* is to indicate the realization of Brahman).

Atha denotes "in the present one" and signifies that the realization of Brahman is fixed as its *avadhi* (limit). Since its *avadhi* is Brahman, the *sūtras* have nothing to do with *Parabrahma.* The word *Athaha* is in the *panchami vibhakti* and since it is in that *vibhakti*, it shows here the *limit* (*avadhi*). (This is so according to Pānini.) Even prior to the realization of *Brahmagnāna*, the word *Athaha* is placed in the *Sūtra* to cast a reflection of the final objective in view, *i.e.*, the realization of the Brahmagnāna. Verily at the end of the work, the Sūtra *Anāvritti Sabdāt Anāvritti Sabdāt*, concludes with an emphatic application of the word *Anāvritti*, repeated twice over, *showing that the limit* (*avadhi*) *of the Sūtra has been reached*. Therefore, *athaha* shows the *pūrva avadhi* or *starting* limit and *anāvritti*, the *uttara* or *final* limit. Thus, by viewing the starting and final limits (*pūrva* and *parānta dvayā avadhāranē sati*), there can be no hesitation on the part of disciples to understand the whole gist of the *mahāvākyas* of the *Mīmāmsa Sāstra* as accurately limited by the venerable author of the Sūtras by the first and the last Sūtras (*ādyantāvadhi*). The words *athāthō* and *atha* as stated in the Smriti texts, as declared by Gōbhilā, well indicate the ways and intentions and the procedural method to be followed in the carrying out of *karma*, just as a torch shows the way out of darkness. That they show anything beyond this *adhikāra* is not correct.

Brahmajignāsa means *Brahmanaha jignāsa*: discussion about Brahman and therefore *athaha* indicates the starting point for those disciples who are earnest in their quest for *Brahmagnāna*. Brahman in its secondary sense means Vēda, Hiranyagarbha, etc. It must not be said that Brahmajignāsa is the discussion of Vedic interpretation or discussion of Hiranyagarbha, etc. Jignāsa here primarily means the discussion and establishing of the *Mīmāmsa Sāstra*. For *jignāsa* is very commonly applied in practice to the discussion of the *Mīmāmsa Sāstra* as is seen in *Athāthō Dharma jignāsa* which is the *pratignāsūtra* of the *Purva-Mīmāmsa*. *Jignāsa* suggests that the discussion should go on until the realization of Brahman is attained and this should be done with the aid of the evidence afforded by the Vedānta and that with the aid of *tattu samanvayāt*. From this Sūtra begins *Brahmagnāna jignāsa*. We should not go beyond the limits thus laid down in this and the succeeding *Sūtrās*; if we did so, we would not attain the realization of the Brahman we aim at as our objective. While this is so, *modern* Vedāntins, who are well versed, by reason of their vast knowledge, postulate that *karma* alone will not do, depending on the Sruti text *avidyayā mrutyum tīrthva vidyayāmrutamasnute iti* (absolve yourself of *avidya* by *karma* and then, being liberated from the clutches of death, pass into the region of celestial bliss through the realization of *vidya*, *i.e.*, Brahmavidya). They say that after getting freed from the hands of death by the performance of *karma*, one should begin the discussion of Brahma in order to realize *Brahmagnāna*. Therefore it is, they add, that *Brahmajignāsa* should be undertaken. And they further state that the word *kartavya* should be understood in the Sūtra, which they would read fully thus: *Athathō Brahmajignāsa kartavya iti.*[43]

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[43] Vignāna Bhikshu quotes *Upakramōpasamhāra*, etc., appearing in *Ānandatīrtha*, I. 1. 4. He refers also to *Sādhanachatushtaya* and considers Sanyāsa at length. Sanyāsa is, he says, the giving up of sixty-four *karmas*; but a man wishing a son should follow them. If so, how to reconcile these statements? According to Vignāna Bhikshu,

At the end of I. 1. 1. Vignāna Bhikshu says that in the *Brahmasūtras* there are no data for *Jīva-Brahmaikya*, for it is said in the *Bhagavad-Gita.* '*Brahmasūtra padaischaiva hētu madbhihi vinischitaihi iti* (*Bhagavad-Gita*, XIII. 4), from which it will be seen that it declares that in the *Brahmasūtras* the subject-matter dealt with is only *Brahman*, which is its chief topic of discussion. While this is so, to postulate *Jīva-Brahmaikya* as its chief subject of discussion would be contradictory to the meaning attaching to the *Mahāvākya* (I. 1. 1.). In the shape of Sūtras, in certain Adhikaranas, it has been aptly stated, without ambiguity, that Brahman is the residue left over (*Brahmasēshatayaiva*). In all the adhikaranas of the *Brahmasūtras*, *Jīvatatva* is clearly explained with adequate proofs, until the *jīvatatva* reaches *Brahmatatva* (*Brahmasēshatayaiva*) as its final stage. And in the adhikaranas explaining the *prānatatva*, the *jīvatatva* is discussed at length. At any rate, even though the meaning of the Mahāvākya is that *Brahman* is declared as equal to *Ātman* (*Brahmātmataiva*), the *Ātman* being spoken of in terms of *Brahman*, yet the argument is overthrown that *Ātman* is *Brahman* itself (*Brahmatvēnaiva ātmatvamākshiptvam ityāśayaha*). Though in the Sruti text *Brihatvāt Brahmanātvātcha ātmā Brahmēti gīyata iti*, the words *Ātma* and *Brahma* are used to denote the same meaning

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this is the *Pratignā Sūtra* which begins the work. It fixes the *vidhi* (*samadamādi*, etc.). It states how Brahmagnāna is to be attained. It should not be interpreted in a manner not warranted by the wording (*viparītārthakalpana*). It does not suggest we should give up all *karmas*—*Sarvakarmatyāga*—and then begin *jignāsa*. Vignāna Bhikshu defines *Bhikshu* as *Ātmannēvātmanābhudhya nāstya*. He quotes :—

> *Sarvaparigraha avyaktalingō vyaktascha charēt bhikshu samā hitaha.*
>
> *Tridandam kundikāmchaiva sūtram chāpi kapālikam*
> *Jantūnām vāranām vastram sarvam bhikshu idam tyajēt.*
> (*Vishnu Dharma Vākya*, *Paramahamsa Prakarana.*)

A *Paramahamsa* should abandon the following :—tridanda, kundika (kamandalu, *i.e.*, waterpot), yagnōpavīta, kapālika (begging bowl made of skull), and raiments of cloth worn (already) by others. (See Vignāna Bhikshu's *Brahmasūtra-Bhāshya*, I. 1. 1.)

(*arthaikya*), in our opinion (*asmin matē*) the defect in the Sūtra cannot be doubted. (As in the Sūtra *Athāthō Brahmajignāsa*, the word *Brahma* is only used, without either *jīva* or *ātma*, the defect cannot be doubted.) Because the subject dealt with is only *Brahman*; the intention being to obtain Brahmagnāna, though there be a residue of karma left over. As is propounded in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*: *Brahmanyādhāya karmāni sangam tyaktvā karōti yaha* । *lipyatē na sa pāpēna padmapatramivāmbhasā*, V. 10.),—he who assigning all karma in Brahman, without desire of any fruit, will be quite free from all misery, just as the lotus leaf, though in the midst of water, does not stick to any particle of it. This affords support to our statement.[43]

Commenting on *Sūtra* I. 1. 2, Vignāna Bhikshu states that *Jagat* is *nitya* and that *Parabrahman* is possessed of *Sakti* and that he has no *vikāra*. *Parabrahman* joins *Prakriti* and *Purusha* and creates. He is the author of *vikāra* but is not himself touched by *vikāra*. *Jagat* is *upādānakārana*, which *Prakriti* and *Purusha* utilize for creation through Parabrahman. *Parabrahma rūpa* has many *gunas* (*atyanta sammisrarūpēna*), far removed from Prakriti and Purusha. Parabrahman is *akhanda*; and Brahman is different from *vyavahāra*. There is no Sruti text for *ēkatva*. It cannot be accepted that *abhēda* is merely for *upādāna* purposes and that after Brahmagnāna is obtained, there is no *bhēda*. There is *bhēda*. *Kēvala aikyatva* is nowhere postulated. In *Bhēda vākyas*, there is considerable means to *mōksha* promised. *If mōksha is to be gained*, that is to be obtained only by the person who has the sense of *bhēda*. Mōksha is only for such a *gnāni*. *Abhēda vākyas* are all included in the *bhēda vākyas* and not independent of them. *Avidya* cannot be removed by *abhēda gnāna* by itself. *Abhēda gnāna* can by itself never remove *avidya*, which is the cause of misery. By *bhēda* being abused,

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[43] *Vignāna Bhikshu* may be briefly described as *Ātma-Brahmaikya Bhēdavādin*. He may also be spoken of as *Samavādabhēdin*, *i.e.*, one who holds that Jīva and Brahman are *sama*; but he holds that the Jīva does not find *aikya* with Brahman.

Sruti texts declaring *bhēda* are not lost. Some are for *bimbavāda*; while others are for *pratibimbavāda.* By *agnāna*, it is said, *bhēda* is seen ; this is wrong. Srūtis also declare doubt. *Svapna* and *jāgrata* are terms in opposition ; similarly, *bandha* and *mōksha* are also in opposition in Srutis and Smritis. That which *gnāna* signifies is *akhanda*—Jīva and Brahma *akhanda ;* it is a means to *bandha* and not to *mōksha.* However much the Mukta may think of Brahman by himself—*ēkānthakarana*—a Mukta is an *amsa* and not *amsī.* There is space in a pot (*ghata*) ; if it is broken, it becomes one with the space without it. There can be no difference between the two. Though *ghata* looks separate, *amsa* and *amsī* are not different ; similarly, *jīva* is always keeping the Paramātma in his mind and can meditate on him and not become *aikya* with *Paramātma.* The *antahkarana* of *jīva* is Paramātma ; the Paramātma is different. *Jīva* cannot therefore become one with Paramātma. Even Kapila and others have expressed in *bhēda* form what is declared definitely as *bhēda* in the Sruti. The following texts are taken from the *Kapila Sūtras* :—

(1) *Janmādi vyavasthathā purushabahūtvam.*
(2) *Upādhibhēdhē apēkasya nānāyōga ākāsasyēva ghatādibhihi.*
(3) *Upādhirbhidyatē natu tadvān.*
(4) *Ēvamēkatvēna parivartamānasya naviruddhya dharmādhyasaha.*
(5) *Nā-advaita sruti virōdhō jātiparatvāt iti.*[44]

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[44] The following is a translation of the above Sūtras :—
(1) Since *Janma*, etc., are eternal ; so *jīvas* are innumerable.
(2) On account of a certain disguise which is not true, the same is seen in many forms with different combinations just as the space in a pot is seen as different from the space outside.
(3) When disguise is removed, the real is seen to undergo no change.
(4) When the real one undergoes several series of changes, there can be no change for the real one.
(5) The *virōdhas* seen in the *Advaita* srutis do not refer to class (*jāti*) distinctions.

Ātma is one. Though the various disguises (*upādhis*), in the form of *janma* and *marana*, do not refer to unaffected *chaitanyas*, as proved by the Srutis and the Smritis, these *chaitanyas* are always in their respective places. The terms " He is born ", " He is dead ", etc., do not refer to them. *The chaitanyas are innumerable* and *are not* undivided like continuous *Ākāsa*. This is the meaning of the *Sūtra*. In the Srutis, *bhēda* is declared and if *abhēda* is also to be declared from them, then it must be settled by *tarka*.

In *bhēda* if we are to understand *abhēda*, it (that matter) can only be decided by *tarka*, says Kapilāchārya. But you should not postulate *upādhi* to Brahma and lightly discuss *abhēda*. Of course, the Srutis afford much ground for doubt. From the second *Sūtra*, we infer that though *upādhi* is true, it gives no change for the *ātma* by its combination. The Real is always above *upādhi* (*i.e. upādhi* cannot affect the Real). From the third *Sūtra*, we learn that *upādhi* is itself different in nature ; *upādhi* itself cannot in any way affect the *jīva* towards its birth, death, etc. The idea that " I am included in all " belongs to the *jīva*. The difference seen through *upādhi* is transitory and of a *viruddha* (contradictory) nature, because on the destruction of *upādhi*, the real becomes undisputedly manifested. In the fifth *Sūtra*, the chief *ātma* is throughout declared one. The Srutis say that the *jīvas* are many as seen in their classes and are different ; but *ātma* is throughout one. In order to declare the mutual differences inherent in *jīvas*, their ordinary qualities (*lakshanas*) are mentioned by the Srutis. Finally, the Srutis declare the *lakshana* of the Supreme (*Parairlakshnaya*) as being the same. Similarly, throughout the *Sānkhya*, this *vishēsha* (peculiarity) is maintained. *Sānkhya* like the *Brahma Mīmāmsa* plainly declares the *vibhāga lakshana* in terms of *amsa* and *amsī* as a constant one, just as sparks of fire are to the fire itself (*agni visphulingavat amsāmsi bhēda vibhāgalakshanō vakshyate*). In the Sūtras *avibhāgāni drishtatvāt*, etc., though the unity (*aikya*) of *ātma* is considered to be of an insignificant kind, at the time of final realization (*bandha mōkshādi vyavastha*) the *ātma* is given a higher place than the *jīva* (*i.e.*, a greater weight than the *jīva*). Though the Srutis point to difference on account of *upādhi* to the *jīva*, yet in the Sruti text *Niranjanah paramamsāmyamupaiti yathāgniragnau sanskshiptah samānatvam anuvrajēt*, it is also declared that the *jīva* will attain a position of *paramasāmyatva*, just as fire when thrown into fire assumes *an equal form*. In the same way, even though the *jīvātma* is equal to the *Paramātma*, the *yogis* declare that at the time of *Mōksha*, difference will still exist in the form of equality (*mokshakālēpi bhēda ghatitam sāmyam srūyate*) and there is nothing more of the *upādhi*.

As we have seen, Vignāna Bhikshu couples the first and the last Sūtras of the *Brahma-Sūtras* when commenting on IV. 4. 22. In commenting on the latter, *Anāvritti sabdāt anāvritti sabdāt*, he again insists on the limit (*avadhi*) prescribed by it. Those who realize Kārya Brahma or enter that Parabrahma form in order to enjoy everlasting bliss do not return to birth (*i.e.*, they have no re-birth) because they have no further re-births. If it is asked why, the reply is *Sabdāt Brahmalōka abhisampadyate na cha punarāvartate iti*, etc., which is a clear authority (for the position). The previous statement that the *jīva* would have to experience further misery is untrue, because he has no other thing to enjoy except endless bliss in Brahmalōka, which is eternal and free from all misery. Those who meditate upon Kārana Brahma also will at once realize Brahman and there will not be the remotest cause for their coming into existence again. This is declared in the Sruti texts. For it is said in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* by Srī Krishna :—

आब्रह्मभुवनाल्लोकाः पुनरावर्तिनोऽर्जुन ।
मामुपेत्य तु कौन्तेय पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते ॥
(भगवद्गीता–८–१६.)

Ābrahmabhuvanāllōkāh punarāvartinōrjuna ।
Māmupētya tu Kaunteya punarjanma na vidyatē ॥
(*Bhagavad-Gītā*, VIII, 16.)

(Oh Arjuna! When one reaches the home of bliss finally in order to realize Me, there is to him no such thing as a return to birth.)

It must not be apprehended that there will be further cause of birth after reaching Vishnulōka, for it is said by Srī Krishna himself to Arjuna that there would be no such further cause for birth. Therefore, there is no contradiction. Hence it is that Bādarāyana expressly uses the words *Anāvritti sabdāt anāvritti sabdāt* in a comprehensive and emphatic manner repeating the words twice over. The whole of the *Brahma Mīmāmsa* has been here brought to an end in a very sententious manner by Bādarāyana. The quality of *chētana* (consciousness) is that it is always desirous of seeking *gnāna* and it consists of *māyākhya nija sakti* (*i.e.*, it possesses an inherent power called *māyā*), by which *Sarvēsvara Brahman* manifests himself to the world in the form *upādhi* consisting of *klēsa* and *karma* and their results. With this, he, in combination with *Prakriti* and *Purusha* and their mutual interactions, brings into existence Mahat and the rest of the creation, though in the same way as a spider, which puts out from its body its finest fabrics and finally inheres into itself the whole of what it has put forth; he himself entering into creation, sustains it by his power; through Prakriti establishes it; through Karma gives the fruits thereof just like a Maharaja, who doles out the fruits of their labour to his servants, gifts for meritorious service rendered or punishment for mistakes committed by them; and finally at the end draws everything into himself in the form of *upasamhāra* (*i.e.*, destruction) and remains alone himself just as a vast ocean is seen with its series of waves undergoing change every moment in the form of transformation effected by Mahēndrajāla. So in *pralaya*, though the universe is seen in the vast ocean as a mere speck, thus proving that the world is different (*bhinnam*) from the vast sheet of water, yet the Sruti says *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma tatjalāni iti*, meaning thereby that there is no difference between them. The apparent difference that is seen is mere *Vāchārambhana* (*i.e.*, mere expression and no more) just as the waves of the ocean and bubbles in the water which last but a moment. This is like *mahēndrajāla* (*i.e.*, jugglery). All living creatures in the world are so many rays of the sun, so many particles (*amsa*) of the Brahman, and are therefore subordinate in character to him. Therefore, *Prakriti* and *jīva* behave as quite subordinate in character to Brahman and are both unreal and unrealizable just like things seen in the dreams and hence untrue. Also, Brahman himself being environed by Māya and being both separate and combined with *jīva*, manifests himself in an extraordinary manner and yet is unaffected by faults. Hence he behaves quite independently and as the chief Ātma of the *panchavimsati tattva*[45] in the *jīva*. Like the threads which woven lengthwise and breadthwise form a cloth, he (Brahman) having joined the *Jīva*, as Kārya and Kārana, makes the *Jīva* the *bhōktātma* (the enjoyer of the fruits). *Jīva* being a lifeless *jada*, he remains manifest in the *jada* in the form of *prāna* under the name of *anātma*. This same Paramātma is termed Parabrahman throughout the whole of the Vēdānta, as the essence of all its truths and he is realizable through *samadamādi sādhana* by wise men, who keep mentally meditating on him—*samamātmā iti, sō aham iti.* Finally, realizing that it is not *jīva* but only an illusion created by Māya which pervaded him, he on the disappearance of the influence created by Māya, enjoys Brahmasākshātkāra. Then *avidya*, *karma*, *dharma* and *adharma* and all other causes of worldly miseries entirely leave him and he becomes a *Mukta*, as the Sruti says:

Nathasya prānā utkrāmanti iti (to him there is no expiration of life).

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[45] Literally, the twenty-five elementary principles of creation. The Sānkhya philosophy so-called enumerates twenty-five *tattvas* or true principles. Its chief object is the final emancipation of the twenty-fifth *tattva*, *i.e.*, the Purusha or Soul, from the bonds of this worldly existence by conveying a correct knowledge of the twenty-four other *tattvas* and by properly discriminating the soul from them.

On the other hand, the *jīva* who is environed by Māya (*Māyā jīva*) meditates upon that same (Māya) form of Brahman. He who out of his incapacity is unable to meditate upon that form of *Māyātirikta Brahma* (Brahman form free from Māya) has to go through *archarādi mārga* through the merit of his meditation upon *apratīkālambana upāsana* and thereby reach out of the environments of Brahmānda and go to *Māyā Sabala* form of Kārana Brahman, who is Hiranyagarbha, and entering in him, out of the grace of Paramēsvara, assume the *līlāvatāra* form in the end and enter into Parabrahma form, for it is said :—

उपक्रमोपसंहार वभ्यासापूर्वताफलम् ।
अर्थवादोपपत्तिश्च लिङ्गं तात्पर्य निश्चये ॥
इति बृहत्संहितायां.

Upakramōpasamhāra vabhyāsa apūrvatā phalam ।
Arthavādōpapattischa lingam tātparya nischaye ॥
(*Brihatsamhita.*)

This is the gist of all the Vēdānta in its symbolic devotion. Since Brahman is the one that remains in the end, it has to be held that it is what is proved by the whole *Sānkhya Sūtra*, in which is embodied the *jīvatattva* in its entirety, without whose help *Pūrvamīmāmsa* and its proofs would be rendered useless. It must not be said here that Brahman being stated to be *akhanda*, that it contradicts the principles of *jīvatattvanirūpana*.[46] For if it were so, the *Pratignā Sūtra* at the beginning (*Athāthō Brahma jignāsa*) ought to have been *athāthō Jiva-Brahmaikya jignāsa iti*. There would have been no necessity for a second *pratigna* to consider *Brahman* and *jīva* as *akhanda* (*i.e.*, undivided). For what is this *akhandata* in Brahman (*i.e.*, indivisibility of Brahman)? If *Brahman* and *jīva* were *akhanda*, why is it that throughout the *Sūtras* it is nowhere seen clearly (that it is so). How could such a thing be invented as a matter of grace (*dayā*)? And therefore such an invention is contradicted by Mumukshus, who accept only what is clearly enunciated in the Sruti and leave off that which is left unsaid as contrary to it (*Katham sraddhadhīran iti dik*).

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[46] This is the Advaita argument. If Brahman is *akhanda*, then the Advaitin would say that there is no place for the *jīva*. This cannot be conceded, says Vignāna Bhikshu. In that case I. 1. 1. would have been, he suggests, differently worded.

Commenting on *Sūtra* I. 1. 1, Vignāna Bhikshu discusses at length the main principles of his interpretation. He says that *abhēda* is *avibhāga lakshana*; there is therefore *sāmya* between *jīva* and *Brahman*. The *Sūtra* does not clearly state that *jīva* is one with Brahman in the *akhanda* form. But it clearly states that *jīva* and *Brahman* are radically different, as acceded to by the Sūtras *adhikantu bhēdanirdesāt*, etc. Even the *Amsa* Sūtras treat of the terms *jīva* and *Brahman* in terms of *Amsa* and *Amsī* (the part and the whole). And, therefore, we have also to understand in the same way in the *Brahma Mīmāmsa siddhānta*.

Even the Sūtrakara Bhagavān Vyāṣa holds in the *Sūtra* that *Brahman* and *jīva* are in the same relation as the father is to the son in the *Amsī bhava* and *Amsa*. And, therefore, *jīva* and *Brahman* can never be said to be ? one like *ākāsa*.

The Sānkhya says that Mōksha is the result of the *gnāna* which the *jīva* attains in recognizing the *svarūpa* of *Brahman* when it loses the sense of *aham*. *No more am I* (*ahambuddyādi nivartitobhavati*). According to the *Sānkhya Sūtra*, the ego (I) vanishes and the *jīva* sees Brahman before him and says "I am before that Brahman who is my Ātma and therefore I see him alone as my Ātma; I see no other."

According to the *Sānkhya Sūtra*, the *jīva* realizes that form of *ātmatva* whereby it enables it to call itself "I am in the same form as Brahman. I can enjoy bliss as Brahman does. I am a subordinate of Īsvara" (*Īsvaraparatantrah*). This is the fundamental difference that exists between the present day wrong interpreters (*Kukalpakānām*) who state that *jīva* and *Brahman* form a single *akhandātma*, and the followers of the Sānkhya and Naiyāyika schools who consider that *jīva* and *Brahman* are different from each other in the forms of *sēsha* and *sēshi* (the remainder and the whole) in two (different) forms.

In the same way, according to the reasoning in the *Yama Purāna*, the Sruti texts *yēshata ātmāntaryāmyamrutah; sama ātmēti vidyāt; tatvamasi*; etc., are thus interpreted: *Jīva* and *Brahman* differ so far as to be divided as *amsa* and *amsī*. Therefore, how can these two be called as one and the same? Being *amsa* and *amsī* in their true forms, the words *tat* and *tvam* remain different from each other.

According to the Sruti text *Tantvōpanishadam purusham prichchāmi* (I ask that Aupanishad purusha *thus*), the Vedas deal with *Brahman* and *ātma* as their subject; so also declare the Smritis. Thus while *Brahman* and *ātma* differ from each other as *amsī* and *amsa*, how can *ātma* become finally one with *Brahman* (*Brahmātmatāvagati phalakatvāt*)? Ātma results in attaining Brahmata as the result of *gnāna*. But not as the Sruti says:—*Na cha tadātmyamidam sarvam sa ātmēti*: I am not one with Brahman but have attained a state of equality with Brahman; for the equality with Brahman has already been obtained. According to the Sruti texts *Aitadātmyam iti*, etc., which say that Brahman is the ultimate form of *prapancha* in its *svarūpa*, the question arises whether the character of Brahman is divided from *prapancha*. Take *ghata* (pot) and the *mrid* (earth), which it is in another form; it cannot be said that *mrid* is the *ghata* form. The answer is that *mrid* is not the form of *ghata*, in its character. Similarly *chētana* is not of the form of *ātma*; because *chētana* represents the whole and *ātma* a part. Therefore in the expression *tatvamasi*, the word *tat* denotes the all-pervading form of Brahman, and *tvam* denotes merely the part (*i.e.*, the *jīva*); this shows the division of the part from the whole. This is the difference that prevails in the expression *tatvamasi* and shows the difference between *tvam* and *aham* (yourself and myself)[47] both in their form and in their meaning (*sabdārthatvāt*). The terms "Myself" and "My" (*aham* and *mama*) do not convey the relationship of "master" and "servant" (*svasvāmi*) as between them and therefore in the *Pātanjali Sūtras* in the Sūtra, *Svasvāmi sakhyōs-svarūpōpalabdhihētu samyōga iti*, the term *samyōga* means the result of combining one with the other, *sva* with *svāmi*. And therefore in the Sruti texts, *Aththātha ātmā dēsa*, *aththathō ahamkārā dēsa*, etc., a repetition is seen. In the *Sānkhya Kārika*, such a repetition is not seen—*nāsmi*, *namē*, *nāham*, etc.,—which plainly shows a clear difference between *sva* and *svāmi*. According to the *Sānkhya Kārika*, *ātma* in its entirety is prohibited from becoming one with Brahman (*sva svāmyasya pratishēdhat iti*). But *ātma* claims equality with *Brahman* (*tēshām ātmatōchchatē*). The fact of the *jīva* addressing Īsvara in terms of "You" and "I") cannot possibly maintain the unity of *jīva* with Brahman as it would be a clear contradiction. By using the terms "You" and "I" (*Tvam* and *Aham*) in addressing Īsvara, a meaning contradictory to unity is implied. If the *jīva* gives utterance through its mouth to the words (*Tvam* and *Aham*), it is clear that the *jīva* addresses one before him (Brahman) who is quite different from himself. Such addressing establishes the truth that *Brahman* and *jīva* are different. To indicate this difference between *Brahman* and *jīva*, the terms *tvam* and *aham* were used by the Guru in the text *tatvamasi*. The Sruti texts *Nānyatōsti drashtā srōtā mantā bōdhya*, etc., point out that it is none other than *Paramātma* that the *jīva* perceives before him and that it is none other from whom he hears. All this clearly shows that *jīva* and *Brahman* are as servant (*karthru*) and master (*svasvāmi*). While this is so, *ādhunikas* (modern teachers) while determining the meaning of the expression *tatvamasi* say that the expressions *tvam* and *aham* denote *jīva* only; and on the basis of the Sruti texts like *kōna ātma*, etc., interpret the meaning just as they please, following in this the common usage, though the interpretation is not one warranted (by the text). In this world, if one asks, "*kōham*" (who am I), the answer appears to be "*amukasthvam asi*" (thou art this self) and nothing more. In our opinion, the expressions

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[47] *Cf.* with *Sankara Bhāshya*, I. 1. 1.

tvam and *aham*, from the very nature of the meanings attaching to them, without contradicting (*nahīyate*), imply two different agencies, similar in form (*sāmānyarūpēnaiva*), conveying to the understanding two different beings with their respective characteristics. This is in conformity with the general usage current in the world.

However, though the expressions *tattvamēva* (That thou art) and *tvamēvatat* (Thou art that) are expressions mutually interchangeable (*paraspara vyatīhāra vākyam*) and appear to expel a conclusive dissimilarity in meaning (*vaidharmya*) and a clear difference (*bhēda*), still in order to release the *jīva* from all the burdens of the *samsāra*, through meditation and *upāsana*, and to realize *Paramātma svarūpa*, the two different forms of *ātma* and *Brahman* are clearly explained without contradiction in *sva* and *svasvarūpa*, as postulated in the Smriti texts *Echchāpyēvam sakalam jātam api sarvam pratishthitam ; sa ēva jīvaha sukha duhkha bhōktā*, etc., which plainly indicate that it is the result of the meditation on Brahman in his undivided form (*avibhāgēnōpāsanām vidadhāti*). This is in accordance with the Smriti texts[48] *Vibhēda janakē gnānē nāsam ātyantikam gatē ; ātmanōbrahmanābhēdam asāntam kimkarishyati*, etc., which declare that one who meditates upon God with the knowledge that he and Brahman are different from each other and who by his knowledge is able to distinguish between *dharma* and *adharma* and who, by his attachment to his carnal body, which attachment is completely expelled by the true knowledge of Brahman, which he gains in the end, will at no time again speak of the *jīva* and Brahman as *avibhāga* (undivided), all cause (for such postulating) having been removed. Again, in the *Gautami Tantra* is the declaration *Yadi jīvah parāt bhinnaha kāryatāmēti suvrata, achitvameha prasajjēta ghatavat panditō mata*, which says that if the *jīva* is entirely different from *Parabrahman*, *para* meaning *ananta* or unending, then at the time of *pralaya*, according to the declaration of the Advaita Sruti texts, even a lifeless *ghata* (jar) would behave like an animate *jīva* and become capable of independent action. In such a case, according to the Smriti texts *Kshētragnam chāpi mām viddhi*[49] (understand that I am the knower of all the source of origin) etc., *amsa* and *amsī* would then have to be interpreted as indivisible. This results in a great contradiction inasmuch as the difference between the terms *amsī* and *amsa*, as explained in I. 1. 3 in terms of *Brahman* and *ātma* will be rendered meaningless and we will have to interpret *sakti* and *sakta* as indivisible and this is obviously contradictory (*dik*). Those who are Tārkikas (logicians) usually ignore that characteristic of indivisible unity (*avibhāga lakshana bhēdamapi*), and consider only for the sake of meditation that *ātma* and *Brahman* are different terms (*Bhēda vākyāni*) and thus in their opinion the Sruti texts which censure *bhēda* (difference between *ātma* and *Brahman*) are rendered inapplicable. A mutual contradiction is thereby made to arise, so that finally in the *Pāramārthika* stage, where meditation enables the realization of Brahman, the position reached is one of *Bhēdābhēda*, which renders the meaning of the Sruti texts fruitless; and for this reason, the *bhēda* Sūtras which champion the *bhēda* position (*bhēdasādhaka*)[50] *Adhikantu bhēda nirdēsat*, etc., which declare *bhēda*, conclusively prove that *jīva* and *Brahman* assume the divided condition (*vibhāga rūpa*) of *amsa* and *amsī*. And therefore throughout, from the beginning to the end, continuously, the *jīva* and *Brahman* prove to be two distinct forms naturally, eternally and truthfully, divided from each other and the idea that *jīva* and *Brahman* are one and indivisible (*i.e.*, without a division between them) and that the *jīva* becomes one with the *Brahman* through an accidental change, is only a characteristic mode of expression (*Vāchārambhana mātramiti visēshaha*). This is generally what the defenders of

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[48] Vignāna Bhikshu quotes the *Vishnu Purāna* in support of his position.

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[49] *Bhagavad-Gītā*, XIII, 3.

[50] *Bhēdasādhaka bhēda sutrēshu*, etc.

Brahmādvaita declare when they speak of "*ātma* being one with *Brahman*".

This is further dealt with in the third *Sūtra* (*Tattu samanvayāt*) where the difference caused by the mutual contradictions of the Brahmādvaitins is clearly explained and the fact that the *jīva* is absolutely different from Īsvara (*Jīvād atyanta bhinna ēva Īsvaraha Brahmasabdārtha iti*) is the meaning conveyed by the term *Brahman.* This is the final conclusion (*iti siddhaha*). And in that this is the greater peculiarity, *viz.*, *māya*, which is quite different from *jīva*, is the chief cause of creation, etc., of the world. And accordingly it is always Brahman's will to inculcate into Māya the power of such creation. And therefore the word *aisvarya* implies the prime meaning of the term *Brahman* in which exists the state of his being the Lord (*Īsāsya Īsatvam*) (over Prakriti, Jīva, Srishti, etc.). This *sakti* is the distinguishing property of Brahman, which he controls in *ananta aisvarya.* All these peculiarities are the characteristics of Brahman. The Sruti texts *Satyam gnānam anantam Brahma; tadēva Brahmatvam viddhi; nēdam yadidamupāsate; sākshīchēta kēvalo nirgunasya; athāta ādēso nēti nēti; akartachaitanyam chinmātram sat;* etc. declare the above truth. In the Smriti texts *Gnānamēva parambrahma gnānam bandhāya neshyate, gnānātmaka midam visvam nagnānāt bhidyatē param*, etc.,[51] according to Audulomi, in the Sūtra that will be referred to below, the *chit* in *ātma* forms but a part of the whole *Parabrahman* and therefore *jīva* and *Brahman* are relatively as *tanmātra* and *ātma*[52] *i.e.*, the part and the whole. Some logicians hold the invented view that *ātma* is enveloped in *Sakti* (*upādhi visishte saktim*), from which they argue that on account of *vyavahāra*, Brahman is independent of his will and *ātma* is subordinate. In this way, the *jīva* and *Brahman* behave in the relationship of *sva* and *svāmi* (servant and Lord). This idea is the result of foolishness (*avivēka*). In the same way, the terms *paramātma*, *paramēsvara* and other (similar) expressions are said to mean peculiar states of *Chaitanya* with varied *sakti*; for it is said in the Smriti[53] texts—

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[51] *Gnāna* is *Parabrahman* himself; *gnāna* desires absolution from *bandha* (ties of this world); this universe is of the form of *gnāna*; there is nothing else greater than *gnāna.*

[52] A primary or rudimentary atom. *Cf. Jīvō alpaha* in contradistinction to *Brahma stūla*.

बदन्ति तत्तत्त्वविदः तत्वं यद्ज्ञानमद्वयम्।
ब्रह्मेति परमात्मेति भगवानिति शब्दयते इति, etc. ॥
अनादिरूपश्चिन्मात्रम् इति, etc. ॥

Vadanti tat tatvavidaha tatvam yadgnānamadvayam;
Brahmēti Paramātmēti Bhagavān iti sabdayatē iti, etc.;
Anādirūpaschinmātra iti, etc.

These texts declare that the very idea of birth as being due to any cause is contradictory to the Smritis. Chaitanya is not a mere characteristic of *ātma*; but it exists in an indivisible manner as substance and its property (*dharma* and *dharmi*) and is called Chaitanya (*dharmā dharmi vibhāga sūnyaschētanah*) just as a luminous body is connected with its luminosity (*tējōdravyam prakāsikam prakāsa iti*), always co-existing with each other in such a manner as to be declared to be almost one, agreeably to the maxim "So significantly small as to merit being ignored" (*lāghavādēkatvasyaiva nyāyatvāt*).

Briefly put, the viewpoint of Vignāna Bhikshu is that the *Brahma-Sūtras* do not aim at establishing the *aikya* of *jīva* except to state his relationship to Brahman as its final goal. It starts with *jignāsa* and ends with *anāvritti* (*idam śāstram jīva nirūpana param na bhavati*). As the work starts with the Sūtra *Athathō Brahmajignāsa*, it relates purely to the discussion of attaining Brahmāvadhi. It is for this reason that the last *Sūtra* also discusses the Brahman in bringing the argument to a close. All those who are experts in differentiating *ātma* from Brahman (*tātparya grāhaka lingānām*) realize that in order to know Brahman, the aid of the *Sānkhya Sāstra* is necessary. It is only *Sānkhya*

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[53] *Srīmad Bhāgavata*, I. 2. 11.

Sāstra that expounds the theory of *jīvatattva* and in that *Sāstra* alone, can it be studied and understood. That would also enable us to get a proper insight into the *Pūrva Mīmāmsa.* But for these purposes, a knowledge of the *Sānkhya Sāstra* would be of little use. If the *Sānkhya Sāstra* is neglected, *Pūrva Mīmāmsa* also becomes useless. If the *Pūrva Mīmāmsa* treats of *karma*, the *Sānkhya* treats of *gnāna* ;[54] the one being complementary to the other. According to *Sānkhya Sāstra*, at the end, the Adhikāri attains *sāyujya* by achieving *Brahma rūpa* and not by *Brahma aikya*. *Brahma sabda* is imbedded, says Vignāna Bhikshu, in the *Sānkhya Sāstra*; when that word is used, it should, he says, be understood as indicating *jīvatattva* according to the *Sānkhya Sāstra.*[55] Therefore, it must not be held that the *jīva* should be understood in terms of Brahmānda in its entirety (*akhandatayā*) ; for such an interpretation would become contradictory (*vaiyarthyam*). This is, he says, the whole gist of the *Brahma-Sūtras* taken as a whole. This being so, to interpret the first Sūtra *Aththāthō Brahmajignāsa* as meaning *jiva-Brahmaikya jignāsa* would be against the avowed object of the *Sūtras* (*pratigna sūtram yujyate*). Mumukshus cannot go any other way than this ; in fact it is unthinkable that they should. *Aikya* being taboo, then, Brahmatva is obtained, according to Vignāna Bhikshu, by *sālōkya* and *sāyujya* by *sahavāsa bhōga mātra.* This is rendered clear by his comments on IV. 4. 21, *Bhōgamātra sāmyalingāchcha*, which he interprets as postulating only *sahavāsa bhōgamātra*,

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[54] *Cf. Bhagavad-Gītā*, II. 39 :—

Yēshā tē abhihitā sānkhyē buddhiryōgē tvimām srunu ।
Budhyā yuktō yayā Pārtha karmabandham prahāsyasi ॥

Commenting on this *slōka*, Ānandatīrtha, in his *Gītā-Bhāshya*, explains the word *Sānkhyam* as meaning *gnānam* and quotes the following *Bhagavadvachana* from the *Vyāsa Smrithi* as his authority for this interpretation :—

Suddhātma tatva vignānam sānkhya mityabhidhīyata iti.

[55] In Sānkhya, *Brahma* stands for 2 ; *Pranava* for 1; *Vēda* for 4 · *Tattva* for 25 ; and so on.

i.e., the happiness of living nearby. He suggests that Brahmatva is attained by *sarvavyāpakatva.* This is the *phala* aimed at by *jignāsa.* This *Sūtra* says beyond this point he cannot attain to the great powers of creation, etc. Those are reserved to Paramēsvara only. According to Sruti text, *Sōsnute sarvān kamān saha Brahmanā,* Parabrahman is an object of adoration by those who attain Brahmatva (*Srutau Brahmanā parabrahmanōpāsyēna ityarthaha*).[56] Vignāna Bhikshu approvingly quotes the *Bhagavad-Gītā* text, *Sarvam samāpnōshi thathōsi sarvaha* (*Bhagavad-Gītā*, XI. 40). It is not said, he says, that *Parabrahma mūrti* (*svarūpa*) has been attained and that

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[56] *Bhāgavata*, II. 9. 20, wherein the *avadhi* is thus fixed:—*pumsām maddarsanāvadhihi.* The full text is as follows:—

वरं वरय भद्रंते वरेशं माभिवांछितं ।
सर्व श्रेयः परिश्रामः पुंसां मद्दर्शनावधिः ॥ २-९-२०.

Varam varaya bhadramtē varēsam mābhivāmchchitam |
Sarva srēyah parisrāmah pumsām maddarsanāvadhih ||

This may be translated thus:—"The highest object that one should aim at to attain eternal bliss as the result of his exalted penance is to obtain my grace *in my very presence, which is the limit of the highest reward.*" The *avadhi* is the *attaining of the presence of Brahman.* Vijayadhwaja, the commentator on the *Bhāgavata*, comments thus: *maddarsanamēva sarvasrēyasām phalam iti.* It is "*labhate Brahmadarsanam*" and not "*labhate Parabrahmadarsanam*" that fixes the *avadhi.* Vijayadhwaja belonged to the Pejawar Mutt, one of the eight Udupi mutts. He was eighth in succession to Srī Madhvāchārya in that mutt,—his predecessors being Adhōkshaja, Kamalāksha, Pushkarāksha, Amarēndra, Vijaya and Mahēndra. From Mahēndra there were twenty successors, the svāmi in 1923 being Visvamānya. Visvamānya died during the life-time of his guru Visvagnya. His disciple is now the svāmi of this mutt. Since Vijayadhwaja was eighth in succession from Madhvāchārya, allowing twenty years for each successor of his, Vijayadhwaja should have come about 160 years after Madhvāchārya. Since Madhvāchārya was still living about 1276 A.D., we may have to set down Vijayadhwaja to about 1436 A.D. This would bring him down to the middle of the fifteenth century A.D. We may not be far wrong if we set down Vijayadhwaja to about the beginning of the sixteenth century.

akhilakārya kāranatva has been attained by the mumukshu. Hence, *jagadvyāpāra* is denied to him (*jagadvyāpāra nāsti*). Īsvara rūpa is of two kinds—Brahman and Parabrahman. While Brahmatva may be reached, Parabrahmatva cannot be reached by the mumukshu. And Brahmatva is attained by *sālōkya* and *sāyujya*, by enjoyment in company with Brahman (*sahavāsa bhōga mātra*). After the completion of that *bhōga* by such *kārya Brahmani* (*i.e.*, those that have attained to Brahman status through work—such work having been accomplished for the purpose of obtaining such *bhōga*)—*tatbhōga samāptyanantaram*—they secure release, *i.e.*, absolution from returning to re-birth (*punarāvritti janma nāsti*). Because, it is so declared: *Brahmalōkamabhisampadyatē na cha punarāvartate na cha punarāvartate iti sabdaprāmānyāt.* But a *kārana Brahmani* who thinks that there is a greater bliss to which he is entitled commits sin, as the result of which, he will have to return to re-birth, being ousted out from the status of Brahman (*utsargiki*). This is the prime difference—between *kārya* Brahmani and *kārana* Brahmani. Those that attain *kārana* Brahmatva, to them there is no *punarāvritti*. This is a settled fact (*apunaravrittir niyatā*). According to Vignāna Bhikshu, therefore, there are two kinds of Brahmatva—*kārya* and *kārana*. Those who attain the first, attain to bliss only temporarily; and those who attain the second, enjoy eternal bliss.

Vignānabhikshu's settled view is that *jīva* may attain to Brahmatva but not to Parabrahmatva. He postulates two kinds of Brahmatva: *kārya* and *kārana*. He describes the *jīva* in terms of Brahman. Ānandatīrtha, the other great teacher who postulates duality, holds that from Brahman to the barest green grass (*Brahmādi trināntha paryantam*) belong to the class of *jīvarāsi* dependent on Parabrahman. These *jīvarāsis* are further divided off into different classes, which may, through the grace of Parabrahman, attain to Brahmatva. Ānandatīrtha describes *jīva* under three heads: (1) Dēva, (2) Mānusha, and (3) Dānavāh.

त्रिविधा जीवसंघास्तु देव मानुष दानवाः ।
तत्रदेवामुक्तियोग्या मानुषेषूत्तमास्तथा ॥
मध्यमामानुषा येतु सृतियोग्यास्सदैवहि ।
अधमा निरया यैव दानवास्तुतमोलयाः ॥
(महाभारत तात्पर्य निर्णये, १. ८७-८८.)

Trividhā jīvasanghāstu dēva mānusha dānavāh ।
Tatra dēvāha muktiyōgyā mānushēshu uttamāsthathā ॥
Madhyamā mānushā ētu sritiyōgyāh sadaivahi ।
Adhamā nirayā yaivā dānavāstu tamōlayāh ॥
(*Mahābhārata Tātparya Nirnaya*, I. 87-88.)

Jīvas are divided into three classes: dēvas, men and rākshasas—of these, *dēvas* are always fit for *mukti*; superior men are also so; those of the middle class are subject to *srishti*, *sthithi* and *laya* in succession; and inferior men will continue for ever in *tamas*.[57]

Vignāna Bhikshu in commenting on IV. 4. 22 *Anāvritti sabdāt anāvrittisabdāt* further quotes the following verse from the *Bhagavad-Gītā*:—

आब्रह्मभुवनाल्लोकाः पुनरावृत्तिनोऽर्जुन ।
मामुपेत्य तु कौन्तेय पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते ॥

Ābrahma bhuvanāllōkāh punarāvartinō Arjuna ।
Māmupētya tu Kauntēya punarjanma na vidyate ॥

and says that naturally there is no *āvritti* from Vishnulōka. But there is *āvritti* (yet) from Vishnulōka to those who did not believe the confidential word (*vissmaranēna āptavākyē*) *māmupētya*, *i.e.*, that they are near me.[58] By *mām*, etc., here is meant that the *jīva* has reached Paramātma and is near him. To those who believe that they are *near* Paramātma, there is no *āvritti*; but to those who disbelieve in being *near* me but assume that they are one with me (by *aikya*) there is *āvritti*. These are disbelievers in the *āpta vākya* pronounced by Sri Krishna. The *Kārana Brahmani* of Vignāna Bhikshu fall under this category of disbelievers in the *āpta vākya*; and the *Kārya Brahmani* are believers in the *āpta vākya*.

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[57] In *Vishnu Tattva Nirnaya*, Jayatīrtha designates the two opposing theorists of Dvaitins and Advaitins as *Bahujīva vādins* and *Ekajīva vādins*. See T. R. Krishnachar's *Vishnu Tattva Nirnaya*, Kumbakonam Edition, page 12, line 1.

[58] *Māmupētya:* This is interpreted by Vignāna Bhikshu *māmityanena Paramātmana ēva uktatvāt*, *i.e.*, what is meant by "me" is *Paramātma*. *Māmupētya* is thus taken in its literal sense *mām+upa+yētya*, *i.e.*, approaches near to me, *i.e.*, having reached me, he shall not have any return. Vignāna Bhikshu is for *sālokya* and *sāmīpya* and not *sāyujya* in the sense of *aikya*.

Vignāna Bhikshu is thus a dualist: he postulates *jīva* and Parabrahman; he denounces *aikya*; he suggests that *mōksha* is attaining *sālōkya* and *sāmīpya*; and he limits the import of *sāyujya* to *sāmīpya* and not *aikya*. In keeping with these views are the sentiments expressed by him in the *mangalācharana slōkas* appearing at the end of his work. These may be thus set down :—

> While Brahman and the rest have been unable to explain clearly Brahma-tattva in this Vedānta Sāstra, my attempt and labour in trying to expound it clearly is a daring attempt (*sāhasam*), which "Lord, I beseech you to overlook" (*Bhagavān chchantumarhasi*). But my attempt cannot afflict my spiritual intellect with misery even to the smallest extent, while my mind is all engaged in meditating upon Thee who is ever revelling in the ocean of bliss free from all worldly fever and who is without beginning or end.
>
> Even if it is said that some amount of fault (*aparādha*) is attaching to me, whether I am conscious of it or not, because of making this attempt, even in that case, Thou art the sole agent in me for all that, for we are like so many puppets moved by strings (*dāruyantra samā vayam*).[59]
>
> Even if I acknowledge that I have committed any fault I disown it because the doer of it is the *chidātmaka* (pure consciousness) in me, who, lacking wisdom, has prompted me to that which consists of *dharma* and *adharma*.
>
> I pray that the Lord may grant me absolute absolution from all misery for this holy service of mine—in trying to expound the sāstras, out of my pure will.

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[59] *Cf*. Ānandatīrtha :

यथा दारुमयी योषा नरास्थिर समाहितः ।
इङ्गयत्यङ्गमङ्गानि तथाराजन्निमाः प्रजाः ॥
(आनन्दतीर्थ–ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्य)

Yathā dārumayī yoshā narasthira samāhitaha |
Ingayati angamangāni thathā rājan imāh prajāha ||
(*Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāshya* quoting from *Mahābhārata*,
Sāntiparva, *Mōkshadharma*.)

country. Through his influence—he was evidently a Minister and wielded some political power—Madhvaism soon spread to Puri, the great religious centre of Orissa, from thence it pressed on to Bengal where it laid the foundation, first for the cult of Vishnusvāmi and later for that of Chaitanya. Vishnusvāmi developed the Krishna part of Madhva's religion, while Chaitanya carried it still further by including in it Rādha as well. Otherwise, there is really little to distinguish the Vishnusvāmi and the Chaitanya cults from Madhvaism. Two Madhva writers prominently stand out in the work of popularizing Ānandatīrtha's religion in Bengal prior to the rise of Chaitanya. These are Vishnupuri, who lived in the thirteenth century and Mādhavēndra Puri, in the fifteenth century. Vishnupuri, by his famous work *Bhaktiratnāvali*, also called *Bhagavad Bhaktiratnamāla*, made the themes of the *Bhāgavata Purāna* not only popular but also beloved of young and old in Bengal. This work is really a treatise on Bhakti based on a number of stanzas taken from the *Srī Bhāgavata*. In the colophon found in it, it is stated that Paramahamsa Vishnupuri was its author and that he was the disciple of Srī Purushōttama (*Srīmanpurushōttama charanāravinda kripā makaranda bindu prōnmīlitha vivēka*, see *Madras D.C. of Sānskrit MSS.*, XI, No. 5144, pp. 3942-3944).[60] Mādhavēndra Puri appears to have been an equally popular teacher. He made the religion of Krishna better known among the people and won a large and influential following. Among those who became his disciples were some who moulded the religious life of Chaitanya.

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[60] In the *Madras Catalogue* quoted, this work of Vishnupuri and his other works are included under the head " Vedanta : the Philosophy of Vallabha". As will be seen, this is not a correct representation of Vishnupuri's philosophical position. Vishnupuri was really a follower of Madhva and his work is a development of the idea underlying Ānandatīrtha's *Bhāgavata Tātparya Nirnaya.* His *guru* Purushōttama was evidently a Madhva ascetic and the title *Paramahamsa* assumed by Vishnupuri indicates that he also belonged to the ascetic order.

Chaitanya's Indebtedness to Madhvaism.

Chaitanya may thus be said to have begun his religious life as a Madhva and to have developed some aspects of Madhva's religion on his own lines. It is not surprising, therefore, that we find Chaitanya's first initiator into the mysteries of the *Bhakti* cult was Īsvara Puri, the Madhva *guru* at Gaya. The significance of this initiation, which occurred in 1508 A.D., will be readily imagined when it is stated that the worship of Krishna is to this day the predominant cult at Udipi, the centre of Madhva's cult. From the day he was initiated by Īsvara Puri, Chaitanya became an ardent devotee of Krishna and dedicated the rest of his life to his service. Chaitanya's principal assistant in spreading his religion was Nityānanda, another Madhva *Sanyāsin.* Finally, we have to note that the teacher who, in 1510, initiated Chaitanya into *Sanyāsa* was Kēsava Bhārati, who was also a Madhva *guru.* Among the principal places visited by Chaitanya in his grand pilgrimage of India were Srī Kūrmam, Simhāchalam, Srīrangam and Udipi,—all places specially sacred to Madhvas. At Srī Kūrmam are the inscriptions of Naraharitīrtha, the direct disciple of Ānandatīrtha, the founder of the Dvaita system, dated in 1281 and 1294 A.D. (*M.E.R.*, Nos. 290 and 291 of 1896; see also *E.I.*, VI, 260-68.) Among the other places mentioned as having been visited by Chaitanya in his tour is Vidyānagara, which has been generally identified with Rajahmundry, which at least seems doubtful. Chaitanya was born in the year in which Sāluva Narasimha I usurped the Vijayanagar throne, and 1534 A.D., the year of Chaitanya's death, falls in the reign of the Vijayanagar King Achyuta (1530-1542 A.D.). The forty-eight years of the lifetime of Chaitanya are accordingly covered by the reigns of the greatest Vaishnavite kings of the Vijayanagar Kingdom, *viz.*, Sāluva Narasimha I (1486-1499 A.D.); his son Sāluva Narasimha II (1493-1509 A.D.), which period includes those of the usurper Narasana Nāyaka (or Vīra Narasimha I) and his son Vīra Narasimha II; Krishna

Dēva Rāya the Great (1509-1530 A.D.); and Achyuta Dēva Rāya (1530-1542). Vijayanagar was, during this period, the most flourishing centre of Vaishnavism in Southern India and Chaitanya could not have missed it—the more so as it was located in the famous Kishkinda of Purānic fame—in his travels down south. As Vijayanagar was long known as Vidyānagar, the *Vidyānagar* of Chaitanya's chroniclers will have to be identified with Vijayanagar. As Rāmānanda Rāya is, however, said to have been Governor of Vidyānagara on behalf of Pratāpa-Rudra, the king of Orissa, it has to be concluded that the chroniclers have by a mistake made him the Governor of Vidyānagara, the capital of the Vijayanagar Empire instead of describing him as the Governor of a *province* of the Empire of Vijayanagar.[61]

Baladeva's Commentary based on Anandatirtha's.

It will thus be seen how close was the contact between Chaitanya and Madhva teachers of eminence of his time. Like Ānandatīrtha, who was the first to stress the importance of the *Bhāgavata-Purāna* (see his *Bhāgavata Tātparya Nirnaya*), Chaitanya and his followers based their teaching on the *Bhāgavata*. Ānandatīrtha was probably the first to rest the practical part of religion on the *Brindāvan-līla* as it is set down in the *Bhāgavata*, though he did not go beyond it. Chaitanya developed it by making devotion to Krishna—in conjunction with Rādha, evidently under the influence of the religious systems of Nimbārka and Vallabha—his exclusive cult. With these close associations with Ānandatīrtha's system of thought and teaching, there will be little difficulty in appreciating the position of Chaitanya and his followers in the philosophic approach they make in interpreting the everlasting theme of *Tattvamasi*. There is current a tradition that Chaitanya himself wrote a commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras* but such a work has not come down to us. But the commentary of Baladēva *alias* Gōvinda, above mentioned, is from the Chaitanya viewpoint, though admittedly it is based on the *Bhāshya* of Ānandatīrtha. Baladēva could not, having regard to the indebtedness of Chaitanya to Ānandatīrtha's School, have materially departed from it. Hence the frank confession in the introductory verses of certain of his works (see *Siddhāntaratna* and *Siddhāntaratnatippani*) that his interpretation is based on Ānandatīrtha's as understood by Chaitanya.

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[61] Rāmānanda Rāya was evidently a poet. There is a drama in five acts, called *Jaggannāthavallabhanātakam*, having for its plot the love-story of Rādha and Srī Krishna, attributed to him. In it, he describes himself as the son of Bhagavadānandarāya and states that he wrote the work at the instance of King Gajapati Pratāpa-Rudra Dēva. (See *Madras T.C. MSS.*, V, i. A. R. No. 4198, pp. 6192-6194.)

Date of Baladeva.

The date of Baladēva has to be fixed with reference, first, to the period of Chaitanya, after whom he came, and, secondly, to the time of Pratāpa-Rudra Gōpāla Dāsa, King of Utkala (Orissa) country. The lower limit is fixed by the date of Chaitanya's death, 1533 A.D., while the upper limit has to be fixed with reference to the period of the king of the Orissa country mentioned above. This king was evidently a later king of that Province, who is not otherwise known to history. We may not be far wrong if we tentatively set him down to the beginning of the eighteenth century—a century after the time of Pratāpa-Rudra Dēva, the Gajapati king who was the opponent of Krishna Dēva Rāya, the great Vijayanagar king.[62] This would give sufficient time for the period covered from the death of Chaitanya to the rise of Baladēva. Mr. Sewell, in his *List of Antiquities*, mentions a grant by one Pratāpa-Rudra-Nārāyana-Deva dated in 1728 A.D. found at the Jagannāthasvāmi temple at Balaga in the present Chicacole Taluk, Ganjam District.

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[62] An inscription of this Pratāpa-Rudra is to be seen at Srī Kūrmam dated in Saka 1425 (=1503 A.D.), see *M.E.R.*, No. 346 of 1896. Pratāpa-Rudra's minister Bhattāchārya Sārvabhauma is said to have been converted by Chaitanya to his religion. It was the first great event in the career of Chaitanya as a religious teacher

Evidently there was a line of kings of the old Gajapati dynasty who set up some sort of rule in a part of their ancient kingdom down to the eighteenth century A.D.

Suka and His Commentary.

Suka is still another commentator on the *Brahma-Sūtras* of Bādarāyana. His work is known as the *Suka-Bhāshya*. This work is known in print in the Telugu script, having been printed in 1892, at Bangalore. Copies of this edition are difficult to secure to-day and there is, so far as is known, no other edition of it. In the *Avatārika* to the Telugu edition, it is mentioned that the MS. copy from which it was printed was originally in the possession of one Mr. Venkatachalayya, a follower of the *Bhāgavata-matha*, who was many years ago *Amildar* of Dodda Sira, in the present Tumkur District, Mysore State. Its existence having come to the knowledge of Srī Krishnānanda Svāmi of the Smārtha-matha—*alias* Bhāgavata Sampradāya-matha—of Talakād, in the Mysore District, he requested Mr. Venkatachalayya to make a present of the MS. in his possession to the *Bhāgavata-matha*, which he did. Sri Krishnānanda Svāmi subsequently directed that a copy of the MS. should be made and from it, the Telugu edition was, it would seem, printed by order of the Svāmi. These facts are vouched for in a *Srīmukha* granted by the Svāmi to Mr. Venkatachalayya, which is found printed in the introductory part of the Telugu edition. In this *Srīmukha* it is also mentioned that Sukāchārya was the first *guru* (*mūla guru*) of the Bhāgavata-matha at Talakād and that its original image of Srī Venugōpāla Mūrti in it had been worshipped by him and that *Srī Bhāgavata*, which is the essence of all Vēdānta, has been its *Siddhānta grantha* from time out of memory. Also, that the *Suka-Bhāshya* composed by the first *guru* Sukāchārya, had been the *Bhāshya* accepted by the *matha* and that the MS. containing it had been lost in a theft that had occurred at the *matha* in the time of Srī Krishnānanda Svāmi, the first of that name and the predecessor of the

Svāmi of the same name who issued the *Srīmukha* above referred to. Since then Srī Krishnānanda Svāmi II had been on the look-out for a copy of the *Bhāshya*, which at last he found in the possession of Mr. Venkatachalayya at Dodda Sira. The further statement is made in the *Srīmukha* that Mr. Venkatachalayya's Telugu MS. was itself a copy of a grantha palm-leaf MS. found at Ten-Tirupati, a place in the Tinnevelly District of the Madras Presidency, where it was found in the possession of a follower of the *Bhāgavata-matha*. The *Srīmukha* is dated in the cyclic year *Khara*. *Khara* corresponds to 1854 and 1914 A.D.

The question arises who is this Suka, or Bhagavadpādāchārya Sukāchārya as he is termed, after whom the *Bhāshya* known as *Suka-Bhāshya* goes and when approximately did he live and where. The materials for answering these questions are not ready. The *Suka-Bhāshya* itself does not afford any definite clue as to the date of its composition. Nor are the legendary tales connected with the name of Suka of a character to enable us to infer anything certain about him or his date. That Suka is claimed as the founder of the *Bhāgavata-matha*—also called *Smārtha-matha*—at Talakād and that his *Bhāshya* is taken to represent the views of that *matha*, we have seen above from the *Srīmukha* referred to. Of this *matha* at Talakād and its *Svāmis*, the following information has been brought together and published in the *Mysore Gazetteer*[63] :—

> There is a Smārtha *matha* of the Bhāgavata-Sampradāya at Talakād presided over by a Sanyāsi of the name of Bālakrishnānanda Svāmi. A village named Koppala, a few miles from Talakād, belongs to this *matha*; and from this circumstance the *matha* is sometimes called *Koppala matha*. The Svāmi is said to be descended in spiritual succession from Padmapādāchārya, the immediate disciple of Sankarāchārya, the three Svāmis that came after Padmapādāchārya being Vishnu Svāmi, Kshīra Svāmi and Krishnānanda Svāmi. In apostolic succession to the last, after a long interval came Abhinava Bālakrishnānanda Svāmi, whose disciple was Bālakrishnānanda Svāmi. The disciple

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[63] *Mysore Gazetteer* (1930 Edn.), V, 848-49.

of the latter is the present Svāmi. The god worshipped in the *matha* is Gōpālakrishna. The agent of the *matha* possesses a manuscript containing the Sthalapurāna and certain quasi-historical matters relating to Vijayanagar, the Talakād chiefs and the Mysore kings. He has also two palm leaves containing copies of two inscriptions which register grants to the *matha* by Mādhvamantri and by a Talakād chief named Chandrasēkhara Wadiyar in Saka 819 and 916 respectively. The former inscription is printed as T.-Narsipur 47. There is an anicut or dam across the Cauvery near Talakād which is known as Mādhvamantri-Katte, the Mādhvamantri who built it being supposed to be Vidyāranya. The manuscript referred to above contains a verse giving Saka 816 as the date of the construction of the dam by Mādhvamantri, nearly 500 years before Vidyāranya's time. The Mādhvamantri who built the dam is probably identical with the Mādhvamantri of the Goa plates (see *M. A. R.* for 1909, para 91), who was a contemporary of Vidyāranya. With regard to the Talakād chiefs, the manuscript informs us that the first chief Sōmarāja Wadiyar, who received a few districts as an Umbali from Vidyādēva Rāja of Ānegondi, ruled from Saka 785 to 837. It was the second chief, Chandrasēkhara Wadiyar, who is said to have ruled from Saka 838 to 915, 78 years, that made the grant to the *matha* in Saka 916. Other Talakād chiefs are stated to have reigned for 91, 86, 84, 76, 85 and 87 years each. These statements are enough, in the opinion of Rao Bahadur Narasimhachar, to show the valueless characters of the manuscripts.

Though this is so, there is no need, in the present state of our knowledge, to reject the whole tradition relating to the *matha* as incredible. The succession given above is: Padmapādāchārya; Vishnu Svāmi; Krishna Svāmi; Krishnānanda Svāmi; after a long time from this last came Abhinava Bālakrishnānanda Svāmi; his disciple was Balakrishnānanda Svāmi; his disciple was Bālakrishnānanda Svāmi, the present presiding *guru*. The order of succession given in the *Srīmukha* quoted above is nearly the same: Sukāchārya; Gōvindabhagavadpādāchārya; Srīpadmapādāchārya; Vishnusvāmi; Kshīrasvāmi; Srī Krishnānandasvāmi I; Abhinava Bālakrishnānandasvāmi; Srī Krishnānandasvāmi, who issued the *Srīmukha*. Thus these two lists exactly tally except for the addition of the names of Sukāchārya and Gōvindabhagavadpādāchārya in the beginning, and they evidently embody a tradition that need not be thrown away. It will be noticed that Suka is claimed in the *Srīmukha* as the *guru* of Gōvindabhagavadpāda, who was the *guru* of Sankarāchārya and the disciple of Gaudapādāchārya, the *paramaguru* of Sankarāchārya and the author of the *Kārika* on the *Mandūkyōpanishad*. It is also noteworthy that Srīpadmapādāchārya, to be identified with Padmapāda, a disciple of Sankarāchārya, is claimed as the successor of Gōvindabhagavadpāda. Finally, it is equally worthy of note that Vishnusvāmi is claimed to be Padmapāda's successor in both the lists. This Vishnusvāmi has to be identified with the founder of the Vishnu cult which exalted the Rādhā-Krishna worship and which in later times was absorbed by the sect associated with the name of Vallabhāchārya. The teaching of Vishnusvāmi, as is well known, found full exposition in the *Krishna Karnāmrita*, written by Līlāsukha Bilvamangala, who hailed from what is now Travancore.[64] This work had such an influence on Chaitanya that he is said to have based his own system of teaching on it. As a matter of fact, Vishnusvāmi differed little from Ānandatīrtha in his teaching and the fact that Chaitanya was indebted as much to Vishnusvāmi's as to Anandatīrtha's teachings shows that their general drift was the same except for the special stress that Vishnusvāmi laid on the Rādhā-Krishna cult. To-day if Vishnusvāmi's cult has practically disappeared, it might be said to be due to its absorption by Vallabha in the north and Ānandatīrtha in the south.

Suka also figures in a MS. giving the succession list of the Sankarāchārya Mutt.[65] This list starts with Śiva as the first occupant, with Vishnu, Brahma, Vasistha, Sakti, Parāsara and Vyāsa following one after another in regular succession. After Vyāsa, came, it is said, Suka, who was, it is recorded, followed by Gaudapāda, Govindabhagavadpāda, Sankarāchārya and his successors. In Gōvindanātha's *Sankarāchārya Charita*, this order of succession is repeated and Suka occupies the identical position in the list set out in it.[66] It will be seen that the Suka referred to here is the son of Bādarāyana, a person quite different from Suka, the author of the *Bhāshya.* That Suka, the son of Vyāsa, is not altogether a mythical personage is shown by the reference to him in Sankarāchārya's *Bhāshya.* In IV. 2. 14, Sankarāchārya quotes a passage from the *Mahābhārata* to show Suka obtained his release.

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[64] A disciple of Padmapāda was Krishna-Līlā Sukha, the author of *Srīchinha Kāvyam* which narrates the story of Krishna. Durgāprasāda-yati, a student of Krishna-Līlā Sukha, wrote a commentary on the work. (See Madras *T.C.M.*, V, A.R. No. 4156.) According to Durgāprasāda-yati, Padmapāda lived at Kōdandamangalam.

[65] See *Sringeri Guruparampara*. Seshagiri Sastri, *Report on Sānskrit and Tamil MSS.*, No. 2, p. 99.

In the *Suka-Bhāshya* all the colophons read alike and state that it was composed by "the other Suka"[67] who was the incarnation of the Bhagavat Bādarāyani Sukāchārya, *i.e.*, Suka, the son of Bādarāyana, the famous author of the *Brahma-Sūtras.* This Suka should therefore be called rightly the second or the later Suka, who was regarded as the incarnation of the original Suka who appears in the Mutt lists referred to above. This Suka II describes himself as the incarnation of the original Suka, the son of Bādarāyana[68]; as of the Srīvatsa gōtra; of unfaltering austerity; famous for every kind of knowledge; *Paramahamsa*; guru of gurus (*paramaguru*); one who has an ascertained knowledge (of Brahman); *Srīmadbhāgavata rāddhānta* (*i.e.*, one who has conclusively demonstrated the truth of the holy *Bhāgavata*); and Bhagavatpādāchārya (*i.e.*, the occupier of the sanctified seat of office as head of Mutt). In one of the invocation stanzas (see stanza No. 4) he pays homage to Srī Gopālakrishna, the first and original guru of the Mutt, an avatār of Srī Krishna and his subsequent followers, Nārāyana and other Paramahamsas, and to his own immediate guru, he says he undertakes the writing of the *Bhāshya* on the *Brahma-Sūtras.*[69]

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[66] Seshagiri Sastri, *Report* No. 2, p. 102.

[67] He is spoken of as "Aparāvatāra" in which *Apara* means *another*, *second*, *additional*, *later*, *posterior*, etc.

[68] *Srīvatsakulatilaka*,

Suka quotes more than once a previous work of his called *Sruti-gītā-Bhāshya.* (See for example his *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshya*, II, 1. 10, *Svapakshadōshāchcha*). The *Sruti-gītā* forms part of the tenth canto of the *Bhāgavata Purāna*, which is perhaps its most popular canto. The present writer has in his possession a fragment of a MS. commentary on the *Bhāgavata* in which the *Sruti-gītā* is presented with a Sanskrit-Telugu commentary. The author's name is not mentioned in it. Whether this is the work of the Suka referred to in the *Suka-Bhāshya*, it is impossible to say. But it recites at its commencement the following verse with which the *Suka-Bhāshya* also begins:—

तं वन्दे परमाचार्यं पादुकीकृतमन्मथम् ।
शुकशास्त्रगुरुं सीतारामार्यं मनुजाकृतिं ॥

Tam vandē Paramāchāryam padukīkritamanmatham ।
Sukasāstragurum Sithārāmāryam manujākritim ॥

In ending this canto the MS. ends with the invocation *Srī Sītārāmābhyānnamah*, an invocation which marks the beginning and end of each *adhyāya* and each *pāda* of the *Suka-Bhāshya*. These may be accidental resemblances, for the *Suka-Bhāshya* is entirely in Sanskrit and it is probable that the *Sruti-gītā Bhāshya* referred to by Suka in his *Bhāshya* was also composed by him entirely in Sanskrit. As has been shown above, Vallabha based his commentary on the *Bhāgavata* and Ānandatīrtha also laid stress on the *Bhāgavata*. An analysis of Suka's *Bhāshya* shows that Suka's use of the *Bhāgavata* is fairly wide. The largest number of citations, however, seem to be from the 10th canto which, considering its importance, seems natural.[70]

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[69] The commentator Krishnāchārya interprets "the other Paramahamsas" as referring to Brahma, Nārada, Vyāsa and Sukāchārya.

[70] The five adhyāyas 29 to 30 in the Tenth Skandha of the *Bhāgavata* are called *Rāsapanchādhyāyi*, because they deal with the Rāsakrīda of Srī Krishna. There is a commentary called *Visuddharasadīpika* on this particular part, by Srī Misra Nārāyanapāda. (*Madras Tri. Cat. of MSS.*, V. I, C. R. No. 4996, pp. 6884–87.)

The 2nd, 7th, 11th and 12th are also referred to often. It may well be asked why this stress on the *Bhāgavata*? Suka says in commenting on I. 2. 17, *Sarvōpanishad sārabhūtam Srīmadbhāgavatam.* We may compare this statement with what, in his *Bhāgavata Tātparya Nirnaya*, I. i, Ānandatīrtha says:—*Brahmasūtra Mahābhārata Gāyatrī vēda sambandhascha ayamgranthah.* Again, Ānandatīrtha observes in his *Bhāgavata Tātparya Nirnaya*, III:—*Sarvavēdētihāsānām sāram sāram samudritam* । *satu samsrāvayāmāsa Mahārājam Parīkshitam* ॥ : In *Bhāgavata* you find the essence of the essence of the Vēdānta. Such essence was related by Suka to Mahārāja Parīkshit. In commenting on III. 3. 1, *Om sarvavedāntapratyayam*, etc., Suka states that the *Bhāgavata* is *sarvavēdāntapratyaya.* Again, commenting on III. 3. 6, *Upasamhāra*, etc., Suka says that all Purānas point to *bhēda* only. If so why select only *Bhāgavata?* Because it is said that "among the eighteen (Purānas), the foremost is the *Bhāgavata* (*Dasāshtam Srī Bhāgavata*)".

In the Bhāgavata school, of which Suka is the chief modern exponent, *bhēda* is the cardinal doctrine and that doctrine is the fundamental basis of *bhakti* as enunciated in the *Bhāgavata.* The second *adhyāya* of the *Bhāgavata* epitomises the whole work. As the saying goes, *dvitīye dvitīyo advitīyaha*: The second verse in the second canto (of the *Bhāgavata*) stands unrivalled:—

"शब्दस्य हि ब्रह्मण एष पंथा ।
यन्नामभिध्यायति धीरपार्थैः ॥
परिभ्रमन् तत्र न विन्दतेऽर्थान् ।
मायामये वासनया शयानः ॥
(श्रीमद्भागवते, २–२–२)

Sabdasya hi brahmana ēsha panthā ।
Ennāmabhidhyāyati dhīrapārthaih ॥
Paribhraman tatra na vindatērthān ।
Māyāmayē vāsanayā sayānaha ॥
Srimadbhāgavata, II. 2. 2.

This may be broadly translated thus:—

The prime meaning of the word *Brahman* points directly to Vishnu, according to the *Sruti* text *Brahmasabdasya*

Vishnavāvēva (the meaning of *Brahma* is the all-pervading Vishnu); but the ignorant *jīva* roams about without knowing the exact manner of realizing him, because he himself is enveloped in the covering of *Jīvāchchādika-māya*, beyond which he is unable to see Brahman, being in want of (Brahma-) *gnāna*.

The suggestion here is that *bhēda* is the doctrine taught in the *Bhāgavata* and that without a realization of *bhēda*, *gnāna* (*i.e.*, right knowledge) is impossible. Hence the attempt made by Suka at every step in his *Bhāshya* to differentiate the *jīva* from *Īśa*. That doctrine is as fundamental to his position as a Bhāshyakāra as to the *Bhāgavata* itself on which his interpretation is based.[71]

Suka, the *Brahma-Sūtra* commentator, should, in view of what has been stated above, be deemed a later person of the same name, who reckoned himself an *avatār* of the original Suka, the son of Vyāsa. Neither from the particulars he gives of himself nor from the internal references contained in his *Bhāshya* is it possible to fix his date with any degree of certainty. That he was posterior to Ānandatīrtha seems fairly inferable from the fact that he follows Ānandatīrtha in his comments. At any rate, it cannot be doubted that Suka, the Bhāshyakāra, was actually indebted to Ānandatīrtha's commentary. He quotes in I. 1. 1, while trying to explain what goes to make a *Sūtra*, the verse quoted by Ānandatīrtha: "*Alpāksharam asandigdham sāravadvisvatōmukham* । *Astōbhamanavadyancha sūtram sūtravidō viduhu*", etc., which is not cited by any other commentator. Like Ānandatīrtha, Suka allows that women, Sūdras and those that are servants of Brāhmanas (*Sthri sūdra Brahmabandhu*) are entitled to hear the *Bhārata* and other epic works (*cf.* Ānandatīrtha's

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[71] A more modern attempt to show that the *Brahma-Sūtras* have their parallels in the *Srīmadbhāgavata* and that the latter is but a commentary on the former, is that of Pandit Haridās Vidyāvāgīsa Bhāgavatāchārya's *Brahma-Sūtras* in Bengali, with the *Bhāgavata-Bhāshya* which has been translated into Bengali. This topic is further referred to below.

Bhāshya, I. 1. 1 and Suka's *Bhāshya*, I. 1. 1, pp. 43—45). Again, like Ānandatīrtha in I. 1. 1, Suka in his *Bhāshya* says that Srī Nārāyana having been approached through prayers by Brahma, Rudra and others, declared that he would incarnate in the house of Parāśara and be born as the son of Parāśara and Satyavati, and destroy all the ill-informed and ignorant-minded people and manifest himself in the person of Krishnadvaipāyana (Bādarāyana) and exhibit to the world—through his works (*Itihāsas* and *Purānas*) which would explain the gist of all the Vedas and Vedānta, and through his *Brahma-Sūtras*, which would unmistakably declare the essence of the *Vedas*—that Krishna, who in his undivided form is Nārāyana, is the Brahman (*Suka Bhāshya*, I. 1. 1, p. 35—36; *cf.* with Ānandatīrtha in I. 1. 1). Again, in discussing I. 1. 1, Suka in his *Bhāshya* says that *Brahmajignyāsa* should be undertaken only in order to know who is to be approached by *upāsana* for realizing Mōksha and out of whose grace such Mōksha is obtainable as the result of *upāsana*. Suka says that the deity of *upāsana*, according to Bādarāyana, is no other than Srī Krishna, the undivided form of Srī Nārāyana, who is extolled throughout the *Srīmadbhāgavata* (Suka's *Bhāshya*, p. 246). This seems also an echo from Ānandatīrtha, who, in his *Anuvyākhyāna* (I. 1. 1), quotes the last two *Sūtras* of the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsa* (*viz.*, *Sa Vishnurāhahi* and *Tam Brahmētyāchakshate*) which indicate that the Brahman who is to be meditated upon to realize Mōksha—the Mahāpurushārtha—is Vishnu, who is the Brahman about whom we are to conduct the *jignyāsa* mentioned in *Uttara-Mīmāmsa*, I. 1. 1.

Suka's view-point is that *jignyāsa* is only for "Mōksha-lābha", *i.e.*, obtaining Mōksha through knowledge obtained by *jignyāsa*. This is the position of Ānandatīrtha, who under I. 1. 1 states that the attaining of Mōksha through the grace of Parabrahma-Vishnu is the only objective aimed at by *jignyāsa*. (*Parasyabrahmano Vishnōh prasādāditi vā bhavate*, *Brahma-Sūtra*, I. 1. 1; *cf.* Suka's *Bhāshya* I. 1. 1: *Mōkshōpāyabhūta Bhagavadbhaktirēva* *ētad sāstrasya vishayah tādrisa bhaktidvāra mōkshalābhayēva prayōjanam.*)

Suka, in I. 1. 2, says that some authorities enunciate that Brahman is *Nirvisēsha*, and that expressions which describe Brahman as *jagadjanmādikārana*, etc., are to be understood as indicating no *lakshana*. It is not possible, he states, to establish a Parabrahman who is devoid of *lakshana* and at the same time capable of *srishti*, *sthithi* and *laya*, which are his chief characteristics. According to Suka, Bādarāyana's view is that Brahman should be recognized by the characteristics indicated in the Sūtra *Janmādyasya yathah*, creation, protection and destruction, which are the chief characteristics by which Brahman should be understood. This is, he adds, the essence of all the Vedānta (*Sarvavēdānta sāram*). This view closely follows Ānandatīrtha's in I. 1. 2, where in declaring *Brahmalakshana*, he quotes from the *Skānda Purāna*:—*Srishti sthithi samhāra niyamana gnānāgnāna bandha mōkshāyathah ; utpaththi sthithi samhāra niyati gnānamavrutihi ; bandha mōkshancha purushāth yasmāth sa Harirēkarātiti Skānde.* This has to be compared with Suka's words: *Utpaththi sthithi laya samānārthah pravesa niyamanādīnām sthithirantharbhāvanaprutha upadeśah.* This is to support his view that the chief *lakshanas* of Parabrahman are known through the *lakshanas* of creation, protection and destruction and He cannot therefore be without *lakshanas*. Parabrahman in the form of Srī Hari is the sole Lord to grant, out of His grace, Mōksha.

If *Nirvisēsha* Brahman is postulated, the result of *jignyāsa* would prove to be nothing ; on the other hand, a contradictory result will be attained (*viparīta phalānēva drashtavyāni*).[72]

In parts of his comments on I. 1. 2, Suka follows the actual wording of Ānandatīrtha. Thus, the following is from Ānandatīrtha's comment as found in the *Anuvyākhyāna* :—*Janmādasyēti tēnailad vishnōrēva svalakshanam,*

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[72] This is the gloss of Krishnāchārya, the commentator of *Suka Bhāshya*, see *Suka Bhāshya*, page 49.

asyōdbhavādi hētutvam sākshādēva svalakshanam. This might be compared with the following from Suka's comments on the identical *Sūtra* (I. 1. 2):—*Jagadjanmādi kāranatvam parabrahmanō lakshanam bhavatīti prāha janmādyasya iti.*

Again, Ānandatīrtha in his *Anuvyākhyāna*, commenting on I. 1. 1, says in ascribing to Brahman *paripūrnaguna :—Brahmasabdōpi hi gunapūrtimēva vadatyayam.* This may be compared with Suka's words in I. 1. 2: *Gunagana paripūrnatvēna savisēshatvamēva hi param Brahmana upadisyatē.* Again, Ānandatīrtha in his *Anuvyākhyāna*, in commenting on I. 1. 1, says, in describing Brahman as possessed of countless *gunas :—Athōnantagunam Brahma nirbhēda mapi bhāvyate.* This may be compared with Suka's words in I. 1. 2:—*Aparimēyatvāt bhutananta parama mangala guna gana paripūrnatvēna savisēshatva mēva hi param Brahmana upadisyatē.*

Again, Ānandatīrtha quotes in support of his interpretation of *Brahma-Sūtra* I. 1. 3, the following from the *Skānda Purāna :*

ऋग्यजुस्सामाथर्वाश्च भारतं पाञ्चरात्रकम् ।
मूलरामायणंचैव शास्त्रमित्यभिधीयते ॥
यच्चानुकूलमेतस्य तच्च शास्त्रम् प्रकीर्तितम् ।
अथोन्यो ग्रंथविस्तारो नैव शास्त्रम् कुवर्त्म तत् ॥

Rigyajussāmātharvāscha Bhāratam pāncharātrakam ।
Mūlaramāyanamchaiva sāstramithyabhidhīyatē ॥
Yachchānukūlamētasya tachcha sāstram prakīrtitam ।
Athōnyō granthavistāro naiva sāstram kuvartma tat ॥

This might be compared with Suka's commentary on I.1.3, where he thus quotes the first half of the above two verses:—

ऋग्यजुस्सामाथर्वाख्य भारतं पञ्चरात्रकम् ।
यच्चानुकूलमेतेषाम् तच्च शास्त्रं प्रकीर्तितम् ॥

Rigyajussāmātharvākhya Bhāratam pancharātrakam ।
Yachchānukūlamētēshām tachcha sāstram prakīrtitam ॥[73]

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[73] Here *ētēshām* is wrongly put down for *ētasya*, thus making the subject singular and the pronoun plural.

Suka quotes this as a well-known "Vachana" without pointing to the source from which it is taken. Ānandatīrtha quotes the *Skānda Purāna* as his source.

Suka next quotes the *Sruti* text, *Yo brahmānam vidadhāti pūrvam yōvai vēdāmscha prāhinōti tasmai iti*, which is found quoted already by Ānandatīrtha in the opening part of his work *Bhāgavata Tātparya Nirnaya*, where he proves that Vishnu imparted the knowledge of all the Sāstras to Brahman in order to show that he formed the source of all knowledge—*Sāstrayōnitvāt*.

Similarly, what Ānandatīrtha says in I. 1. 2, *Janmādasya yathah*, *abhignā sarvagna*, etc., is repeated by Suka in his comments on I. 1. 6.

Again, when commenting on II. 2. 44, *Vipratishēdhāchcha*, Suka quotes the following verses in support of his view without mentioning the source from which they are taken:

त्वं हि रुद्र महाभाग मोहशास्त्राणि कारय ॥
अतथ्यानि वितथ्यानि विपरीतानि दर्शय।
प्रकाशीकुरुचात्मानम् अप्रकाशंच मां कुरु ॥ इत्यादि.

Tvam hi rudra mahābhāga mōhasāstrāni kāraya ॥
Atathyāni vitathyāni viparītāni darsaya ।
Prakāsī kuruchātmānam aprakāsancha mām kuru ॥
ityādi, etc.

This might be compared with the following from Ānandatīrtha's *Mahābhārata Tātparya Nirnaya*, I. 48–49, where he says he quotes as from the *Varāha Purānam* the following:—

त्वंच रुद्र महाबाहो मोहशास्त्राणि कारय ॥
अतथ्यानि वितथ्यानि दर्शयस्व महाभुज ।
प्रकाशं कुरु चात्मानं अप्रकाशंच मां कुरु॥

Tvamcha rudra mahābāhō mōhasāstrāni kāraya ॥
Atathyāni vitathyāni darsayasva mahābhuja ।
Prakāsam kuru cha ātmānam aprakāsam cha mām kuru ॥

Though Suka gives the verses slightly differently, there can be no question that he has taken them from Ānandatīrtha.

Next, in commenting on *Sūtra* I. 1. 15, *Taddhētu vyapadēsāchcha* (identical with Ānandatīrtha's I. 1. 14), Suka quotes the identical *Sruti* (Taittirīya) text referred to by Ānandatīrtha :—

कोह्येवान्यात् कः प्राण्यात् ।
यदेष आकाश आनन्दो नस्यात् ॥—(तै. २–७)
Kōhyēvānyāth kah prānyāth ।
Yadēsha ākāsa ānandō nasyāth ॥
—(Taitt. 2–7.)

Then, in commenting on Sūtra I. 1. 16, *Mantravarnikamēvacha gīyatē*, Suka quotes likewise the same *Sruti* texts as Ānandatīrtha, *Brahmavidāpnōti param* and *Satyam gnānam anantam Brahma*, practically copying Ānandatīrtha's commentary *ipsissima verba*.

Further, in commenting on I. 1. 18 (corresponding to Ānandatīrtha's *Bhāshya* I. 1. 17, *Bhēdavyapadēsāchcha*), Suka gives the *Sruti* text quoted by Ānandatīrtha: *Adrisyē Anātmē Aniruktē Anilayanē abhayam pratishtām vindatē aththasō abhayam gatō bhavati*.

Likewise, in his comments on I. 1. 20, *Asminnasyacha tadyōgam sāsti* (Ānandatīrtha's *Bhāshya*, I. 1. 17), Suka quotes the *Brihat Samhita* text, *Sirōnārāyanapakshō dakshina savya ēvacha* etc., which occurs in Ānandatīrtha's comments on *Brahma-Sūtrā* I. 1. 15, *Mantravarnikamēvacha gīyatē*. It should be noted that this quotation occurs in the same Adhikarana in both the commentaries —*i.e.*, *Ānandamayādhikaranam*. In Suka, this quotation practically ends his comments on I. 1. 20 and with it he ends *Ānandamayādhikarana*. Suka argues that if Brahman has *avayavas*, then he cannot be described as one not possessing *avayavas*, *gunas*, *ākāra*, etc.

Again, in his comments on *Brahma-Sūtra* I. 1. 26, *Chchandōbhidhānān nētichēt nathathā chetōrpanā nigadāthathāhi darsanam*, corresponding to Ānandatīrtha's comments on *Brahma-Sūtra* I. 1. 25, Suka quotes the same *Sruti* text *Chētōrpanārtham vinigadyate*. Similarly, the *Purushasūkta* text quoted by Ānandatīrtha under *Brahma-Sūtra* I. 1. 26, *Bhūtādipada vyapadēsōpapaththe schaivam*, is enlarged by Suka who quotes in full the same text under his comments on *Brahma-Sūtra* I. 1. 28, *Upadēsa bhēdānnētichēnnōbhayasminnapya virōdhāt.*

In I. 2. 19, *Antharyām adhidaivādhilōkādhishu taddharmavyapadēsāt*, Suka follows Rāmānuja in adding *lōkādhi* (where *lōkādhi* is omitted by Ānandatīrtha), but follows Ānandatīrtha's interpretation, quoting the same *Sruti* text, though he quotes it at greater length. (See Ānandatīrtha's *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshya* I. 2. 18.)

Similarly, Suka's I. 2. 20 follows Ānandatīrtha's I. 2. 19.[74]

Again, Suka's comment on *Brahma-Sūtra* I. 1. 21, *Anthastaddharmōpadēsāth*, is but a reflection of the comment of Ānandatīrtha on I. 1. 20, the corresponding *Sūtra* and on I. 1. 21 *Bhēda vyapadēsāchcha* in the same *adhikarana*—*Antastatvādhikarana* of Ānandatīrtha and *Antarādhikarana* of Suka.

Though Suka adopts *bhēda* throughout, he is careful to avoid anything approaching Ānandatīrtha's theory of *tāratamya bhēda* as among *jīvas*. Ānandatīrtha holds to *pancha bhēda*, which are fundamental to his system. Suka, however, accepts only *jīvesa bhēda* and *jīva prakriti bhēda.*

We may now sum up and note the points in which *Suka* and *Ānandatīrtha* agree and those in which they appear to differ. First, as to the points on which they agree:—

(1) *Sāstrasya nityatvam* [*i.e.*, Sabda (Veda) is eternal].

(2) *Jagatjanmādikāranam Nārāyana ēva* (*i.e.*, Vishnu is the cause, etc. of the world).

(3) *Ata sāstrayonitvam tasyōktam*, *i.e.*, Vishnu can be understood only through the proofs manifested in the Sāstra.

(4) *Tatascha Parabrahmanō Nārāyanasya nikhila jagatjanmādikāranatva rūpa lakshanam siddham* (*i.e.*, Parabrahma Nārāyana is the sole possessor of the characteristic

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[74] But Suka reads I. 2. 20 thus: *Na cha Smārtha matha dharmābhilāpāscharīraschya*. Ānandatīrtha and Sankara, however, take *scharīraschya* with the next *Sūtra*. In this Suka agrees with Rāmānuja and Srīkantha. But Srīkara agrees with Sankara and Ānandatīrtha.

of *jagatjanmādikāranatva*, *i.e.*, creation, protection and destruction. This is the established fact throughout the *Sūtras*).

Next, as to the points on which Suka and Ānandatīrtha differ, we may note the following :—

1. In his interpretation of I. 1. 11, *Gati sāmānyāt*, Suka says that those who practise Bhakti in the nine forms mentioned in the *Bhāgavata* are on a *level*. This is a departure from Ānandatīrtha, who holds that there is *tāratamya* among the nine different kinds of faithful devotees. They are not put by Ānandatīrtha on an equal footing as is done by Suka. Suka holds that these are all equal in Mōksha—*tasmādanyatamāpi navānāmapi bhaktīnām mōksharūpaphalasya samānatvāt*. Ānandatīrtha holds :—*Mōkshaye layē tāratamyam dēvānāmapi drishyatē* (see *Mahābhārata Tātparya Nirnaya*, I). Suka repeats the equality of all *bhaktas* of whatever nature, among the nine different kinds, in Mōksha, in I. 1. 12 :—*Tasmāt sravanādīnām tāratamyam nāstīti siddham.* We ought to compare this with what Ānandatīrtha says in his *Mahābhārata Tātparya Nirnaya* (I. 51.) :—*Nirdōshatvam tāratamyam muktānāmapi chōchyate*, in which both faultlessness and gradation among Muktas is clearly postulated.

2. Suka holds there is *bhēda* as between *Jīva* and *Īsvara* ; but not as between *jīvas* themselves. Ānandatīrtha holds that there is difference between *jīvas* as well.

Suka, in commenting on I. 1. 18, *Bhēdavyapadēsāchcha*, stresses the remark that there being many *Sūtras* referring to *Bhēda*, such as *Bhēdavyapadēsāchcha* (I. 1. 18) ; *Bhēdavyapadēsāchchānnyaha* (I. 1. 22) ; *Bhēdavyāpadēsāchcha* (I. 3. 4) ; *Bhēdasrutērvailakshanyāchcha* (II. 4. 17) ; *Bhēdānnētichē-nnaikasyāmapi* (III. 3. 2) ; *adhikantu bhēdanirdēsāt* (II. 1. 22), etc. in the *Brahma-Sūtras*, critics, not properly understanding their *bhēda* import, exercise their verbal ingenuity for interpreting them from the *abhēda* point of view, through their ardent love of mere contradiction. Suka hints that even in the Sūtrakāra's time there was observable this tendency towards *abhēda* and consequently to do away with that tendency, the Sūtrakāra specifically introduced into the *Brahma-Sūtras* this species of *Sūtras* establishing the *Bhēda* view-point.

Suka, in commenting on I. 2. 14, says that the Jīva is a *Sākha* of Īsa and not his equal. The *Bhāgavata*, according to him, is devoted to the demonstration of the difference between *Jīva* and *Paramātman* in their respective *svarūpa* (I. 2. 17). Jīva is jīva; and Paramātman is Paramātma; both will not and do not undergo any transformation in any kind of manifestation (I. 2. 18). Both Suka and Ānandatīrtha think that there is *bhēda* in *svarūpa* between Jīva and Paramātman, a point in which they fundamentally differ from Sankara, who holds that both are one in manifestation and *svarūpa*; only in manifestation it is *vyavahāra*. Again, commenting on III. 3. 19, *Samāna evanchā bhēdāchcha*, Suka says that *bhēda* does not extend to the different *avatāras*. All *avatāras* are *samāna* in *svarūpa* like gold and jewels made out of gold (*kanaka* and *makuta*), though they seem different as between themselves. This is in accordance with the view of Ānandatīrtha. Commenting on III. 3. 25, *Vēdhādyartha bhēdāt*, Suka says that Jīva can approximate (in *guna*) as far as Parabrahman. *Tatra jīva lakshanam sarva Vēdhādhikam Parabrahmani nōchyate. Adh* denotes that Jīva can get to Brahman. But why does not the Jīva become part of Parabrahman? Because only *deha sārūpya* is possible and Brahman becomes, through *mantras*, *Vasa.* The term *Vēdha* has been used and not *Brahman.* This is to show that assimilation with Brahman is not possible. Commenting on III. 4. 39, *Athasthvithara jyāyō lingāchcha*, Suka comments that, to those who are imbued with Bhakti and Yoga and who deserve the best, there shall be *sama darsana.* Commenting on III. 4. 40, *Tadbhūta*, etc., Suka says that this *Sūtra* suggests the grant of *samatva* to those who approach the Brahman with humility. "To those who show themselves as humble servants of mine (*Srī Haridāsa bhavābhyah*), I give them *my own rūpa* (*tadrūpabhāvam*) as declared in the *Sruti.*" *Bhēda*, between *jīva* and *Īsa* thus seems the fundamental basis of Suka's *Bhāshya*.

In keeping with this view of the dependence of the *jīva* on the *Īsa* is the doctrine of *Mōksha* propounded by Suka. Commenting on IV. 4. 17 *Jagadvyāpāra varjam*, Suka asks : Does the *mumukshu* attain all the eight qualities of Paramātma, such as *Jagadvyāpāra*, etc., after attaining realization (*mukti*) ? The answer is *Jagadvyāpāra varjam*. He attains Brahmatva—excluding the eight qualities. He is a *paratantra*, subordinate to Paramātma. He gets *mōksha* because of the grace of the Almighty (*Bhagavat prasāda labdhasya mōkshasya pratyagātmana sannihitatvamasti*). This lack of *jagadvyāpāra* shows the mumukshu's *paratantratva*.

Commenting on IV. 4. 21, Suka winds up by saying that the mumukshu enjoys bliss *in association with* (*sākam*) Parabrahman. This is the objective of the desire of the *jīva*.

Suka, however, finds some difficulty in holding strictly to his view that there is no *bhēda* as between *jīvas*. At one point, he appears to evade the issue. Thus, though he quotes, while commenting on I. 3. 43 *Sushuptyutkrāntyōr bhēdēna*, texts from the *Bhāgavata* indicating *bhēda* between *jīvas*, he does not identify himself with them. He simply passes them by, saying that there is *bhēda* between *jīvas* and *Īsvara*. In places like this, *jīva paraspara bhēda* seems to be tacitly denied by him. He appears to quote these texts only to establish *bhēda* between *jīva* and *Īsvara*. According to him, none but Parabrahman can be the Lord of the Universe. However, Suka, in commenting on III. 2. 40 *Pūrvantu Bādarāyanō hētuvyapadēsāth*, states that Nārāyana grants *phala* to *jīvas* in keeping with the merit of their past actions (*Nārāyanāt tattat jīvānām tattat pūrvānugunyēna phalam bhavatīti nīschētavyam*). This would seem to indicate that *tāratamya* as between *jīvas* would seem to be recognized by Suka, though he does not enlarge on the topic. This is a rare statement; usually he propounds *bhēda* as only between *jīva* and *Brahman*, but does not enlarge on differences between *jīva* and *jīva*.

In commenting on I. 1. 13 *Ānandamayōbhyāsāt*, Suka closely follows the reasoning adopted by Jayatīrtha in his *Nyāya Sudhā*, when explaining *charama sabda* in I. 1. 25 *Jyōtishcharanābhidhānāt*.[75] In his comments on the latter, Jayatīrtha raises the issue whether *charama sabda* is applicable to Parabrahman or to the Jīva and answers by saying that it is applicable only to the former. In dealing with the identical point when commenting on I. 1. 13, Suka sets down the same view and concludes by saying that in this *Sūtra* (I. 1. 13) it is Paramātman only that is primarily contemplated and that there is not even a distant suggestion that there is *abhēda* between *Jīva* and *Īsvara* (*tasmāt iha sārīratvasya Paramātmanyēva paryavasānāt na jīvēsvara abhēda prasakti gandhōpi iti nischīyatē*).

Suka's interpretation of I. 1. 13, *Ānandamayōbhyāsāt*, bears also evident traces of adoption of the phraseology used by Jayatīrtha in his *Nyāyasudhā* on the same Sūtra. Suka opens his argument thus :

> " सर्ववेदान्तसारे पुरुषविधोऽन्वयोऽत्र **चरमोऽन्नमयादिषु** ॥ " इति. अत्रत्य **चरम** शब्दस्य आनन्दमयपरतया तैत्तरीयके श्रूयते ॥ श्रु ॥ " तस्माद्वा एतस्माद्विज्ञानमयात् अन्योन्तर आत्मानन्दमय "। इति सर्ववेदान्तसाराम्नात चरम शब्दपर्यायभूतेनात्रत्यानन्दमयशब्देन **किं परमात्मेवोपदिश्यते ? आहोस्वित्परस्मादात्मनोऽन्यजीवः** इति विचिकित्सायामुत्तरत्र " तस्यैष एव शारीरआत्मे " ति शरीरशब्देन जीवस्याभिधानात्स एवात्रोक्त **चरमशब्दपर्याय भूतानन्दमय** शब्दाभिधेयः ॥ इति कृत्वा यश्चरमस्सत्वामिति अस्मिन्नर्थे पर्यवसानात् जीवेश्वराभेदश्च सिद्ध इत्येवं प्राप्ते प्रतिब्रूमः ॥ परमात्मैवेहानन्दमयोभवितुमर्हति, कस्मात् ? अभ्यासात् ॥ परमात्मनि खल्वानन्दोऽभ्यस्यते । अभ्यासो नाम आवृत्तिः तथा हि आनन्दमयं परमात्मानं प्रस्तुत्येव श्रूयते ॥ रसोवै सः ॥ रसंह्येवायं लब्ध्वा आनन्दी भवति ॥ इति अत्ररसशब्देनानन्दमयो परमात्मैवोच्यते ॥····

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[75] *Charama Sabda* has to be differentiated from *Charamaslōka*, which has a large literature associated with it in Srī-Vaishnava philosophy. See *Charamaslōka tātparyadīpika*, see *Madras Catalogue of Skt. MSS.* IV, i. C. page 3665(b); R. No. 3665(b), etc. In the *Rahasyatraya* of Srī Vēdāntāchārya, we have a treatise on the three great principles of Srī-Vaishnava religion : *Ashtākshara*, *Dvaya* and *Charamaslōka*, see for a commentary on it, *Madras Tri. Cat. of MSS.* V, 1. Skt. C. p. 6718, R. No. 4714.

तस्मात् परमात्मन्येव बहुकृत आनन्दोऽभ्यस्यते ॥ तस्मात्स एवेह्यानन्दमय शब्दे नावगम्यते ॥ न तु जीवः ॥

Compare this with Jayatīrthā's comments in his *Nyāyasudhā* on the same Sūtra :—

गुणवाचिनस्त्वानन्दादयः ते गुणिनि ब्रह्मणि वर्तितुं नार्हतीति अन्यत्र प्रसिद्धाः॥ गुणिगुणिनोरभेदस्त्व हि कुण्डलाधिकरण एव साक्षात्सूत्रकृता वक्षते॥ तैत्तरीयके स वा एष पुरुषोऽन्नरसमय इत्यादिनाऽन्नमय प्राणमय मनोमय विज्ञानमयानन्दमयाः पठ्यंते ॥ तत्र संशयः ॥ किमेतेऽन्नमयादयः परमात्मैवा उत तदन्यः कश्चिदिति । सर्वत्र ब्रह्मशब्दश्रवणात्तस्य च विष्ट एषावन्यत्रप्रयोगात् । किं तावत्प्राप्ते ॥ अन्य एवान्नमयादिशब्दार्थ इति ॥ कुतः अन्नमयादि शब्दा हि विकारवाचिनः ॥

Thus, Suka concedes : (1) *Jīvēsa bhēda*, *i.e.*, that jīva and Īsa are different ; (2) *Jagat satyatvam*; *Sāstrasya nityatvam* ; (3) Jīva can attain to the *sārūpya* of Paramātman ; (4) Equality in *svarūpa* as between *avatāras* (III. 3. 19) ; and (5) Both hold that Parabrahman is *Nirguna* in so far as he is held to be absolutely free from *satva*, *rajas* and *tamō* gunas ; but he is held to be full of *ānandādi sadgunas* in regard to which he is described as *gunapūrna*. But Suka does not agree with Ānandatīrtha in assigning *tāratamya-bhēda* among *jīvas*. Suka, however, holds with Ānandatīrtha that Paramātman is one, in all his multifarious forms ; there being no *bhēda* between his *avatāras*.

From what has been set out above, it will be conceded that Suka came long after Ānandatīrtha. How long after, it is not possible to state definitely. But seeing that the position assumed by Suka, though basically identical with that of Ānandatīrtha, is still one somewhat at variance from his, it might be suggested that it is an attempt at producing a *Bhāshya* on the *Brahma-Sūtras* to suit the special position of the Bhāgavata school represented by him. The tradition of this school was evidently one of *bhēda* but not probably *bhēda* of the logical type propounded by Ānandatīrtha and propagandized with zeal by his school. The Smārtha or the Bhāgavata matha of Talkād claimed Suka's *Bhāshya* as its own possibly for two reasons : (*a*) to provide a *Bhāshya* for itself and its adherents, which seemed a necessity seeing that other leading *maths* had their own ; and (*b*) to suggest that though it followed the *bhēda* theory in its interpretation, it differed in certain respects from the theory as worked out by Ānandatīrtha. These differences, though they do not go to the root of the matter, are possibly thought of to be material enough to justify the claim of a separate school. It is possible too that it adheres to quite an ancient tradition. However this may be, these considerations would suggest a date for Suka, the *Bhāshyakāra*, far removed from Ānandatīrtha. While Suka follows closely the latter's *Bhāshya* and as might be expected holds fast to his cardinal doctrine of *bhēda*, he agrees to differ from him in certain other phases of his doctrine. Considerable time should have elapsed between the two for Suka to attempt at popularising such a radical departure from the *bhēda* view propounded by Ānandatīrtha. Probably we may not be far wrong if we premised that a couple of centuries divides the one from the other. If Ānandatīrtha belongs to the 13th century A.D., Suka may, perhaps, be set down to at least the 16th century. His criticism of the Advaita position would induce one to shift him to the next century even. In it, he envisages a fully developed Advaita attitude. Suka's language is also quite modern; he quotes sparingly from the *Srutis*, except where he takes from Ānandatīrtha and the Telugu part of his *Srutigīta* is almost conversational in character. This apart, the type of *bhakti*—utter dependence on God in a spirit of humility—would also seem to signify a late date. Judging from the criticisms he offers on the Advaita School of his time, which is referred to by him at different points of his *Bhāshya*, Suka's work should, if anything, be advanced by perhaps another century. Thus Suka, in fact, holds up devotion to Vishnu of a somewhat extreme type as the ideal to be aimed at by those desirous of *mōksha*. While commenting on I. 2. 5 *Sabda vishēshāt*, he says that in order to realize *mōksha*, Bhagavān Nārāyana alone should be resorted to as the sole bestower of *mōksha* to those who meditate on him (*Āmnāyō vishēshitaha Paramātmanōnyatra mumukshūpāsyatva mapahasati*, *tasmādbhagavānnārāyana ēva mumukshūpāsyatvēna pratipattavyaha*). He approvingly quotes in this connection, in support of his position, *Bhāgavata*, IX. 9. 21, *Avismitam paripūrna kāmam*, etc. Quite in keeping with this standpoint is his summing up of the import of the first five *adhikaranas* of the first *Adhyāya*. Of these five *adhikaranas*, Suka says:—Parama Purusha Bhagavān Nārāyana alone is the one to be meditated upon and discussed, in order to realize *mōksha*, as he is the sole Lord of creation, protection and destruction as declared throughout the Vedānta. In commenting on I. 4. 3, *Tadadhīnatvāttadarthavat*, Suka writes thus referring to the Advaita position:—*Tava mate Brahma vyatirikta vastvabhāvāt*; *yadyakasmādbhēdam parikalpya sāstrāni pravartēran tadā tēshām bhrānta pralāpa vishēsho vyarthāyasascha prasajyatē tasmādasthyaiva tayōrbhēdaha*. This shows that Suka belongs to the post-Sankara period. Commenting on II. 1. 7, *Asaditichēnnapratishēdha mātratvāt*, Suka says:—Those that argue that *visva* is *mithya* are rejected here. *Adhyāsa* in Brahman is what is not supported by the *Vēda*. It is against *Sruti* texts: *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni*, etc. *Jagat* is therefore *satya*. Otherwise, *Sruti* texts will be rendered mutually contradictory. *Brahma satyatva* will end in *Brahma mithyatva*. Both *adhyāsa* and *Brahman* will become *satya*. Thus the *adhyāsa* theory will end in no satisfactory solution (*anavasta*). This will be the result of predicating that *visva* is *mithya*. Therefore *jagat* is *satya* and *nitya*. Hence it is stated in the *Bhāgavata*:—*Satyavratam satyaparam trisatyam satyasya yōnim nihitancha satyē satyasya satyamiti* (Canto X). Again, commenting on II. 1. 8, *Apītan*, etc., Suka adds if *jagat* is *mithya*, then *mōksha* which we aim at is also rendered *mithya*. All the Sāstras are thus rendered *asamanjasa*. It would be folly to predicate *mithyatva*; for it is destructive of all *bhakti*. Thus all meditation will be rendered futile.

In II. 1. 9, *Natudrushtāntābhāvāt*, Suka next observes that when meditation goes, *mōksha* will become impossible. The *Kīta* becomes *Bhramara* by meditation and the fear of *Bhramara*. Similarly the jīva, by meditation on Brahman, can attain *Sārūpya*—the *rūpa* that it meditates on. According to the opposite theory (*asanmata*) if everything is unreal, then the example of *Bhramara* and *Kīta* would be unreal. The final result of *sārūpya*, *i.e.*, Brahmatva, would be thus rendered unreal, so that the doctrine itself becomes untrue (*asamanjasa*). Commenting on II. 1. 10, *Svapaksha dōshāchcha*, Suka says :—Your own view-point is false. If *śarīra* is *asatya*, then *jīva* and *Īsvara* being one and both within bondage, there will be no such thing as father, teacher, son, disciple, etc., thereby resulting in *mahādōsha*. Therefore, such a view-point is extremely faulty. This is made clear in our *Srutigītā Bhāshya*.[76] Next commenting on II. 1. 11, *Tarkāpratishtānādapi*, Suka says that those who leave the *Vēdas* and base their argument on mere logic, find it impossible to establish their doctrine. Vaiseshikas base themselves on logic but hold that there is *bhēda* between *jīva* and *Īsvara*. Others basing on logic, go a different way and try to establish a doctrine which cannot carry conviction (*i.e.*, that *visva* is *mithya*). Commenting on II. 1. 12, *Anyadhānumēyamitichē dēvamapyanirmōksha prasangaha*, Suka says that if *jagat* is *mithya*, *sarīra* is denied. If *sarīra* is denied, then the *sarīra*-less *ātman* postulated by the doctrine presumes he is already *Brahman* and as such has attained *mōksha*. Hence *mōksha-sādhana* for him is needless (*asat*). Commenting on II. 1. 13, *Yētēnasishtāparigrahā apivyākhyātāha*, Suka says that the doctrine of the *nirīsvara* Sānkhyas is also contradicted here. Suka follows the reading of Rāmānuja in II. 1. 18 *Asadvyapadēsānnē*, etc.—which *Sūtra* is split into two by Ānandatīrtha and Suka. But in interpreting the *Sūtra*, Suka quotes the very *Sruti* text cited by Ānandatīrtha—*nāsadasīnnō sadāsīththadānīm*. The strong criticism that is offered by Suka of the Advaita position and the rest of his criticism of that standpoint as briefly indicated above would seem to indicate that he probably wrote long after the Advaita position had become fully established. The cumulative effect of all available evidence—historical and philosophical—would seem to suggest that he belonged to the 16th, if not indeed, to the 17th century.

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[76] This work has been quoted more than once by Suka in his *Bhāshya*. See text above in regard to Suka's *Bhāshya* on it. *Srutigītā* is a part of Canto X of *Bhāgavata*, in which *jagat satyatva* is established.

Though he follows Ānandatīrtha in upholding the *bhēda* doctrine, Suka differs from him largely in his readings of the text of the *Brahma-Sūtra*, thus showing that he only adopts as much as is necessary for his purposes and no more. Thus unlike Ānandatīrtha, but like Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Srīkara, he retains the *Sūtra* I. 1. 9, *Pratignāvirōdhāt*. Rāmānuja interprets the *pratigna* here referred to as the statement made in the *Chchāndōgya* text (VI. 1):—Through the knowledge of one thing all things are to be known. Nimbārka follows him in this interpretation as well and both use it to reject the Pūrvapakshin's argument that *sat* is the Pradhāna. If the Pradhāna were the cause, says Rāmānuja, the aggregate of sentient beings could not be known through it, for sentient beings are not the effect of a non-sentient principle, and there would thus arise a contradiction. Nimbārka's comment is not only brief—just a line—but also merely turns into aphoristic form what Rāmānuja had said before him. Quoting the same text as Rāmānuja, he remarks that to suggest that the cause is a non-sentient being cannot prove acceptable. (*Kincha ekavidyā na tu sarvavidyā na pratignā virōdhādapi na achētana kāranādāha sādhuh*). Suka, with whom *Brahma Tarka* occupies a place wholly subordinate to *Bhakti*, does not refer to Pradhāna in this connection except for the evolution from the *Bhāgavata* of the text *Yanmāyayā gahanayā* (*Bhāgavata*, IV. 7. 30) in his comment on *Brahma-Sūtra*, I. 1. 6, *Gaunaschēnnātma sabdāt*. On this text, he adds the remark that though Prakriti looks as the more prominent thing, Paramātman is the cause. (*Tataschāyamabhigna sabdah prakritēmukhya ēva bhavati*, *tēna cha paramātmaiva gamyate tasmājjagatkāranatva rūpasya paramātma lakshanasya na kāchitkshatiḥ*). Later, when he comments on I. 1. 9, *Pratignā virōdhāt*, Suka omits all mention of Prakriti and proceeds :—Unless one meditates according to the Sāstras, there is no realization of Mōksha to him. Why? *Pratignā virōdhāt*, *i.e.*, it is opposed to the declared sayings (of the Upanishads). If at all any one can realize Mōksha, then, he could do so only in accordance with the texts: No one that does not duly meditate on Me with all his heart and soul, he cannot realize Me, through My grace, through knowledge and through the grace of My Lakshmi (*Bhāgavata*, X. 72. 11); No one that does not duly become a suppliant of Mine will be eligible for realizing Me (*Bhāgavata* X. 51. 43); "Know it for certain, O Kauntēya, no faithful servant (*bhakta*) of Mine will come to ruin" (*Bhagavad-Gītā*, IX. 31.). Thus these *pratignas* (avowed statements) of Parabrahman will be contradicted. Therefore, in this way, should one with faith in him meditate upon and worship the immeasurably powerful Almighty. Such is the interpretation put—from the Bhakti point of view—by Suka on this *Sūtra*.

Suka treats the *Pasupatyadhikarana* and *Uthpathyadhikarana* as one single *adhikarana* and calls it *Pasupathyadhikarana*. In this he differs from the other commentators.

Sankara thus arranges these sets of *sūtras* :—

II. 2. 33-36. Ekasminnasambhavādhikaranam in which the systems of Sugata and Vivasana (*i.e.*, Buddhist and Jaina) systems are rejected.

(Naikasminnasambhavāt ; Evancha ātmā kārthsnyam ; Nacha paryāyādapyavirōdhō vikārādibhyah ; Antyāvasthitēschōbhayannityātvādaviseshah.)

II. 2. 37-14. Patyadhikaranam.

Patyurasāmanjasyāt ; Sambandhānupapaththēscha ; Adhishthānānupapaththescha ; Karanavachchēnnabhōgādibhyah ; Antavattvamāsarvagnatāva.

The Pasupati and Nirguna doctrines are rejected.

II. 2. 42-45. Utpatyasambhavādhikaranam.

Utpatyasambhavāt; Nachakartuh karanam; Vignānādibhāve vā tadapratishēdhah; Vipratishēdhāchcha.

Bhāgavata doctrine is rejected.

Rāmānuja's arrangement is as follows :—

II. 2. 31-34. Ekasminnasambhavādhikaranam.

Naikasmin, etc.	.. II. 2. 31.
Evanchā, etc.	.. II. 2. 32.
Nachaparyā, etc.	.. II. 2. 33.
Antyāvasththē, etc.	.. II. 2. 34.

Sugata and Jaina doctrines are rejected.

II. 2. 35-38. Pasupatyadhikaranam.

Patyura, etc.	.. II. 2. 35.
Adhisthānā, etc.	.. II. 2. 36.
Karanā, etc.	.. II. 2. 37.
Antavattva, etc.	.. II. 2. 38.

Rāmānuja omits the Sūtra *Sambandhānupapaththescha.* This adhikaranam, in his view, rejects the Pāsupata doctrine.

II. 2. 39-42. Utpatyasambhavādhikaranam.

Utpatyasambhavāt	.. II. 2. 39.
Nachakartuh karanam	.. II. 2. 40.
Vignānādi, etc.	.. II. 2. 41.
Vipratishēdhāchcha	.. II. 2. 42.

Bādarāyana establishes, according to Rāmānuja, the Bhāgavata doctrine in this adhikaranam.

Ānandatīrtha adopts the following arrangement :—

II. 2. 33-36. Naikasmin adhikaranam.

Naikasmin, etc.	.. II. 2. 33.
Evanchā, etc.	.. II. 2. 34.
Nacha, etc.	.. II. 2. 35.
Antyāvasthiteschōbhayanityatvādaviseshāh, etc.	II. 2. 36.

The Syādvāda mata (*i.e.*, Jaina system) is rejected.

II. 2. 37-41. Patyuradhikaranam.

Patyurasam, etc.	.. II. 2. 37.
Sambandha, etc.	.. II. 2. 38.
Adhisthā, etc.	.. II. 2. 39.
Karana, etc.	.. II. 2. 40.
Antavattva, etc.	.. II. 2. 41.

The Pāsupata system is rejected.

II. 2. 42-45. Utpatyadhikaranam.

Utpatya, etc.	.. II. 2. 42.
Nacha, etc.	.. II. 2. 43.
Vignā, etc.	.. II. 2. 44.
Viprati, etc.	.. II. 2. 45.

The Sakti doctrine is rejected.

Nimbārka has the following arrangement :—

II. 2. 33-36.

Naikasmin, etc.	.. II. 2. 33.
Antyāvasthi, etc.	.. II. 2. 36.

The Jaina doctrine is rejected by Bādarāyana in these four sūtras.

II. 2. 37-41.

Patyur, etc. to Antavattva, etc.

The Pāsupata system is rejected.

II. 2. 42-46.

Utpatti, etc. to Vipratishēdha, etc.

The Sakti doctrine is rejected.

Nimbārka follows Ānandatīrtha, his commentary being nothing more than the noting down of the conclusions arrived at by Ānandatīrtha, the argumentative portion being almost entirely omitted. This is one of the Adhikaranas which unmistakably shows that Nimbārka came *after* Ānandatīrtha and not *vice versa.*

Vallabha styles *sūtras* 33-36 as the Naikasminnasambhavādityadhikaranam and includes the following *sūtras* under it :—

Naikasminnasambhavāt	.. II. 2. 33.
Evancha, etc.	.. II. 2. 34.
Nachaparyā, etc.	.. II. 2. 35.
Antyāvasthi, etc.	.. II. 2. 36.

According to Vallabha, Bādarāyana in these *sūtras* rejects the Vivasana, *i.e.*, Jaina, doctrine.

II. 2. 37-41. Patyurasāmanjasyadhikaranam.

Patyurasāmanjasyāt	.. II. 2. 37.
Samban, etc.	.. II. 2. 38.
Adhishthāna, etc.	.. II. 2. 39.
Karana, etc.	.. II. 2. 40.
Antavattva, etc.	.. II. 2. 41.

According to him, Bādarāyana rejects in these *sūtras* Anīsvara Tārkikavāda, *i.e.*, the system that postulates that there is no creating Lord.

II. 2. 42-45. Uttpaththisambhavādhikaranam.

Utpattisambhavāt	.. II. 2. 42.
Nachakartuh, etc.	.. II. 2. 43.
Vignānādi, etc.	.. II. 2. 44.
Vipratishēdhāchcha	.. II. 2. 45.

Bādarāyana here rejects, according to him, some parts of the Bhāgavata system.

Vallabha simply states the conclusions of Sankara in a few sentences, often using Sankara's words and phrases.

Suka exhibits these identical *sūtras* thus :—

II. 2. 32-35. Ekasminnasambhavādhikaranam.

Naikasminsambhavāt; Evanchātmākārthsnyam; Nachaparyāyadapyavirōdhōvikārādibhyah ; Anthyāvasthitēschōbhaya nityatvādavisēshah.

According to him, the Jaina system is rejected in these *sūtras*.

II. 2. 36-44. Pasupathyadhikaranam.

Pathyurasāmanjasyāt ; Sambandhānupapaththeh; "Adhishthanānupapathescha" ; Karanavāchēnnabhōgādibhyah ; Anthavathvamasarvagnathāva ; Utpatyasambhavāt ; Nachakarthuhkāranam ; Vignānādibhāvēvātadapratishēdhah ; Vipratishēdhāchcha.

The Pāsupata system is, according to him, rejected in these *sūtras*.

Suka thus is unique in his division of the *sūtras*; in place of three he has only two *adhikaranas*. The first of these he styles *Ekasminsambhavādhikaranam*, following Sankara and Rāmānuja; the second he calls *Pasupatyadhikaranam*, in which he combines the *sūtras* which go to form the *Patyadhikaranam* and *Utpatyasambhavādhikaranam* of Sankara and *Pasupatyadhikaranam* and *Utpathyadhikaranam* of Rāmānuja. As will be seen, *Pasupatyadhikaranam* is the name given by Suka to the two sets of *adhikaranams* combined by him. In regard to the subject-matter, in the *Ekasminsambhavādhikaranam*, Suka agrees with the rest of the commentators in suggesting that in them Bādarāyana rejects the Jaina system. In the next *adhikaranam*, Suka does not agree with Sankara and Rāmānuja in the view that there is any reference in the *sūtras* comprising it to the Bhāgavata system. He treats the whole as one *adhikaranam* and applies it to the Pasupati system. In this he partly agrees with Ānandatīrtha and Nimbārka, who suggest that there is no reference to the Bhāgavata system in these *sūtras*. Ānandatīrtha divides the *sūtras* forming it into two *adhikaranams* and styles them *Patyuradhikaranam* (II. 2. 37 to 41) and *Utpatyadhikaranam* (II. 2. 42-45) in which the Pāsupata and Sakti systems are respectively rejected by him. Suka, it will be seen, is unwilling to divide these *sūtras* into two *adhikaranams* and to treat the second set of these *sūtras* as applicable to the Sakti doctrine. He suggests that all these *sūtras* form only one *adhikaranam* and that they all refer exclusively to the Pāsupata system which, according to him, is rejected by Bādarāyana. Why he does this will be apparent when it is stated that Suka belongs to the Bhāgavata school and is loath to admit there is any discussion of that doctrine with a view to its rejection in these *sūtras*. One other remarkable feature of Suka's commentary in this part of his work is that he does not quote any slōkas from the *Bhāgavata* to support his position from II. 2. 32 to II. 2. 42. In commenting on II. 2. 44, *Vignānādibhāvēvā tadapratishēdhaḥ*, he quotes three slōkas from the *Bhāgavata* (IV. 2. 28; IV. 2. 29 and IV. 2. 30), in which it is stated that those who follow Śiva are Pāshandas; that they are opposed to the Vaishnava faith; that they adhere to customs not in keeping with accepted sanctions (*nashta saucha*); that they are bigoted; that they wear *jata*, *bhasma* and *asthi*; that they assume the *Sivadīksha*; and that they worship deities opposed to the *dēvatas*, find fault with Brāhmanas, and that thus they derive the title *Pāshandas*, etc. These quotations are intended to support Suka's position deduced from this *sūtra* (II. 2. 43) that those who are possessed of wisdom derived from *gnāna vignāna vairāgyādi guṇas* should reject a system like that of the Pāsupatas which makes fun of the *Vēdas*, the *Brāhmanas*, the *Yagnapurusha*, etc. Apart from these three quotations from the *Bhāgavata* to buttress his position against the Pāsupatas, the only other slōka quoted by Suka from that work occurs in the next *sūtra* (II. 2. 44) *Vipratishedhāchcha*. This slōka (IX. 9. 30) is quoted to support the position that the Pāsupata system should be discarded. The slōka *Tathēti rāgnābhihitam sarvalōka hitassivaḥ* । *dadharāvahitō Gangām pāda pūta jalam harēḥ* ॥ suggests the adoration of Śiva in an entirely different aspect. (Let it be so; and so saying God Śiva, who is the bestower of happiness on the whole world, at once took on his head the waters of the Ganges in order to be free from all pollution as its waters poured forth from the sacred feet of Hari).[77] He is represented as the friend of all kinds of people (*Sarvajana hitachintaka*), of those who follow the *Purānas* and *Upanishads* and those who are opposed to them. Siva is thus associated with both. This position is supported further by Suka by a text, whose source is not disclosed by Suka himself but which is actually found quoted by Ānandatīrtha in his *Mahābhārata Tātparya Nirnaya* as taken by him from the *Varāha Purāna.*

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[77] The reference is to the story of Śiva purging himself of all sin acquired by his connection with those not friendly to Vishnu. By his act of receiving Ganga on his head, he became "sinless".

त्वं हि रुद्र महाभाग मोहशास्त्राणि कारय ॥
अतथ्यानि वितथ्यानि विपरीतानि दर्शय ।
प्रकाशं कुरु चात्मानमप्रकाशं च मां कुरु ॥

Tvam hi Rudra mahābhāga mōhasāstrāni kāraya ॥
Atathyāni vitathyāni viparītāni darsaya ।
Prakāsam kuru chātmānam aprakāsam cha mām kuru ॥
etc.

(Oh illustrious Rudra! bring to light false doctrines exhibiting untruths, falsehoods and contrary teachings. Extol your own greatness; and keep me hidden from my antagonists.)

This was, Suka says, given as a command to Śiva by Vishnu in order to hide himself from coming into contact with people possessing the *tāmasa* quality and to inculcate the doctrine (of the Pāsupata system) in the world that Pasupati is the sole lord of the Universe to those who disbelieved in the greatness of Nārāyana. Since Pasupati is thus kind to all, Śiva is described to be *sarvalōkahita.*

Thus, while Suka differs from Ānandatīrtha in his grouping of the *sūtras*, he agrees with him in securing the *Bhāgavata* position, by suggesting that there is no reference to it in the *sūtras*. His adoption of the quotation from the *Varāha Purāna* shows that he is, as customary with him, following Ānandatīrtha in his interpretation, wherever possible, of the *sūtras*. Incidentally, the particular slōkas quoted by him from the *Bhāgavata* show that he is quite a late commentator.

There is evidence to believe that Suka, the commentator, was an author who came subsequent to Vijayadhwaja, the author of *Padyaratnāvali*, the leading *Madhva* commentary on the *Bhāgavata*. Suka incorporates in his commentaries on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, the identical slōkas from the *Bhāgavata* which Vijayadhwaja has linked the *sūtras* with in explaining the slōkas. To put the matter in another way, while Vijayadhwaja has quoted certain *sūtras* from the *Brahma-Sūtras* in explaining a particular slōka in the *Bhāgavata*, Suka has, in his turn, taken the self-same slōkas to explain the *sūtras* when writing his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*. In a word, the key to Suka's interpretation of the *Brahma-Sūtras* is to be found in *Vijayadhwajīya*. Vijayadhwaja was an ascetic *guru* of the Pejāwar math, one of the eight maths of Udipi, founded by Ānandatīrtha. He probably lived about the sixteenth century. Suka, who follows his methodology, must be ascribed to a date posterior to him—say by about a century or so.

Suka treats I. 4. 1, *Ānumānika mapyēkēshāmitichēnna sarīra rūpakavinyastha grihītēḥ darsayaticha* as two *sūtras* dividing it thus:—(1) *Ānu. . . . grihītēḥ* and (2) *Darsayatīcha*. All the other commentators—Sankara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Ānandatīrtha, Nimbārka, Vallabha, Vignānabhikshu and Srīkara—combine these two *sūtras* into one. Suka makes the first part the *pūrvapaksha* and in the second part establishes the *Siddhāntā*, finally fixing that there is bhēda between *jīva* and *Īsvara*. In developing the argument, he follows Ānandatīrtha. In treating the first part as helping to set down the *pūrvapaksha* argument, he adopts Sankara's position, while in fixing the *Siddhānta*, he follows Ānandatīrtha. Suka, in fact, follows Ānandatīrtha in his *pada*, though he does not explain *ka* in *rūpaka* in the first part of this *sūtra*. *Ka* is, as aptly pointed out by Ānandatīrtha, quoting Pānini, evidence of *inferiority*—inferiority of the *jīva* to *Īsvara*. The *jīva* is not *rūpa* but *rūpaka* of *Īsvara*, *i.e.*, inferior to *Īsvara*.

Following Rāmānuja, Suka, again, treats II. 1. 11 and II. 1. 12 as two different *sūtras*, whereas Ānandatīrtha and Sankara read them together as one *sūtra*, though there is a slight difference in the reading of the latter. Such variations, however, are common among commentators on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, as will be seen from the tables of comparison given in an Appendix to this volume (see Appendices). As this matter is considered at some length below, it is unnecessary to pursue it further here. The point to note is that though Suka agrees with Ānandatīrtha generally, there are occasions on which he differs from him as from the rest of his predecessors. A few other *sūtras* in the commentaries in which Suka follows Ānandatīrtha either in his interpretation or in requoting the *Sruti* texts quoted by him may be simply noted :—I. 1. 1, *Athāthō brahmajignāsa* ; I. 1. 5, *Gaunaschēnnātma sabdāt*; I. 1. 15, *Taddhētu vyapadēsāchcha* ; I. 1. 18, *Bhēda vyapadēsāchcha* ; I. 1. 20, *Asmin nasyacha tadyōgamsāsti* ; I. 1. 29, *Prānastathānugamāt* ; I. 1. 31, *Sāstradrushstyātūpadēsō vāmadēvavat* ; I. 2. 19, *Antaryāmyadhidaivādhilōkādishu taddharmavyapadēsāt* ; I. 2. 20, *Nacha smārtha matāddharmābhilāpāchchārīrascha* ; I. 4. 1, *Ānumānik mapyēkēshāmitichēnna sarīra rūpaka vinyastha grihītēh darshayati cha ;* I. 4. 7, *Trayānāmēvachaiva mupanyāsaḥ prasnascha ;* etc.

Suka Bhashya Tika.

A few words may be added about the writer of the *Tīka* on the *Bhāshya* of Suka. The name of the writer of the *Tīka* on this *Bhāshya* is Krishnāchārya (see *Suka Bhāshya*, p. 232). He belonged to the family of one Rāmakrishnāchārya (*anvayasambhūta*). He was of the Gārgya gōtra. His name appears as *Krishnamāchārya* on p. 1 of the *Suka Bhāshya*, but this seems a mistake for *Krishnāchārya*. He calls his work *Sarvavēdāntasāra Mīmāmsa Bhāshya Chandrikā*, in which only the more difficult passages or contexts are explained by him. The date of Krishnāchārya is not known. Among the verses forming the *Mangalaslōka* of his commentary are two (4 and 5), which seem to be but echoes of two *slōkas* of Jayatīrtha's *Mangalaslōka* in his *Tatvaprakāsika*, a commentary on Ānandatīrtha's *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāshya*. The following are the *slōkas* of Suka :—

एतद्भाष्यान्वयाच्छुद्ध्येन्ममेयं गीरसत्यपि ।
अप्याविलंहिरथ्याम्भो गङ्गासङ्गाद्विशुद्ध्यति ॥४॥
येषांस्वान्तंभवेत्तान्तं महानिर्वृतिवीक्षणे ।
तत्कृतेतान्तुसंक्षिप्य क्रियते भाष्यचान्द्रिका ॥५॥

With these, compare the two following *slōkas* taken from Jayatīrtha's work (*Tatvaprakāsika* I. *Mangalācharana slōkas*).

अथ तत्कृपया ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यं यथामति ।
व्याकुर्वे श्रीमदानन्दतीर्थार्यमुखनिःसृतं ॥६॥
गङ्गासङ्गेन नैर्मल्यं रथ्याद्भिर्लभ्यते यथा ।
वाचो विशुद्धिसिद्ध्यर्थं सङ्गम्यन्ते गुरोर्गिरः ॥७॥

The following similarities between the two sets of *slōkas* may be noted :—

(1) The words used by Jayatīrtha are reproduced, for example, *rathyāmbho* and *gangasangād visuddhyati* in Suka appear in Jayatīrtha as *rathyādbhiḥ* and *gangāsangēna nairmalyam.*

(2) The governing idea in both is the same.

Krishnāchārya's *slōkas* seem to be an adaptation of Jayatīrtha's and not *vice versa*.

As we know Jayatīrtha lived in the 14th century, it has to be inferred that Krishnāchārya came after Jayatīrtha. How long after, it is not possible to determine. As Suka himself is a late commentator on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, his commentator should have come some time after him. In any case, he cannot be much older than the 17th century A.D.

Srikantha.

It has been mentioned above that Srīkantha, the author of the *Bhāshya* known after him, lived about the third quarter of the 13th century A.D. His *Bhāshya* admittedly outlines the Śaiva Visishtādvaita Siddhānta. (See his comments on II. 1. 22, *Adhikantu bhēdanirdēśāt.*)[78] He identifies Siva with Parabrahman, thus subordinating all other deities to Siva. (See I. 1. 17-20; I. 2. 5; I. 2. 8; I. 3. 2; III. 2. 35-36; III. 3. 15-17; IV. 4. 9; etc.) The superiority to Siva is sought to be established by him in his commentary on III. 2. 35, *Tathā'nyapratishēdhāt* and in III. 2. 36, *Anēna sarvagñatatva māyāmaśabdādibhyaḥ*. At the same time, he endeavours to avoid the extreme, irreconcilable points of view. Thus, in commenting on II. 3. 42 *Apicha smaryate*, though he protests against the view of some that the Vēdas establish the supremacy of Vishnu, he remarks that matters of this kind are best left undiscussed (*avichārita ramaṇīyam*). While the very position occupied by Srīpati differentiates him from Srīkantha, it is clear that Srīpati was well acquainted with the *Bhāshya* of Srīkantha. Often the verbal similarity is so great as to make one infer that he had Srīkantha's work before him as he wrote his own. But there is, however, enough evidence in Srīpati's own work that he was no mere literary imitator or a common verbal copyist. He adopts the arguments of Srīkantha for his particular purposes but he goes his own way whenever Srīkantha's theory is opposed to his own. In some places, Srīpati expands the arguments of Srīkantha though he does thus only to suit his own object, *i.e.*, for elaborating his special interpretation of the *Sūtras*. The following *sūtras* may be quoted in illustration of this observation:—III. 3. 29 and 30; III. 3. 32; III. 3. 33; III. 3. 34; IV. 1. 3.; IV. 2. 13; IV. 3. 14 and IV. 3. 15.

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[78] In the course of his comments on this Sūtra, Srīkantha writes: *Nanu 'tadananyatvam' ityabhēdapratipādanāt 'adhikantu' iti bhēdapratipādanāt prapancha brahmaṇōḥ bhēdābhēdaḥ sādhitō bhavatīti chēt—na, bhēdābhēdakalpam visishtādvaitam sādhayāmaḥ* | *na vayam brahmaprapanchayōratyantamēva bhēdavādinaḥ ghatapatayōriva tadanyatva parasrutivirōdhāt* | *na vā atyantabhēdavādinaḥ suktirajatayōrivaikataramityātvēna, tatsvābhāvika gunabhēda parasruti virọdhāt* | *na cha bhēdābhēdavādinaḥ, vastu virōdhāt* | *kintu sarīrasarīriṇōriva*

In III. 3. 32, the *Chchāndōgya* text merely referred to by Srīkantha is actually quoted by Srīpati, while the very words of Srīkantha are adopted in places. The adaptation is, however, subject to the qualification that it is limited to his own needs; for Srīpati refers to Lingadhāraṇa as a necessary qualification. Though it is only mentioned in one place, Lingadhāraṇa should be taken, he says, to be

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guṇaguṇinōriva cha visishtādvaita vādinaḥ | *prapancha brahmaṇōranan-yatvam nāma mrudghatayōriva guṇaguṇinōriva kāryakāraṇatvēna visēshaṇa visēshyatvēna vinābhāvarahitatvam* ||

prescribed throughout as a preliminary qualification for *upāsana*. All this is of course foreign to Srīkantha.

On the other hand, the deviation is sometimes very wide. Thus in *Sūtra* II. 1. 4, Srīkantha says :—*ataḥ satyagnānānandarūpāt Brāhmaṇō asya* (*prapanchasya*) *vailakshaṇyam siddham*. Commenting on the same *Sūtra*, Srīpati taking the opposite view, says *athō Brahma pradhāna yōḥ navailakshaṇyam ityāḥ*. In some cases the illustrations used by Srīkantha in one *Sūtra* re-appear in Srīpati's commentary under another. Thus the illustration of the *gōvu* and the *mahisha* in II. 1. 4 in Srīkantha appear in II. 4. 18 in Srīpati. Commenting on II. 1. 4, *Navilakshaṇatvādasya tathēvancha sabdāt*, Srīkantha states that Paramātman being *satyagnānānandarūpa* and being the *kāraṇasrishti*, is also *kāryarūpa*. This is mutually contradictory. Looking at *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*, there seems all the difference between *kārya* and *kāraṇa* as between *gōvu* and *mahisha*. (That is, the cow cannot be buffalo any more than *kārya* can be *kāraṇa*.) Srīpati in II. 4. 18 *Vaishyēttu tadvadastadvādaḥ*, states that the *ātma* in accordance with the *nyāya kāraṇaguṇāḥ kārye parisamkrāmanti iti*, etc., enters the jīva and giving himself the *sarīra* made up of the *pancha bhūtas*, meditates through the *jnānēndriyas*, and the *bhāva* of *bimbapratibimba* and becomes himself the *kartru*. The Advaita argument that holds that the *jīva* is Īsvara and that the jīva and the Īsvara are *abhēda* from the *aupachārika* point of view only, is accordingly held to be like the invented argument which holds that the elephant is the horse and is as such unacceptable to us (*asamanjasa*). Therefore *bhēda* between *jīva* and *Īsvara* in Srīpati's view has to be accepted, as the opposite view is an obvious contradiction of several *Sruti* and *Smriti* texts (*pratyaksha sruti smriti virōdhāt*). Similarly, the example of the *tatāka* appearing in Srīkantha under *Sūtra* III. 3. 29, *Gaterarthavatvamubhayadhānyadhātivirōdhaḥ*, re-appears in Srīpati under III. 3. 30, *Upapannasthallakshanārthopalabdhērlōkavachcha*. But Srīpati, however, does not reverse the order of these *sūtras* as Srīkantha does nor does he use the example of the king and the subject in commenting on III. 3. 29.

Chief Commentators in Chronological Order.

Summing up, we may now note, in chronological order, the names of the chief commentators whose works have actually come down to us and whose systems are still studied with religious interest :—

Sl. No.	Name	Probable Date	Description of System
1	Śankara	788-820 A.D.	*Nirviseshādvaita*
2	Bhāskara	*circa* 1000 A.D.	*Bhēdābhēda*
3	Rāmānuja	*circa* 1140 A.D.	*Visishtādvaita*
4	Ànandatīrtha (Madhva)	1238 A.D.	*Dvaita*
5	Nimbārka	1250 A.D.	*Dvaitādvaita*
6	Srīkantha	1270 A.D.	*Saiva Visishtādvaita*
7	Srīpati	*circa* 1400 A.D.	*Bhedābhēdātmaka Visishtādvaita*
8	Vallabha	1479-1544 A.D.	*Suddhādvaita*
9	Suka	*circa* 1550 A.D.	*Bhēdavāda*
10	Vignānabhikshu	*circa* 1600 A.D.	*Ātma-Brahmaikya Bhēdavāda*
11	Baladēva	*circa* 1725 A.D.	*Achintyabhēdābhēda*

As has been remarked above, there had been commentators on the *Brahma-Sūtras* before Śankara, though Śankara does not mention by name those whom he actually refers to. If Rāmānuja is any guide in the matter, it is possible that most, if not all, of these commentators, including Bōdhāyana and the rest of those mentioned in the *Vēdārtha Sangraha*, were Vaishnavas. This seems a plausible inference, for Śankara quotes or refers to them mainly to record his dissent from them (see *ante*, page 115). There is thus some ground for the belief that the *Brahma-Sūtras* were first commented upon by some Vaishnava writers who professed a form of modified monism. This shows that the *Brahma-Sūtras* were originally regarded as an authoritative work of the dualists, though Bādarāyana himself was more a theist (*Brahmavādin*) rather than an absolutist (*Advaitin*) or a dualist (*Dvaitin*).[79] This view is supported by the fact that we have no writer earlier than Gaudapāda who propounded monistic theories as he did nor any commentator prior to Śankara, who interpreted the *Brahma-Sūtras* from the strictly monistic standpoint as he did. Gaudapāda himself does not refer to any other writer of the monistic school, nor even to Bādarāyana, while Śankara states in ending his commentary on Gaudapada's *Kārika*, that the Advaita teaching was recovered from the *Vēdas* by Gaudapāda. It is remarkable that Śankara should attribute such recovery to Gaudapāda and not to Bādarāyana. These facts seem to more than justify the suggestion of Mr. Das Gupta that "as the pure monism of the Upanishads was not worked out in a coherent manner for the formation of a monistic system, it was dealt with by people who had sympathies with some form of dualism which was already developing in the later days of the *Upanishads* as evidenced by the dualistic tendencies of such *Upanishads* as the *Svetāsvatara* and the like. The epic *Sānkhya* was also

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[79] The alternative names for the work referred to below show its original Vaishnava character :—

(1) *Brahma-Sūtrāni :* Trivikrama Panditāchārya in his *Vāyu Stuti :—Rartham lōkōpakluptyai guṇa gaṇa nilayaḥ sūtrayāmāsa*

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kritsnam| *yōsō Vyāsābhidhānaḥ tamaḥ maharahaḥ Brahmasūtrāni kritva*|| (2) *Krishna-Sūtrāni :* Ānandatīrtha in his *Nyāya Vivarana :—Kritvābhāshyānubhāshyeham apivēdārtha satpatēḥ* | *Krishnasya Sūtra-anuvyākhyā sauyāya nivrutīm chatu* || (3) *Hari-Sūtrāni*: Sankarshanatīrtha in his *Jayatīrtha Vijaya :—Adūshyamānyai Harisūtra bhāshyam*, etc. (4) *Vyāsa-Sūtrāni :* Ānandatīrtha in his *Brahma-sūtra Bhāshya :—Atha tatkrupayā Vyāsasūtrāni chakāra Badarāyanaḥ*. (5) *Urukrama-Sūtra*, where *uru* stands for Vishnu. (*Cf. Urukrama-Gītā*, the name for the *Bhagavad-Gītā* or *Krishna-Gītā*) Ānandatīrtha in his *Aitarēya Bhāshya :—Paramasya Vishnōḥ māhātmyam varnitam Urukrama Sūtrēshu* | *Urukramasya sahibindu iththa Vishnōpade parame madhva utsāh* || *Rig Veda*, I. 4. 8. (6) *Vēdānta-Sūtrāni :* Narāyana Panditāchārya in *Madhva Vijaya :—Vēdānta sūtrāni kritānta vittamō bhāshyādasau sishya ganāya sumsadi* || (7) *Uttara mīmāmsā-Sūtrāni.* (8) *Vishnu-Sūtrāni*: Ānandatīrtha in his *Gītā-Bhāshya :—Vishnu māhātmaya lesaya vibhakasya cha kotidhā* | *Tasyāpyanantadhātasya* | *Punasyapihyanantadhā* | *naikamsya samamahātmya Srī Sēsha Brahma Sankara iti varnitam Vishnu Sūtrēshu.* (9) *Bhēda-Sūtra* : Ānandatīrtha in his *Vishnutatva Nirnaya* says :—*Vishnōsarvōtmatvantu Bhēda Sūtreshuvarnitam vishēshēna nantu kripayā Vēdavyāsena* || (10) *Sārīraka Mīmāmsa* : Śankara and Rāmānuja call it by this name. Jayatīrtha in his *Nyāya Sūtra* says :—*Imāni sārīraka mīmāmsa sūtrāni iti vadan vyākhyānan akurutam.*

the result of this dualistic development" (*Hist. of Ind. Philosophy*, I. 422). Accordingly Mr. Das Gupta inclines to the view that the dualistic interpretations of the *Brahma-Sūtras* are probably more faithful to the *sūtras* than the interpretations of Śankara. This view is not, as may at first be supposed, at variance with that of Dr. Thibaut who has remarked that while the interpretation of Śankara is nearer to the teaching of the *Upanishads* than to that of the *Sūtras* of Bādarāyana, the system of Rāmānuja is in some important points closely related to that of the *Sūtras* (*Vedānta Sūtras with the Commentary of Śankarāchārya*, introduction, cxxvi). For Rāmānuja's system is, in its fundamental aspects, but a development of the view of Bodhāyana, perhaps, the earliest of the Vaishnavite commentators of the Ekāntabhāva School. It is his theory or rather teaching as embodied in his interpretation of the *Brahma-Sūtras* that Rāmānuja avowedly sought to restore for the benefit of the world. If this view is founded in sound reasoning, as it seems to be, then Bodhāyana should be accounted one of those Vaishnavas who may perhaps be identified with the followers of the Ekāntabhāva and who are represented as having professed that form of Vaishnavism which is enunciated in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. If the *Gītā* was not actually a product of the Ekāntika Vaishnavas, it was at least thoroughly representative of the views held by them. It is not surprising, therefore, that the *Brahma-Sūtras* should be referred to in the *Gītā* and spoken of as expounding, with the aid of cogent reasoning, the religion taught by it. (See *Bhagavad-Gītā*, XIII, 5.) This view renders the reference in the *Gītā* to the *Brahma-Sūtras* a perfectly natural one and not a mere interpolation as has been sometimes suggested.[80] The late

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[80] A possible reference to the *Brahma-Sūtras* may also be traced in *Bhagavad-Gītā*, VII, 7, which may be thus rendered :—"There is naught whatsoever higher than I, O Dhananjaya. All this is woven in me as rows of pearl-like letters are in the *Sūtra*." As regards the word *prōtam* appearing in this verse, Ānandatīrtha quotes the phrase *ōtam prōtam patavat* occurring in the *Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, V. 8. 11, commentary on I. 3. 10, *Aksharādhikaraṇa*. Where the

Mr. Telang assigned the *Bhagavad-Gītā* to the third century B.C. On independent grounds Sir Ramakrishna Bhandarkar has come to the conclusion that the date of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* is not later than the beginning of the fourth century before the Christian era. (See *Vaishnavism*, *Saivism*, etc., 13.) Writing more recently Dr. Das Gupta has found himself unable to accept the view of Professor Jacobi, who suggesting that the references to Buddhism contained in the *Brahma-Sūtras* are not with regard to the Vijnāna-vāda of Vasubandhu (400 A.D.) but with regard to the Śūnya-vāda, and this doubt makes the *Brahma-Sūtras*, a post-Nāgārjuna (100 A.D.) work. Dr. Das Gupta definitely controverts the contention that Sūnya-vāda was peculiar to Nāgārjuna or had not been already a well-developed doctrine long before Nāgārjuna. He holds with Dr. Satischandravidyābhushaṇa that both the Yogāchāra, *i.e.*, Vijnāna-vāda system and the system of Nāgārjuna evolved from the *Prajnāpāramitā*. "Nāgārjuna's merit," he says, "consisted in the dialectical form of his arguments in support of Śūnya-vāda; but so far as the essentials of the Śūnya-vāda are concerned, I believe that the Tathata philosophy of Asvaghōsha (100 A.D.) and the philosophy of *Prajnāpāramitā* contained no less. There is no reason to suppose that the works of Nāgārjuna were better known to the Hindu writers than the *Mahāyāna Sūtras*. Even in such later times as that of Vāchaspati Miśra, we find him quoting a passage of the *Sālistambha Sūtra* to give an account of the Buddhist doctrine of *prabitya samutpāda*. (See Vāchaspati Miśra's *Bhāmati* on Sankara's Bhāshya on *Brahma-Sūtra*, II. ii.) We could interpret any reference to Śūnya-vāda as pointing

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word *Sūtra* is used by itself, it should be taken to indicate the *Brahma-Sūtra* and not any other *Sūtra*. (See Ānandatīrtha's commentary on *Brihad. Up.*, VI. 1). *Cf.* also the following from the *Vāyu Stuti* of Trivikrama Panditāchārya :—

Astavyastam samastaśrutigata madhamai ratnapūgam yathāndhhai |
Rartham lōkōpakluptyai guṇagaṇanilayaḥ sūtrayāmāsa kritsnam ||
Yō'sau Vyāsābhidhāna stamahamaharahar bhaktitastvatprasādāt |
Sadyō vidyōpalabdhyai gurutama magurum dēvadēvam namāmi ||

to Nāgārjuna only if his special phraseology or dialectical methods were referred to in any way." Dr. Das Gupta accordingly holds that the reference in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* to the *Brahma-Sūtras* clearly points out a date prior to that of Nāgārjuna. He suggests that "its date could safely be placed so far back as the first century B.C. or the last part of the second century B.C." He is thus inclined to place the *Brahma-Sūtras* slightly earlier than the date of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. There is, so far as could be seen, no evidence that could be urged against this conclusion. There is thus reason to believe that the reference to the *Brahma-Sūtras* in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* is a genuine one and that both these works belonged to one and the same class of religio-philosophic teachers who, though Vaishnavas, tended towards some form of modified monism. From a text-book of monistic Vaishnavas, the *Brahma-Sūtras* soon became a text-book of other monists as well. The fundamental reason why it came to be recognized a work as important to Vaishnavas as to others was that its very aphoristic form gave scope for its interpretation in a manner acceptable to all who believed in the *Vēdas* and the *Upanishads*, while, at the same time, professing allegiance to Vishnu or Śiva as the case may be.

Other Commentaries Current.

The above are among the most well-known commentators on the *Vēdānta-Sūtras* of Bādarāyana. There are some others which are not equally famous; one of these is the *Brahmasūtravritti* by Dharmābhatta, who describes himself in the colophon to his work as the son of Rāmachandrārya, who was, it is added, a disciple of Mukundāsrama (Madras *D.C.* IX, No. 4689, p. 3492). His interpretation evidently follows that of Sankara. (See his comment, for example, on I. 1. 1, where he refers to *Sādhanachatushtaya*, which is the discipline prescribed by Sankara.) Another is the *Śārīraka Sūtra Bhāshya* by Srimath Chinmayamuni, who was, before he became a Sanyāsin, called Venkaiya. He also follows Sankara.

His work is now under examination, on behalf of the Mysore Palace authorities, by Mr. V. Subrahmanya Iyer, an erudite Vedāntic scholar.

Other Supplementary Commentaries.

There are, besides, numerous other commentaries, independent and other, based in the main on the interpretation of one of the three leading commentators—Sankara, Rāmānuja and Ānandatīrtha. Only a few of these need be referred to here. Thus, there is the *Brahmasūtra-vritti*, also known as *Brahmatatva-prakāśika* by Sadāśivendra-Sarasvati, which, though an independent commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, follows the viewpoint of Sankara (*ibid.*, No. 4690, p. 3493). A similar work is *Brahmasūtrabhāshya Vyākhyā*, only a fragment of which is known. The author was probably a disciple of one Rāmānanda (*ibid.*, No. 4692, p. 3495) and a follower of Sankara's system. Sankara's *Bhāshya* has had considerable attention, by way of elucidation, bestowed on it by a long succession of teachers. Their works are really commentaries on the commentary of Sankara. The *Panchapādika* (otherwise called *Brahmasūtrabhāshya Vyākhyā*) by Padmapādāchārya is a work of this kind. An explanatory gloss on it is the *Panchapādikavivaraṇam* by Prakāsātman. A further gloss on this latter work is the *Tatvadīpanam*, otherwise known as the *Panchapādika-vivaraṇa Vyākhyānam* by Akhandānandamuni. Another commentary on Sankara's *Bhāshya* is Advaitānanda's *Brahmavidyābharaṇam*. Advaitānanda was a disciple of Rāmānandatīrtha, who was himself a disciple of Bhūmānanda. A similar commentary onSankara's *Bhāshya* is the *Bhāshyaratnaprabha* by Gōvindānanda (Madras *D.C.* IX, No. 4679, p. 3482). The *Śārīraka-nyāya-vivaraṇam* is a fourth commentary on Sankara's *Bhāshya* by the famous Ānandagiri (*ibid.*, No. 4683, p. 3485). Appaya Dīkshita's *Śārīraka-nyāya-rakshāmaṇi* is a further commentary on this last work (*ibid.*, No. 4086, p. 3488). As is well known, Ānandagiri's work is a commentary on the *Bhāmati* by Vāchaspati-Miśra, which is itself a commentary on Sankara's *Bhāshya*. A gloss on this latter work is the *Bhāmati-Vyākhyā*, otherwise known as the *Vedāntakalpataru* by Amalānanda. A further commentary on this last work is the *Vedāntakalpataru-Vyākhyā* or *Parimala* by Appaya Dīkshita. These different works attest to the popularity enjoyed by Sankara's *Bhāshya* and the interest taken in elucidating it to a growing circle of readers. Rāmānuja's *Srī Bhāshya* has had even greater attention bestowed on it. A commentary on this work is the *Tattvatīka* by Vedāntadēsika, another is the *Nyāyaprakāśika* by Meghanādri, son of Nātha (or Nāthamuni); a third one is the *Mūlabhāvaprakāśika* by Rangarāmānuja; and a fourth one is the *Śrutapradīpika* by Sudarśanasūri, who describes himself as the disciple of Varadāchārya. Sudarśanasūri also wrote a more exhaustive commentary on the *Srī Bhāshya* called the *Śrutaprakāśika*. A gloss explanatory of a portion of this last-named work (I. 2 to I. 4) by one Varadavishnusūri is well known, besides a commentary on the whole of that work by one Śuddhasattva-Lakshmanārya. A fifth commentary on the *Srī Bhāshya* is by Sundararājadēsika. It is called *Brahmasūtravyākhyā*, without any alternative name attached to it. A somewhat independent commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, though mainly in support of the *Srī Bhāshya*, is the *Tattvamārtānda* by one Srīnivāsa, son of Srīnivāsatātārya (Madras *D.C.* X, No. 4894). It is largely based on Rāmānuja's work and is written in support of it, criticising the *Chandrika* of the Madhva *guru* and writer Vyāsayati, who lived in the reign of the Vijayanagar King Krishnadeva Rāya (1509–1530 A.D.). In the same way, Ānandatīrtha's *Bhāshya* has had a number of commentaries written on it. Ānandatīrtha himself wrote a shorter commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, called the *Brahmasūtra Aṇuvyākhyānam*. This is in verse and follows his *Brahmasūtra Bhāshyam*. He also wrote another work called the *Brahmasūtrāṇubhāshyam*, which sets out briefly in verse the substance of the conclusions intended, according to him, to be taught by the *Brahma-Sūtras.*[81] Ānandatīrtha also wrote an explanatory gloss on his *Aṇuvyākhyānam* and this work goes by the name of *Aṇuvyākhyānanyāyavivaraṇam.*[82] On Ānandatīrtha's *Brahmasūtrabhāshyam*, a commentary called the *Tattvapradīpika* was written by Trivikrama Panditāchārya.[83] It was eclipsed by the *Tattvaprakāśika* of Jayatīrtha, better known as Tīkāchārya (Madras *D.C.* X, No. 4813).[84] Another commentary on it, called the *Dīpika*, was composed by one Jagannātha-yati (*ibid.*, No. 4814).[85] On the *Aṇuvyākhyānam*, Padmanābhatīrtha wrote the *Sanyāyaratnāvali*, of which MS. copies are known.[86] But it was elbowed out by Jayatīrtha's famous work, the *Aṇuvyākhyāna-tīka*, better known as the *Nyāyasudhā.*[87] On this work of Jayatīrtha, there is a further commentary called the *Nyāyasudhāvyākhyānam*, or *Parimala*, by Rāghavendra-yati, a disciple of Sudhīndra.[88]

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[81] A short work in four adhyāyas consisting of thirty-two verses. Edited by Krishnāchār and printed at the Nirnayasāgara Press, Bombay.

[82] All these works of Ānandatīrtha have been printed and published by the Nirnayasāgara Press, Bombay.

[83] Printed by Abaji Ramachandra Savant at the Rāma Tatva Chāpkhāna, Belgaum.

[84] Printed by Abaji Ramachandra Savant at the Rāma Tatva Chāpkhāna, Belgaum.

[85] Jagannātha-yati was a disciple of Raghōttama, who remains sainted at Tirukkōyilur, South Arcot District. His work has been edited by S. Gopālakrishnāchāriār, under the auspices of the late Hon. P. Chentsal Rao, C.I.E., and printed at the Grove Press, Teynampet, Madras (1900).

[86] The *Sanyāyaratnāvaḷi* is mentioned by Rāghavēndra-yati in his work entitled *Parimaḷa*, which is a commentary on the *Nyāyasudhā* of Jayatīrtha. (See *Parimaḷa*, comment. on II. 1. 1, where it is thus referred to :—*Sanyāyaratnāvaḷyuktām tāvadādau vyanakti.* Evidently this work was still ardently studied by scholars during the time Raghavēndra-yati flourished.

[87] Edited by Krishnāchār and printed at the Nirnayasāgara Press, Bombay.

[88] *Ibid.*

There are numerous other works bearing on the topics discussed in the *Brahma-Sūtras* but these need not be referred to here. Nor is it, again, necessary to refer works which while belonging to one system of thought seek to examine the component ideas of another. Nor again to the commentaries that exist on these latter works. Works of this type are many and often of great interest. It ought to suffice if we noted that all these have for their primary basis the text of the *Brahma-Sūtras*, which they seek to interpret in the light of their own systems of thought.

Style of Sripati.

The style of Srīpati is usually simple though on occasions, on account of the involved sentences employed, it is rendered somewhat difficult. Evidently he was a teacher, accustomed to make lengthy discourses to his students. Striking examples of these involved sentences, indicating the habit of a *guru*, can be easily quoted. Thus, the opening sentence explaining IV. 4. 11 is one in point. The sentence with which the commentary on II. 4. 18 starts is even a better one. Other examples are to be found included in the comments under I. 4. 16, III. 3. 19 and III. 1. 20. Many more could be easily quoted. Another characteristic feature of Srīpati's writing is the extensive use he makes of maxims (*nyāyas*), a long list of which will be found arranged in the alphabetical order at the end of this volume. Of the sixty-nine found there, I have been able to trace only five in Sankara's *Bhāshya*. These are the *Arundhatī nyāyaḥ* (I. 1. 8 and I. 1. 12); *Andhaparampara nyāyaḥ* (II. 2. 30 and II. 2. 37); *Chchatri nyāyaḥ* (III. 3. 34); *Bijāmkura nyāyaḥ* (II. 1. 36 and III. 3. 9); and *Arthisamarathō vidvānadhikriyate* (I. 3. 25). Against the sixty-nine *nyāyas* used by Srīpati, Sankara is found to use only about twenty-five. Rāmānuja quotes the *Śākhāchandra nyāya* (I. 1. 13) and the *Nishadhāshtapati nyāya* (I. 3. 14). Ānandatīrtha finds no occasion for the use of any *nyāya*. His method of quoting apposite texts from *Srutis* and *Smrithis*, under each *Sūtra*, perhaps, did not necessitate the seeking of the aid of popular *nyāyas*. Of *nyāyas* and the limitations within which they could be used, Manu says:—अधार्मिकं त्रिभिर्न्यायै निगृह्णीयात्प्रयत्नतः, *Adhārmikam tribhirnyāyair nigruhṇīyāt prayatnataḥ*, Don't try suddenly to provide a rule of action, when you aim at an *adharma* (*Manu*, 8. 310). A *nyāya* thus should not be used to help in the formulation of an *adharma* plan of action. It has its place where there is uncertainty, as there is need for reason there. As the *nyāya* goes, *Sandigdhe nyāyaḥ pravartite iti nyāyaḥ*, a *nyāya* quoted by Srīpati.[89] A few of these *nyāyas* quoted by Srīpati may be noted here:

Agnīndrasālā nyāya,
Ayaskāntasūchī nyāya,
Andhasandhyā nyāya,
Arthīsamarthō vidvānadhikriyate iti nyāya,
Gōbalivarda nyāya,
Chchāgapaśu nyāya,
Nadīsamudra nyāya,
Nishadhāshtapati nyāya,
Bījāmkura nyāya,
Bhramarakīta nyāya,
Rātrisatra nyāya,
Sākhāchandra nyāya,
Saudhasaupāna nyāya,
Samakshapravāha nyāya,
etc.

What Srīpati quotes as the *saudhā saupāna nyāya* appears elsewhere with the name of *Sōpānārōhaṇa nyāya* (see *Bhāmati*, I. 3. 8). Of these several *nyāyas* found in Srīpati's *Bhāshya*, the *Nishadhāshtapati nyāya* is quoted thrice; the *Sthulārundhatī nyāya*, 12 times; the *Bhramarakīta nyāya*, 18 times; the *Ayaskāntasūchī nyāya*, 5 times; and the *Lōharasādi nyāya* and the *Nadīsamudra nyāya*, each four times. *Chchatri nyāya* (III. 3. 34), *Jalasarkara nyāya* (IV. 2. 13), *Sandēhe vākyaśēshāt* (III. 3. 7), *Gunōpasamhāra nyāya* (II. 3. 7) and *Patasankōcha vikāsa nyāya* (II. 3. 11) are other *nyāyas* quoted by Srīpati that may be referred to here. The utility of some of these *nyāyas* in the field of Hindu law has been referred to by Prof. Berriedale A. Keith (see *Karma-Mīmāmsa*, 97-107). Among those referred to by legal text-writers is the *Nishadhāshtapati*

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[89] This *nyāya* is found in Jnānōttama's comment on *Naishkarmyasiddhi*. IV. 3. Akin to it is the *nyāya sandigdham saprayōjanam cha vichāra marhati*, *Ibid.*, I. 29.

nyāya for validating adoption by a Sudra (see *ibid.*, p. 103). The object of quoting, in this extensive fashion, these well-known maxims is to prove the position taken up by him. They are apposite to a degree where they are applied to and the appeal made to them seems thus well justified. Srīpati's criticism of opposing views is usually direct and delivered with great effect, the reasons being stated in categorical form, appropriate texts being quoted for the positions taken. The question and answer is not seen, though the use of the formal terminology of objection and answer, such as *nanu*, *na*, etc., is quite frequent. Neither the point criticised nor the point made out is, however, ever in doubt. The dialectical skill displayed is undoubted, while the extensive range of studies of the author is manifest on almost every page of his writing. His knowledge of Saiva literature seems to have been intimate. A part of his methodology in dealing with an adversary's view is to closely analyse it and set down its constituent parts under specific heads and deal with them successively in succinct fashion. Good examples of this method are to be found in the comments under I. 1. 4, I. 1. 5, I. 4. 22, II. 4. 16, III. 3. 63, where each point is disposed of under the heads of *na ādyaḥ*, *na dvitīyaḥ*, *na tritīyaḥ*, etc. This mode of treating analytically the point at issue is reminiscent of Jayatīrtha (*circa* 1350 A.D.) who uses it very effectively indeed in his *Nyāyasudhā*. Anticipating objections that might possibly be advanced against a view propounded and meeting them in advance is also a fairly common characteristic of the author. This is usually done by the use of words or phrases like *kathamithyā-śankāyām*; *kutaḥ* (see III. 3. 19; III. 3. 20; III. 3. 23; III. 1. 11), *kimbhavati* (IV. 4. 17), etc. His frequent use of the following words and phrases seems to indicate an unusual fondness for them:—*durnivāraḥ*; *anivāryam*; *vidvat ramanīyam*; *tadēva ramanīyam*; *dattānjali prasangaḥ*; *ghantāghōsha*; *avichārita ramanīyam*; *śūnyavāda sāmrājya prasangaḥ*; *rādhdhāntaḥ*; etc. (I. 2. 1; I. 1. 5; I. 1. 4;

I. 1. 2; I. 2. 19; I. 3. 8; I. 3. 25; I. 3. 38; I. 3. 43; I. 4. 1; I. 4. 28; II. 1. 4; II. 1. 8; II. 1. 9; II. 2. 37; II. 2. 40; II. 2. 42; II. 2. 44; II. 3. 16; II. 3. 28; II. 3. 34; II. 3. 44; II. 3. 50). In his style, in the nature of authorities quoted by him, and in the purposes aimed at by him, Srīpati differs from his chief predecessors—Sankara, Rāmānuja and Ānandatīrtha.

An Outline of Sripati's View.

We may now pass on to consider Srīpati's *Bhāshya* under certain convenient heads for a better understanding of its contents. In what follows, the mode of argumentation adopted by Srīpati is closely followed and care has been taken to set down in a non-technical manner his views on the fundamental points raised by him. This is intended to be no more than a mere outline, the reader being referred to the work itself for a fuller understanding of it.

The Nature and Object of Jignyasa.

In commenting on I. 1. 1, Srīpati remarks that Parāśara embraced the Mahā-Pāśupata dīksha. His son was Vyāsa. He was the author of the *Sūtras*. He enunciates the first *Sūtra* to remove some doubt. Is Brahman existent or not? In the *Vēda*, in one place it is stated there was originally nothing existent and in another that Brahman was existent. There is a conflict thus between these two views. Does "non-existent" mean "not visible to the eye," or that it would be visible hereafter some time after we get the vision for it through the knowledge of Brahman? For we do not know by experience that any man who has once died has ever come back. Further there is the saying: To the body which has been burnt to ashes, where is the re-birth? Therefore, by all means contract debts and drink ghee (*i.e.*, enjoy in boundless fashion life without the fear of having to pay for it even in another life).[90] Further the mixture of lime and saffron creates red colour. Similarly on this earth, inanimate and animate beings are created and destroyed, from *samyōga* and *viyōga* of five elements, *prithvi* etc. This is improper, as such a thing is not within our experience. If this were so, then, why not create beings by cutting off a part of the body of human beings or animals? It is seen that Īśvara has located in cowdung and the like life-matter (*jīvatvam*) in an unseen form.[91] And even to a Mahārāja who is provided with every source of happiness, there appear suddenly mental and physical anxieties, diseases, etc., which reduces him to poverty and misery and finally kills him. The conclusion is thus arrived at that it is Īsvara that allots to us these results of the fruit of our actions done in our previous births, be they good or bad. So *Jīva* and *Śarīra* are not different. This is one view. Another Vēdic view is that *Śarīra* is not eternal, whereas the *Jīva* is. If the *Jīva* is eternal, there is no need for a Creator. Thus there are three views:—(1) Brahman is existent; (2) Brahman is non-existent; and (3) *Śarīra* and *Jīva* are not different.

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[90] *Bhasmībhūtasya dēhasya punarāgamanam kutaḥ* ।
Tasmāt sarvaprayatnēna riṇam kritvā ghritam pibēt ॥
Compare the above with the doctrine of the *Chārvāka Siddhānta*,

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attributed to Brihaspati as formulated in the *Sarvadarśana Sangraha*:—

Yāvadjīvam sukham jīvēnnāsti mrutyōragōcharaḥ |
Bhasmībhūtasya dēhasya punarāgamanam kuta iti ||

[91] This saying recurs in Srīpati's *Bhāshya* more than once. The belief underlying it is treated as an exception to the general maxim *Sadruśāt sadruśōdbhavaḥ*, which literally means *Like produces like.* This maxim, according to Hindu writers, does not enshrine a fixed principle. Jayanta Bhatta thus denies its truth on the ground that scorpions are produced from cowdung, in his *Nyāyamanjarī* (*Vizianagram Sanskrit Series*, Edn. 1895, page 466):—*Nachaisha niyamō lōkē sadruśāt sadruśōdbhavaḥ* | *Vrischikādēḥ samutpādō_ gōmayādapi druśyatē* || This belief regarding the scorpion is found in the *Mahābhāshya*, I. 4. 30, and is used as an illustration by Sankarāchārya in his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, II. 16. Rāmānuja also uses it. Udayana quotes it in his *Vritti* on the *Kusumānjali*, II. 2. while Haridāsa remarks that a scorpion can be produced from cowdung as well as from a scorpion. Of course, the modern view, as propounded by writers on biogenics, is that "life can only come from the touch of life." See Col. Jacob's *Laukikanyāyānjaliḥ*, II. 81.

And there are three different kinds of discussion (*Vādabhēda* or *Jignyāsa*):—(1) *Vidhi*; (2) *Mantra*; and (3) *Artha Vāda*. *Sruti* is thus of three different kinds. In this three-fold division, the offering of *Jyōtishtōma* and other sacrifices with the desire to obtain *Svarga* is *Vidhi Vāda*. In *Mantra Vāda*, worship (*upāsana*) is essential. In the same way, *Artha Vāda* consists in offering praises to God (*Stōtras*).

To *Jīvas*, according to their past *Karmas*, God allots on their birth their respective meeds of joy and sorrow (*Sukha* and *Dukkha*). If this were so, there would be no need for *Jignyāsa*. The reading of *Upanishads* would also prove of no utility; even *Yagnas* would not be necessary, since they all treat of *Artha* and *Kāma*, the realization of desires. Such a proposition requires consideration, *i.e.*, we should endeavour to ascertain its truth or untruth. Hence the need for *Jignyāsa*. *Jignyāsa* is necessary to establish the ultimate truth and set at rest the doubt.

About what are we to undertake a *Jignyāsa* for? Is it for the purpose of establishing that Para-Śiva (Brahman) is in *Śarīra* or *Śarīra* in Para-Śiva. There is no truth in the first; for it is said that *Satyam gnānamanantam Brahma*; Brahman is all-truth (*Satya*), all-wisdom (*Gnāna*) and eternal (*Anantam*). *Eka ēva Rudro na dvitīyāya tastē*, "Only there was one Rudra and no second," here only one Rudra is mentioned. Again *Rudra ēkatva māhuḥ*, Rudra alone is said to have existed; *Rudrō vai śāśvatam vai purāṇam iti*; "Rudra is eternal", "Rudra is ancient", etc., are statements contained in hundreds of *Sruti* texts. These go to show that Para-Śiva is true Brahman. The termination "Aham" refers to the Self inside the *Sarīra* who reflects outside and no other second. The fruit of *Jignyāsa* is that which could be elucidated by *Jnāna* becomes *Jnāna*. Accordingly is Brahman one that could be elucidated or not? If he could be elucidated, then he is different, which is against hundreds of *Sruti* texts. If he could not be elucidated, then *Jignyāsa* becomes a vain matter, *i.e.*, a discussion of no value. Because, it is said that *Ajāmēkām lōhita śukla krishṇām*, there is only one, never-born, and which is alone, and which appears in red, white and black colours. Inside there are two: *Īśa* and *anīśa* (the chief and the subordinate), *gnā* and *agna* (the knower and the ignorant). Thus says the *Vēda* in different places. In this way, to understand that *Śarīra* has no end would be of no avail, for it would end in *mukti*. Thus it is also stated in one place in the *Vēda*. *Ayamātmā Brahma* "This Ātma is Brahman", *Tatvamasi* "That Thou Art" and other sayings occur elsewhere. Jīva and Brahman are identical and one. But *Aham pratyaya* is used in some places, thereby denoting *bheda pratibhāsa* (*i.e.*, difference between Jīva and Brahman). This creates the doubt, why should it not be so, *i.e.*, why should they not be identical? This *Aham pratyaya* does not really indicate a difference but shows as if there was a difference and thereby weakens the argument of *Svayam prakāśa* of Brahman, *i.e.*, weakens the position that Brahman is self-evident by his glory. *Aham pratyaya* also weakens the power of self-knowing Brahman by bringing him into the orbit of never-ending Avidya, and drags him into the smaller sphere of man, which is much less than that of Brahman. This is a misnomer. This leads to a discussion from which no salvation is possible, *i.e.*, the argument ends in the destruction of the discussion. Further just as darkness and light are different and are opposed to each other in their characteristics, those who stick to the one-sided argument, *viz.*, *Yatho vācho nivartanta* and other sayings of the *Vēda*, according to which Brahman cannot be perceived even mentally, it comes to this that there can be no use in beginning the discussion of the *Vēdānta Sāstra*. If this doubt arises, we answer it thus:—It should not be thus viewed because we have to say this: It is meet we should begin the study of the *Mīmāmsa Sāstra* which deals with the Dvaitādvaita doctrine which is in conformity with the essence of all the *Upanishads*. You may ask why? If Brahman is real, he can be seen physically and perceived mentally through the aid of the evidences afforded by the Āgama. Because it is said

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"There is only Rudra and none others." This is said in many *Āgamas* and *Vēdas* so that the evidence afforded by them are put as Sūrya, Chandra, Seasons, Ocean and Time—all these are guided by the Will of God and denote their own *Dharma* (*i.e.*, nature). In this world those blessed with wealth, knowledge and all kinds of conveniences, still have not got what they seek after. While those who have none of these conveniences, at some time or other, they obtain what they desire for. This shows plainly that God administers over these (human affairs) by His existence. This is sufficient ocular proof of His existence (*lit.* He can be physically perceived). In the world we find cars, towers, storeyed mansions, enclosures (probably fortifications) and the like which are the production of man's intelligence. In a similar manner, there is Paramēsvara who is assumed to be the maker of the animate and inanimate worlds. Some say that just as by the combination of chunam and saffron, a reddish appearance is created to the eye, in the same way, by the combination of the earth with the other four elementals, the animate and inanimate creation comes into being of its own accord. This, however, is not true. It is not within the experience of anyone—*i.e.*, nobody has borne testimony to—such a combination of the earth and the four elementals producing the animate and inanimate world consisting of domestic animals, birds and *feræ naturæ* (wild animals). If it is asked why we should not assume that it is possible to visualize the animal, human and other creations in the same body, with their different qualities in it, then we have to suggest that this is against human experience. It is known to experience that we have to attribute to Īśvara the creation of countless hidden beings (*i.e.*, worms) in a lump of cow-dung[92] just in the same way that we have to attribute even to a mighty king who though he never for a moment desired mental or physical anxieties and old age, death or poverty, yet we see him subject to these calamities. In the same way, it is certain that *Jīvas* realize happiness or discomfort according to their previous good conduct or bad conduct, according to the awards of an Īsvara. But it may be asked if there are not men in this world who do not enjoy happiness in place of the misery that they should experience and *vice versa*—as in the case of those coming under the heads of thieves and adulterers—we would answer that this is a part of *Dharma Mīmāmsa* which it is unnecessary to discuss here. It would therefore seem to follow that the argument of Kapila and Kanāda that this world originates out of *jada* (*i.e.*, inanimate matter) is without foundation. In the *Sruti* text it is stated:—*Asadvā idamagra āsīt.* The use of the *asad* herein has to be interpreted as indicating that there was an infinitesimally small world, because the word *āsīt* is subsequently used. If it is not so construed, there would be contradiction as in the further part of the same *Sruti* the following words occur:—*Tato vai sadajāyata.* These words ("*From that Sat came out*") show that the above interpretation is the correct one. Here in this *Sruti* text the word *asat* is used. Why cannot it be taken to mean that *From nothing Sat came into being?* This would be like saying that a pair of horns have come out of the head of a rabbit; that flowers are growing in the sky; or that an impotent person has borne children. Therefore what has been said at first is the truth, and this is supported by Bādarāyana in his *Sūtra*, *Asaditi chēnna pratishēdha mātratvāt* (II. 1. 7).

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[92] See footnote 91, on p. 233 *ante*.

He has sufficiently expounded *Asat* in this *Sūtra* as meaning *that infinitesimally small matter*. What is Brahman? And how is it clearly understood and how are doubts relating to it cleared by going into the *Vēdas* and the *Āgamas?* It is for clearing doubts and for realizing Brahman from the *Vēdas* and the *Āgamas* that Jignyāsa is needed. Brahman is possessed of endless power and is the sole cause of the visible and the invisible worlds and is the author of worldly attractions (*paśu*) and bondage (*pāśa*), of *Sakala* and *Nishkala* (the faulty and faultless), of *Sthūla* and *Sūkshma*; he exhibits himself as *Chit* and *achit*; he

"There is only Rudra and none others." This is said in many *Āgamas* and *Vēdas* so that the evidence afforded by them are put as Sūrya, Chandra, Seasons, Ocean and Time—all these are guided by the Will of God and denote their own *Dharma* (*i.e.*, nature). In this world those blessed with wealth, knowledge and all kinds of conveniences, still have not got what they seek after. While those who have none of these conveniences, at some time or other, they obtain what they desire for. This shows plainly that God administers over these (human affairs) by His existence. This is sufficient ocular proof of His existence (*lit.* He can be physically perceived). In the world we find cars, towers, storeyed mansions, enclosures (probably fortifications) and the like which are the production of man's intelligence. In a similar manner, there is Paramēsvara who is assumed to be the maker of the animate and inanimate worlds. Some say that just as by the combination of chunam and saffron, a reddish appearance is created to the eye, in the same way, by the combination of the earth with the other four elementals, the animate and inanimate creation comes into being of its own accord. This, however, is not true. It is not within the experience of anyone—*i.e.*, nobody has borne testimony to—such a combination of the earth and the four elementals producing the animate and inanimate world consisting of domestic animals, birds and *feræ naturæ* (wild animals). If it is asked why we should not assume that it is possible to visualize the animal, human and other creations in the same body, with their different qualities in it, then we have to suggest that this is against human experience. It is known to experience that we have to attribute to Īśvara the creation of countless hidden beings (*i.e.*, worms) in a lump of cow-dung[92] just in the same way that we have to attribute even to a mighty king who though he never for a moment desired mental or physical anxieties and old age, death or poverty, yet we see him subject to these calamities. In the same way, it is certain that *Jīvaś* realize happiness or discomfort according to their previous good conduct or bad conduct, according to the awards of an Īsvara. But it may be asked if there are not men in this world who do not enjoy happiness in place of the misery that they should experience and *vice versa*—as in the case of those coming under the heads of thieves and adulterers—we would answer that this is a part of *Dharma Mīmāmsa* which it is unnecessary to discuss here. It would therefore seem to follow that the argument of Kapila and Kanāda that this world originates out of *jada* (*i.e.*, inanimate matter) is without foundation. In the *Sruti* text it is stated:—*Asadvā idamagra āsīt.* The use of the *asad* herein has to be interpreted as indicating that there was an infinitesimally small world, because the word *āsīt* is subsequently used. If it is not so construed, there would be contradiction as in the further part of the same *Sruti* the following words occur:—*Tato vai sadajāyata.* These words ("*From that Sat came out*") show that the above interpretation is the correct one. Here in this *Sruti* text the word *asat* is used. Why cannot it be taken to mean that *From nothing Sat came into being?* This would be like saying that a pair of horns have come out of the head of a rabbit; that flowers are growing in the sky; or that an impotent person has borne children. Therefore what has been said at first is the truth, and this is supported by Bādarāyana in his *Sūtra*, *Asaditi chēnna pratishēdha mātratvāt* (II. 1. 7).

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[92] See footnote 91, on p. 233 *ante*.

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In the *Vēda* (*i.e.*, *Upanishads*) since texts like *Tatvamasi*, *Aham Brahmāsmi*, *Brahmavid Brahmayeva bhavati*, etc., etc., occur denoting *abhēda* between the two (*i.e.* Brahman and *Jīva*), it is not meet to distinguish between the *Jīva* and the Brahman as being different from each other. To so distinguish between them would be wrong. The texts above quoted would be rendered meaningless if we distinguished between them, though Brahman is described as possessed of *saviśēshatva* and the *Jīva* is described as possessed of *parichchēdatva*, the *Jīva's* qualities being *Māyāpāśabaddha* (*i.e.* Brahman is possessed of never-ending good qualities and the *Jīva* is ever subject to alterations in the forms of *Sukha* and *Dukkha*, *Janana* and *Maraṇa*, etc.). When *Māyā* leaves him, the *Jīva* will be one with the Brahman—agreeably to the Upanishadic texts mentioned below. *Ghaṭa* (the pot) is indestructible (matter); but the *Jīva* is in the *ghaṭa* and can obtain liberation by coming out of the *ghaṭa*. And when it comes out, it joins Brahman influenced by *ātmajñāna*, as it is said, *Sa ātma nēti nēti*, *asthūlam*, *ananvam*, *adīrgham*, etc., in the *Upanishads*. These are qualities of the Brahman which cannot be kept in bondage (*parichchēdatva*). So Brahman is fully described in the

Upanishads as being quite free from the touch of all worldly connections—*Sthūla sūkshma prapancha vyāvrutta.* Therefore such a Brahman should be discussed and understood.

Srīpati opines that the first *Sūtra* should be answered affirmatively. He says *Brahmajigynāsa yuktaḥ*, *i.e.*, it is meet to discuss the nature of Brahman. In support he quotes texts such as:

Brahmavid āpnōti param; *Gnātva śivam śāntam atyantam yēti*; *Īśam gnātva amritā bhavanti*; *Dhyāna nirmathanābhyāsāt pāśam dahati panditaḥ*; *Śiva ekōdhyeyaḥ śivam karaḥ*; *Sarvam anyat parityajya*; *Ksharam pradhānam amrūtāksharam haraḥ*; *Ksharātmanā vīkshate dēva ēkaḥ*; *Tasyābhidhyānādyōjanāt tatvabhāvāt bhūyasyānte visvamāyā nivrittiḥ*; *Tamakratum paśyati vītaśōkō dhātu prasādān mahimānam īśam*; *Gnātva dēvam muchyatē sarvapāśaiḥ*, etc.

By discussing the nature of such a Brahman according to Vēdic and Upanishadic texts, *Brahmagnāna* is obtained: to know that the *Jīva* is not different from Brahman. After knowing this, the *Jīva* will be rid of all bondage created by worldly ties. There will be extinction of sorrow and finally the *Jīva* will obtain *paramapurushārthatva*, which is *Para-Śivatva*, *i.e.*, *Para-Brahmatva.*

Srīpati starts with Brahmatva and arrives at Para-Śivatva. So this Brahman is Para-Śiva, *i.e.*, Paramaśiva.[93]

It is significant that Srīpati calls his work *Brahma-mīmāmsa*, etc., and not *Śārīraka-mīmāmsa*, etc. The former is in accordance with Ānandatīrtha's designation; while the latter is the designation of Sankara. Why Srīpati does so will be evident when we remember that he accepts the dualistic theory up to a limit, whereas Sankara does not. Sankara advisedly designates his work *Śārīraka-mīmāmsa* because he identifies in argument *Śārīra* (the human or individual Soul) with the

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[93] Cp. *Parōsi Nārāyaṇayēva nānyathā* in *Mahābhārata*, *Udyoga Parva*, where *Para* means "above all".

Brahman.[94] Srīpati's three points are:—*Samśaya*, Doubt; *Vishaya*, Subject; and *Prayojana*, Result. The result of discussing of Brahman is to know that he is no other than *Jīva* and to break off the curtain separating them is the object of the *Jignyāsa*.

There is difference between *Bhramara* and *Kīta*, between *lōha* and *rasa*. When the *bhrānti* is gone, then the *kīta* becomes *bhramara*, *rasa* becomes *lōha*. In the same way, *Tatvamasi* and the like texts in the *Upanishads* expound the view that there is no difference between the two—the *Jīva* and the Brahman, *i.e.*, they will be one when the screen of *agnāna* is removed.

It is very clearly stated in the *Srutis*, without the least doubt, that just as all rivers, as stated in Sruti texts like *Yatha nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudre astam gachchanti nāmarūpe vihāya* । *tathā vidvānnāmarūpad vimuktaḥ parātparam purushamupaiti divyam iti*, enter the sea and become one with it, losing their separate individualities and names, similarly a wise man—after obtaining wisdom—gets himself free from his name and form and gets into *parā* and *parama purusham*, *i.e.*, the highest effulgent Self, *i.e.*, Brahman. So it is that all *Srutis* declare that *Jīva* is capable of attaining to *Brahmatva*. This cannot well be otherwise—this is not said for the sake of formality; else all the abovenamed Upanishadic texts will not have spoken the Truth. Not only that; they will also have differed from the primary teaching of the *Īkshyatādhikaraṇam* (I. 1. 5). And we will also be vainly troubling our mind for a thing of no consequence with a matter from which we cannot obtain liberation (*Mōksha*). But every *Sruti* text states that there is *Mōksha*.

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[94] *Śārīraka.*—From *Śārīra*, which means relating to the body; hence, the incorporate or embodied spirit; human or individual soul. *Śārīraka*, therefore, means relating to the body; corporal; incorporate, embodied (as the soul). *Śārīraka* is the inquiry into the nature of that spirit (*i.e.*, the embodied spirit), a term adopted by Sankara and Rāmānuja for their *Bhāshyas* on the *Brahma-Sūtras*.

Srīpati next passes on to formulate how he differs from Sankara. According to the Upanishadic text *Aham ajnaḥ*, etc., which means "I am ignorant," etc., whereby the *Jīva* says that he is environed by bondage of attractive bodily (worldly) ties. If such a thought as *Aham ajnaḥ* is entertained by the *Jīva*, even as the result of ignorance or otherwise (*māyāpāśa baddha*), then it would amount to this that the Brahman, who is *nirviśēsha* (*i.e.*, attributeless) is bound by *māyōpādhi*, *i.e.*, ignorance or illusion, which cannot be explained how it could be, while the *Vēda* explains, *Yas sarvagnas sarvavit iti*, *Pragnānam Brahma iti*, etc., *i.e.*, that the *Jīva* who is all-knowing and who is a *prāgna*, how can he fall into ignorance (or become subject to illusion). If this were conceded, one would be falling a prey to confusion of thoughts as regards the qualities of Brahman and the *Jīva*. If *avidyā* is conceded, there is no chance of attaining *Brahmatva* (*Brahmatva bhanga*). If Brahman is really subject to *avidyā*, and if *avidyā* is also one of the entities, then there will be the fallacy called *anyōnya āśraya*. (That is, *Brahman* will have been associated with *avidyā* and *avidyā* with *Brahman*, which is mutually contradictory).[95] Further, the *Sruti* text goes: *Aprāṇo hyamanāśśubhraḥ*. As Brahman is said to be devoid of mind (*manaḥ*) and life (*prāṇa*), how can such a Brahman be subject to the influence of Māyā? Here Sankara's theory that *manaḥ* and *prāṇa* disappear at one stage, is disputed. Srīpati asks, at such a stage how can Brahman be subject to the influence of Māyā? In reply, if we admit that the *Jīva* is subject to ignorance (*i.e.*, Māyā), then we have to admit that there is something else *beyond Brahman* (*Brahmānantara*) to remove this ignorance (Māyā). If so, unsettledness (*i.e.*, confusion) will prevail. The *Taittirīya* text *Vāchārambhaṇam vikārō nāmadhēyam mrittikētyēva satyam* and other similar Upanishadic texts, state that

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[95] *Anyōnya āśraya* (*anyōnya āśrayaḥ*).—This is a term in *Nyāya* which treats of the fallacy of the reciprocal relation of cause and effect. The term suggests mutual or reciprocal dependence, support, or connection.

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[95] *Anyōnya āśraya* (*anyōnya āśrayaḥ*).—This is a term in *Nyāya* which treats of the fallacy of the reciprocal relation of cause and effect. The term suggests mutual or reciprocal dependence, support, or connection.

Vēdic texts like *Yatōvā imāni bhūtāni jāyantē*, etc., declare that the world and the creatures in it have been created by Brahman. This proves that the world consists of both Dvaita and Advaita consisting of cause and effect, as expounded by the Sūtra, *Pratignā siddherlingamāśmarathyaḥ*, etc., and the two Sūtras following it (I. 4. 21-22). In these Sūtras the different tenets of the three doctrines of the Vedānta philosophy (*Bhēda*, *Abhēda*, *Bhēdābhēda*) are clearly explained. And subsequent Sūtras like *Ubhaya vyapadēsāttvahi kuṇḍalavat* (III. 2. 26) establish the fact that the *Bhēdābhēda* doctrine is the only doctrine that can be pointed to as not being open to any objection and as one not suffering from any contradiction. Agreeably to this view, it is explained in the *Sūta Samhita*, *Bhēdābhēdastathābhēdō bhēda etē matāstrayaḥ iti*, etc. Also in the *Mahimnastava*, it is thus declared: *Dhruvam kaschid brūte sakala mapara-stva dhruvam idam parō dravyādravyaḥ iti*, etc. Thus according to some, everything is true and eternal; according to others, everything is unreal—both material and immaterial.

Harmonising Sruti Texts.

Srīpati suggests that there is need for reconciling these conflicting texts. He proceeds to show that the same want of harmony between *Sruti* texts is to be seen. He quotes the *Sruti* text, *Yatō vāchō nivartanta*, etc. [Those (*Jivas*) who are bereft of the good grace of the *guru's* blessing have no salvation.] This is seemingly against the text *Ānanda Brahmaṇō vidvān nabibhēti kutaschana*, etc. (One who knows Ānanda Brahman is never afraid of the world.) These seemingly contradictory texts can only be harmonised by *Jignyāsa*. To prove that *gnāna* obtained by *Guru-kaṭāksha* leads to the knowing of Brahman and that all other ways lead away from the path leading to the knowledge of Brahman as known to experience, is, says Srīpati, confirmed by the *Taittirīya* text, *Brahmavidāpnōti param*, *Brahmavid Brahmaiva bhavati*, etc. (He who knows Brahman will reach Him and he who knows Brahman will also become Brahman.) But then, there are texts which declare that just because one knows the *Vēda*, one cannot exactly find that great Being, the Brahman. Srīpati quotes texts like (*a*) *Na vēdavin manute tam bruhantam*;

(*b*) *Naishā tarkēṇa mati rāpanīyā;* (*c*) *Tantvōpanishadam purusham pruchchāmi;* and (*d*) *Sāstra yōnitvāt*, which declare that Brahman is not possible of understanding through any faulty (or imperfect) sources. He holds that he is understandable only through the aid of the doctrine of *Bhēdābhēda*, which harmonises the meaning of every *Sruti* text relating to *Brahma-Mīmāmsa* (*Sarva śruti samanvita Brahma-Mīmāmsa*). It is therefore meet, he says, that a beginning should be made for *Brahma-Jignyāsa*.

Meaning of Atha.

Having thus laid the foundation for his doctrine of *bhēdābhēda*, Srīpati next proceeds to interpret the word *Atha* as meaning *anantara*, *i.e.*, *afterwards* or *then*. He says he does not accept the interpretation that it refers to *adhikāra*, which is the interpretation of Ānandatīrtha. Ānandatīrtha says that *atha* refers to *adhikāra anantaram*, i.e., *after a man is qualified for Jignyāsa.* Though Srīpati, following Ānandatīrtha, quotes the Mangalaślōka, *Omkārascha atha sabdascha dvāvētau Brahmaṇō gurōḥ* । *kanṭham bhitvā viniryāṭau tasmāt māngalikāvubhau*, he interprets the word *atha* differently. Ānandatīrtha interprets the word in the sense of *adhikāra anantaram*, *i.e.*, after the student has obtained the necessary qualification of being in a position to assimilate the knowledge relating to Brahman. Srīpati says that because the word *Jignyāsa* is in the *Sūtra*, the word *atha* need not mean *adhikāra*, because *Jignyāsa* means *Vichāra lakshaṇatvāt*, that is, *knowing after understanding*. That is, Srīpati suggests that entering into understanding, for knowing is itself *adhikāra* and so there is no need for further *adhikāra*. From the word *Jignyāsa*, we have to infer that the inquirer has the desire placed in him (*adhikrita*) to know the *Brahman.* Therefore *atha* need not necessarily mean *adhikāra*. *Jignyāsa* has included in it *Vichāra adhikāra*. The desire to know the Brahman is sufficient *adhikāra* and that is implied in the word *jignyāsa*. Then to what does *Atha* refer? It refers to the prerequisite in one who wants to know the Brahman. One who has not the determination (*dīksha*) to know Brahman, after freeing himself from the three kinds of worldly sins (*malatraya*) arising from *manas*, *vāk* and *kāya*, cannot know the Brahman. That is, freeing oneself from the sins arising from these three worldly sources is the prerequisite for knowing the Brahman. That is, one should purge himself of these three kinds of sins before he can desire to know the Brahman. "Atha" ("Then") therefore means "when" one has qualified by purging himself from the three kinds of sins called *malatraya*. Srīpati's interpretation is summed up by him in this dictum: *Deva-dhāraṇa*. The term "Athāthah" implies that when the remaining conditions (*sēshalakshaṇa*) are fulfilled, "then" *jignyāsa* commences. What are the *sēshalakshaṇa*? They are the destruction of the *malatraya*—the sins caused in association with *kāya*, *mānasa* and *vācha* and when one has destroyed these three sins, he reaches the fourth stage—*gnāna*—for *jignyāsa*. *Dharma*, *Brahma* and *Sāstra* in the Vēdic texts imply *karthru*, *karma* and *phala*, *i.e.*, Cause, Action and Effect. Even though he has carried out his various duties in his former birth, yet to attain the Brahman, he ought to carry out the rules set down in the *vidhis* (*i.e. Vēdas*) in connection with *bhōjana* (food) and *gamana* (conduct). He who aspires to *Mōksha* should have carried out the above rules of conduct for *malatraya vidhvamsa*, so that he might be qualified for *Brahma-jignyāsa*. This is what has been fixed in the *vidhis* (*Vēdas*) as the requisite qualification for *Brahma-jignyāsa*. For it is said in the *Taittirīya Upanishad* about the desire of the disciple who wishes to receive wisdom about the Brahman:—*Yadētatchchandasām rishabhō viśvarūpaḥ* । *chchandōbhyō'dhyamrutāt sambabhūva. Samēndrō mēdhayā spruṇōtu. Amrutasya dēvadhāraṇō bhūyāsam śarīram mē vicharshaṇam, jihvā mē madhumattamā karṇābhyām bhūri viśruvam. Brahmaṇaḥ kōśōsi mēdhayāpihitaḥ śrutam mē gōpāya iti.* May the Lord Śiva who is the *Rishabha*, *i.e.*, the greatest of all prosodies, the Lord of all Vēdic lore, who pervades the world in the form of the vṛśa (*viśvarūpa*), grant me that *mōksha* which is obtained by the enlightenment afforded